Binse v The King

SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA

COURT OF APPEAL

S EAPCR 2024 0025

CHRISTOPHER BINSE	Applicant
v
THE KING	Respondent

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JUDGES:	BEACH, RICHARDS and KAYE JJA
WHERE HELD:	Melbourne
DATE OF HEARING:	26 June 2025
DATE OF JUDGMENT:	4 July 2025
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION:	[2025] VSCA 158
JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM:	R v Binse [2014] VSC 253 (T Forrest J)

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CRIMINAL LAW – Appeal – Conviction – Applicant pleaded guilty to charges of armed robbery, reckless conduct endangering persons, theft, prohibited person possessing firearm, and prohibited person using firearm – Sentenced to 18 years and 2 months’ imprisonment – Applicant committed armed robbery on two security guards with loaded shotgun – Applicant engaged in siege with police – Applicant fired multiple shots at police in course of siege – Allegation by applicant that counsel pressured him to plead guilty to charges in circumstances where applicant wished to raise defences of necessity, duress and self-defence – Where applicant alleged diagnosis of PTSD affected his state of mind at time of offending – No evidentiary bases to support defences – Application for extension of time – Delay of 9 years and 8 months – No adequate explanation for delay – Proposed grounds of appeal not sufficiently arguable – Application for extension of time in which to file leave to appeal against conviction refused.

Crimes Act 1958, ss 322K, 322N, 322O, 322P and 322Q referred to – Madafferi v The Queen [2017] VSCA 302; Peters v The Queen (No 2) (2019) 60 VR 231; R v Hurley [1967] VR 526; R v Rowan (a pseudonym) (2024) 418 ALR 91, applied; R v Loughnan [1981] VR 443; Zecevic v Director of Public Prosecutions (1987) 162 CLR 645, referred to.

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Applicant filed several applications under s 317 of Criminal Procedure Act 2009 seeking documents from various persons and entities – Whether in the interests of justice to order production of documents – Whether applicant has legitimate forensic purpose in seeking production of documents – Requests for documents a fishing expedition – Not in the interests of justice to order production of documents – Applications refused – Criminal Procedure Act 2009, ss 317 and 319A, referred to – Polimeni v The Queen [2022] VSCA 20, considered.

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Counsel
Applicant:		In person
Respondent:		Mr J O’Connor
Solicitors
Applicant:	In person
Respondent:	Ms A Hogan, Solicitor for Public Prosecutions

BEACH JA
RICHARDS JA
KAYE JA:

In 2014, the applicant was charged on two indictments, namely, indictment C11434997.3 (the ‘first indictment’), and indictment C1143997.4 (the ‘second indictment’), with a number of offences, which he was alleged to have committed between 9 January 2012 and 23 May 2012.
The first indictment contained eight charges. At the commencement of the trial of those charges, the applicant pleaded guilty to charges 7 and 8. After a trial, he was acquitted of the first six charges on the indictment. Following the completion of the trial, he pleaded guilty to the four charges on the second indictment.
Following a plea presented on his behalf, the applicant was sentenced, on 22 May 2014, to a total effective sentence of 18 years and 2 months’ imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 14 years and 2 months.
The sentences on the two indictments were as follows:

Charge

Offence

Maximum

Sentence

Cumulation

Indictment C11434997.3

7 Prohibited person possess firearm (contrary to s 5(1) of the Firearms Act 1996) 10 years’ imprisonment 2 years’ imprisonment 6 months on the sentence imposed on indictment C114349997.4

8 Theft (contrary to s 74 of the Crimes Act 1958) 10 years’ imprisonment 1 month’s imprisonment Nil

Total Effective Sentence on Indictment C11434997.3: 2 years’ imprisonment, of which 6 months is cumulative on the sentence imposed on Indictment C11434997.4.

Indictment C11434997.4

1 Armed robbery (contrary to s 75A of the Crimes Act 1958) 25 years’ imprisonment 14 years and 2 months’ imprisonment Base

2

Prohibited person use firearm (contrary to s 5(1) of the Firearms Act 1996)

10 years’ imprisonment

6 years’ imprisonment

2 years

3

Reckless conduct endangering persons (contrary to s 23 of the Crimes Act 1958)

5 years’ imprisonment

2 years’ imprisonment

6 months

4

Prohibited person possess firearm (contrary to s 5(1) of the Firearms Act 1996)

10 years’ imprisonment

4 years’ imprisonment

1 year

Total Effective Sentence on Indictment C11434997.4: 17 years and 8 months’ imprisonment

Global Total Effective Sentence 18 years and 2 months’ imprisonment

Non-Parole Period: 14 years and 2 months

Pre-Sentence Detention declaration pursuant to s 18(1) of the Sentencing Act 1991: 715 days

Section 6AAA Statement: 22 years’ imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 18 years

Other relevant orders: Forfeiture and disposal orders; compensation order.

Subsequently, the applicant unsuccessfully sought leave to appeal against the sentences on two grounds, namely:
(1)that the sentence imposed on charge 1 on the second indictment (armed robbery) was manifestly excessive;
(2)as a consequence, the total effective sentence and minimum non-parole period were inconsistent with the principle of totality.
On the hearing of the application for leave to appeal, he also sought two further grounds. The application for leave to appeal against sentence was refused.[1]
[1]Binse v The Queen [2016] VSCA 145 (‘Binse’).
The applicant now seeks leave to appeal against his conviction on four grounds, namely:
Ground 1: The Court was led into error and a miscarriage of justice occurred when counsel for the Applicant coerced the Applicant into a plea of guilt against his will.
Ground 2: Counsel for the Applicant perverted the course of justice when he denied the Court knowledge of the true facts and circumstances of the Applicant’s case. [Note: this is not a complaint of incompetence of counsel].
Ground 3: Because of the error that the Court was led into, as stated in Ground 1 and 2, the Court subsequently failed in its s 6(2) (b) Charter obligation to conduct a fair hearing of the matter and to ‘promote and protect’ the Applicant’s s 24(1) human right to a fair hearing.
Ground 4: Counsel for the Applicant perverted the course of justice when he denied the Court knowledge of the true facts and circumstances of the Applicant’s case as it relates to an objective factual matter that was misrepresented, and then allowed the Court to proceed in its reasoning to rely on the factually false representation.

The circumstances of the offending

On the original plea hearing, the prosecution categorised the applicant’s offences into five incidents, namely:
(1)On 9 January 2012, a loaded semi-automatic handgun, with a silencer fitted, was found by police in a motor vehicle, shortly after the applicant had departed from the vehicle and abandoned it. The applicant had driven to Seaford with the firearm, with the intention of confronting another person, referred to as Prisoner X (charge 4 on the second indictment).
(2)On 19 March 2012, the applicant committed an armed robbery on two Armaguard security guards, who were carrying $235,090.05 in cash, in the car-park of the Westside Hotel in Laverton North. The applicant was armed with a loaded sawn-off pump action shotgun (charge 1 on the second indictment).
(3)On 20 May 2012, the applicant produced a revolver when he was approached by persons in a restaurant who, unbeknownst to him, were, in fact, plain clothes police officers. In the course of that incident, the applicant stole a portable radio belonging to Victoria Police (charges 7 and 8 on the first indictment).
(4)Over a period of approximately 44 hours, between 21 May 2012 and 23 May 2012, a siege took place at a house in which the applicant was then living in Keilor East. In the course of the siege, the applicant fired nine shots with a revolver, which he had taken from one of the Armaguard security guards in the course of the armed robbery that he had committed on 19 March. Five of the shots were discharged at a Special Operations Group (‘SOG’) armoured vehicle. One shot was fired at a Victoria Police robot. Three shots were fired out of the back door of the house, one of which penetrated two fences, and fell close to a busy thoroughfare (charges 2 and 3 on the second indictment).
(5)Following the armed robbery, police searched a storage unit that was rented by the applicant, and regularly attended by him. Police located four firearms in the storage unit (charge 4 on the second indictment).
For the purposes of the present application, it is necessary to describe in a little detail the circumstances of the offending. Those circumstances were summarised, in some detail, in the prosecution opening, and in the primary judge’s reasons for sentence.[2]
[2]R v Binse [2014] VSC 253 (‘Reasons for sentence’).
On 28 September 2011, the applicant was released from custody after serving a term of imprisonment. On his release, he lived with his former partner, Kylie Miller, and his daughter, Charlize. The applicant was concerned for their welfare, as he believed that Prisoner X represented a threat to their safety and to his safety. On 16 October 2011, the applicant was assaulted by a number of men, in the course of which he sustained head injuries. In November 2011, an associate of the applicant was shot and seriously wounded.
The applicant, when later interviewed by police, explained that, after he was released, he was reliably informed that Prisoner X wanted to kill him and his associates. Prisoner X had been arrested on firearms charges, but was subsequently released on bail, which had caused the applicant and other people to become worried about their safety. In that context, the applicant commenced using methylamphetamine. He determined to confront Prisoner X. In order to do so, on 9 January 2012, he drove in his black Land Rover to an address in Seaford. He parked the Land Rover, and then attempted, unsuccessfully, to steal a nearby vehicle. When that attempt failed, he left the area, leaving the Land Rover behind.
Subsequently, police were called. When the Land Rover was searched, the police located a .22 calibre Ruger brand semi-automatic handgun, fitted with a silencer, beneath the driver’s seat. The applicant’s possession of that handgun formed part of charge 4 on the second indictment, charge 4 being a rolled-up count.
On 19 March 2012, the applicant drove to Laverton Market in preparation to commit an armed robbery at the nearby Westside Hotel. He unloaded from his vehicle an off-road motorcycle, and strapped a sawn-off single barrel pump action shotgun to the side of the motorcycle. The applicant had previously cut a hole in a cyclone wire fence at the western perimeter of the hotel grounds, to enable him to gain access to a small walkway between the hotel and an adjacent factory. He had also previously drilled 14 small holes in the high wooden paling fence that separated the factory from the hotel carpark, and had positioned a ladder against the fence, and a deckchair nearby.
The applicant rode his motorcycle to the small hole in the cyclone wire fence. He took the shotgun from it, and moved to the prepared site behind the paling fence. At about 11:00 am, an Armaguard van entered the rear carpark. The two guards entered the hotel, and collected $235,090, which was placed into a large blue Armaguard bag. They then left the rear of the hotel, and walked towards their van. As they did so, the applicant, using the ladder, elevated his head and shoulders above the paling fence, and, wearing a hood, pointed the shotgun at them, pumped it, and demanded that the guard, who was holding the bag, throw it over the fence. The guard attempted to comply, but the bag failed to clear the fence. The applicant approached the first guard, pointed his shotgun at him, and removed his service revolver from its holster. He also required the other guard to surrender his revolver. The applicant then climbed back over the fence with the money bag and the two revolvers, and departed the scene on his motorcycle. He rode to the Laverton Market, where he dumped the motorcycle and the shotgun, and drove away in a white van. That offending was the subject of charge 1 on the second indictment (armed robbery).
During the following period, the applicant was identified as a suspect in the armed robbery, and his movements were the subject of surveillance. He was observed to regularly attend an ATAK storage facility in Ballarat Road, Albion. He had earlier rented three shipping containers at the facility. On 22 May 2012, police searched the ATAK facility. In the course of the search, police located and seized four firearms, which are the subject of charge 4 on the second indictment, namely:
•a .357 calibre Sturm Ruger revolver, which had been stolen from the security guard during the Westside Hotel armed robbery;
•a .22 calibre Long Rifle Sturm Ruger rifle, which had been cut down and loaded, modified to fire in a full automatic mode, and which had a silencer attached;
•a 12 gauge Sportco brand Model 81 bolt action repeating shotgun, which was loaded. The butt, stock and barrel of the weapon had been cut down;
•a .45 calibre Auto Ordinance Corporation brand Thompson model 1928 – A1 sub-machine gun.
Those items were all seized from one of the three containers. Ammunition for all of the firearms was also found in the container.
In the meantime, on 20 May 2012, two police officers, in an unmarked vehicle, observed the applicant riding his Honda motorcycle in the north-west metropolitan region. After a relatively minor traffic accident, police pursued a motorcycle that had been travelling in company with the applicant. About 90 minutes later, two other police officers saw the applicant’s motorcycle parked outside La Porchetta pizza restaurant in Niddrie. They contacted the other two officers, and the four officers assembled on the footpath outside the restaurant.
At about the same time, the applicant emerged from the restaurant. He did not realise that the four persons standing outside were police officers. He turned and walked briskly back into the restaurant. Three of the police officers followed the applicant into the restaurant. One of them placed his arm on the applicant’s shoulder. In response, the applicant produced a loaded silver coloured revolver, which he had taken from the security guard at the Westside Hotel armed robbery on 19 March. The applicant’s possession of that weapon as a prohibited person was the subject of charge 7 on the first indictment. The police officer then backed away and dropped his police radio, which the applicant took possession of. That conduct constituted charge 8 on the first indictment, the charge of theft. The applicant then hurriedly left the premises and drove home.
On the following two days the offending then took place, which was the subject of charges 2, 3 and 4 on the second indictment. Those offences were alleged to have been committed in the course of a siege by police of the applicant’s home in Sterling Drive, Keilor East.
At about 6:40 am on 21 May 2012, members of the Victoria Police SOG attended outside those premises. The applicant’s partner, Loretta Collier, was present with him. Police requested that the applicant exit the property, and surrender. The applicant did not respond, and then attempted to barricade himself inside the house, where he remained for the next 44 hours. He was armed with the .357 Sturm Ruger service calibre silver revolver that, some hours earlier, he had produced in La Porchetta, and which he had stolen during the armed robbery at Westside Hotel on 19 March 2012.
The applicant discharged that firearm on four occasions on that day. At 7:38 am, he fired a shot at a SOG armoured vehicle, positioned in the driveway, in which two SOG operators were seated. The shot ricocheted off the front of the vehicle. At 7:48 am, the applicant fired two further shots at the SOG vehicle. Both shots missed the vehicle, and passed through the wooden fence, into the neighbouring front yard. At 3:38 pm, the applicant fired a further shot, that ricocheted off the front of the vehicle, and again two SOG operators were present inside the vehicle. At 3:48 pm, the applicant fired a further shot at the vehicle, which struck the driver’s door window. The two occupants remained in the vehicle at that time.
On the following morning, 22 May 2012, at 12:51 am, the applicant emerged from the house, wearing a white ballistic vest. A police robot was positioned in the driveway. The applicant pointed his firearm at the occupied SOG vehicle, then turned and fired a shot at the robot. He again pointed his firearm at the vehicle, then flipped the robot over, and returned into the house. The shots fired by the applicant constituted charge 2 on the second indictment, which is a rolled-up charge, alleging that the applicant, as a prohibited person, used a firearm.
At approximately 10:10 am on 22 May, the applicant fired three shots from the back door of his house, towards the rear fence of the property. That fence is adjacent to Keilor Park Drive. Traffic was heavy on the roadway at that time. One of the shots penetrated the fence, continued through a further barrier fence, and travelled towards, but not onto, Keilor Park Drive. The discharge by the applicant of those shots constituted the offence that is the subject of charge 3 on the second indictment (reckless conduct endangering others of serious injury).
Loretta Collier left the house at 7:27 pm on 22 May. At approximately 2:10 am on the next morning, 23 May, the SOG fired chemical munitions into the house and called for the applicant to surrender. The applicant emerged, armed with a silver revolver. He complied with a request to drop his weapon. When he bent over to pick it up, non-lethal bean bag rounds were fired at him. He then picked up the weapon, and dropped it when he was struck with more bean bag rounds. The applicant fell to the ground and was arrested by police.

The plea

In substance, the proposed grounds of appeal are based on the proposition that the applicant’s counsel, in effect, pressured him to plead guilty to the charges, in circumstances in which he wished to avail himself of defences that included duress, necessity and (in the case of charges 2 and 3 on the second indictment) self-defence. In particular, the applicant submits that, at the time of the offending, he suffered post-traumatic stress disorder (‘PTSD’), which was relevant to his defence of each of the charges. A number of the submissions, made by the applicant, on the present application, focused on matters put on his behalf on his plea. By way of background, it is necessary to set out, in a little detail, the applicant’s circumstances and the matters that were advanced on that plea.
The applicant was born in October 1968. His parents separated when he was young. He commenced to run away from home when he was about eight or nine years of age. Since the age of 11 years, he was in a number of institutions, which included Baltara, Turana, and Malmsbury. In 1985, when he was 17 years of age, he was remanded in Pentridge Prison for two years. In the period of 32 years preceding the plea in the present case, the applicant had been detained in custody for some 28 years. As we have noted, he was last released from custody, in Port Phillip Prison, in September 2011. At the time of his release, he was not supported.
The applicant was examined by Pamela Matthews, a forensic psychologist, on two occasions in March 2014. Ms Matthews’ report, dated 14 April 2014, was tendered on the plea, and Ms Matthews gave evidence consistent with that report. The applicant was also examined by Dr Danny Sullivan, consultant psychiatrist, and Dr Sullivan’s report, dated 19 January 2014, was tendered on the plea.

In the conclusion to her report, Ms Matthews noted that the applicant had spent a great proportion of his life in prison. He presented with a history of disordered effects, behaviour and mental states, which related to his time in restrictive custody settings, and also to the context of increased psycho-social stress, including pre-eminent release from custody, court hearings, and management circumstances in custody. Ms Matthews considered that, at the time of assessment, the applicant had a decompensated mental state, which was a result of his time contained in restrictive custody settings.
In respect of the applicant’s mental state at the time of the offending, Ms Matthews noted the circumstances in which he had been released from prison in September 2011, his concerns about the threat posed by Prisoner X, and the assault on him. Ms Matthews noted that the applicant has, in the past and present, been observed with symptoms consistent with PTSD, but she considered that the applicant’s fears were not necessarily divorced from reality, and they were an integrated aspect of his overall presentation, which was also complicated by other traumatic events over his lifetime. Ms Matthews considered that the intensifying stress, from those matters, including stress applied by his former partner, Kylie, and her mother, Ursula Prendergast, had led the applicant to fall back on limited coping skills, which included the acquisition of firearms and vests, theft and robberies which were means of financial survival and providing for his daughter, and drug use to release his stress.
Ms Matthews was of the opinion that the applicant had very limited capacity to cope or manage in a functional manner in the world outside that of a custodial environment. She concluded that his underlying mental state, leading up to the offending, was one of adjustment disorder, as defined by the DSM-5, in circumstances in which his state was exacerbated by the use of methylamphetamine. Ms Matthews considered that the applicant’s conduct, in respect of the siege, represented his last resort thinking, which was characteristic of an individual with a mixed antisocial and narcissistic personality disorder, confronted with a marked discrepancy between his expectations and reality. She considered that, in the circumstances, it was the applicant’s intention to be shot in the course of the siege.
In his report, Dr Sullivan concluded that the applicant would satisfy a diagnosis of a mixed personality disorder, with antisocial and narcissistic traits. He had a clear history of substance use disorders, involving stimulants and cannabis. He noted that the applicant had drawn attention to a diagnosis of PTSD.
In that respect, Dr Sullivan stated:
Although he might meet the diagnostic criteria for post-traumatic stress disorder, it is perhaps more appropriate to regard his condition as an adaptation to prolonged incarceration in austere circumstances, as well as a number of attacks on him associated with prison life and his lifestyle outside prison.
Dr Sullivan noted that the applicant had, on occasion, experienced brief episodes of behavioural disturbance, disordered thinking, and persecutory and grandiose beliefs. However, on those occasions, his symptoms had resolved spontaneously. Dr Sullivan also noted that the applicant had said that his conduct, in the siege, was based on his belief that the police would kill him if they had the opportunity to do so.
In the course of the plea, counsel for the applicant outlined his history and his circumstances, noting that the applicant had been institutionalised from the age of 11 or 12 years. Counsel also noted that, in respect of the applicant’s last two lengthy periods of imprisonment, he had served the entirety of the head sentence, so that, on each occasion, he had been released into the community without any parole support.
On the last occasion, in September 2011, the applicant had become immediately aware of threats relating to Prisoner X. He understood that he was on a hit list, and that the threats were directed not only towards himself, but also his daughter. Counsel submitted that those threats, and the applicant’s perception of them, were part of the circumstances in which the events in La Porchetta, and the siege in May 2012, occurred. It was for that purpose that the applicant acquired the firearms that were located in the ATAK storage units, as he felt that he needed to be able to protect both himself and his daughter.
Counsel submitted that the applicant committed the armed robberies as a method of protecting his family, and, in particular, his daughter. The applicant considered that he needed to make a substantial one-off capture of money in order to enable him to properly protect his family. At the time, the applicant was under substantial pressure from the grandmother of his daughter, Ursula Prendergast, to commit the offence for the purposes of obtaining money. In that connection, counsel referred to call charge records that recorded a large number of telephone calls and messages by Ms Prendergast to the applicant in that time period.
In respect of the incident at La Porchetta, counsel submitted that the applicant was engaging in self-defence. He was not aware that the other persons involved in the incident were police members. In addition, at the time, Ursula Prendergast, and his former partner, Kylie, had prevented him from seeing his daughter, and he was experiencing substantial pressure as a result.
In respect of the siege, counsel noted that the siege itself lasted for 44 hours, but the offending during it only occupied short parts of that period. The applicant’s partner, Loretta Collier, had described, in her interview with police, how the applicant, during the siege, in fact spent a lot of time asleep or resting, and she also described him as being nauseated, shivery and hot. Based on the report of Ms Matthews, counsel explained that the applicant did not wish to go back into custody, and he had told Ms Collier that he would rather be dead.

Application for an extension of time

The applicant pleaded guilty on arraignment on 28 April 2014, and he was sentenced on 22 May 2014. The application for leave to appeal against conviction was filed on 2 February 2024, more than nine years and eight months after the expiration of the time prescribed by the Criminal Procedure Act 2009.
In an affidavit dated 2 February 2024, the applicant has set out the circumstances on which he relies in support of an extension of time within which to file the application for leave to appeal against conviction.
In the affidavit, and in other affidavits filed in support of the substantive applications, the applicant has deposed to suffering PTSD and mental ill-health, both in the period before his sentence, and in the subsequent period between 2014 and 2017. In his affidavit, he stated that the onerous conditions in which he was detained compounded and affected his deteriorating mental health, so that he found it extremely difficult to focus and present his case in a coherent manner.
On 6 March 2018, the applicant made an application to the Victorian Attorney-General and submitted a petition of mercy. That petition was refused by a letter from the Governor of Victoria dated 17 April 2020. The applicant then engaged in correspondence, between August 2020 and November 2023, with Victoria Legal Aid, Monash Oakleigh Legal Service, and with the Court, seeking to obtain legal assistance, for the purpose of submitting an appeal to the Court. He stated that during that period, he was struggling with his PTSD condition. In his affidavit, he further stated that it has only been since November 2023 that he has had the assistance of a fellow prisoner to enable him to present his appeal in a coherent fashion.
The principles relevant to an application for an extension of time were conveniently stated by this Court in Madafferi v The Queen[3] in the following terms:
The applicant carries the burden of persuading this Court that an extension of time should be granted. When considering the application, it must be acknowledged that time limits exist for sound reasons. Among those reasons is the desirability of achieving finality in criminal proceedings with reasonable expedition (consistently, of course, with the imperative of correcting substantial miscarriages of justice). The Court has a broad discretion whether to grant an extension of time, scrutiny being invited of the reasons for the delay and the merits of the proposed appeal. Although the exercise of the discretion whether to extend time must always be informed by what the interests of justice require in the particular circumstances of the case, the length of the delay — and the reasons for it — and the prospects of success should the extension be granted, are relevant (but not necessarily decisive). The reasons for the delay and the merits of the proposed appeal will not necessarily be in equipoise. Thus, where the merits of the putative appeal are very good, but the explanation for the delay is poor, the court may incline towards granting an extension. Where the merits of the proposed appeal are very poor, however, even a satisfactory explanation for the delay might not justify an extension. The discretion must, as we have said, be exercised according to the individual facts of each case.[4]
[3][2017] VSCA 302.
[4]Ibid [11] (Priest, Hansen and Coghlan JJA).
In the present case, in view of the extensive delay, it would only be appropriate to grant the applicant an extension of time if the proposed grounds, on which he seeks leave to appeal, are sufficiently arguable.

The application for leave to appeal conviction — affidavits in support

The principal submission, advanced by the applicant in support of each of the proposed grounds of appeal, is that he provided evidence to his legal representatives that supported an argument that, due to his suffering PTSD, his state of mind was such that there was a reasonable doubt that he was guilty of the offending that was the subject of the charges. In particular, the applicant has contended that his counsel and solicitor had originally led him to believe that that evidence would be used in his defence. However, the report of Dr Sullivan cast doubt on the PTSD diagnosis, and, as a consequence, his legal representatives incorrectly prevailed on him to plead guilty to the charges.
In support of that proposition, the applicant has deposed a number of affidavits. The matters relied on by the applicant, in that respect, are principally contained in affidavits deposed by him on 3 July 2024, 7 October 2024 and 30 December 2024.
In the affidavit deposed 3 July 2024, the applicant commenced by stating that his solicitor and his barrister pressured him into entering a plea of guilty against his will, by advising him that PTSD was not a defence, but only a mitigating factor. In addition, they advised him that his other defences, namely, duress and necessity, were not legally valid or open to him.
The applicant, in the affidavit, deposed that, following his release from custody on 28 September 2011, he was informed that there was a ‘hit’ out on him. Within weeks, he was severely assaulted, as a result of which he was required to receive urgent medical hospital treatment. The applicant later learned that Prisoner X was involved in the attempted murder and shooting of a sergeant of arms of the Bandidos Brunswick chapter. As a result, the applicant was pressured by his daughter’s grandmother, Ursula, to ensure that both Kylie and Charlize would be safe.
In respect of the charge of possession of firearms (charge 7 on the first indictment), the applicant deposed that, due to ‘controlling unrelenting pressure’ practised by Ursula, he had obtained a loaded .22 calibre Ruger brand semi-automatic pistol with a silencer. He further deposed that Ursula’s threat, that he would never see his daughter again, placed him under duress. The applicant also deposed that, during the period preceding the offending that is the subject of the second indictment, he had suffered two ‘full-blown’ psychoses.
The applicant further deposed as to the conferences that he had with counsel, Saul Holt, and his solicitor, Gavin Green, that preceded his guilty plea. He said that, in the course of those conferences, he indicated to his legal practitioners that he wished to contest charge 2 on the second indictment, on the basis of self-defence. He said that he had identified audio of SOG police discussing their intention to shoot and kill him. However, he was ‘coerced’ by his counsel not to run that defence. The applicant also deposed that, in the course of the siege, he had been exposed to ‘flash bang explosion trauma’, which was relevant to his state of mind at the time of the alleged offending. The applicant, in his affidavit, stated that he only pleaded guilty because he was ‘coerced’ by counsel, who knew the law, and who told him that he had no prospects of succeeding on the charge against him.
In the affidavit, the applicant further stated that it had always been his intention to contend that he had engaged in the criminal offending due to his diagnosed chronic PTSD, and, further, to contend that the armed robbery (that was the subject of charge 1 on the second indictment) was committed to fund the relocation of his ‘loved ones’ to a safe place, so as to protect them from the ‘real grave live dangers and threats’ that were then posed against him.
In his affidavit dated 7 October 2024, the applicant again described the pressures under which he was placed after his release from custody on 28 September 2011. He stated that Ursula (a ‘well-known criminal matriarch’) had pressured him to ensure that her daughter, Kylie, and her granddaughter, Charlize, were safe. That pressure caused him acute anxiety and stress, which caused him to relocate Kylie and Charlize, and to ‘be active in trying to find and catch up with’ Prisoner X, which culminated in the police finding the loaded .22 calibre Ruger brand semi-automatic pistol on 9 January 2012. In the affidavit, the applicant reiterated that his primary motive for committing the armed robbery, was to make Kylie and Charlize safe and to relocate them.
The applicant then described the circumstances in which he had discussions with his counsel and his solicitor concerning the charges on the first indictment. He stated that, during the period of time in which the jury was deliberating the first six charges on the first indictment, they discussed the remaining charges. The applicant further stated that, during that time, counsel would begin to ‘sternly and aggressive[ly] at times’ try to sway him from his firm intention to fight the armed robbery charge, with ‘duress’, being ‘a pivotal key element’, arising from ‘unrelenting threats’ to him by Ursula, coupled with additional fears and concerns posed to him by Prisoner X and another violent criminal, and his ‘PTSD line of defences’.
The applicant said that he refused to be swayed, and was adamant he could defend the armed robbery charges. As a consequence, counsel shifted his attention to the other charges, and, in particular, the siege charges. The applicant told counsel that he relied on his previous history of police assaults, and that, at the time, he was suffering from repeated past traumas at the hands of police. He further noted the audio recordings of police discussing to shoot and kill him. However, counsel was not receptive to the content of that audio as (counsel said) it could not be proven who had spoken on it.
In respect of the ATAK facility, the applicant said that he agreed to plead guilty to possession of the weapons that were recovered there, but he would contest any of the other items. In response (according to the applicant), counsel was ‘flustered’ and ‘frustrated’. He said that he could reduce the ATAK charges to the firearms. The applicant said that he wanted to prove that the manager of ATAK was responsible for the other items, namely, explosives, drug precursors and stolen motorbikes, located at the facility.
In the affidavit, the applicant further stated that counsel said that he would ‘take control of’ the armed robbery charge. He would abandon the duress defence, but contend that Ursula had placed enormous pressure on the applicant to commit the offence. In those discussions, counsel also placed emphasis on the applicant’s PTSD.
The applicant further deposed that counsel attempted to convince him to also plead guilty to the siege charges (charges 2 and 3 on the second indictment). In the end, the applicant ‘reluctantly capitulated’ to counsel’s demands, ‘being coerced into this by [counsel] and his claims he knew the law and that I had no real prospects of success of beating [the charges]’.
In the affidavit, the applicant stated that it had always been his intention that he would maintain a defence on the basis that he had engaged in the offending due to his ‘diagnosed chronic PTSD’. He further deposed that his lawyers had access to the relevant information and crucial evidence to reveal his ‘PTSD state’. In that respect, he relied on a certificate of determination by a medical panel on 10 May 2023, in a claim for personal injury damages maintained by the applicant, namely, that he was then suffering from PTSD, relevant in part to an incident in May 2006 and an assault in July 2007, and also an unrelated antisocial personality disorder.
In conclusion to his affidavit, the applicant stated that the issue of his mental health before, during, and after the offending was not revealed, and that his legal representatives had presented facts to the court that were materially misleading. Further, his legal representatives had pressured him into entering pleas of guilty against his will.
In his affidavit dated 30 December 2024, the applicant covered a number of topics. In seeking an extension of time, he requested that he have a fair opportunity to present ‘the truth and facts’ relevant to his application for leave to appeal. He submitted that the conduct of his counsel had, in effect, perverted the course of justice, such as to constitute a substantial miscarriage of justice. In that respect, he submitted that his counsel made ‘inflammatory false malicious submissions’ in the course of the plea before T. Forrest J.

Other applications

In support of his application for leave to appeal against conviction, the applicant filed seven applications seeking documents from various persons and entities (‘the document applications’) and an application that this Court make a reference determination under s 319A of the Criminal Procedure Act (‘the reference determination application’).
It is convenient to deal with those applications before returning to the applicant’s applications for an extension of time and for leave to appeal.

The document applications

The document applications did not specify the statutory or other basis upon which they were made. We take them to have been made under s 317 of the Criminal Procedure Act. Section 317 relevantly provides that for the purposes of an application for leave to appeal against conviction, this Court ‘may order the production of any document, exhibit or other thing connected with the proceeding if [the court] considers that it is in the interests of justice to do so’.
The relevant principles governing the operation of s 317 were conveniently summarised by this Court in Polimeni v The Queen,[5] as follows:
In looking to see whether it is in the interests of justice to order the production of a document under s 317, the Court primarily looks to see whether an applicant has a legitimate forensic purpose for seeking access to the document. The assessment of whether an applicant has a legitimate forensic purpose for seeking access to a document falls to be considered by reference to the proposed grounds of appeal and the issues in dispute in the proceeding.
While it has been observed that the process in respect of an order under s 317 of the Criminal Procedure Act is treated as being akin to an order for a subpoena for the production of documents, ultimately the question of whether the production of a document should be ordered under s 317 is governed by whether this Court, to use the language of the statute, ‘considers that it is in the interests of justice to do so’. Thus, for example, while a given application may involve a greater than usual degree of uncertainty about whether it was ‘on the cards’ that the production of the document would materially assist an applicant’s case, the importance of the issue in respect of which the document is sought might be such that, weighing all relevant matters, the Court might conclude that it is nevertheless in the interests of justice to order production of the document.
On the other hand, a discretionary reason for refusing to order the production of a document under s 317 might be that the proposed ground of appeal to which the document relates is manifestly hopeless. Ordering production of a document relating to a proposed ground of appeal that is manifestly hopeless is a pointless exercise — and one serving no legitimate forensic purpose. Courts do not engage in acts of futility.
This is not to say that this Court, on the hearing of an application under s 317, should lightly conclude that a proposed ground of appeal (or application for leave to appeal) is manifestly hopeless. Generally speaking, an application under s 317 of the Criminal Procedure Act, involving a dispute between the applicant and a party other than the respondent, is not the occasion upon which to give any detailed consideration to the merits of the applicant’s proposed appeal. More often than not, the material before the Court on such an occasion does not permit of anything other than a broad understanding of the competing contentions as to the merits of the proposed appeal.[6]
[5][2022] VSCA 20 (‘Polimeni’).
[6]Ibid [34]–[37] (citations omitted). See also Madafferi v The Queen [2021] VSCA 1, [98] (Emerton, Weinberg and Osborn JJA); Zirilli v The Queen (2021) 287 A Crim R 407, 422 [77]–[98] (McLeish, Emerton and Weinberg JJA); [2021] VSCA 2 (‘Zirilli’); Zirilli v The Queen [2021] VSCA 174, [42] (Irving JA).

The document applications seek the production of 18 classes of documents. Some of the categories are of considerable width. For example, category 10 of the document application filed on 19 September 2024 addressed to Corrections Victoria seeks:
Any and all documented intelligence information on file, specific to threats to the safety and welfare from identified enemies of [the applicant] for the periods of January 1, 2006 to 13 September 2024 (inclusive).
The document applications are variously addressed to Corrections Victoria and one of its Commissioners; an unspecified ‘freedom of information officer’; a law firm and one of its solicitors; a barrister who had a Zoom conference with the applicant in May 2024, and his clerk’s office; the Victorian Legal Services Commissioner; and Barwon Health. Again by way of example, so far as the document application made against Barwon Health is concerned, the applicant sought:
Any and all documents, things, statements and X-rays imaging materials that relate to [the applicant] medical reporting’s [sic] swallowing 13x AA batteries incident on file for periods of: 11 June–14 June 2024. Inclusive.
The applicant filed an affidavit affirmed by him on 19 September 2024 in support of the document applications. In his affidavit, the applicant asserted that the documents he sought would variously establish ‘the sheer level of improper criminal corrupt conduct fleshed out by [his solicitor and named counsel with whom he conferred in May 2024]’; ‘the corrupt criminal conduct of his plea counsel’; and his ‘frail mental state’.
Having read all of the applicant’s material and heard his submissions in support of the document applications, we are not persuaded that the applicant has any legitimate forensic purpose for seeking access to the categories of documents identified in the document applications. The applicant has not demonstrated how the documents, sought by him, could be relevant to any of the proposed grounds of appeal. The document applications appear to us to be no more than a fishing expedition.
Moreover, a substantial number of the categories of the documents are expressed in terms which are oppressive in that they would require the person or entity to whom any such order was directed to engage in a process of construction[7] before potentially having to search large numbers of documents. The oppressive nature of the requests in the document applications tells against any order being made in the applicant’s favour in those applications.
[7]For example, in order to comply with an order expressed in the terms set out in para [65] above, Corrections Victoria would have to identify the applicant’s ‘identified enemies’.
Further, for the reasons given below, we have concluded that the applicant’s proposed grounds of appeal are not arguable. It would thus be futile to make any order under s 317.[8]
[8]See Polimeni [2022] VSCA 20, [36] (Beach JA).
In summary, having read the applicant’s material and listened to his submissions, we are not persuaded that it is in the interests of justice to make any order under s 317 of the Criminal Procedure Act and we thus refuse the document applications.

The reference determination application

Section 319A of the Criminal Procedure Act permits this Court to refer, for the making of a reference determination, any specified issue or matter arising on an appeal or an application for leave to appeal to a judge of the Trial Division. That section is capable of having application in this case because the applicant’s application for leave to appeal is one which is brought under the Part of the Criminal Procedure Act containing s 319A.[9]
[9]See s 319A(1)(b).
The applicant seeks to refer 64 questions to a judge of the Trial Division. The questions are wide-ranging and include the following topics: the applicant’s state of mental health; circumstances of the armed robbery (charge 1 on the second indictment); the circumstances of the siege (charges 2 and 3 on the second indictment); issues that may have been disputable at trial; the competence of counsel; and issues relating to charge 4 on the second indictment.
Having considered the applicant’s affidavit evidence and submissions in support of the reference determination application, we are not persuaded that there is any basis upon which a reference determination could or should be made in this matter. Again, the application appears to us to be no more than a broad-based fishing expedition, made in the hope that the applicant might discover some evidence supportive of his proposed grounds of appeal. As we explain below, the proposed grounds of appeal identified by the applicant are not arguable.

Application for leave to appeal conviction — applicant’s submissions

In his written submissions, in support of the application for leave to appeal conviction, the applicant, based on the evidence referred to in paragraphs [45]–[60] above, submitted that he had provided a large quantity of evidence to his counsel and solicitor that supported the proposition that his state of mind was such that, due to his suffering PTSD, there was a reasonable doubt that he was guilty of the offending alleged against him. The applicant has contended that his counsel and solicitor led him to believe that that evidence would be used in his defence. However, Dr Sullivan’s report cast doubt on his PTSD diagnosis.
Further, it was submitted, the applicant had instructed his lawyers to run defences based on duress, necessity and self-defence, but they told him that they were not prepared to rely on those defences. The applicant submitted that counsel had effectively ‘extinguished’ his necessity and duress lines of defence, and that they coerced him to plead guilty to charge 1 on the second indictment.
The applicant, in his submissions, has maintained that he sought to contest charge 2 on the second indictment. He maintained that, when he fired the shots, he did not cause the complainants to apprehend any danger, and, in any event, he was acting in self-defence. In particular, as a result of his PTSD condition, he acted in self-defence.
In oral submissions to the Court, the applicant placed particular emphasis on his PTSD condition. He submitted that counsel erroneously relied on the report of Dr Sullivan, so that T. Forrest J did not have available the evidence as to his PTSD condition. The applicant submitted that all his alleged offending, and particularly that which occurred during the siege, was attributable to his concerns for his own safety, which concerns, themselves, were caused or accentuated by his PTSD condition. He submitted that, on previous occasions, he had had violent interactions with the police, which had caused him, on the occasion of the siege, to have concerns for his own safety. It was for that reason that he discharged his firearm each time he observed police approaching the house down the driveway.
The applicant further submitted that his PTSD had played a relevant and important role in his commission of the armed robbery offence that was the subject of charge 1 on the second indictment. In particular, being influenced by PTSD, the applicant had genuine fears for the safety of his daughter and her mother, and he committed the armed robbery in order to be able to make provision for their security.

Submissions of respondent

In response to ground 1, counsel for the respondent submitted, first, that the applicant’s affidavits do not establish that the integrity of his pleas of guilty was affected in the sense described in the authorities.
In particular, counsel noted that there is no evidence of any particular ‘demand’ being made by counsel, or any other improper pressure exerted on the applicant, that is capable of vitiating his free choice of whether to plead guilty. On the contrary, it was submitted, the applicant’s decision to plead guilty was based on the advice of counsel as to the merits of the defences, which the applicant had proposed to rely on. Counsel submitted that advice as to the prospects of any particular defence, even if expressed in strong terms, does not impugn a guilty plea entered based on that advice, unless that advice is imprudent or inappropriate. Counsel submitted that the complaint, by the applicant, that he was advised by his legal representatives that his intended lines of defence were not viable, did not constitute pressure that is capable of affecting the integrity of his pleas of guilty.
Further, counsel submitted that the applicant has not advanced any basis upon which to conclude that counsel’s advice, as to the merits of the defences the applicant intended to rely on at trial, was wrong.
In that respect, counsel noted that the evidence of Dr Danny Sullivan and Ms Pamela Matthews did not demonstrate that there was any sufficient connection between the applicant’s PTSD and the offending. Additionally, counsel noted that, on the applicant’s appeal against sentence, this Court observed that the material, which was before the sentencing judge, did not establish the kind of connection between the applicant’s mental condition and the offending, which would have been necessary in order to moderate general deterrence.[10] In those circumstances, it was submitted, there was no basis for the contention that there was any triable question whether the applicant might have been able to rely on the defence of mental impairment, or any cognate defence.
[10]Binse [2016] VSCA 145, [78] (Whelan, Beach and McLeish JJA).
In respect of the defence of duress, counsel noted that, on the plea, defence counsel (based clearly on instructions) had submitted that the applicant had committed the armed robbery arising from pressure placed on him by Ursula Prendergast, in respect of the firearm that she provided to him, and which he had lost in the circumstances that constituted charge 4 on the second indictment. Counsel noted that, although the applicant appears to accept that he maintained, at the time of the plea, that he had been provided with firearms by Ursula Prendergast, nevertheless, he now criticises defence counsel’s conduct in relying on that point, because, he now maintains that he did not commit the armed robbery to make good the loss of a firearm that Ursula Prendergast had supplied to him.
In any event, counsel submitted that the question, concerning how the applicant originally obtained the firearms, was not fundamental to the issue, whether there existed an arguable defence of duress on the charge of armed robbery. Counsel submitted that there was no evidentiary basis for that defence, as well as no evidence of any express or implied threat that a relevant form of harm (such as death or grievous bodily harm) would be inflicted on a person if the applicant failed to commit the armed robbery.
Counsel further submitted that a defence of necessity was not viable in the circumstances, as there was no evidentiary basis of any specific threat of death or serious injury. Further, there was no evidentiary basis for establishing that the applicant’s offending was a proportionate response to any immediate peril.
Finally, counsel submitted that there was no evidence that would support a defence of self-defence to the charges relating to the applicant discharging firearms during the siege, namely, charges 2 and 3 on the second indictment. In particular, counsel noted that there was no evidence that suggests that when the applicant discharged the eight shots during the siege, any of those shots were fired in response to any particular action by attending police. Accordingly, it was submitted, there was no evidence reasonably capable of raising the possibility that the applicant acted in self-defence in discharging those shots.
For those reasons, counsel submitted that ground 1 must fail. Counsel further noted that grounds 2, 3 and 4 are all based on the matters advanced by the applicant under ground 1. Accordingly, it was submitted, those grounds must also fail.
Applicant’s reply submissions
In further written submissions, entitled ‘Reply to Crown’s response to applicant’s submission’, which the applicant provided to the Court on the hearing of the applications, the applicant contended that his guilty pleas to the charges were not a tactical abandonment of a weaker defence, but were the product of ‘… improper pressure exerted by senior counsel, misrepresentations concerning the viability of viable defences (such as PTSD and self-defence) and the withholding of KEY psychiatric material’. The applicant submitted that counsel had failed to advise him, and had misled him, concerning available defences, which impacted his decision to plead guilty. He maintained that his counsel’s advice went ‘beyond robust advice into the realm of coercion and misinformation’. In particular, he submitted that he had been ‘falsely informed’ that no defences were available, despite there being credible evidence supporting defences of PTSD and self-defence. Thus, he submitted that the improper advice given to him fundamentally deprived him of his right to make an informed choice.

Legal principles — appeal against conviction after guilty plea

It is well-established that an applicant must demonstrate particularly exceptional circumstances, in order that an appellate court, following a plea of guilty, will grant leave to appeal against conviction.[11] Courts approach such an application with caution, based on the public interest in the finality of legal proceedings, and the principle that a plea of guilty by an accused, in possession of all the relevant facts, is normally an admission by that person of the necessary elements of the offence.[12]
[11]Zirilli (2021) 287 A Crim R 407, 411 [10] (McLeish, Emerton and Weinberg JJA).
[12]Liberti v The Queen (1991) 55 A Crim R 120, 122 (Kirby P).
A conviction entered on the basis of such a plea will not be set aside on appeal, unless it can be demonstrated that a miscarriage of justice has occurred. Ordinarily, in such a case, it will be necessary to demonstrate that the accused did not understand the nature of the charge, or did not intend to admit that he or she was guilty of it, or that, on the admitted facts, the accused could not have been guilty of the offence.[13]
[13]R v Forde [1923] 2 KB 400, 403 (Avory J); Meissner v The Queen (1995) 184 CLR 132, 157 (Dawson J); [1995] HCA 41 (‘Meissner’); R v Stewart [1960] VR 106, 108 (Herring CJ and O’Bryan J); R v Murphy [1965] VR 187 (Herring CJ and Adam J), 190 (Sholl J); Weston (a pseudonym) v The Queen (2015) 48 VR 413, 444 (Redlich JA); [2015] VSCA 354; Gurappaji v The Queen [2018] VSCA 187 [6]–[10] (Priest, Beach and Weinberg JJA).
In Peters v The Queen (No 2),[14] this Court summarised the relevant principles in the following terms:
The test for determining whether a conviction should be set aside following a plea of guilty is whether the applicant has established a substantial miscarriage of justice, in accordance with s 276(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act 2009....
Although the categories of miscarriage of justice are of course not closed, two kinds of situation have emerged repeatedly in the cases. As articulated by Avory J in R v Forde, they are, first, where the applicant did not appreciate the nature of the charge, or did not intend to admit that he was guilty of it, and secondly, where the applicant could not in law have been convicted of the offence charged on the facts alleged.
The first of these cases can be described as challenging the integrity of the plea in the sense that it was not really attributable to a genuine consciousness of guilt. Of itself, that will ordinarily only suffice to warrant a new trial if, in addition to doubt attaching to the integrity of the plea, it is shown that there was an ‘issuable question of guilt’, meaning a genuine issue as to the guilt of the accused.
The second kind of circumstance does not involve merely an arguable case as to the guilt or otherwise of the accused. It involves a relatively narrow class of case in which the material relied upon by the Crown was insufficient at law to sustain a conviction on the charge in question. In this situation, the focus is not on the integrity of the plea but on the conviction itself. The conviction involves a miscarriage of justice because the facts alleged simply could not support a conviction, or the charge in question was not known to the law.
In contrast, identification of a mere issue as to the guilt or innocence of the person who has pleaded guilty, without more, will rarely if ever warrant setting aside a conviction after a plea of guilty. This itself respects the integrity of the plea and the high public interest attached to finality of criminal proceedings. It also recognises the fact that, in pleading guilty, an accused will have chosen to forego potential defences in the hope of deriving some compensating benefit.[15]
[14](2019) 60 VR 231; [2019] VSCA 292.
[15]Ibid 241–2 [37]–[41] (Maxwell P, Kaye and McLeish JJA).
In accordance with those principles, it is well-established that erroneous advice by counsel, concerning an applicant’s prospects of success at trial, may not necessarily, per se, be sufficient to establish a substantial miscarriage of justice.[16]
[16]R v Pugh (2005) 158 A Crim R 302, 312 [52] (Doyle CJ, Bleby J agreeing at [80]–[81]); [2005] SASC 427; Meissner (1995) 184 CLR 132, 143 (Brennan, Toohey and McHugh JJ).
The circumstances in which erroneous advice, as to an applicant’s guilt, may be such as to result in a miscarriage of justice, are illustrated by the decision of the Court of Appeal of Queensland in R v Williamson.[17] In that case, counsel gave advice to the applicant as to her guilt of the relevant charge, which advice the court characterised as ‘grossly inadequate’.[18] As a result, the court was satisfied that the applicant did not understand the nature of the charge to which she was pleading guilty, and she did not intend to admit her guilt of the offence that was the subject of the charge.[19] On that basis it was concluded that the case was one of the ‘relatively rare cases’ in which a substantial miscarriage of justice, based on the erroneous advice of counsel, was established.[20]
[17](2012) 224 A Crim R 160; [2012] QCA 139.
[18]Ibid 173 [38] (Fraser JA, White JA agreeing at [48] and Daubney J agreeing at [49]).
[19]Ibid 175 [45] (Fraser JA).
[20]Ibid 175 [45] (Fraser JA).
In the present case, the applicant has submitted that he was given not only wrongful advice by counsel, but that he was ‘coerced’ by counsel to plead guilty, in circumstances in which he had legitimate defences based on his PTSD, and which defences included self-defence, duress and necessity. Before considering the evidence adduced by the applicant, on this application, concerning the advice given to him by counsel, and the circumstances in which he contends he was persuaded by that advice to plead guilty, it is convenient, first, to outline the legal principles relating to the constituent elements of the defences of self-defence, duress and necessity.

Self-defence — legal principles

The alleged offending occurred before the commencement of s 322K of the Crimes Act 1958, which introduced the statutory defence of self-defence, and s 322N, which abolished self-defence at common law.
In Zecevic v Director of Public Prosecutions,[21] Wilson, Dawson and Toohey JJ, in their joint judgment, restated and defined the elements of self-defence at common law in the following terms:
The question to be asked in the end is quite simple. It is whether the accused believed upon reasonable grounds that it was necessary in self-defence to do what he did. If he had that belief and there were reasonable grounds for it, or if the jury is left in reasonable doubt about the matter, then he is entitled to an acquittal.[22]
[21](1987) 162 CLR 645; [1987] HCA 26.
[22]Ibid 661.
Thus, the constituent elements of the defence of self-defence at common law were:
(1)the accused must have belief, at the time that he (or she) committed the relevant act, that what he (she) was doing was necessary; and
(2)that belief must have been based on reasonable grounds.

Duress — legal principles

The alleged offending occurred before the commencement of ss 322O to 322Q of the Crimes Act, concerning the defence of duress, which were also introduced by the Crimes Amendment (Abolition of Defensive Homicide) Act 2014.
The constituent elements of the defence of duress at common law were authoritatively expounded by Smith J in his dissenting judgment in R v Hurley[23] in the following terms:
Taking into account the two preceding paragraphs I consider that the following affirmative proposition may be stated. Where the accused has been required to do the act charged against him (i) under a threat that death or grievous bodily harm will be inflicted unlawfully upon a human being if the accused fails to do the act and (ii) the circumstances were such that a person of ordinary firmness would have been likely to yield to the threat in the way the accused did and (iii) the threat was present and continuing, imminent and impending (as previously described) and (iv) the accused reasonably apprehended that the threat would be carried out and (v) he was induced thereby to commit the crime charged and (vi) that crime was not murder, nor any other crime so heinous as to be excepted from the doctrine and (vii) the accused did not, by fault on his part when free from the duress, expose himself to its application and (viii) he had no means, with safety to himself, of preventing the execution of the threat, then the accused, in such circumstances at least, has a defence of duress.[24]
[23][1967] VR 526 (‘Hurley’).
[24]Ibid 543; see also R v Dawson [1978] VR 536, 537 (Anderson J), 541 (Harris J) (‘Dawson’); R v Rowan (a pseudonym) (2024) 418 ALR 91, 93 [3], 104 [57] (Gageler CJ, Gordon, Jagot and Beach-Jones JJ); [2024] HCA 9 (‘Rowan’).
Thus defined, the constituent elements of the defence of duress at common law include the following:
(1)That there be a threat of infliction of death or grievous bodily harm if the accused fails to commit the particular crime.[25]
(2)The threat must be operative or effective at the time at which the accused committed the acts that constitute the offence charged.[26]
(3)The accused must reasonably apprehend that, if he or she did not commit the crime, the threat would be carried out.[27]
(4)The circumstances of the threat were such that the will of the accused was coerced to commit the crime, such that the accused became a mere instrument of the crime.[28]
(5)A person of ordinary firmness of character would be likely to yield to the threat in the way that the accused did.[29]
[25]Rowan (2024) 418 ALR 91, 99 [37] (Gageler CJ, Gordon, Jagot and Beech-Jones JJ).
[26]Ibid 100 [40] Gageler CJ, Gordon, Jagot and Beech-Jones JJ.
[27]Emery v The Queen (1978) 18 A Crim R 49, 57 (Young CJ, Lush and Brooking JJ).
[28]Dawson [1978] VR 536, 537 (Anderson J).
[29]Hurley [1967] VR 526, 543 (Smith J).
In effect, a defence of duress at common law will fail, if the prosecution is able to exclude, beyond reasonable doubt, any one (or more) of those five fundamental elements.

Necessity — legal principles

The legal defence of necessity[30] is only infrequently invoked, principally because other defences, such as self-defence and duress, are ordinarily more appropriate to deal with situations which come before the Court.
[30]R v Dudley and Stephens (1884) 14 QBD 273; R v McKay [1957] VR 560, 562–3 (Lowe J), 571–3 (Smith J); R v Davidson [1969] VR 667, 670–2 (Menhennitt J).
For the purposes of the present case, it is not necessary to consider the content of the defence of necessity in detail. It was given consideration by the Full Court of the Supreme Court in R v Loughnan,[31] which was a case in which the applicant was charged with, and convicted of, escaping from Pentridge Prison, contrary to s 132(1) of the Community Welfare Services Act 1970.
[31][1981] VR 443 (‘Loughnan’).
In their joint judgment, Young CJ and King J described three elements of the defence of necessity, namely: first, the criminal act or acts must have been done in order to avoid certain consequences, which would have inflicted irreparable harm on the accused, or on others he was bound to protect; secondly, the accused must honestly believe, on reasonable grounds, that he was placed in a situation of imminent peril; and, thirdly, the act, that was done to avoid the imminent peril, must not be out of proportion to the peril sought to be avoided.[32]
[32]Ibid 448; see also Rogers v The Queen (1996) 86 A Crim R 542, 546–7 (Gleeson CJ); Behrooz v Secretary to the Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 219 CLR 486, 496–7 [15] (Gleeson CJ); [2004] HCA 36; B v The Queen [2015] NSWCCA 103 [301]–[302] (Simpson J); Veira v Cook [2021] NSWCA 302 [10]–[18] (Meagher JA).
In his separate reasons, Crockett J described the elements of the defence of necessity in similar, but different, terms, namely:
Similarly, I would prefer to restate the first three propositions. They appear to me to be in the form of evidentiary requirements rather than principles. The essential conditions, I consider, so far as presently relevant, are that:
1. The harm to be justified must have been committed under pressure either of physical forces or exerted by some human agency so that “an urgent situation of imminent peril” has been created; 2. The accused must have acted with the intention of avoiding greater harm or so as to have made possible ‘the preservation of at least an equal value’. 3. There was open to the accused no alternative, other than that adopted by him, to avoid the greater harm or ‘to conserve the value’.[33]
[33]Loughnan [1981] VR 443, 460.

Analysis

In substance, the applicant relies on two principal propositions in support of the proposed grounds of appeal, namely, first, that he had a valid defence to the charges to which he pleaded guilty, and, secondly, that he pleaded guilty because he was ‘coerced’ to do so by counsel acting on his behalf.
The particular defences, on which the applicant contends that he could have successfully relied, are not entirely clear. As expressed in the affidavits to which we have referred, the applicant contends that he could have resisted the charges on a defence based on his PTSD, and on defences of duress, necessity and self-defence. In an affidavit dated 19 September 2024, the applicant deposed that his legal representatives pressured him to plead guilty, advising him that his PTSD was not a defence, but only a mitigating factor, and that the defences of duress and necessity ‘were not legally valid or open’.
As we have noted, in oral submissions, the applicant placed particular emphasis on his PTSD, contending that that condition was central to his defence of the charges to which he pleaded guilty. In his affidavit dated 2 February 2024, that was deposed in support of the application for leave to appeal out of time, the applicant has quoted from prison records concerning medical attention that he received between August 2007 and June 2013. Those records contain notations that the applicant had (on various occasions) reported suffering depression, suicidal ideation, feelings of paranoia, personal issues, and PTSD.
The medical evidence in support of those complaints is, at the most, particularly limited. In his affidavits in the present application, and in oral submissions, the applicant has placed particular reliance on a certificate of determination issued by a medical panel on 10 May 2013, pursuant to s 28LZG(2)(a) of the Wrongs Act 1958, in which the panel concluded that the applicant suffered from a PTSD that was relevant ‘in part’ to incidents of 31 May 2006 and an ‘assault’ on 21 July 2007, and also an antisocial personality disorder that was unrelated to those incidents.
On the other hand, as we have noted, Dr Sullivan, who examined the applicant in January 2014, concluded that although the applicant might have met the diagnostic criteria for PTSD, it was more appropriate to regard his psychological condition as an adaptation to his long-term prolonged incarceration in difficult circumstances, as well as a number of attacks, which he had suffered, associated with his prison life and also his lifestyle when not in custody.
Ms Matthews, the psychologist who examined the applicant in March 2014, diagnosed him to suffer from an adjustment disorder. In evidence on the plea, Ms Matthews agreed with Dr Sullivan’s assessment of the applicant’s mental state. Ms Matthews considered that, although the applicant had some symptoms of PTSD, they were not sufficient to found a full diagnosis of that disorder.
The applicant has not explained how, in any event, his psychological condition (whether PTSD or adjustment disorder), of itself, constituted a viable defence to the charges to which he pleaded guilty. In his affidavit deposed 3 July 2024, he stated that it was always his intention that it was to be his defence that he had engaged in the criminal offending ‘… due to my diagnosed chronic PTSD, which had been recognised reported as involving a perceived hypervigilance and fixated fears, manifesting in the grave and heightened perceived threats to my loved ones and myself’.
That proposition might provide some mitigation to the applicant’s moral culpability for his offending, but it was not, of itself, such as to constitute a legitimate defence to any charges to which he pleaded guilty. In particular, the applicant has not produced any evidence that his mental state, at the time of the offending, was such that he could not, or did not, formulate the requisite mens rea to commit each of the offences. The fact that, due to his mental state and his PTSD, he had a tendency to perceive danger in circumstances in which that perception might be exaggerated, might be relevant to some of the potential defences of self-defence and, possibly, duress. However, of itself, and standing alone, his PTSD did not constitute a viable or valid defence to any of the charges.
As we have noted, it is difficult to identify the specific defences to the charges, which the applicant now claims were available to him, and which, he claims, counsel disregarded in his advice to him. At different points in his affidavits, and in his submissions, he referred to defences of duress, self-defence and necessity.
In considering those matters, it must first be noted that the applicant, on this application, has not put in issue any of the actions it is alleged that he performed, and that constituted the fundamental elements of each of the offences to which he pleaded guilty. For example, in his affidavit of 3 July 2024, he admitted that he committed the armed robbery on the Westside Hotel, in the course of which he stole $235,090 and two revolvers, that armed robbery being the subject of charge 1 on the second indictment. Similarly, in the same affidavit, he stated that he obtained possession of a large quantity of firearms, which were later recovered at the ATAK storage facility (charge 4 on the second indictment). He did not put in issue his offending at the La Porchetta restaurant, albeit that he claimed that he had a defence of self-defence to the charges on the first indictment of which he was acquitted. In respect of the siege, which was the subject of charges 2 and 3 on the second indictment, he has not sought to put in issue any of the conduct attributed to him, including the discharge of his firearm, but rather he has contended that he was acting in self-defence.
Further, the applicant, in his affidavit, does not provide a sufficient basis for any viable or valid defence of self-defence, duress or necessity to the charges to which he pleaded guilty.
The two La Porchetta charges to which the applicant pleaded guilty (charges 7 and 8 on the first indictment), were that he possessed a firearm while being a prohibited person, and stole a police radio. Self-defence was plainly not a viable defence to either charge. The applicant makes no complaint about his legal representatives’ advice to plead guilty to those charges, while successfully maintaining a defence of self-defence to the other charges.
As we have noted, the applicant has, in clear terms, admitted to undertaking the armed robbery at the Westside Hotel, that was the subject of charge 1 on the second indictment. In his affidavit deposed 3 July 2024, and in his affidavit deposed 7 October 2024, the applicant has said that his primary motive for committing that offence was to make his former partner, Kylie Miller, and his daughter, Charlize, safe, and to relocate them elsewhere. In oral submissions, he contended that, due to his PTSD, he feared for the safety of Ms Miller and Charlize, and he was concerned to obtain sufficient funds to be able to make suitable arrangements to accommodate their security. That reason for the conduct of the armed robbery may give some explanation for the applicant’s conduct. However, it does not, and could not, be the basis of a viable defence of either duress at common law, or necessity, in accordance with the principles relating to those two defences, which we have earlier discussed.
In his affidavit dated 3 July 2024, the applicant contends that his conduct, in the siege that took place between 21 May and 23 May 2012, and that was the subject of charges 2 and 3 on the second indictment, could be justified on the basis of self-defence.
In his affidavit deposed 2 February 2024, the applicant placed particular emphasis on the use, by police, of ‘flash bang grenades’ in the course of the siege. However, it is apparent, both from the applicant’s affidavit, and also from the video exhibits, that the SOG team did not fire the chemical munitions at the house until 6:00 pm on 22 May 2012, after the applicant had discharged all of the eight shots from his firearm. The subsequent use of the chemical munitions by the SOG team at 2:00 am on 23 May 2012, in effect, brought the siege to an end.
In his affidavit dated 3 July 2024, the applicant said that he has, subsequent to the offence, identified audio of SOG police ‘discussing their intent and plans to shoot and kill me’. In his affidavit, the applicant did not state that he, in fact, heard the SOG police conversation during the siege. In that respect, we note that the audio of the words, spoken by police, was particularly faint. In any event, the discussion by police occurred at 10:30 pm on 22 May 2012, subsequent to the applicant firing the shots that were the subject of charges 2 and 3 on the second indictment. As such, it could not provide the basis of a defence to those charges.
Further, based on the evidence, it is clear that, at the time, the police were acting lawfully and quite appropriately. When they arrived at the premises, they requested the applicant to exit his property and peacefully surrender. The applicant did not respond, and attempted to barricade himself in his house, where he remained for the next 44 hours. During that time, he discharged his firearm on four separate occasions, firing some eight shots. His conduct in doing so, quite plainly, could not be the basis of a legitimate defence of self-defence, in circumstances in which the police were acting appropriately and lawfully in seeking to arrest him for his offending. Further, while the applicant’s psychological state might have been relevant to an assessment, on the plea, of his moral culpability for his conduct, it could not, in the circumstances, assist to establish a viable defence of duress, or necessity, in terms of the fundamental elements of those defences, which we have earlier outlined.
As we have noted, the applicant, in his affidavit dated 3 July 2024, has admitted to possession of the large quantity of firearms, which were later recovered at the ATAK storage facility, and which were the subject of charge 4 on the second indictment. In his affidavit, the applicant has suggested that, in some way, he had a viable defence of duress to that charge.
The affidavits of the applicant do not provide any, or any sufficient, basis for the establishment of any of the five constituent elements of the common law defence of duress, which we have earlier summarised.[34] Nor do the contents of the affidavits form the basis of a defence of necessity, the elements of which were outlined by the Full Court of the Supreme Court in R v Loughnan,[35] and to which we have earlier referred,[36] or for any defence of self-defence. More importantly, there is nothing in the applicant’s affidavits which is capable of creating any reasonable doubt that, in respect of any of his offending, the applicant might have been acting under duress or out of necessity or in self-defence.
[34]Above, [101].
[35][1981] VR 443.
[36]Above, [104]–[106].
In those circumstances, the applicant has not demonstrated that, if he had not pleaded guilty, he would have had available to him valid and viable defences to the charges to which he did plead guilty. Accordingly, there is no basis upon which to conclude that counsel’s advice to the applicant, to that effect, was erroneous or misconceived.[37] That consideration, alone, is fatal to the application, by the applicant, to seek leave to appeal against his conviction on the charges to which he pleaded guilty. However, it is appropriate, in the circumstances, that we also consider the second point upon which the applicant seeks to rely, namely, that in some way he was coerced, or intimidated, by counsel to plead guilty, in circumstances in which (he maintains) he had valid defences available to him.
[37]Cf R v Holden [2009] VSCA 254 [91] (Neave JA).
In his affidavit dated 2 February 2024, the applicant commenced by stating the basis upon which he had intended to defend the charges, in the following terms:
It was always my intention that it was to be my defence that I had engaged in the criminal offending due to my diagnosed chronic PTSD, which had been recognised reported as involving a perceived hypervigilance and fixated fears, manifesting in the grave and heightened perceived threats to my loved ones and myself. The armed robbery was to fund the relocation of my loved ones to a safe place, so as not expose them to the very real grave live dangers and threats posed — real and perceived.
Pausing there, for the reasons we have already discussed, the applicant’s psychological condition did not, and could not, constitute a valid defence to any of the charges against him, and to which he pleaded guilty. As the applicant has noted, the report of Dr Sullivan was inconsistent with a diagnosis of PTSD. In his affidavit, the applicant criticised his lawyers for relying on that matter, because, he claims, it was inconsistent with a ‘large raft’ of medical and other evidence about his PTSD diagnosis.
That ‘large raft’ of medical and other evidence is set out in the exhibit to the applicant’s affidavit, and summarised in the affidavit. Essentially, it consists, primarily, of prison medical records. Those records do not contain any considered diagnosis by psychiatrists (or psychologists), but, rather, are notations of attendances, by the applicant, on the medical section of the prison. The references to various psychological states, in those notes, taken at their highest, do not, and could not, constitute a viable defence to any of the charges. It is understandable that the applicant’s legal practitioners at the time properly advised him that those matters could not constitute a valid defence, but, rather, they might be used (as it appears they were) on a plea in mitigation of sentence. Advice given to the applicant by his legal representatives to that effect, was unimpeachable.
We add that the determination of the Medical Panel, that diagnosed the applicant with PTSD, appears not to have been available to the applicant’s legal representatives until after the plea. Although the Panel’s determination and reasons were dated 10 May 2013, they were not provided to the applicant’s solicitors until October 2014.

The applicant did seek to rely on the Panel determination on his appeal against sentence. The Court of Appeal concluded that it could not have altered the sentencing judge’s conclusions about the applicant’s mental condition:
The material which was before the sentencing judge did not establish the kind of connection between the [applicant’s] mental condition and the offending which would have been necessary in order to moderate general deterrence. In our view it has not been shown that the panel determination could have altered that position. Ms Matthews had assessed the [applicant] twice, and Dr Sullivan, whilst only having assessed him once for a comparatively brief period, had reviewed the relevant medical records. It is clear from their reports that they had considered the effect of the 2006 assault and the consequential psychological impact of that assault. They concluded that that matter was only a part of a far more complex psychological picture. The 2013 panel determination was not directed at issues concerning offending behaviour. It addressed the 2006 assault in the context of a personal injury claim. It adds little or nothing to the analysis of the connection between the [applicant’s] mental state and the offending in the manner set out in O’Neill.
As to specific deterrence, none of the psychological material suggests a basis for moderation.
Given the detailed offence-specific analyses which the sentencing judge did have, we consider that the [applicant] has not demonstrated that a failure to put the panel determination before the sentencing judge constitutes a miscarriage of justice.[38]
[38]Binse [2016] VSCA 145, [78]–[80] (Whelan, Beach and McLeish JJA)
We have reviewed the psychological material for ourselves, and agree with those conclusions.
The applicant, in his affidavits, has contended that he was coerced by his legal representatives to plead guilty, notwithstanding his desire to rely on the defences to which we have just referred.
In his affidavit deposed 3 July 2024, he outlined the circumstances in which he had a number of discussions with counsel concerning the charges. Those discussions commenced when the jury commenced its deliberations in the trial of the first six charges on the first indictment (on which the applicant was acquitted). In that respect, we note that the applicant pleaded guilty to charges 7 and 8 on the first indictment at the commencement of the trial of the charges on that indictment. The applicant has not deposed to any discussions that he had with counsel concerning his plea to the offences that were the subject of those charges, which, as we have noted, were based on the circumstances of the events that occurred at the La Porchetta restaurant on 20 May 2012.
In his affidavit, the applicant maintained that, during their discussions, counsel would begin to ‘sternly and aggressively at times try to sway me from my rigid firm intentions to fight the armed robbery’. The applicant stated that although he was not familiar with the law of necessity, he knew he had a solid case on which to defend the armed robbery charges. He said that he refused to be ‘swayed’, and was adamant he could defend those charges. We interpolate that, for the reasons we have already discussed, a defence based on necessity, to the armed robbery charges, would have been futile, and doomed to failure.
In his affidavit, the applicant further deposed that counsel, realising that ‘argument’ on considering the armed robbery was futile, turned his attention to the other charges that were still pending. The applicant said he intended to defend the siege charges on the basis of the audio recordings, which subsequently came to his attention, in which (he says) police discussed shooting and killing him. The applicant said that, further in defence of the charges, he had ‘sought to show a significant level of flash bang explosion trauma I had been exposed to by police …’. The applicant further stated that counsel was ‘not receptive’ to exposing the audio.
As discussed, counsel was, again, correct on that matter. There is no evidence that the applicant, at the time of the siege, knew of any such discussion by police (that they would shoot or kill him). The evidence of the audio recordings was, in that respect, irrelevant. Further, both the recorded conversation, and the ‘flash bang trauma’ occurred near the end of the siege, after the applicant had already, on four occasions, discharged the eight shots from his firearm. As such, it could not be relevant to any defence of the charges relating to the siege.
In his affidavit, the applicant further stated that counsel attempted to persuade him that he would speak to the prosecution and have the vast majority of outstanding charges relating to the ATAK storage facility dropped, if the applicant pleaded guilty to possession of the firearms recovered in the container. The applicant said that he reluctantly accepted that proposition.
Again, we note that that position by counsel was entirely appropriate. The applicant has not contested possession of the four firearms in the ATAK container. He had no legal excuse or defence for his possession of the firearms. His counsel acted to his benefit in ensuring that other items, that were apparently connected with the storage facility, were not the subject of the charge (charge 4 on the second indictment).
In his affidavit, the applicant stated that counsel told him, in respect of the armed robbery charge, that he would ‘abandon duress elements, run with the crap Ursula [Prendergast] had place[d] enormous pressure on me to do it, combined with my fears at the time and my PTSD’. We note that, in his next affidavit, deposed 7 October 2024, the applicant, in fact, stated that he, himself, ‘conjured up’ an account that he committed the armed robbery arising from pressure from Ursula Prendergast. He said that, following his arrest on 23 May 2012, he suffered two full-blown psychoses and was extremely angry with Ursula Prendergast, and it was in that state of mind that he, in fact, sought to blame her for his involvement in the armed robbery. In those circumstances, it is apparent that the explanation, given by counsel, for the applicant’s commission of that offence, was based on instructions given to him by the applicant. In any event, as earlier discussed, it is clear that the applicant did not have any viable, or arguable, defence to the armed robbery charge.
The applicant concluded the section of his affidavit, deposed on 3 July 2024, stating:
... I only in the end reluctantly capitulated to his [counsel]’s demands, being coerced into this by him and his claims he knew the law and that I had no real prospects of success of beating.
That proposition contains two basic flaws. First, there is no evidence that the applicant was coerced by counsel to plead guilty. In his affidavits, which are quite fulsome, the applicant does not, in any way, give an account of any discussion he had with counsel in which counsel spoke in a manner, which could be properly characterised as coercion. Secondly, for the reasons we have discussed, counsel was plainly correct to advise the applicant that he had no real prospects of succeeding on any of the charges against him.
For the reasons we have discussed, the applicant has failed to demonstrate, first, that he had a viable defence to any of the charges to which he pleaded guilty, and, secondly, that there was any inappropriate advice, or anything amounting to the claimed ‘coercion’ by counsel, which caused him to plead guilty to the charges in circumstances in which he had wished to defend them. Rather, it is clear that counsel, quite responsibly and properly, advised the applicant that his proposed defences to the charges could not succeed. In such a case, it was the duty of counsel to give his client advice to that effect. If counsel had desisted from giving such advice to his client, he could be properly criticised for failing to discharge his duty to his client.
It follows that the applicant has failed to demonstrate that his pleas of guilty constituted, in some way, a fundamental miscarriage of justice. For those reasons, the application for leave to appeal against conviction out of time must fail. Accordingly, the application for an extension of time, within which to commence the application for leave to appeal, must be refused.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, notwithstanding the applicant’s obviously genuine belief in the strength of his arguments (arguments which were commendably put by him in a respectful and measured way in his oral submissions), we are unable to conclude that there is any basis upon which the applicant might now overturn the convictions for which he previously pleaded guilty. As a consequence, an order must be made refusing his application for an extension of time.
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Charge	Offence	Maximum	Sentence	Cumulation
Indictment C11434997.3
7	Prohibited person possess firearm (contrary to s 5(1) of the Firearms Act 1996)	10 years’ imprisonment	2 years’ imprisonment	6 months on the sentence imposed on indictment C114349997.4
8	Theft (contrary to s 74 of the Crimes Act 1958)	10 years’ imprisonment	1 month’s imprisonment	Nil
Total Effective Sentence on Indictment C11434997.3:		2 years’ imprisonment, of which 6 months is cumulative on the sentence imposed on Indictment C11434997.4.
Indictment C11434997.4
1	Armed robbery (contrary to s 75A of the Crimes Act 1958)	25 years’ imprisonment	14 years and 2 months’ imprisonment	Base
2	Prohibited person use firearm (contrary to s 5(1) of the Firearms Act 1996)	10 years’ imprisonment	6 years’ imprisonment	2 years
3	Reckless conduct endangering persons (contrary to s 23 of the Crimes Act 1958)	5 years’ imprisonment	2 years’ imprisonment	6 months
4	Prohibited person possess firearm (contrary to s 5(1) of the Firearms Act 1996)	10 years’ imprisonment	4 years’ imprisonment	1 year
Total Effective Sentence on Indictment C11434997.4:		17 years and 8 months’ imprisonment

Global Total Effective Sentence	18 years and 2 months’ imprisonment
Non-Parole Period:	14 years and 2 months
*Pre-Sentence Detention declaration pursuant to s 18(1) of the Sentencing Act 1991:*	715 days
Section 6AAA Statement:	22 years’ imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 18 years
Other relevant orders:	Forfeiture and disposal orders; compensation order.

[2025] VSCA 158

4 July 2025