Binetter v BCI Finances Pty Ltd (in liq)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Binetter v BCI Finances Pty Limited (in liq) [2015] FCAFC 122

Citation: Binetter v BCI Finances Pty Limited (in liq) [2015] FCAFC 122
Appeal from: Application for leave to appeal: B.C.I Finances Pty Limited (in liq) v Commissioner of Taxation [2015] FCA 679
Parties: ANDREW BINETTER v BCI FINANCES PTY LIMITED (IN LIQ), COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION, JOHN SHEAHAN and IAN RUSSELL LOCK
File number: NSD 835 of 2015
Judges: BESANKO, MCKERRACHER AND PAGONE JJ
Date of judgment: 13 August 2015
Date of published reasons: 27 August 2015
Catchwords:

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for leave to appeal – whether there was sufficient doubt about the correctness of the decision under challenge – whether the appellant would suffer substantial injustice if leave was refused and the decision was wrong.

EVIDENCE – letter of request to take evidence issued to judicial authorities of Israel under s 7 of the Foreign Evidence Act 1994 (Cth) – implied obligation at common law not to use documents obtained by means of compulsory process without leave of the Court – whether the Foreign Evidence Act 1994 (Cth) was an exhaustive statement of the purposes for which the evidence could be used – whether the evidence could be used for non-litigious purposes – whether the evidence could be used for other purposes without the permission of the judicial authorities in the country to which the letter of request was directed – whether the judicial authorities in Israel were executing the letter of request at all times – Foreign Evidence Act 1994 (Cth) s 7.

Held: Leave to appeal granted. Appeal dismissed.  

Legislation:

Evidence Act 1905 (Cth) Part IIIB
Foreign Evidence Act 1994 (Cth) ss 3, 5, 7, 9, 9A, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, Part 2

Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters Arts 1, 9,10, 11, 12

Cases cited: Allstate Life Insurance Co and Others v Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd and Others (No 18) (1995) 133 ALR 667
BCI Finances Pty Limited v Commissioner of Taxation [2012] FCA 855
BIL (NZ Holdings) Ltd and Another v ERA House Ltd and Others (1991) 23 NSWLR 280
British American Tobacco Aust Services Ltd v Eubanks for the United States of America (2004) 60 NSWLR 483
Commissioner of Taxation v Rawson Finances Pty Ltd [2012] FCA 753
Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397
Dendron GmbH v Regents of the University of California [2005] 1 WLR 200
Harman v Secretary of State for Home Department [1983] 1 AC 280
Hearne and Another v Street and Others (2008) 235 CLR 125
Liberty Funding Pty Limited v Phoenix Capital Limited [2005] FCAFC 5; (2005) 218 ALR 283
Minister for Lands and Forests and Another v McPherson and Another (1991) 22 NSWLR 687
Rawson Finances Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation [2013] FCAFC 26
Yosef Muskonav Gideon Moor No 632/77 and 662/77, dated 2 May 1978
Date of hearing: 13 August 2015
Place:
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Details
Case
[2015] FCAFC 122
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appellant, Binetter, sought leave to appeal against the orders made by the primary judge in the Federal Court of Australia concerning the use of evidence obtained from Israel. The primary judge had issued a letter of request under the Foreign Evidence Act 1994 (Cth) to the judicial authorities in Israel to gather evidence from Bank Hapoalim employees regarding the authenticity of documents relating to tax assessments. The appellant argued that the use of the obtained evidence was not within the scope of the Act and required the permission of the foreign judicial authorities.

The legal issues before the court involved the interpretation of the Foreign Evidence Act 1994 (Cth), specifically sections 7 and 13, and the scope of evidence obtained via letters of request. The appellant contended that the Act was an exhaustive statement of the purposes for which evidence could be used and that such evidence could not be used for non-litigious purposes without permission from the foreign judicial authorities. The appellant also argued that the letter of request was miscarried and the Israeli court was not executing the letter of request at all times, thus rendering the orders invalid.

The court found that the appellant's arguments did not establish sufficient doubt about the correctness of the primary judge's decision. The court held that the Foreign Evidence Act 1994 (Cth) was not an exhaustive code and that the use of evidence obtained under the Act was not limited to litigious purposes. The court also determined that the Israeli judicial authorities were executing the letter of request as required, and therefore, the orders were valid. Consequently, the court granted leave to appeal but dismissed the appeal, ordering the appellant to pay the respondents' costs.

The court's decision was based on the interpretation of the Act and the circumstances of the case. The court found that the primary judge's orders were consistent with the provisions of the Act and did not exceed the scope of evidence that could be used. The court also found that the letter of request was properly executed, and there was no abuse of process. Therefore, the court concluded that there was no substantial injustice to the appellant if the appeal was dismissed, and leave to appeal was granted, but the appeal was ultimately dismissed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Leave to appeal be granted.

2. The appeal be dismissed.

3. The appellant pay the respondents’ costs of the application for leave and the appeal.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The appellant does not dispute the entitlement of the Commissioner of Taxation (“the Commissioner”) to use the documents identified in Schedule B of the Commissioner’s application. The dispute concerns the documents in Schedule A which, generally described, are two transcripts of examinations of Ms Emilia Mandel (a current Bank Hapoalim employee) and Mr Baruch Etzion (a former Bank Hapoalim employee) respectively, and various documents produced by Bank Hapoalim in response to a letter of request issued under s 7 of the Foreign Evidence Act 1994 (Cth) (“the Act”).Background The background to the matter is as follows. The orders which the appellant challenges were made is NSD 626 of 2011. BCI Finances Pty Limited (in liq) (“BCI Finances”) commenced that proceeding in 2011 and at that time the company was not in liquidation and was under the control of its directors. By the proceeding, BCI Finances appealed against various decisions of the Commissioner rejecting objections to assessments of tax payable by BCI Finances and related penalties. On 9 August 2012, the primary judge made the following orders in the proceeding, relevantly:1.A letter of request be sent to the judicial authorities of Israel to take or cause to be taken the evidence of Mr Ilan Mazur. A draft of the proposed letter of request is annexed to these orders and marked ‘Annexure A’.2.The applicant provide to the Court a document signed on or behalf of the applicant in the form of the document in Schedule A in aid of and for transmission with the letter of request. The primary judge published reasons for her decision to issue a letter of request (BCI Finances Pty Limited v Commissioner of Taxation [2012] FCA 855) (“letter of request judgment”). In her letter of request judgment, the primary judge noted that the Commissioner’s application for the issue of a letter of request was made under s 7(1)(c) of the Act. The primary judge made a number of observations in which she identified the context of, and the reasons for, the Commissioner’s application for an order under s 7(1)(c) (at [6], [20] and [21]):The essential issue in dispute between the parties is the status of the arrangements between the applicant and Bank Hapoalim. It is the Commissioner’s position that the available evidence is insufficient to support the existence of these arrangements as loans and that the genuineness of the arrangements is in question. The Commissioner contends that there are numerous indicia which indicate that the arrangements should not be accepted as genuine arrangements. Accordingly, it was put by senior counsel for the Commissioner in support of the application that it must be recognised that the provenance, integrity and adequacy of the documents evidencing the loans and other arrangements between the applicant and Bank Hapoalim are themselves the critical issue in the proceeding. As such, it was pointed out for the Commissioner that the current application is somewhat unusual in that the Commissioner is seeking to obtain evidence from Bank Hapoalim which if in fact obtained would support the applicant’s case rather than the Commissioner’s case. Nevertheless, the applicant opposes the making of the order sought. Section 7(2)(b) refers to the question of “whether the person will be able to give evidence material to any issue to be tried in the proceeding”. As I have emphasised, I accept that a central issue in this proceeding is the provenance, integrity and adequacy of documents evidencing the loans and other arrangements between Bank Hapoalim and the applicant. I have no doubt that an officer of the bank could give evidence relevant to the proceeding in terms of what has been described by the Commissioner as evidence of the bank's systems in relation to its administration of its credit arrangements, its processes for requiring and maintaining documents, and its processes and systems for ensuring the provenance and authenticity of documents. In this case, given that the provenance and authenticity of documents already produced by the applicants is in issue, that relevant evidence could also be given by Mr Mazur as to those issues. Accordingly, I also have no doubt that s 7(2)(b) of the Foreign Evidence Act is satisfied. Section 7(2)(c) requires me to have regard to “whether, having regard to the interests of the parties to the proceeding, justice will be better served by granting or refusing the order”. On the evidence that has been adduced before me, and in the circumstances of the proceeding as referred to above, I have no doubt that it is in the interests of the parties to the proceeding that the order be made and that justice will be better served by the granting of the order. This is the applicant's appeal seeking to set aside the Commissioner's disallowance of objections on the basis that the taxation amount in the assessments is excessive. The basis upon which the applicant seeks to do so essentially is the existence of loans and other credit arrangements between it and Bank Hapoalim. Despite numerous attempts to obtain relevant documents so as to demonstrate the genuineness of those loans the documents which have been produced thus far by the applicant, not unreasonably from the Commissioner's point of view, raise more questions than they answer. In these circumstances, for Bank Hapoalim to be required to give evidence in accordance with the interlocutory application would be in the interests of both parties and would serve justice, because it would ensure that the parties and indeed the Court will be determining the appeal on the basis of a proper evidentiary foundation and not an incomplete or dubious evidentiary foundation, as the Commissioner currently asserts is the case.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Division 4 of Part 2 has the heading “Miscellaneous” and it includes sections giving the Court a discretion to exclude evidence and the power to vary or revoke orders made by the Court under ss 7, 9A, 10 or 11. Sections 15 and 16 are in the following terms:15 Discretion to exclude evidence(1)This section applies to any civil proceeding or criminal proceeding in a superior court, the Federal Circuit Court of Australia or an inferior court.(2)If it is in the interests of justice to do so, a court may exclude from the proceeding evidence obtained under this Part, even if it is otherwise admissible.(3)This Part does not affect a court’s power under any other law to exclude, or limit the use of, evidence:(a) because it has been obtained unlawfully or improperly; or(b)because it would, if admitted, operate unfairly or be unfairly prejudicial to a party; or(c) for any other reason.16 Variation or revocation of orders(1)A superior court may vary or revoke an order made by the court under section 7, 9A, 10 or 11.(2) The power to vary an order includes the power to:(a) include in the order a direction under section 13; or(b)vary or revoke a direction under section 13 that is included in the order.(3)If an order under section 7 or 10 that includes a direction under section 13 is revoked, the direction under section 13 is taken to have been revoked at the same time.Issues on the Appeal The four grounds of appeal are as follows. First, the appellant contends that the Act is an exhaustive code as to the uses which may be made of evidence taken in an examination conducted pursuant to letters of request issued under the Act. The uses of the evidence which were the subject of the primary judge’s orders were not within the terms of the Act and it was not open to her Honour to make the orders which she did. Secondly, even if the first contention is rejected, the appellant contends that the provisions of the Act are such that the use of the evidence outside the uses specified in the Act is restricted to use in other judicial proceedings and does not extend to use of the evidence for what the appellant described as administrative purposes. Thirdly, even if the first and second contentions are rejected, the appellant contends that the respondents are not entitled to use the evidence for the purposes specified in the orders under challenge without the permission of the judicial authorities of the foreign country to which the letters of request were directed. Finally, and irrespective of the fate of the preceding contentions, the appellant contends that in this case the letter of request procedure miscarried and the primary judge erred in finding that the Israeli Court “at all times, was executing the LOR”. The appellant contends that even if there is a discretion, it is only engaged if the letter of request is executed according to its terms. Other arguments were put to the primary judge. It was argued by the appellant that the letter of request process should have been terminated when the proceeding was dismissed by consent on 10 March 2014. It was argued that maintaining the process after that date was an abuse of process. It was also argued by the appellant that the process was maintained for the purpose of the winding up of BCI Finances, that that was an improper purpose and that, therefore, the maintaining of the letter of request process was an abuse of process. These arguments were rejected by the primary judge and were not repeated on appeal.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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