FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BJW17 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 813
Appeal from: BJW17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCCA 3572 File number(s): NSD 11 of 2019 Judge(s): FARRELL J Date of judgment: 3 June 2019 Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from the Federal Circuit Court of Australia – where the primary judge dismissed an application for judicial review of a decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority to affirm a decision of a delegate of the Minister to refuse the appellant a Safe Haven Enterprise (Class XE, subclass 790) visa – where appellant’s two grounds of appeal did not meaningfully engage with reasons of primary judge but essentially repeated original grounds verbatim – whether any appellable error demonstrated in primary judge finding that the Authority did not misconstrue the “real chance” test or overlook an integer of the appellant’s claim – appeal dismissed Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 5H, 5J, 473EA Cases cited: BJW17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCCA 3572
CNN15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 579
DCD17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 1262
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Guo [1997] HCA 22; 191 CLR 559
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang [1996] HCA 6; 185 CLR 259
SZJHE v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FCA 1771
Date of hearing: 24 May 2019 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 62 Counsel for the Appellant: The Appellant appeared in person with the assistance of an interpreter Solicitor for the First Respondent: Mr A Moss of Clayton Utz Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent submitted to any order of the Court, save as to costs ORDERS
NSD 11 of 2019 BETWEEN: BJW17
Appellant
AND: MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS
First Respondent
IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
FARRELL J
DATE OF ORDER:
3 JUNE 2019
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal is dismissed.
2.The appellant must pay the first respondent’s costs as agreed or taxed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
FARRELL J:
INTRODUCTION
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia delivered on 21 December 2018: BJW17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCCA 3572. The primary judge dismissed the appellant’s application for judicial review of a decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority (or IAA) to affirm a decision of a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection not to grant the appellant a Safe Haven Enterprise (Class XE, subclass 790) visa (SHEV).
The appellant is a citizen of Sri Lanka from the Northern Province and of Tamil ethnicity. He arrived at the Cocos (Keeling) Islands in October 2012 as an unauthorised maritime arrival.
BACKGROUND
The appellant lodged his…
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- Case
- [2019] FCA 813
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The appellant's appeal raised two issues: whether the Authority misconstrued the "real chance" test and whether the Authority overlooked an integer of the appellant's claim. The appellant's grounds of appeal did not meaningfully engage with the reasons given by the primary judge but essentially repeated the original grounds verbatim. The court found that the primary judge did not accept the Minister's submission that, properly read, the Authority's findings did not depend upon the Sri Lankan authorities' supposed lack of knowledge of the appellant's previous activities or his connection with his cousin. The court also found that the Authority's process of reasoning was sound and that the appellant's claims did not establish a real chance of future persecution.
The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the first respondent's costs as agreed or taxed. The court held that the appellant's grounds of appeal did not demonstrate any error on the part of the primary judge and that the Authority's decision was based on a sound process of reasoning. The court also held that the appellant's claims did not establish a real chance of future persecution, and therefore, the appeal was dismissed.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal is dismissed.
2. The appellant must pay the first respondent’s costs as agreed or taxed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In reply, the appellant reiterated factual claims concerning the abduction of his father and a robbery at his home which he said resulted in him taking his family to live at a town 60 kilometres away. He also repeated the claim that his cousin remains in detention but if the appellant returns to Sri Lanka, his cousin will be released and he will be put in jail instead. CONSIDERATION The appellant’s grounds do not meaningfully engage with the reasons given by the primary judge. In this respect, as said by Derrington J in DCD17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 1262 at [21], it is important to recognise that an appeal to this Court concerns the correction of error by a court below. An appeal court is not a forum in which a party may reargue the case agitated for below in the hope of convincing a judge to take a different view of the evidence. Moreover, absent demonstrated error, it is not a forum to engage in a factual re-hearing of the matter before the administrative decision-maker: SZJHE v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FCA 1771 per Flick J at [6]-[8] and CNN15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 579 per Gilmour J at [13]-[14]. Having said that, the appellant appeared in person and participated in the hearing of the appeal with the assistance of an interpreter. His oral submissions addressed some factual matters arising from the primary judge’s reasons for judgment. On the basis of fulfilment of the Minister’s obligations as a model litigant, his representative made submissions in support of the correctness of the primary judge’s decision, reiterating submissions made to the primary judge. It is therefore appropriate to address those submissions briefly. It is plain that the primary judge did not accept the Minister’s submission that, properly read, the Authority’s findings did not depend upon the Sri Lankan authorities’ supposed lack of knowledge of the appellant’s previous activities or his connection with his cousin. At J[77], the primary judge found that “… the familial relationship with the appellant’s cousin was not known to the Sri Lankan authorities and nothing had been put to the Authority to indicate that the link would become known …” (see [43] above). It is also clear from this passage of J[77] and J[78] that the primary judge did not accept the reading of DR[20] for which the appellant’s counsel contended, which is recorded at J[41] (see [30] above) or the other arguments summarised at [31] and [32] above. In my view, the primary judge was correct in both cases. The Authority’s process of reasoning was:(1)It recognised and accepted the appellant’s claim that his cousin was involved with the LTTE as a truck driver for approximately eight years, that he accompanied his cousin several times delivering meals and other goods to the LTTE and that he was a branch manager at the local cooperative where he sold rice and other basic foods to the LTTE and he occasionally transported them on his motorcycle (see DR[5] and [10]);(2)With some hesitation, the Authority was prepared to accept that the appellant’s cousin had been in detention for eight years up to 2016 because he drove a truck for the LTTE (see DR[11]);(3)In assessing the chance of the appellant facing harm in the future because of his and his cousin’s links with and support provided to the LTTE, the Authority noted that the appellant had stated that the Sri Lankan government was not aware of his involvement with and the support he provided for the LTTE or that he had a cousin involved with the LTTE (see DR[11]);(4)The Authority noted (at DR[12]) that the appellant did not claim that he had ever been questioned or interrogated about his cousin or his links with the LTTE. The Authority again noted that the appellant stated that the Sri Lankan government did not know about his cousin, that it was not aware of the support he provided to the LTTE and that the appellant had not been detained under the Emergency Regulations or the Prevention of Terrorism Act 1978 (Sri Lanka). All of those factors support the contention that the Sri Lankan authorities are not aware of the appellant’s link to his cousin;(5)The Authority again noted that the appellant did not claim to have been questioned or harmed or accused in the past because of links with the LTTE. Nor did he claim that his wife or his parents had been questioned or harmed or accused in the past on suspicion of links with the LTTE and they continue to live in the appellant’s home area. In relation to the claimed incident concerning his father, the Authority noted that the appellant did not claim that this occurred because of any association on his part or that of his family, real or perceived, with the LTTE (see DR[15]); and(6)With a starting point that the 2012 UNHCR Eligibility Guidelines stated that “originating from an area that was previously controlled by the LTTE does not in itself result in a need for international refugee protection” and having noted that the priority of the current (Sirisena) government was to prevent resurgence of the LTTE and any moves towards Tamil separatism, the Authority considered the country information from the UNHCR and the UK Home Office which indicated those categories of people who were “at risk”. Those “at risk” included (4) Former LTTE supporters who may never have undergone military training, but were involved in sheltering or transporting LTTE personnel or the supply and transport of goods for the LTTE; … (6) Persons with family links or who are … otherwise closely related to persons with the above profiles. (see DR[16]-[19]).