Biondi & Koen (No 3)
[2022] FedCFamC1F 288
•3 May 2022
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 1)
Biondi & Koen (No 3) [2022] FedCFamC1F 288
File number(s): MLC 2872 of 2017 Judgment of: BENNETT J Date of judgment: 3 May 2022 Catchwords: FAMILY LAW – COSTS – Application for litigation funding in parenting proceedings where reliance is placed on costs power. Legislation: Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) Cases cited: Strahan & Strahan (2011) FLC 93-466
Zschokke and Zschokke (1996) FLC 92-693
Division: Division 1 First Instance Number of paragraphs: 51 Date of hearing: 26 April 2022 Place: Melbourne Counsel for the Applicant: Mr Whitchurch Solicitor for the Applicant: Macgregor Barristers and Solicitors Counsel for the Respondent: Ms Stoikovska SC Solicitor for the Respondent: Lander And Rogers Counsel for the Independent Children’s Lawyer: Mr Eidelson Solicitor for the Independent Children’s Lawyer: Southern Family Law ORDERS
MLC 2872 of 2017 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 1)
BETWEEN: MS BIONDI
Applicant
AND: MR KOEN
Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
BENNETT J
DATE OF ORDER:
26 APRIL 2022
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The father pay to his solicitors by way of litigation funding for the mother the sum of $38,000 within 24 hours, such monies to be paid out to the practitioners for the mother upon production of an appropriately drawn account (which do not contain any information to which legal professional privilege attaches).
2.My reasons will be delivered subsequently.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
Section 121 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under a pseudonym has been approved pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
BENNETT J:
INTRODUCTION
On the first day of defended parenting proceedings concerning X (5 years old), counsel for the mother made an oral application that the father pay $43,080 for litigation funding to cover the mother’s estimated costs and disbursements for the hearing which is estimated to take four days. The respondent father and the court were aware that the mother would apply for litigation funding. There having been two earlier orders made by me totalling $35,000. The mother announced on 28 January 2022 that the $35,000 funds would be exhausted before the commencement of this four day hearing and further funding would be sought on the first day if not entertained on 28 January 2022. There was a notation to that effect at [45] of my reasons for decision of 28 January 2022. The father opposes the mother’s application for litigation funding and seeks that it be dismissed.
Senior Counsel for the father sought to cross examine the mother and did so. Otherwise the matter proceeded on affidavitory evidence filed by the mother and the father, including current Financial Statements, and submissions. The independent children’s lawyer took no part in this application.
I have ordered that the father pay to his solicitors $38,000 within 24 hours, which I calculate to be by 3:00 pm on 27 April 2022. In the interests of not taking up time allocated for the defended hearing, I said that I would deliver my reasons subsequently. These are those reasons.
RELEVANT BACKGROUND
I will recite some non-contentious background in order to give context to the application.
The father is 41 years old and runs a business, FF Group, of which he is director. The mother is 40 years old, not employed outside the home and has the primary care of X who was born in 2016. The mother’s comprehension of written English is better than her conversational English but her conversational English is good. She makes a considerable effort to speak and understand English but requires the services of an interpreter in the EE language.
The parties met through the father’s business. The mother was present in Australia on a Tourist Visa which was granted to allow her to study English here. The mother has completed her English course and undertaken other studies but her visa status does not entitle her to seek paid employment in Australia or to receive any government assistance. The mother is excluded from Medicare. The mother is solely reliant on maintenance payments from the father and X’s entitlement to an income tested pension or benefit from the Commonwealth Government. From time to time the father has paid for the mother’s visa to be renewed and there is a pending application for a Parenting Visa which, if granted, would allow the mother to remain in Australia indefinitely as a permanent resident.
The parents commenced cohabitation in May 2016. They separated in 2017 shortly after X was born when the mother left the father’s residence taking X with her. There has been no resumption of cohabitation or of the relationship. They did not marry.
Proceedings were commenced by the mother’s Initiating Application for financial relief filed on 24 March 2017. On 7 April 2017 the father filed a Response to the Initiating Application seeking parenting as well as other financial orders. On 10 April 2017 interim orders were made which included an urgent interim order for spousal maintenance to be paid by the father for the mother’s benefit. That was followed by a spousal maintenance order in the sum of $250 per week made by Senior Registrar FitzGibbon on 24 August 2017. I have since made further spousal maintenance orders including one that is still current.
The matter was allocated to my docket on 2 August 2018. In the financial proceedings the mother sought to affect the interests of third parties and bring those interests into the property interests divisible between the father and herself. In the parenting proceedings, the mother sought to relocate X’s place of residence to Country D. On 6 September 2019 I ordered that the financial proceedings be heard separately to the parenting proceedings. Subsequently, the mother’s application for alternation of property interests was struck out of the list of pending cases. That is, it was not dismissed and has not been considered on its merits.
The parenting matter proceeded before me as a final hearing on 18-23 December 2019 when I reserved my decision and made interim orders increasing the father’s time with the X. In March 2020 the COVID-19 pandemic hit Melbourne. On 27 March 2020 I granted the mother leave to re-open her case to vary spend time arrangements for X in light of pandemic related restrictions to which all Victorians were subject. I made orders on 1 April 2020 increasing the father’s time with X.
On 10 November 2020 the father filed an application seeking further interim parenting orders and the mother filed her response on 8 December 2020. I made orders on the interim parenting applications on 10 December 2020 providing for time during holidays and special occasion time and the enrolment of X in kindergarten. Pandemic restrictions were still in force.
On 12 February 2021 I delivered my reasons in relation to the final hearing. I included draft orders which provided the parents to have equal shared parental responsibility, for X to remain living with the mother, the mother have permission to relocate X’s primary residence to Country D, the mother and the father do all things necessary to ensure the parenting orders are enforceable in Country D as a condition precedent to relocation and for the spend time arrangements applicable if the father travels to Country D and if X travels to Australia. I made clear that there was no consideration of the then prevailing COVID-19 restrictions or other matters arising out of the pandemic. At [239] to [242] inclusive, I stated:
239. I have not set a specific date for X to depart. The mother should provide not less than 30 days notice and departure is conditional upon enforceability of the Australian order in Country D. I predict that the mother’s departure may be delayed by the need to perfect enforcement so I urge both parties not to lose time doing all acts and things necessary to bring it about. For what it is worth, I consider that it would be prudent to authorise the Hague Network Judges in Australia, including Hon. Justice Williams and myself to communicate with our counterparts in Country D or such other judicial officer in Country D who may be competent to assist.
240. As observed earlier, I have not considered nor determined any issue of vaccination of the child and/or the mother against COVID-19.
241. For the avoidance of doubt, X’s departure is not conditional upon any level of travel alert issued by the Australian Government. There was no evidence that the mother required an exemption to travel out of Australia with X and there is the concession in relation to the requirements for entry to Country D.
242. Given that the orders will need to be quite detailed, I ask the practitioners for the parties to be responsible for refining my first draft of the orders which is distributed with these reasons for decision.
On 24 February 2021 I ordered that the parties each notify the other and my Chambers of any suggestions or corrections to the draft orders which I had circulated.
On 9 March 2021 the father filed an application seeking further interim parenting orders for leave to adduce new evidence in the parenting proceedings relating specifically to the COVID-19 pandemic, X travelling to Country D during the pandemic and that the mother and/or child be vaccinated. The mothers’ response was filed on 31 March 2021 and she opposed vaccinations and, inter alia, sought:
In the event of any further applications from X’s’ father, he fund the legal costs for me to engage a private family law solicitor and barrister (of my choice) to advise and represent me through to the end of this case with unlimited expenses, including the event of an appeal against the formalised final decision/orders.
By this time, the mother was self-represented. She had previously been represented by Macgregor Barristers and Solicitors (who are her current solicitors). A letter dated 22 February 2021 from Macgregor’s to the mother was put into evidence by the mother. It included, inter alia, the following statement:
We confirm that you have completely used your allocation of funding available from Victoria Legal Aid. We have made a number of applications, on your behalf, for “over capped funding”, which have also been expended. In these circumstance, we believe it is effectively impossible for you to obtain further funding from Victoria Legal Aid. […] We can make an Application to the Court that Mr Koen pay your costs associated with any further application but that, in itself, would also cost money.
There were various hearings in relation to expert evidence to do with pandemic conditions and attendant risks of X travelling internationally, X residing in Country D and the father travelling to Country D.
On 6 April 2021 I ordered, inter alia, that the father pay the sum of $10,000 into the trust account of his solicitor for payment of the mother’s reasonable legal costs and disbursements associated with the father’s application to adduce further evidence in these parenting proceedings and matters relevant if further evidence is adduced. The father was required to find the single expert evidence relating to the pandemic.
On 22 April 2021 I ordered that the parties have leave to re-open their respective cases for the purpose of adducing further evidence. The evidence to be adduced was confined to the health risks of X travelling to Country D to live and the ease of exercising access across international borders having regard to pandemic conditions in Country D.
On 3 November 2021 I, inter alia, varied the previous orders extending leave to the parties to adduce further evidence to include “relevant developments or events that have occurred since evidence was concluded on 23 December 2019”. I also ordered that a further sum of $12,500 be paid by the father to the mother’s solicitors on account of anticipated costs of the mother for these proceedings. By this stage it was apparent that the parents would not be able to agree on a single expert. I made a dollar for dollar order against the solicitors for the father to secure the payment of $12,500. I ordered that the $10,000 which had been paid by the father to his solicitors, pursuant to my order of 22 April 2021, be paid to the mother’s solicitors forthwith. The mother’s solicitor was entitled to draw upon the monies received provided that she first prepared an account and provided that account to the father’s solicitors seven clear days before the monies could be drawn upon. My reasons for decision were published in case neutral citation [2021] FamCA 230.
In addition to being represented at various times, including now, by Macgregor Barristers and Solicitors, the mother received pro bono assistance from Mr Lino Marchetti, of Counsel, from the Victorian Bar. Mr Marchetti appeared for the mother for her first litigation funding order of $10,000 but declined to take any part of those monies. Mr Marchetti also represented the mother in relation to the expert evidence about COVID-19. He appeared to be thorough, prepared and diligent. There have been periods during which the mother has acted as a self-represented litigant.
On 23 November 2021 the Court received a s69ZW report from the Department of Families, Fairness and Housing (“DFFH”) which provided information of an investigation under child welfare law in relation to X. DFFH were investigating statements or alleged “disclosures” by X whether bruises sustained by her were non accidental injuries and the implications of the allegations made by one parent against the other.
In open correspondence dated 28 March 2022 the mother’s solicitors notified the father’s solicitors, the Independent Children’s Lawyer and the Court that the mother would be seeking further litigation funding for the final hearing from the father.
At the commencement of this hearing the court was advised that there was now no longer any COVID-19 issue and that the further evidence would relate solely to matters which had occurred since December 2019.
At all material times throughout the proceedings X’s interests have been represented by Ms Kristy Hams, Solicitor, as Independent Children’s Lawyer. The Independent Children’s Lawyer takes no part in this litigation funding application.
COSTS
Each party filed a costs notification for this hearing. Additionally, the mother relied on the affidavit of Ms GG sworn 24 April 2022 in relation to the mother’s past and anticipated costs.
The mother’s costs[1] to 26 April 2022 were $36,733 of which $35,000 has been paid by the father. There are outstanding costs of $343 and unbilled costs of $1,390. The mother’s anticipated costs of this hearing (4 days) are $43,120 including counsel’s fees of $26,400 for the four day hearing and two days preparation. All costs paid to date have been paid by the father pursuant to litigation funding orders.
[1] Taken from mother’s Costs Notice (pursuant to Rule 12.06) sealed 25 April 2022 06:28PM
Counsel for the father did not take issue with the quantum of costs claimed by the mother. I asked that future costs be estimated in accordance with the Family Law Scale of costs and was informed that the re-calculated costs total $38,000.
The father’s costs[2] to 25 April 2022 have been $576,569 of which $449,635 is paid and $126,934 is outstanding. There are unbilled costs of $16,408. The father’s anticipated costs of this hearing (4 days) are $81,000 including counsel’s fees of $61,600 for the four day hearing and three days preparation. The father’s solicitors hold $72,920 in their trust account. The source of funds is noted as being from the father or the business FF Group. The Costs Notice states that the father has instructed his lawyers that, notwithstanding the monies have been paid by the father or his business, the father has instructed his solicitors that payments “have been funded as to approximately $400,000 from your sister and your parents by way of borrowings, in addition to a further $75,000 borrowed from your sister on or around 22 April 2022 for your costs of trial. The balance of your legal fees and disbursements (being approximately $175,000) have been funded from your personal income and resources.”
[2] Taken from father’s Costs Notice (pursuant to Rule 12.06) sealed 26 April 2022 12:33PM
DISCUSSION
A court making a litigation funding order, such as is sought here, must identify the relevant source of power because the source of power determines the necessary preconditions and relevant considerations of which the court must be satisfied before the order can be made.
In Strahan & Strahan (2011) FLC 93-466 the Full Court comprising Boland, Thackray and O’Ryan JJ said at para 81:
“In Paris King Investments Pty Ltd v Rayhill [2006] NSWSC 578 (Paris King Investments) Brereton J observed at [29], ‘[t]he juridical bases for an order for preliminary provision for litigation costs in matrimonial proceedings are diverse’. As Brereton J said, an order may be made as a maintenance order under ss 72 and 74 of the Act or a property settlement order under s 79 and s 80(1)(h) or a costs order under s 117. The spouse maintenance and costs jurisdiction to make such an order was recognised by the High Court in Breen v Breen (1990) 65 ALJR 195 (Breen) per Brennan, Dawson and Gaudron JJ, when dismissing an application for special leave to appeal against such an order”.
In Zschokke and Zschokke (1996) FLC 92-693, the Full Court comprising Baker, Finn and Hannon JJ referred to the costs power (under s 117(2)) and the interim property order power (s 79(1) and s 80(1)(h)) as being relevant to that case, but also alluded to the possible availability of the injunctive power (under s 114) and the maintenance power (under s 74) in relevant circumstances (see also Poletti and Poletti (1990) 15 Fam LR 794). As the mother and father in this case never married the relevant maintenance power is found in s. 90SE and the property power is found in s90SM of the Family Law Act 1975 (“the Act”).
Section 117 of the Act provides the Court’s power to make orders in relation to costs. There are no extant financial proceedings for an alteration of property interests so the court’s power to alter the interest of the parties in property on an interim basis is not available to the mother. The mother is in receipt of spousal maintenance from the father, expressed to be an interim order, but in the limited submissions made by Counsel for the mother, he did not seek to invoke s90SE of the Act as a relevant source of power.
I will treat the application as an application for orders in relation to costs under s117 of the Act.
Section 117(1) of the Act provides that subject to certain provisions each party to proceedings under this Act shall bear his or her own costs.
Section 117(2) provides that if the court is of the opinion that there are circumstances that justify doing so, and subject to certain other subsections and the applicable rules of court, the court may make such order as to costs and security for costs whether by way of interlocutory order or otherwise as the court considers just. The order now sought by the mother is an order as to costs. Section 117(2) is silent on the matters to which the court may have regard but, essentially, I cannot have regard to irrelevant or extraneous considerations.
In considering whether there are circumstances which justify an order being made which requires the father to make provision for the mothers costs of being represented in this proceeding, I take into account the following:
(a)These are hard fought and difficult international relocation proceedings which have detained the mother in Australia, and away from her country of origin and all of her family, for the last five years and for the entirety of X’s life.
(b)These defended hearing says were allocated to allow the father to adduce further evidence and for the mother and independent children’s lawyer to be able to respond to that evidence. The mother did not apply to re-open her case to adduce further evidence. Upon the father applying to re-open his case for the purpose of adducing further evidence, I stated that leave would be conditional upon the father making provision for payment of the reasonable costs to be incurred by the mother in the further litigation if she could not pay herself. Leave was granted to all parties to re-open his/her case by the Order of 22 April 2021. That leave was not expressed to be conditional upon payment by the father or the mother’s costs because the mother’s costs had earlier been estimated at $10,000 and the $10,000 had already been paid by the father. As the court acceded to the father’s further applications to widen the matters in respect of which further evidence could be adduced, further provision was made for the father to pay the further costs anticipated to be incurred by the mother. The father paid a further $25,000 on account of the mother’s anticipated expenses.
(c)The purpose of the father adducing further evidence is to seek that I reverse the conclusion which I reached in 2021, being that as at 2021 it was in X’s best interests that the mother be permitted to relocate their residence to Country D. The father sought to adduce evidence about the risks associated with the COVID-19 pandemic and relevant events which have occurred in relation to X and parenting arrangements since evidence was concluded and all parties closed their cases in December 2019. The father no longer wishes to adumbrate the COVID-19 considerations.
(d)This is not an easy case. This last stanza of the proceedings at first instance is more nuanced than an uninterrupted relocation case because there are relevant matters in respect of which I made findings in 2021, based on the evidence as it then stood, in respect of which I am required to make findings now having regard to all of the evidence.
(e)It is in X’s best interests that the uncertainty of whether she will reside primarily in Australia or primarily in Country D be determined as soon as practicable.
(f)The mother has no funds of her own or at her disposal with which to retain legal representation. The mother has exhausted her entitlement to assistance from Victoria Legal Aid. The mother has already received pro-bono assistance from Mr Lino Marchetti. Macgregor’s and Mr Whitchurch do not offer to appear pro bono.
(g)The father has paid $35,000 on account of anticipated legal expenses of the mother which has been applied and none of which remains. The father’s legal costs and disbursements have been approximately $600,000. His costs have been met from his own resources and, he says, borrowings from the business run by him and his family members. He retains senior counsel to appear on his behalf at a daily rate of $8,800 per day. The father says that he cannot afford to pay the mother’s anticipated costs and that he has no funds with which to pay the mother’s costs. However, the father is not stinting on his own legal costs, as is evidenced by retaining senior counsel, and he continues to incur those costs. There is no evidence as to the obligation to repay the alleged loans from his parents and sister or explanation as to how such funds came to be advanced in the name of the business and/or the father.
(h)I am satisfied that the mother will be materially disadvantaged, by reason of language difficulties (notwithstanding the assistance of an interpreter) and that she has no legal training or experience, if she was required to represent herself in this proceeding.
(i)There is no realistic prospect of the mother repaying any costs to the father.
(j)It is in the interests of justice that the mother be legally represented in this proceeding.
Having considered the matters set out in the immediately preceding paragraph, I am satisfied that an order as to costs and/or security for costs is justified within the meaning of s.117(2).
Section 117(2A) sets out seven matters to which the court must have regard when considering what (if any) order should be made. Those matters are:
(a)The financial circumstances of each of the parties;
(b)Whether any party to the proceedings is in receipt of assistance by way of legal aid and, if so, the terms of the grant of that assistance;
(c)The conduct of the parties in relation to the proceedings including their conduct in relation to pleadings, particulars, discovery, inspection, directions to answer questions, admissions of facts, production of documents and similar matters;
(d)Whether the proceedings were necessitated by the failure of a party to comply with previous orders of the court;
(e)Whether any party to the proceedings has been wholly unsuccessful in the proceedings;
(f)Whether either party has made an offer in writing to the other party to settle the proceedings and the terms of any such order; and
(g)Such other matters as the court considers relevant.
I need only discuss those matters which are relevant. I find subparagraphs 117(2A)(a), (b) and (g) to be the relevant matters.
Income and financial sources of the parties
The mother’s Financial Statement was filed on 22 April 2022. It was not completed by her lawyers in every respect necessary but no issue was taken in that regard by Counsel for the father. The mother deposes to an income of “nil” as she is not employed outside of the home. The mother receives $575 per week by way of maintenance from the father. The mother is also in receipt of Centrelink benefits of $279.38 per week which represents X’s entitlement to an income tested benefit. The mother deposes to an average weekly income of $854.38. The father asserts that the mother’s net income is equivalent to a gross income of $75,000 per annum. I have not satisfied myself of whether that is correct because the incontrovertible fact, which is not challenged by the father, is that the mother’s reasonable expenses are only $5 less than her income. Counsel for the mother informed me that two current bank statements provided by the mother showed bank deposits at $500 or $600 (in total) but those monies are earmarked to pay the mother’s rent which is due.
The father filed his Financial Statement on 20 April 2022. He described his occupation as “director” of FF Group and deposed to an average weekly income of $1,280. The father is in receipt of a Child Care Subsidy of $324 per week. The cost of the father’s mobile phone ($12 per week) and Home electricity ($30 per week) are benefits which he receives from FF Group. He deposes to having mortgage ($183pw), rates ($14pw) and a payment plan for legal fees ($1,154 pw) paid for by members of his family. In addition to spousal maintenance of $430 per week and child support of $145 per week, the father deposes to paying the mother’s fees to attend a psychologist at $160 per week. He deposes that the mother’s car expenses of $92 per week are “paid by business”. He deposes that he has a total of $113 in banks, owes $17,360 over three credit cards “in personal name but used for business transactions”, owes his solicitors $126,933 and $400,000 to Ms N and Mr DD “by way of loan to assist with the payment of legal fees and related costs the subject of this litigation.” The value of the father’s business interest is not specified.
The father has more assets and liabilities than the mother. However, he has demonstrated a capacity to raise funds for his own legal costs as and when necessary. The mother has not demonstrated any such capacity. There is no evidence before the court upon which I can be satisfied that the mother can borrow to pay her anticipated legal costs. There is also no evidence upon which I could be satisfied that the mother will ever re-pay funds paid by the father’s litigation funding.
Under cross examination the mother stated that she believes that her family cannot contribute to her legal costs. She last asked for assistance from her father when she represented herself in these proceedings in 2021, prior to Mr Marchetti rendering pro bono assistance. The mother said that she asked for $50,000. Her father’s response, she says, was that he could assist her with payment of her airfares to return to Country D with X in due course. The mother describes that her family have a comfortable life in Country D but that the exchange rate between Country D and Australia is very unfavourable (4:1). In effect, the well-resourced life the family have in Country D does not translate to assets of resources of any significance in Australia. Her father has suffered ill health, had surgery in October 2021 for which he is still paying and he is continuing to work selling motor cars by auction. Her parents own their residence and another property. Her brother and sister in law reside in the second property. The mother is one of three children.
Cross examination by counsel for the father established that the mother has not filed affidavits from her family members verifying that they could not gift or advance the mother money with which to pay for the costs of this trial. I do not think that takes the position of either party any further.
Assistance by way of legal aid
I am satisfied that the mother’s entitlement to assistance from legal aid is exhausted.
Other matters as the court considers relevant
I take into account the matters to which I gave consideration in the context of s117(2). As discussed above [36] in relation to circumstances which justify an order as to costs being made, these proceedings arise from the father’s application to adduce further evidence. In spite of the evidence at the final hearing having concluded in December 2019, the mother did not want the case to be re-opened. Sure enough there have been further events but whether the issues are any more developed or finely balanced now than they were in 2021 remains to be assessed.
At all material times the father has been aware that:
(a)the mother could not pay her legal costs for this further hearing; and
(b)the mother would make application that the father provide further litigation funding or cover the costs of the preparation of the case.
Delay in determination of the proceedings frustrates the relief sought by the mother because she wants to relocate and must obtain positive orders entitling her and X to do so. Delay in determination of the proceedings will, necessarily, see the mother and X further retained from leaving Australia which is consistent with the outcome sought by the father. It followed that the parents do not necessarily share the same motivation or commitment to see this parenting litigation concluded as soon as possible.
I am satisfied that the mother will not repay the monies which she seeks the father pay to finance her litigation.
The father has apparently managed to fund his own costs and, given the history of this matter, should have made provision to pay for the mother’s costs as well.
I am satisfied that the justice of the situation requires the matter be finalised for the benefit of the parties but, more particularly, in the best interests of X. I am satisfied that the order which I have made is proper, in the meaning of s117(2). Counsel for the mother did not seek a further dollar for dollar order as a collection mechanism for the $8,000. However, I will be available to look at implementation measures during the hearing should the need arise.
I certify that the preceding fifty-one (51) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Bennett. Associate:
Dated: 3 May 2022
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