Biomax Technologies Pte Ltd v Jabiru Agribusiness (Aust) Pty Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Biomax Technologies Pte Ltd v Jabiru Agribusiness (Aust) Pty Ltd

[2016] FCA 505

File number: NSD 567 of 2015
Judge: RARES J
Date of judgment: 5 February 2016
Legislation:

Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) ss 36(1A), 115

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) Pt VB

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth)

Cases cited: Searson v Salmon [2014] FCA 748
Date of hearing: 5 February 2016
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations
Sub-area: Commercial Contracts, Banking, Finance and Insurance
Category: No Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 26
Counsel for the Applicant: Ms E E Whitby
Solicitor for the Applicant: Clayton Utz
Counsel for the First and Second Respondents: The First and Second Respondents did not appear
Counsel for the Third Respondent: Mr R Hawkins
Solicitor for the Third Respondent: Henry Davis York

ORDERS

NSD 567 of 2015
BETWEEN:

BIOMAX TECHNOLOGIES PTE LTD (RC NO 200906670E)

Applicant

AND:

JABIRU AGRIBUSINESS (AUST) PTY LTD (ACN 097 142 455)

First Respondent

RAYMOND FREDERICK BEAZLEIGH

Second Respondent

IRONSIDE MANAGEMENT (SERVICES) PTY LTD (ACN 010 593 293)

Third Respondent

JUDGE:

RARES J

DATE OF ORDER:

5 FEBRUARY 2016

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

Upon admissions which the first and second respondents are taken to have made, consequent upon non-compliance with orders of the Court, it be declared that:

1.The first and second respondents pay the applicant, damages including additional damages under s 115(4) of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth), such damages to be assessed at a further hearing.

2.The first and second respondents pay the applicant’s costs of the proceeding on an indemnity basis.

3.During the period between 7 August 2012 and 16 January 2013:

(a)the first respondent breached cll 7.1, 7.4, 7.5, 10.1, 10.2, 10.3, and 10.4 of the agency agreement entered into in or about May 2011 between the applicant and the first respondent (agency agreement);

(b)the second respondent was a party to, or knowingly concerned in, or induced the first respondent's breaches of cll 7.1, 7.4, 7.5, 10.1, 10.2, 10.3, and 10.4 the agency agreement;

(c)by authorising the reproduction in material form, publication and communication, to the public on the website <biocomplete.com.au>, of the applicant’s copyright works identified in Schedule 1 of these orders (or a substantial part thereof) without the licence or authority of the applicant, the second respondent infringed the applicant’s copyright that subsists in the applicant’s copyright works.


Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(REVISED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT)

RARES J:

  1. Biomax Technologies Pte Ltd commenced these proceedings on 15 May 2015 against three respondents, Jabiru Agribusiness (Aust) Pty Limited, its sole director, Raymond Beazleigh, and Ironside Management (Services) Pty Limited.  Biomax has applied for default judgment against Jabiru and Mr Beazleigh.

    Procedural background

  2. For some time, Jabiru and Mr Beazleigh have been in default for the purposes of r 5.23 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth). That is because, each of them had failed,…

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Details
Case
[2016] FCA 505
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Biomax Technologies Pte Ltd initiated legal proceedings against Jabiru Agribusiness (Aust) Pty Ltd and Mr Beazleigh, seeking enforcement of an agency agreement. The agency agreement, entered into in May 2011, set specific sales targets and outlined various duties and obligations for Jabiru, including the use of Biomax's intellectual property and non-compete clauses post-termination. Biomax alleged that Jabiru failed to meet the sales targets and breached several clauses of the agreement, including those relating to the use of intellectual property and non-compete provisions. Jabiru and Mr Beazleigh did not appear in court due to financial constraints and lack of legal representation. The legal issues before the court were whether Biomax was entitled to default judgment based on the allegations in its amended statement of claim and the additional evidence provided, and whether such a judgment could be granted under the Federal Court Rules.

The court considered the principles applicable to default judgment as outlined in Searson v Salmon and subsequent cases. It noted that while a defaulting party is deemed to have admitted the facts as pleaded, the court must still determine whether those facts establish an entitlement to the relief claimed. The court found that the allegations and evidence supported the conclusion that Jabiru and Mr Beazleigh had breached several clauses of the agency agreement and infringed Biomax's copyright. The court granted default judgment, declaring that Jabiru and Mr Beazleigh had breached specific clauses of the agency agreement and infringed Biomax's copyright. The court also ordered that Jabiru and Mr Beazleigh pay damages and costs.

In summary, the court granted default judgment in favour of Biomax, declaring that Jabiru and Mr Beazleigh breached the agency agreement and infringed Biomax's copyright. The court ordered damages and costs to be assessed at a further hearing, and Jabiru and Mr Beazleigh were directed to pay Biomax's costs on an indemnity basis. The judgment reflects the court's discretion in granting relief based on the pleadings and additional evidence, while adhering to the principles governing default judgment in the Federal Court.

Orders

Orders of the court

Upon admissions which the first and second respondents are taken to have made, consequent upon non-compliance with orders of the Court, it be declared that:

1. The first and second respondents pay the applicant, damages including additional damages under s 115(4) of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth), such damages to be assessed at a further hearing.

2. The first and second respondents pay the applicant’s costs of the proceeding on an indemnity basis.

3. During the period between 7 August 2012 and 16 January 2013:

(a) the first respondent breached cll 7.1, 7.4, 7.5, 10.1, 10.2, 10.3, and 10.4 of the agency agreement entered into in or about May 2011 between the applicant and the first respondent (agency agreement);

(b) the second respondent was a party to, or knowingly concerned in, or induced the first respondent's breaches of cll 7.1, 7.4, 7.5, 10.1, 10.2, 10.3, and 10.4 the agency agreement;

(c) by authorising the reproduction in material form, publication and communication, to the public on the website , of the applicant’s copyright works identified in Schedule 1 of these orders (or a substantial part thereof) without the licence or authority of the applicant, the second respondent infringed the applicant’s copyright that subsists in the applicant’s copyright works.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Yesterday, Mr Beazleigh’s wife, Sue Beazleigh, who had appeared, or sought to appear for both her husband and Jabiru, at earlier directions hearings, sent an email to my associate stating that neither Jabiru nor Mr Beazleigh would be appearing either in person or by telephone today and that due to financial constraints neither of them could afford legal representation. They have not appeared today.Factual background In about May 2011, Biomax, as principal, entered into an agency agreement with Jabiru as agent. Relevantly, the agency agreement set sales targets for Jabiru to achieve as Biomax’ agent in the sale and exploitation of Biomax’ rapid thermophilic digestion technology and machines. Biomax marketed rapid thermophilic digestion machines that were capable of processing waste product from agricultural activities and converting that to material that could be used to provide nutrients and other substances to assist in agricultural and farming activities. Clause 4.1 of the agency agreement set a sales target for the 2012 year of USD3 million. Biomax could terminate the agency agreement by giving Jabiru seven days written notice if Jabiru had failed to achieve an annual agreed sales target (cl 6.1.3). Clause 6.2 required Jabiru to return promptly to Biomax all property belonging to it in accordance with its directions and to cease to promote, market, advertise or sell Biomax’ goods, to maintain its confidentiality undertaking in cl 11, and to continue to provide an indemnity under cl 17. The agency agreement also provided in cl 7.1 that, during its term, Jabiru had to act in the interests of Biomax, not allow Jabiru’s interests to conflict with the duties that it owed to Biomax and to act towards Biomax dutifully and in good faith. During the term of the agreement and for one year after its termination, Jabiru agreed not to directly or indirectly sell, offer to sell, negotiate the sale or be concerned with or interested in, relevantly, the promotion or marketing of any goods that were similar to Biomax’ goods or which competed with it, without first obtaining Biomax’ consent (cl 7.4). Jabiru also agreed not to represent or sell products similar to those presently manufactured by Biomax or to financially support, directly or indirectly, any competitive organisation (cl 7.5). Jabiru was not authorised to enter into any compromise or agreement with any of Biomax’ customers (cl 7.9). The agreement also placed constraints on Jabiru’s ability to use Biomax’ intellectual property rights and literature except in the course of its pursuit of the agency on behalf of Biomax. In particular, Jabiru agreed that it was allowed to use the trademarks, copyright and designs in respect of Biomax’ goods (which were defined as “intellectual property”), together with literature provided by Biomax in connection with those goods, only as expressly authorised by Biomax (cl 10.1). Jabiru acknowledged that it had no rights to the defined intellectual property and promised not to do, or omit to do, anything by which the goodwill and reputation associated with that intellectual property might be diminished or jeopardised (cl 10.2). Jabiru also acknowledged that Biomax’ property included its design of the machines and the formulation of its bacterial enzyme mixes and Jabiru was prohibited from copying the machines or any parts of them or the bacterial enzyme mixes without seeking and obtaining Biomax’ permission (cl 10.3). In addition, Jabiru promised promptly and fully to notify Biomax of any actual, threatened, or suspected infringement in Australia of any intellectual property, as defined, that had come to Jabiru’s notice (cl 10.4).

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Whether Jabiru breached clauses 7.1, 7.4, 7.5, and 10.1-10.4 of the agency agreement between August 7, 2012, and January 16, 2013.
2. Whether Mr Beazleigh was a party to, knowingly concerned in, or induced the breaches of the agency agreement.
3. Whether Mr Beazleigh infringed Biomax’ copyright by authorising the reproduction and communication of Biomax’ works without a licence or authority.

Held
1. The court held that Jabiru breached clauses 7.1, 7.4, 7.5, and 10.1-10.4 of the agency agreement between August 7, 2012, and January 16, 2013.
2. The court held that Mr Beazleigh was a party to, knowingly concerned in, or induced the breaches of the agency agreement.
3. The court held that Mr Beazleigh infringed Biomax’ copyright by authorising the reproduction and communication of Biomax’ works without a licence or authority.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

I set out the principles applicable to the Court’s approach to the grant of default judgment under r 5.23 in Searson v Salmon [2014] FCA 748 at [6]-[9], as follows:6A plaintiff or applicant who seeks relief in proceedings started by an originating application supported by a statement of claim is entitled upon a default by a defendant or respondent, under r 5.23, to seek judgment based on the statement of claim without needing to rely on evidence supporting that claim. The Court may give judgment in the party’s favour provided that the pleading, on its face, makes that claim and the claim falls within the jurisdiction of the Court: Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v dataline.net.au Pty Ltd (2006) 236 ALR 665 at 677-678 [45] per Kiefel J; Yeo v Damos Earthmoving Pty Ltd; in the matter of Beachwood Developments Pty Ltd (in liq) [2011] FCA 1129 at [9] per Gordon J; Sanko Steamship Co Ltd v Australia Gloria Energy Group Pty Ltd [2012] FCA 798 at [6] per myself.7However, as Kiefel J noted in Dataline 236 ALR at 678-679 [49]-[51], the Court could permit the applicant to lead some evidence in relation to the relief sought. That is because r 5.23 operates on the premise that the defaulting party has admitted the facts of the claims as pleaded and the Court then considers whether those facts establish an entitlement to the relief claimed. Her Honour held that the analogue of the rule required that the face of the statement of claim must show a right to some form of relief (236 ALR at 679-680 [53]).8Kiefel J held that the matters alleged in the statement of claim must permit the conclusion that some relief may be granted, even if its grant were subject to other considerations. Such a conclusion is at least possible in cases where a declaration and an injunction are sought. An applicant may establish some right or legal interest or legal conclusion capable of resolving a controversy that might properly be expressed in the form of a declaration or establish the infringement of a right or a standard set by a statute. 9Subject to considerations that might weigh against the grant of relief of those kinds, the applicant may be said to have an “entitlement”. It does not have to be absolute for the purposes of the rule, which is discretionary in nature in any event. Her Honour suggested that, in an appropriate case, such as one brought by a regulator in respect of protecting the public interest, the court might make a qualified declaration, notwithstanding the traditional restraint exercised by courts in making binding declarations without having held a contested hearing of the disputed facts (236 ALR at 680-681 [54]-[59]). She suggested that, in a default judgment context, such declarations might be prefaced by a statement (236 ALR at 681 [59]):“Upon admissions which [the respondent in question] is taken to have made, consequent upon non-compliance with orders of the court.”Consideration The further evidence relied on by Biomax together with the allegations in the amended statement of claim satisfy me that it is appropriate to make declarations that, in the period between 7 August 2012 and 16 January 2013, Jabiru breached cll 7.1, 7.4, 7.5 and 10.1-10.4 of the agency agreement and that Mr Beazleigh was party to, knowingly concerned in, or induced, those breaches.