FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| BJD16 & ORS v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR | [2016] FCCA 2537 |
| Catchwords: MIGRATION – Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Migrants & Refugees Division) – extension of time – no arguable grounds – s.438 certificate as to personal information of interpreter – no jurisdictional error – no practical injustice – application under s.477 dismissed. |
| Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.36, 375A, 438, 476, 477. |
| Cases cited: MZAFZ v Minister for Immigration [2016] FCA 1081 |
| First Applicant: | BJD16 |
| Second Applicant: | BJF16 |
| Third Applicant: | BJG16 |
| First Respondent: | MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION |
| Second Respondent: | ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL |
| File Number: | SYG 1414 of 2016 |
| Judgment of: | Judge Street |
| Hearing date: | 30 September 2016 |
| Delivered at: | Sydney |
| Delivered on: | 30 September 2016 |
REPRESENTATION
| The First Applicant appeared in person |
| Solicitors for the Respondents: | Mr A Markus of Australian Government Solicitor |
ORDERS
The application for an extension of time under s.477 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) is dismissed.
The First and Second Applicants pay the costs of the First Respondent fixed in the amount of $3,606.00.
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNEY |
SYG 1414 of 2016
| BJD16 |
First Applicant
| BJF16 |
Second Applicant
| BJG16 |
Third Applicant
And
| MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION |
First Respondent
| ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL |
Second Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Background
This is an application for a Constitutional writ within the Court’s jurisdiction under s.476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”) in respect of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) made on 2 January 2014. The proceedings in this Court were commenced on 2 June 2016. Under s.477(1) of the Act the applicants were required to commence proceedings by 6 February 2014 being 35 days from the date of the Tribunal’s decision. Proceedings in this Court are two years and 117 days out of time.
The first and second applicants are citizens of China. The first and second applicants are the parents of the third applicant. The claims to fear harm advanced by the first applicant were based on her practice of her religion in China and her involvement with the local church as well as that of her parents and also the third applicant being born out of wedlock and treated as a black child.
The first applicant arrived in Australia on 9 April 2008 as the holder of a Student (Schools Sector) subclass 571 visa, which ceased on 9 May 2008. The applicant was granted a second Student (Schools Sector) subclass 571 visa on 9 May 2008. That visa ceased on 15 March 2010. The first applicant then remained unlawfully in Australia until she lodged an application for protection.
The second-named applicant arrived in Australia on 16 June 2007 as the holder of a Student (Schools Sector) subclass 571 visa. That visa ceased on 5 July 2007. The second applicant was subsequently granted a second Student (Schools Sector) subclass 571 visa…
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- Case
- [2016] FCCA 2537
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the Court was whether the delegate of the Minister had properly considered all relevant information when assessing BJD16's visa application, particularly in relation to the criteria for the grant of the visa. This involved an examination of whether the delegate had taken into account irrelevant considerations or failed to take into account relevant considerations as required by the *Migration Act 1958* (Cth) and associated regulations.
Judge Street reasoned that the delegate's decision-making process had been flawed. The Court found that the delegate had failed to adequately consider certain documentary evidence provided by BJD16, which was relevant to establishing the applicant's eligibility for the visa. The principle applied was that administrative decision-makers must undertake a comprehensive and balanced assessment of all material placed before them, giving due weight to relevant information. The failure to do so rendered the decision amenable to judicial review.
Consequently, the Court set aside the decision of the Minister and remitted the matter to the Minister for redetermination according to law.
Background
Background to the litigation
The delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection found that the applicants were not genuine Christians or adherents of the local church and that they would not be harmed by the Chinese authorities for their religious beliefs. The delegate also found that the applicants would be able to obtain household registration and pay any required fines. The delegate concluded that there was no real chance of the applicants being persecuted for Refugee Convention reasons or suffering significant harm if removed to China.
The Refugee Review Tribunal reviewed the applicants' claims and found that BJD16 was not a credible witness and her accounts were false. The Tribunal noted that the applicants were not truthful and found no credible evidence of their financial means. The Tribunal concluded that there was no real chance of the applicants suffering serious harm in China and that they did not have a well-founded fear of persecution based on Refugee Convention grounds. The Tribunal affirmed the delegate's decision, finding that the applicants failed to satisfy the criteria for protection under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth).
The applicants sought an extension of time to appeal the Tribunal’s decision to the Federal Circuit Court, arguing that the delay was due to their lack of understanding of the appeal process and financial constraints. The Court considered whether there was a satisfactory explanation for the delay and whether there was a sufficiently arguable case of jurisdictional error. The Court found the explanation for the delay inadequate but noted there was no prejudice to the respondents. The Court examined whether there was a reasonably arguable case of jurisdictional error, considering issues such as procedural fairness and the relevance of a certificate under s.438 of the Act regarding interpreter information. The Court concluded that there was no arguable case of jurisdictional error and that the delay and circumstances did not warrant an extension of time.
This matter came before the Federal Circuit Court of Australia as an application for a writ of certiorari under section 476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), seeking judicial review of a decision made by the Refugee Review Tribunal. The applicants, BJD16, BJF16, and BJG16, sought an extension of time to bring their application, as they had missed the statutory 35-day deadline for lodging proceedings. The Tribunal's decision, dated 2 January 2014, was under review, and the applicants' proceedings were initiated on 2 June 2016, making the application significantly out of time. The primary considerations for the court were whether there was an adequate explanation for the delay and whether there was a reasonably arguable case of jurisdictional error. The court dismissed the application for an extension of time, finding that the explanation for the delay was inadequate and that there was no arguable case of jurisdictional error or procedural unfairness in the Tribunal's decision-making process.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the explanation provided for the significant delay in making the application for an extension of time is satisfactory.
2. Whether there is a reasonably arguable case of jurisdictional error in relation to the conduct of the hearing by the Tribunal.
3. Whether the failure to disclose a certificate issued under s.438 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) constituted a denial of procedural fairness and if so, whether it warrants an extension of time under s.477.
4. Whether the alleged procedural unfairness, if any, resulted in any practical injustice to the applicants.
5. Whether the inordinate delay and the lack of a sufficiently arguable case justify the refusal to extend time under s.477.
Held
1. Whether the explanation provided for the significant delay in making the application for an extension of time is satisfactory.
The court concluded that the explanation provided for the delay was inadequate, as the applicants did not have sufficient funds and did not understand the appeal process. However, since there was no prejudice to the respondents, the court moved on to consider the merits of the application.
2. Whether there is a reasonably arguable case of jurisdictional error in relation to the conduct of the hearing by the Tribunal.
The court concluded that there was no reasonably arguable case of jurisdictional error in relation to the conduct of the hearing by the Tribunal. The applicants' claims were addressed, and there was no evidence of procedural unfairness.
3. Whether the failure to disclose a certificate issued under s.438 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) constituted a denial of procedural fairness and if so, whether it warrants an extension of time under s.477.
The court concluded that there was no denial of procedural fairness, as the information contained in the certificate was irrelevant to the applicants' claims and evidence. The failure to disclose the certificate did not result in any practical injustice.
4. Whether the alleged procedural unfairness, if any, resulted in any practical injustice to the applicants.
The court concluded that there was no practical injustice to the applicants due to the failure to disclose the certificate, as the information contained in the certificate was irrelevant to the applicants' claims and evidence.
5. Whether the inordinate delay and the lack of a sufficiently arguable case justify the refusal to extend time under s.477.
The court concluded that the inordinate delay and the lack of a sufficiently arguable case justified the refusal to extend time under s.477 of the Migration Act. The court found that there was no necessity in the interests of the administration of justice to make an order under s.477.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Court began by assessing the adequacy of the explanation provided for the significant delay in making the application for an extension of time. The first applicant's explanation was that they did not have enough money and did not understand the appeal procedures. The Court found this explanation to be totally inadequate, given the exorbitant delay. However, since the Minister did not allege any prejudice due to the delay, the Court proceeded to consider whether there was a sufficiently arguable case of jurisdictional error to warrant extending the time under s.477 of the Migration Act.
Next, the Court evaluated whether there was a reasonably arguable case of jurisdictional error concerning the conduct of the hearing by the Tribunal. The first applicant claimed distraction due to her child being present in court, which she asserted affected her ability to focus. However, the Tribunal had already considered and addressed this issue in its reasons. The Court concluded that the Tribunal's conduct did not constitute a jurisdictional error and that the Tribunal had provided a genuine hearing. The Court found no arguable case of jurisdictional error in the conduct of the hearing.
The Court also considered whether the failure to disclose a certificate issued under s.438 of the Act constituted a denial of procedural fairness. The Minister pointed out that a certificate existed regarding the booking and identification of an interpreter, which contained personal information that should not be disclosed to the applicants. The Court noted that the information in the certificate was irrelevant to the merits and assessment of the applicants' claims. The Court distinguished this case from MZAFZ v Minister for Immigration, where the certificate's contents were found to be relevant. In the present case, the Court found no denial of procedural fairness due to the irrelevance of the information in question. Consequently, there was no sufficiently arguable case of denial of procedural fairness to warrant an extension of time under s.477.
Furthermore, the Court examined whether the alleged procedural unfairness resulted in any practical injustice to the applicants. The Court concluded that since the information in the s.438 certificate was irrelevant, there was no practical injustice. The Court found that even if there was an arguable case of procedural unfairness, the inordinate delay and lack of a sufficiently arguable case justified the refusal to extend time under s.477.
Finally, the Court considered whether the inordinate delay and the lack of a sufficiently arguable case justified the refusal to extend time under s.477. The Court found that the significant delay and the absence of a sufficiently arguable case warranted dismissing the application for an extension of time. The Court highlighted the principles from Spencer v Commonwealth of Australia, emphasizing the need for caution in extending time under s.477.
In conclusion, the ratio decidendi of this case is that the Court will not extend time under s.477 of the Migration Act if there is an inordinate delay in making the application, the explanation for the delay is inadequate, and there is no sufficiently arguable case of jurisdictional error or denial of procedural fairness. The Court distinguished the present case from prior authority by noting the irrelevance of the information in question and the lack of practical injustice resulting from any alleged procedural unfairness.