BIQ16 v Minister for Immigration

Link copied
Case Copied 25 min read

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BIQ16 v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR [2016] FCCA 2741
Catchwords:
MIGRATION – Application for an extension of time under s.477 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – application refused.

Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.91X, 477

Cases cited:

Hunter Valley Development Pty Ltd v Cohen (1984) 3 FCR 344; [1984] FCA

176

M29/2001 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 1266
M211 of 2003 v Refugee Review Tribunal (2004) 212 ALR 520; [2004] FCAFC 293

MZABP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1391

MZABP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 110

MZZLD v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCCA 1201
SZLIH v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2009] FCA 108
SZOCH v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship & Anor [2010] FMCA 300
SZRIQ v Federal Magistrates Court of Australia (2013) 236 FCR 442; [2013] FCA 1284
SZTES v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 719
SZTES v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 158

Applicant: BIQ16
First Respondent: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION
Second Respondent: ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
File Number: SYG 1400 of 2016
Judgment of: Judge Barnes
Hearing date: 12 October 2016
Delivered at: Sydney
Delivered on: 12 October 2016

REPRESENTATION

The Applicant: In Person
The Respondents: Mills Oakley

ORDERS

  1. The application for an extension of time pursuant to s.477(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) be refused.

  2. The Applicant pay the First Respondent’s costs fixed in the amount of $3,606.

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
AT SYDNEY

SYG 1400 of 2016

BIQ16

Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

(revised from transcript)

  1. This matter comes before me as an application for an extension of time within which to bring proceedings seeking review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the Tribunal) not to grant the Applicant a protection visa. 

  2. Under s.477(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act) an application to this court in relation to a migration decision of this nature must be made within 35 days of the date of the migration decision. However s.477(2) provides that the court may by order extend that 35 day period as it considers appropriate if an application for the order has been made in writing specifying why the applicant considers it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice to make the order and the court is satisfied that it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice to make the order. While the factors to which regard may be had in this respect are not specified, the factors which might ordinarily be taken into account were referred to by Foster J in SZRIQ v Federal Magistrates Court of Australia (2013) 236 FCR 442; [2013] FCA 1284 at [46]-[48].

  3. To consider this application it is necessary to refer to the background to these proceedings and…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read BIQ16 v Minister for Immigration and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2016] FCCA 2741
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The applicant, BIQ16, sought judicial review of a decision made by the Minister for Immigration. The dispute centred on the applicant's failure to file her application for judicial review within the prescribed 35-day time limit. The applicant contended that she lacked understanding of her review rights and the time constraints, attributing this to her legal representative's alleged failure to inform her of the option to seek judicial review in the Federal Circuit Court or to pursue Ministerial intervention concurrently. The matter came before Judge Barnes of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia.

The primary legal issue before the Court was whether the applicant had provided a sufficient explanation for her delay in commencing proceedings, thereby warranting an extension of time. This required the Court to consider the applicant's asserted lack of knowledge regarding her review rights and the time limits, and whether her actions, including seeking Ministerial intervention, constituted an adequate explanation for the delay. The Court also had to determine whether the general principle that seeking Ministerial intervention does not adequately explain delay applied in this specific case.

Judge Barnes acknowledged that information sheets clearly outlined the process for judicial review and the time limits. However, the Court noted that the applicant's evidence regarding her understanding and actions was not entirely clear. While authorities suggest that seeking Ministerial intervention generally does not constitute an adequate explanation for delay, as it can imply an abandonment of judicial challenge, Judge Barnes indicated that this is a question to be determined on the specific facts of each case. The Court considered that, in certain circumstances, an application for Ministerial intervention might, in whole or in part, provide a satisfactory explanation for some or all of the delay in seeking judicial review.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The Applicant made this claim in circumstances where the information sheet spelt out very clearly, after indicating that the Minister may substitute a more favourable decision, under the heading “Review of Decisions”, that:Applicants can apply to the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (the Court) for judicial review of our decisions. The Court will consider whether we made a jurisdictional error. If you wish to apply for review, you must do so within 35 days of the date of our decision. If you require an extension of time, you must ask for it in the application and explain why. The Court will decide whether or not to grant an extension of time. On the front page, the AAT information sheet also has a heading in bold type: “What Happens Next?”, which clearly would alert a reader to the alternatives available. The Applicant claimed that her lawyer never mentioned to her that she could seek review in the Federal Circuit Court or, as was stated in the grounds for an extension of time which she adopted, to seek both Ministerial intervention and judicial review at the same time. She claimed that she had little or no understanding of her review rights and that she did not know about the prescribed period of 35 days from the date of the Tribunal decision within which an application to this Court should be commenced. The Applicant’s evidence about what occurred thereafter was, it has to said, somewhat lacking in clarity as to the circumstances in which she then, acting on what she was told by friends in the town in which she was living, left that state and travelled some considerable distance to Sydney, on the basis that she had received advice that there was an organisation in Sydney that could assist her with what was, in fact, a “next step” involving an application to what she described as the Federal Court. The Applicant claimed that she came to learn of the time limit when she came to the Fiji Community centre in Sydney, the whereabouts of which she said she located through the Fijian community after she came to Sydney. There are authorities to the effect that seeking Ministerial intervention does not constitute an adequate explanation for delay (see M29/2001 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 1266). That view is generally taken on the basis that an application for Ministerial intervention is considered to indicate a decision by the applicant to abandon any course that would seek to challenge the decision of the Tribunal on any grounds, or as an implicit acceptance that the Tribunal decision was not to be the subject of judicial challenge (see M211 of 2003 v Refugee Review Tribunal (2004) 212 ALR 520; [2004] FCAFC 293 at [24]). However, in my view, whether this is so is a question for the particular circumstances of the individual case, rather than a general rule. It may well be that an application for Ministerial intervention may, in the particular circumstances of a case, be in whole or in part a satisfactory explanation for some or all of a delay in seeking judicial review.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established