839 J 9y-
JUDGMENT NO. .....r....w.n. rrm m e n
C A T C H W O R D S
DISQUALIFICATION - b~as.
Students Assistance Act 1973
Re F~nance Section Union of Austral~a ex Darte Elation P9 Ltd (1992) 66 ALJR 583. GeofErev
v Derek Volker. The Honourable Slmon Crean and the Honourable Ross Free
QG132 of 1994
Kiefel J: -e: 20 October. 1994
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA ) No. OG132 of 1994 QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY 1 GENERAL DIVISION 1 BETWEEN: GEOFFREY JAMES BIRD
Avulicant
A?LW: DEREK VOLKER
First Resoondent
AND: THE HONOURABLE SIMON CREAN
Second Resoondent
m: THE HONOURABLE ROSS FREE
soondent
MINUTES OF ORDERS
Kiefel J
: -
20 October, 1994
. -
WHERE: Brisbane
J'HE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1. The application be d~sm~ssed. m: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt wth m Order 36 of the Federal
Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA 1 No. OG132 of 1994
9 1 GENERAL DIVISION 1
BETWEEN:
ADDbant
m: PEREK VOLKER
First Res~ondent
Am2 THE HONOURABLE SIMON CREAN
Second Res~ondent
AWL& m E HONOURABLE ROSS FREE
Third m
m: Kiefel J J&l'm 20 October, 1994 W Brisbane
MI Bird has asked that I dlsquallfy myself from heamg this matter as
he does and, m Ius submission, other members of the publ~c might, apprehend that I
would be b~ased in dealing with the issues arlslng in the apphcatlon. Mr Bird is said to appear for a group, the Australian Un~on of Students. He contends that a student eligible to recerve payments under the Students Assistance Act 1973 should be able to elect to jorn a partlclpating student unlon uslng a payroll deduction form and that such a form should be presented to students llstlng the relevant unions and offering a student wshlng to joln them a cholce as between them. It 1s also suggested the
deduction system could be utlllsed for payments to other organisations, such as health
Issues.
Orders are then sought agalnst Mr Volker, who is Secretary of the
Department of Employment, Education and Traming, to have this system put in place.
Two ministers said to be responsible for that department or for the administrabon of
the act are named m the application and have also appeared today by counsel. I know none of the persons named and I have no familiarity with the union of students
referred to or the department named.
h41 Bird's bases for my d~squalification may, I think, be sumrnansed as:
(a)
that he apprehends that as I am a woman and a lawyer I fall within a class of persons who all hold the bel~ef that decisions ought to be
determmed on a polit~cal and not a legal basis;
(b)
that the federal government or the Attorney-General can be seen to recognise this m their appomtment of me. In this respect h41 Bird holds concerns about the timing of a press release announcing my impending appomtment to this court whlch he says was made only a few days &er
h ~ s application was made;
that I might also hold mews opposed to those of persons of Anglo-Saxon background whlch interence, Mr B~rd says, arlses slnce he belleves I may
be Jewish.
Mr Blrd did not suggest that there were other more specific bases, for
example, that I had been known in the past to be a member of a particular group, or to have made statements to a part~cular effect, or that anyth~ng was to be gleaned from any of my previous declslons glven m the Supreme Court. The fact that Mr Bird
asserts a potential for bias does not require me to disqualify myself and as the High Court restated in Re_Fmance Sector Un~on of Australia ex oarte Elation Ptv Ltd
(1W) 66 AUR 583: "Caution must be exercked by the coum in relation to these
applications".
In some cases these applications may amount to no more than exercises
to secure a hearing by a judge of a party's cho~ct. In addltion to the question as to
how justice is to be done between opposing parties, at a practical level, a system of
Finance Sector Union Case at 583, is that: choosing judges 1s obviously unworkable. The principle to be appl~ed m these appl~cations, as confirmed in the "A judge or person obliged to act judicially . . should not sit to hear a matter if; in all the circumrtances, a parry or the public might enteflain a reasonable apprehenswn that she or he might not bring an impartial or unprejudiced mind to the resolution of the question or questions in it".
Given the question outlined above wh~ch is concerned wlth whether the
department ought to provlde th~s facillty in the manner suggested, I do not thlnk a
member of the publlc would reasonably apprehend that the socio-political conslderatlons Mr Bird is concerned about would ever enter into the decision malang process. Further, if they were relevant, members of the public are, I consider,
unlikely to ascribe the particular points of mew to the persons Mr Bird has referred to. The fact that Mr Bird says that he harbours these mews is, as I have said, not conclusive of the question. The overr~dlng requuement is that the stated
apprehension be one whlch can be seen to be reasonably basic. I do not cons~der h ~ s
are. I am not aware of any matter whlch would affect my determination of the
questions raised and I decline to disqualify myself. I do not propose to grant any stay
of these proceedmgs whch is, I mfer, the order sought by Mr Bird when he referred
to leave for appeal. I will proceed to determine the matter.
I c e d j that this and the preceding three (3) pages are a true mpy of the reasons for judgment herein of the Honourable Justice KiefeL
Date: 20 October, 1994
i-!l"' !z.&bJ-
Associate:
Counsel fa the applicant: In person
Solicitors for the applicant: In person Counsel for the respondents: Mr D Pestorius Solicitors for the respondents:
Austra l ian Government Solicitor Date of Heariug: U) October, 1994
- AGLC
- Bird, G.J. v Volker, D [1994] FCA 839
- Case
- [1994] FCA 839
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue the court had to decide was whether Justice Kiefel should be disqualified from hearing the matter, based on Bird's contention that she might be perceived as biased. Bird's arguments for disqualification were based on the belief that Justice Kiefel, as a woman and a lawyer, might hold the opinion that decisions should be made on political rather than legal grounds. Bird also suggested that the federal government's recognition of this perceived bias could be inferred from a press release announcing her appointment to the court, which was made shortly after the application was filed. Additionally, Bird speculated that Justice Kiefel might hold views contrary to those of persons of Anglo-Saxon background, based on an assumption that she might be Jewish.
Justice Kiefel dismissed Bird's application for disqualification, noting that the mere assertion of a potential for bias does not necessitate disqualification. The court emphasised the importance of caution in such applications, as they can sometimes be used as a tactic to secure a hearing by a preferred judge. The principle applied is that a judge should not sit if there is a reasonable apprehension that they might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the issues. However, Justice Kiefel found that there was no reasonable basis for the public to apprehend that her socio-political considerations would influence her decision-making. She concluded that the apprehension expressed by Bird was not reasonably founded and therefore declined to disqualify herself from the case.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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