BKH18 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

(DIVISION 2)

BKH18 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FedCFamC2G 684

File number(s): MLG 744 of 2018
Judgment of: JUDGE J YOUNG
Date of judgment: 1 August 2024
Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for judicial review – Protection (subclass 866) visa – where Administrative Appeals Tribunal affirmed decision of the first respondent – where applicants assert they were not given the opportunity to fully present their case before the Tribunal – found no jurisdictional error on behalf of the Tribunal.
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 5J(1)(a), 474, 476
Cases cited:

Craig v South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163

Jayasinghe v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1997) 76 FCR 301

Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth of Australia (2003) 211 CLR 476

Division: Division 2 General Federal Law
Number of paragraphs: 58
Date of hearing: 1 May and 11 June 2024
Place: Melbourne
Counsel for the Applicants: Self-represented litigants
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr Hibbard appearing on 11 June 2024
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Mr O’Shannessy of Mills Oakley Lawyers appearing on 1 May 2024
Second Respondent: Submitting appearance save as to costs

ORDERS

MLG 744 of 2018

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)

BETWEEN:

BKH18

First Applicant

BKJ18

Second Applicant

BLC18

Third Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

JUDGE J YOUNG

DATE OF ORDER:

1 AUGUST 2024

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The Application filed 23 August 2018 be dismissed.

2.The Applicants pay the costs of the first respondent fixed in the sum of $8,371.30.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.

Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

JUDGE J YOUNG:

INTRODUCTION

  1. Before the Court is an Application filed on 23 August 2018, in which the applicants seek judicial review of a decision of the second respondent (Tribunal) dated 27 February 2018. By that decision, the Tribunal affirmed a decision of a delegate of the first respondent (Minister) to refuse to grant the applicants a Protection (subclass 866) visa (Visa).

    CONTEXT

  2. The applicants are citizens of Malaysia.

  3. On 5 September 2015, the applicants entered into Australia on a Visitor UD-601 visa. The second applicant is the wife of the first applicant, and the third applicant is the child of the first and second applicants.

  4. On 15 September 2015, the applicants applied for the Visa. The first applicant (Applicant) advanced claims for protection in the Visa application, whilst the second and third applicants were included in the Visa application as members of the Applicant’s family unit. The…

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Details
Case
[2024] FedCFamC2G 684
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of BKH18 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs involves an application for judicial review concerning a Protection (subclass 866) visa. The applicants, who were denied the visa by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT), sought to challenge the Tribunal's decision. They argued that they were not given the opportunity to fully present their case and that the Tribunal failed to properly consider their claims. The primary focus of the dispute was the credibility and reliability of the applicants' evidence regarding their claims for protection based on alleged harassment and threats related to a credit card debt.

The central legal issue was whether the Tribunal had made a jurisdictional error by failing to provide the applicants with an opportunity to fully present their case or by not properly considering their claims. The applicants asserted that the Tribunal member's conduct during the hearing intimidated them, particularly when questioning the authenticity of a police report, which led to them not producing certain photographs. The applicants argued that this conduct prevented them from adequately presenting their case.

The Court examined the audio recording of the Tribunal hearing to determine whether the applicants were given a fair opportunity to present their case. It found that the Tribunal had questioned the applicants' evidence thoroughly, including concerns about the authenticity of the police report. However, the Tribunal did not tell the applicants that they were lying or that they had bought the police report, as claimed. The Court concluded that the Tribunal's questioning was necessary for procedural fairness and did not amount to a jurisdictional error. Furthermore, the Court noted that the second applicant's claim regarding a historical sexual assault was raised for the first time during the Tribunal hearing, indicating that the applicants had an opportunity to present their case.

In conclusion, the Court found no jurisdictional error in the Tribunal's decision. It affirmed the Tribunal's assessment of the applicants' claims, noting inconsistencies and implausibilities in their evidence. The Court held that the Tribunal had properly considered the applicants' case and had not failed to provide them with an opportunity to present their claims. As a result, the application for judicial review was dismissed.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

JUDGE J
On 27 February 2018, the Tribunal affirmed the Delegate Decision not to grant the applicants the Visa. On 2 March 2018, the Tribunal sent a copy of its decision and reasons to the Applicant’s email address.Tribunal decision The Tribunal issued its statement of decision and reasons on 2 February 2018 (Tribunal Decision). At paragraphs [46]–[48] of the Tribunal Decision, the Tribunal discussed the oral evidence of the Applicant and the second applicant. The Applicant claimed that a licensed financial institution was demanding money from the applicants, arising from a credit card debt in 1991, and that his wife and child had been harassed and threatened by six Indian men coming and knocking at their residence. The Applicant claimed he had avoided the bank when he moved from [Malaysian state] to Kaula Lumpur in 2009 and further claimed he had made the Police Report and relocated to [Malaysian state] before departing Australia. The second applicant claimed that the Indian men visited their residence a few times, twice when she was at home, and that there were threats against the Applicant and their property but not herself. The second applicant did not see the men but only heard their voices. She claimed she and their child remained in Kuala Lumpur when the Applicant relocated to [Malaysian state]. At paragraphs [49]–[50] of the Tribunal Decision, the Tribunal discussed elements of the applicants’ claims and inconsistencies in the applicants’ evidence, and how those elements undermined the applicants’ claims for protection based on the Applicant’s indebtedness. This included:(a)the Applicant originally claiming he relocated to Kaula Lumpur to seek better opportunities then changing his testimony, saying that it was to avoid the bank’s harassing calls; (b)the Applicant’s claim he acquired the debt in 1991 but did not relocate to Kaula Lumpur until 2009, and made no claims that the bank sent threatening debt recovery agents to him in [Malaysian State]; (c)it would be “very unlikely” that a bank would employ debt recovery agents who would make threats as claimed given the available powers of banks to initiate lawful debt recovery or bankruptcy proceedings; and(d)given the historic nature of the claimed debt, it would have been reasonable for the bank to have undertaken bankruptcy proceedings long before the applicants’ departed. The Tribunal stated that when considered cumulatively, the concerns held by the Tribunal invited it to consider that “there are too many implausible, inconsistent and mutually unsupportive elements to [the Applicant’s] claims about indebtedness to a licensed bank to be credible or reliable.” At paragraphs [51]–[56] of the Tribunal Decision, the Tribunal made adverse credibility findings about the specific claims made by the applicants in relation to the claims for protection based on the Applicant’s indebtedness. In summary, the Tribunal did not accept that:(a)the Applicant has any debt, substantial or otherwise, with a licensed financial institution; (b)the Applicant was ever targeted by debt recovery agents, thugs, or criminals (of Indian or any other ethnicity) on behalf of any lender, nor was it the triggering event leading to the applicants’ departure to Australia; (c)the applicants were seriously or significantly harmed or harassed; and(d)the Applicant briefly relocated to [Malaysian state] before departing with the other applicants.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: JUDGE J

The task on judicial review is not to undertake a general review of the decision or to substitute it with a decision which the Court may consider ought to have been made. The jurisdiction, being supervisory, allows for a decision to be quashed on established grounds, the most important of which is jurisdictional error, and, where appropriate, to order that the matter be remitted and reconsidered according to law: Craig v South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163 at [175]. CONSIDERATIONFurther Material It is convenient to first address the Further Material. In relation to items 1, 3, 4 and 5 of the Further Material none of this material was before the Tribunal. Accordingly, this Court has not had regard to that material. Item 2 was before the Tribunal and considered by it. Item 6 was accepted into evidence, notwithstanding that a transcription of the audio file was not filed in the Court. This course was, correctly in my view, not opposed by the Minister. The audio recording is clearly the best evidence of what occurred at the hearing before the Tribunal. Subsequently, the Minister filed a transcription of the audio recording. However, at the hearing on 11 June 2024 the Minister informed the Court that the transcription contained errors. Given that, and the prior admission into evidence of the audio recording, it was determined to proceed on the basis of the audio recording only.Ground 1 By Ground 1 the applicants assert that they were not given the opportunity to fully present their case, and that the Tribunal failed to properly consider their case. At hearing, the Applicant submitted that the applicants were denied the opportunity to fully present their case, as a result of the conduct of the Tribunal member. Specifically, the Applicant contended that the Tribunal member repeatedly told the Applicant that he was lying about the Police Report and the Police Report had been bought. As a consequence, the applicant submitted that he was intimidated and did not produce the photographs contained in Item 1 of the Further Material (Photographs). For the following reasons, those submissions are rejected. The Tribunal hearing went for a period of approximately 150 minutes, with the second applicants’ evidence taking approximately 47 minutes. Questioning of the Applicant in relation to the creation of the Police Report commenced at around minute 71 and continued for approximately 5 minutes. During the course of the hearing, the Tribunal put to the Applicant that the Police Report contained a URL at the bottom of the page which indicates that it was downloaded from the internet and that on that basis the Tribunal had a “reasonable suspicion” that the Police Report was not genuine. The Tribunal twice asked the Applicant if he had paid someone to create the Police Report. Although it is clear that the Tribunal had considerable concerns about the veracity of the Police Report and the conduct said to have occurred therein, at no stage did the Tribunal tell the Applicant that he was lying or that he had bought the Police Report. There is no error in the Tribunal testing the Applicant’s evidence or putting to him concerns arising from it. Indeed, procedural fairness requires it. Additionally, I note that at paragraph [53] of the Tribunal Decision the Tribunal found that the Police Report was not fraudulent (although the Tribunal did not accept the truthfulness of the matters contained in the report). It is also to be noted that the second applicant’s claim with respect to her historical sexual assault arose only at the Tribunal hearing. Having considered the audio recording of the hearing as a whole, including those parts of the hearing in relation to the Police Report, I am satisfied that the applicants’ had an opportunity to fully present their case and were accorded procedural fairness.