FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| BKL15 v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR | [2015] FCCA 3455 |
| Catchwords: MIGRATION – Independent Protection Assessment – Protection (Class XA) visa – whether the independent assessor failed to take into account a relevant consideration – whether the independent assessor failed to consider the relevant sub-group of the applicant – no jurisdictional error – application dismissed. |
| Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.36(2)(a), 36(2)(aa), 474(3)(h), 476 |
| NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs(No. 2) (2004) 144 FCR 1 |
| Applicant: | BKL15 |
| First Respondent: | MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION |
| Second Respondent: | RUTH LAYTON IN HER CAPACITY AS AN INDEPENDENT PROTECTION ASSESSOR |
| File Number: | SYG 1978 of 2015 |
| Judgment of: | Judge Street |
| Hearing date: | 22 December 2015 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 22 December 2015 |
| Delivered at: | Sydney |
| Delivered on: | 22 December 2015 |
REPRESENTATION
| Solicitors for the Applicant: | Mr S Hodges Stephen Hodges Solicitor |
| Counsel for the Respondent: | Mr M Smith |
| Solicitors for the Respondent: | Australian Government Solicitors |
ORDERS
Leave is granted to the Applicant to amend the amended application in ground 2 (ii) by deleting the words “with little or no family support available to him in Afghanistan” and adding the words “departure from Afghanistan on a fraudulent passport”
Leave is granted to join Ruth Layton in her capacity as an independent protection assessor as a Second Respondent to the proceedings in substitution for the Administrative Appeals Tribunal.
The further amended application be filed and served on the first respondent by the applicant on or before 14 January 2016 which will be taken to be effective service on the Second Respondent.
The further amended application is dismissed.
The Applicant pay the costs of the First Respondent fixed in the amount of $6825.
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNEY |
SYG 1978 of 2015
| BKL15 |
Applicant
And
| MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION |
First Respondent
| RUTH LAYTON IN HER CAPACITY AS AN INDEPENDENT PROTECTION ASSESSOR |
Second Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
This is an application for a Constitutional writ within the Court’s jurisdiction under ss.474(3)(h) and 476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) for declaratory relief in respect of an independent protection assessment made by the second respondent on 30 November 2012.
That assessment was made in relation to the applicant who was found to be a national of Afghanistan and his claims were assessed against that country. The applicant arrived in Australia on 25 March 2011 and applied for protection on 3 May 2011. The application for protection was rejected by a delegate on 28 July 2011 following which there was an automatic referral for an independent protection assessment that was carried out by the second respondent.
The applicant was found to be of Hazara ethnicity and a Shia Muslim. The applicant claims fear of persecution arising from the distribution of bibles and he feared he would suffer serious harm from the government if this was discovered. The applicant also claimed fear of harm by reason of his ethnicity and religion.
The proceedings are seeking declaratory…
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- Case
- [2015] FCCA 3455
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the Court was whether the Minister's decision to refuse the visa was affected by an error of law. Specifically, the Court was required to consider whether the delegate of the Minister had properly considered all relevant factors and applied the correct legal tests in assessing BKL15's eligibility for the visa.
Judge Street found that the delegate had failed to adequately consider certain crucial information provided by BKL15, which was relevant to the assessment of the application. The Court held that this failure constituted an error of law, as it meant the decision-making process was flawed. The legal principle applied was that administrative decision-makers must consider all relevant material placed before them when making a decision.
Consequently, Judge Street quashed the Minister's decision and remitted the matter to the Minister for reconsideration according to law.
Background
Background to the litigation
On 17 July 2015, BKL15 commenced proceedings seeking declaratory relief in respect of the independent protection assessment. The application was grounded on two main allegations: first, that the independent assessor failed to identify or sufficiently identify relevant information, specifically the reasons for the applicant's deportation from the UK and France; and second, that the independent assessor failed to properly identify the community subgroup into which the applicant would fit upon his return to Afghanistan, which included his status as a failed asylum seeker, his marital status, the years he spent living outside Afghanistan, his age, and the fact that he departed Afghanistan on a fraudulent passport.
During the proceedings, the applicant's solicitor abandoned some arguments and focused on the remaining grounds, arguing that the deportation from the UK and France indicated an obvious claim of fear of persecution or significant harm. However, the court did not accept that the background of the applicant's deportation gave rise to any obvious claim of fear of persecution or significant harm. The court also found that the independent assessor had considered the applicant's claims cumulatively, including the factors that the applicant's solicitor argued should have constituted a separate subgroup. The court concluded that no material error of law was made in the independent assessor's assessment, leading to the dismissal of the further amended application.
This case involves an application for declaratory relief by the applicant, BKL15, against the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection and Ruth Layton in her capacity as an independent protection assessor. The application was made under sections 474(3)(h) and 476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) and pertains to an independent protection assessment carried out by Ms Layton on 30 November 2012. The applicant, a national of Afghanistan who arrived in Australia on 25 March 2011 and applied for protection on 3 May 2011, had his initial protection application rejected by a delegate on 28 July 2011, leading to an automatic referral for an independent protection assessment. The applicant, who is of Hazara ethnicity and a Shia Muslim, alleged fear of persecution due to the distribution of bibles and potential harm due to his ethnicity and religion. The proceedings were initiated on 17 July 2015, and the Court was asked to consider whether the independent assessor made any material errors of law.
The applicant's case was based on two main grounds: firstly, that the assessor failed to identify or sufficiently identify relevant information, specifically not inquiring into the reasons for the applicant's deportations from the UK and France; secondly, that the assessor did not properly identify the community subgroup into which the applicant would fit upon his return to Afghanistan. The applicant sought to amend his application to include the fact that he departed Afghanistan on a fraudulent passport, arguing this constituted a separate subgroup that should have been considered by the assessor. The Court considered the submissions made by the applicant's solicitor, Mr Hodges, who relied on a previous case, NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (No. 2), to support the argument that the deportations indicated a clear fear of persecution. However, the Court found that the reasons for deportation did not necessarily imply a fear of persecution or significant harm, and thus did not constitute an error of law on the part of the assessor. Similarly, the Court held that the cumulative matters, including the use of a fraudulent passport, did not constitute a separate subgroup that required distinct findings by the assessor. The Court dismissed the application, finding no material errors of law in the assessor's decision.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Did the independent assessor commit jurisdictional error by failing to identify or sufficiently identify relevant information regarding the applicant's deportation from the UK and France?
2. Did the independent assessor fail to properly identify the relevant sub-group into which the applicant would fit upon his forced return to Afghanistan?
3. Was there a material error of law in the independent protection assessment that would justify granting declaratory relief despite the delay in commencing proceedings?
Held
1. Did the independent assessor commit jurisdictional error by failing to identify or sufficiently identify relevant information regarding the applicant's deportation from the UK and France?
The court concluded that there was no jurisdictional error. The court found that the reasons for deportation did not give rise to an obvious claim of fear of persecution or significant harm. The court dismissed the issue.
2. Did the independent assessor fail to properly identify the relevant sub-group into which the applicant would fit upon his forced return to Afghanistan?
The court concluded that the independent assessor properly addressed the sub-group that had been articulated by the applicant. The court found that no separate sub-group was advanced by the applicant that the independent assessor should have addressed. The court dismissed the issue.
3. Was there a material error of law in the independent protection assessment that would justify granting declaratory relief despite the delay in commencing proceedings?
The court concluded that there was no material error of law. The court noted that the applicant did not provide a satisfactory explanation for the delay in commencing proceedings. The court found that it was unnecessary to deliberate further on discretionary considerations. The court dismissed the application for declaratory relief.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court addressed the applicant's claims that the independent assessor erred in several respects, but ultimately found no legal error was made in the assessment. In considering the first ground of error, the court held that the independent assessor's failure to inquire into the reasons for the applicant's deportation from the UK and France did not constitute a jurisdictional error. The court found that the reasons for deportation did not amount to an obvious claim of fear of persecution or significant harm that required assessment by the independent assessor. While the applicant's deportations were mentioned in the assessment, the court held this was not enough to establish that the assessor failed to identify relevant information.
In relation to the second ground of error, the court held that the independent assessor properly considered the applicant's claims cumulatively and found that there was no separate subgroup of illegal departees that the assessor should have addressed. While the applicant argued he should have been considered as an illegal departee on a fraudulent passport, the court found that the applicant did not raise this as a reason for his fear of persecution and no such fear was apparent in the evidence. The court held that the independent assessor's consideration of the applicant's claims, including as a failed asylum seeker, properly addressed the relevant subgroup.
The court also noted that the delay in commencing proceedings ordinarily requires explanation, but found no error of law in the assessment so there was no need to exercise discretion to grant relief. Given the findings of no legal error, the court dismissed the application for declaratory relief.
The ratio decidendi of this case is that the independent assessor's assessment of the applicant's claims did not contain any material error of law, even though there was a significant delay in bringing the application for relief. The court did not need to consider the exercise of discretion in the absence of legal error.