FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Biomax Technologies Pte Ltd v Jabiru Agribusiness (Aust) Pty Ltd
[2016] FCA 505
File number: NSD 567 of 2015 Judge: RARES J Date of judgment: 5 February 2016 Legislation: Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) ss 36(1A), 115
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) Pt VB
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth)
Cases cited: Searson v Salmon [2014] FCA 748 Date of hearing: 5 February 2016 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations Sub-area: Commercial Contracts, Banking, Finance and Insurance Category: No Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 26 Counsel for the Applicant: Ms E E Whitby Solicitor for the Applicant: Clayton Utz Counsel for the First and Second Respondents: The First and Second Respondents did not appear Counsel for the Third Respondent: Mr R Hawkins Solicitor for the Third Respondent: Henry Davis York ORDERS
NSD 567 of 2015 BETWEEN: BIOMAX TECHNOLOGIES PTE LTD (RC NO 200906670E)
Applicant
AND: JABIRU AGRIBUSINESS (AUST) PTY LTD (ACN 097 142 455)
First Respondent
RAYMOND FREDERICK BEAZLEIGH
Second Respondent
IRONSIDE MANAGEMENT (SERVICES) PTY LTD (ACN 010 593 293)
Third Respondent
JUDGE:
RARES J
DATE OF ORDER:
5 FEBRUARY 2016
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
Upon admissions which the first and second respondents are taken to have made, consequent upon non-compliance with orders of the Court, it be declared that:
1.The first and second respondents pay the applicant, damages including additional damages under s 115(4) of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth), such damages to be assessed at a further hearing.
2.The first and second respondents pay the applicant’s costs of the proceeding on an indemnity basis.
3.During the period between 7 August 2012 and 16 January 2013:
(a)the first respondent breached cll 7.1, 7.4, 7.5, 10.1, 10.2, 10.3, and 10.4 of the agency agreement entered into in or about May 2011 between the applicant and the first respondent (agency agreement);
(b)the second respondent was a party to, or knowingly concerned in, or induced the first respondent's breaches of cll 7.1, 7.4, 7.5, 10.1, 10.2, 10.3, and 10.4 the agency agreement;
(c)by authorising the reproduction in material form, publication and communication, to the public on the website <biocomplete.com.au>, of the applicant’s copyright works identified in Schedule 1 of these orders (or a substantial part thereof) without the licence or authority of the applicant, the second respondent infringed the applicant’s copyright that subsists in the applicant’s copyright works.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(REVISED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT)RARES J:
Biomax Technologies Pte Ltd commenced these proceedings on 15 May 2015 against three respondents, Jabiru Agribusiness (Aust) Pty Limited, its sole director, Raymond Beazleigh, and Ironside Management (Services) Pty Limited. Biomax has applied for default judgment against Jabiru and Mr Beazleigh.
Procedural background
For some time, Jabiru and Mr Beazleigh have been in default for the purposes of r 5.23 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth). That is because, each of them had failed,…
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- Case
- [2016] FCA 505
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered the principles applicable to default judgment as outlined in Searson v Salmon and subsequent cases. It noted that while a defaulting party is deemed to have admitted the facts as pleaded, the court must still determine whether those facts establish an entitlement to the relief claimed. The court found that the allegations and evidence supported the conclusion that Jabiru and Mr Beazleigh had breached several clauses of the agency agreement and infringed Biomax's copyright. The court granted default judgment, declaring that Jabiru and Mr Beazleigh had breached specific clauses of the agency agreement and infringed Biomax's copyright. The court also ordered that Jabiru and Mr Beazleigh pay damages and costs.
In summary, the court granted default judgment in favour of Biomax, declaring that Jabiru and Mr Beazleigh breached the agency agreement and infringed Biomax's copyright. The court ordered damages and costs to be assessed at a further hearing, and Jabiru and Mr Beazleigh were directed to pay Biomax's costs on an indemnity basis. The judgment reflects the court's discretion in granting relief based on the pleadings and additional evidence, while adhering to the principles governing default judgment in the Federal Court.
Orders
Orders of the court
Upon admissions which the first and second respondents are taken to have made, consequent upon non-compliance with orders of the Court, it be declared that:
1. The first and second respondents pay the applicant, damages including additional damages under s 115(4) of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth), such damages to be assessed at a further hearing.
2. The first and second respondents pay the applicant’s costs of the proceeding on an indemnity basis.
3. During the period between 7 August 2012 and 16 January 2013:
(a) the first respondent breached cll 7.1, 7.4, 7.5, 10.1, 10.2, 10.3, and 10.4 of the agency agreement entered into in or about May 2011 between the applicant and the first respondent (agency agreement);
(b) the second respondent was a party to, or knowingly concerned in, or induced the first respondent's breaches of cll 7.1, 7.4, 7.5, 10.1, 10.2, 10.3, and 10.4 the agency agreement;
(c) by authorising the reproduction in material form, publication and communication, to the public on the website , of the applicant’s copyright works identified in Schedule 1 of these orders (or a substantial part thereof) without the licence or authority of the applicant, the second respondent infringed the applicant’s copyright that subsists in the applicant’s copyright works.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether Jabiru breached clauses 7.1, 7.4, 7.5, and 10.1-10.4 of the agency agreement between August 7, 2012, and January 16, 2013.
2. Whether Mr Beazleigh was a party to, knowingly concerned in, or induced the breaches of the agency agreement.
3. Whether Mr Beazleigh infringed Biomax’ copyright by authorising the reproduction and communication of Biomax’ works without a licence or authority.
Held
1. The court held that Jabiru breached clauses 7.1, 7.4, 7.5, and 10.1-10.4 of the agency agreement between August 7, 2012, and January 16, 2013.
2. The court held that Mr Beazleigh was a party to, knowingly concerned in, or induced the breaches of the agency agreement.
3. The court held that Mr Beazleigh infringed Biomax’ copyright by authorising the reproduction and communication of Biomax’ works without a licence or authority.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
I set out the principles applicable to the Court’s approach to the grant of default judgment under r 5.23 in Searson v Salmon [2014] FCA 748 at [6]-[9], as follows:6A plaintiff or applicant who seeks relief in proceedings started by an originating application supported by a statement of claim is entitled upon a default by a defendant or respondent, under r 5.23, to seek judgment based on the statement of claim without needing to rely on evidence supporting that claim. The Court may give judgment in the party’s favour provided that the pleading, on its face, makes that claim and the claim falls within the jurisdiction of the Court: Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v dataline.net.au Pty Ltd (2006) 236 ALR 665 at 677-678 [45] per Kiefel J; Yeo v Damos Earthmoving Pty Ltd; in the matter of Beachwood Developments Pty Ltd (in liq) [2011] FCA 1129 at [9] per Gordon J; Sanko Steamship Co Ltd v Australia Gloria Energy Group Pty Ltd [2012] FCA 798 at [6] per myself.7However, as Kiefel J noted in Dataline 236 ALR at 678-679 [49]-[51], the Court could permit the applicant to lead some evidence in relation to the relief sought. That is because r 5.23 operates on the premise that the defaulting party has admitted the facts of the claims as pleaded and the Court then considers whether those facts establish an entitlement to the relief claimed. Her Honour held that the analogue of the rule required that the face of the statement of claim must show a right to some form of relief (236 ALR at 679-680 [53]).8Kiefel J held that the matters alleged in the statement of claim must permit the conclusion that some relief may be granted, even if its grant were subject to other considerations. Such a conclusion is at least possible in cases where a declaration and an injunction are sought. An applicant may establish some right or legal interest or legal conclusion capable of resolving a controversy that might properly be expressed in the form of a declaration or establish the infringement of a right or a standard set by a statute. 9Subject to considerations that might weigh against the grant of relief of those kinds, the applicant may be said to have an “entitlement”. It does not have to be absolute for the purposes of the rule, which is discretionary in nature in any event. Her Honour suggested that, in an appropriate case, such as one brought by a regulator in respect of protecting the public interest, the court might make a qualified declaration, notwithstanding the traditional restraint exercised by courts in making binding declarations without having held a contested hearing of the disputed facts (236 ALR at 680-681 [54]-[59]). She suggested that, in a default judgment context, such declarations might be prefaced by a statement (236 ALR at 681 [59]):“Upon admissions which [the respondent in question] is taken to have made, consequent upon non-compliance with orders of the court.”Consideration The further evidence relied on by Biomax together with the allegations in the amended statement of claim satisfy me that it is appropriate to make declarations that, in the period between 7 August 2012 and 16 January 2013, Jabiru breached cll 7.1, 7.4, 7.5 and 10.1-10.4 of the agency agreement and that Mr Beazleigh was party to, knowingly concerned in, or induced, those breaches.