Binding and Repatriation Commission
[2006] AATA 516
•14 June 2006
Administrative
Appeals
Tribunal
DECISION AND REASONS FOR DECISION [2006] AATA 516
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL )
) No S2005/30
VETERANS' APPEALS DIVISION ) Re KENNETH DOUGLAS BINDING Applicant
And
REPATRIATION COMMISSION
Respondent
DECISION
Tribunal Mr J G Short (Member) Date14 June 2006
PlaceAdelaide
Decision The Tribunal affirms the decision under review.
..............................................
J G SHORT
(Member)
CATCHWORDS
VETERANS' AFFAIRS – veterans' entitlements – operational service – claim that post-traumatic stress disorder was war-caused – consideration of statement of principles – hearing of floating mines – scare charges – decision affirmed
Veterans’ Entitlements Act 1986 ss 5, 6, 9, 13, 120(1), 120(3), 120A(3), 196, 196A, 196B
Repatriation Commission v Deledio (1998) 83 FCR 82
Lees v Repatriation Commission (2002) 125 FCR 331
Stoddart v Repatriation Commission (2003) 74 ALD 366
Byrnes v Repatriation Commission (1993) 177 CLR 564Statement of Principles Instrument No 3 of 1999
Statement of Principles Instrument No 54 of 1999REASONS FOR DECISION
14 June 2006 Mr J G Short (Member) 1. Kenneth Binding served in the Royal Australian Navy (the Navy) from 9 March 1964 until 8 December 1985. His operational service, which was also eligible war service, was from 19 January 1965 until 17 March 1965 with the Far East Strategic Reserve (FESR) and from : 20 December 1967 until 3 January 1968; 17 January 1968 until 8 February 1968; 27 March 1968 until 26 April 1968; 21 May 1968 until 13 June 1968 and 13 November 1968 until 28 November 1968, while serving on HMAS Sydney (Sydney) in South Vietnam. Mr Binding’s other period of eligible service was eligible defence service from 7 December 1972 until 8 December 1985.
2. Mr Binding lodged a claim for acceptance of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) as war-caused. The Repatriation Commission rejected the application on the basis that no incapacity was found. On 23 November 2004 the Veterans’ Review Board (VRB) varied the decision to include a diagnosis of PTSD, however the VRB affirmed the decision after finding that events during Mr Binding’s periods of eligible service were not relevantly related to his PTSD.
3. Mr Binding referred to two days spent in Vung Tau Harbour, one during each of his first two trips to South Vietnam. His first day in Vung Tau Harbour was on 27 December 1967 and the second day was on 3 February 1968. Mr Binding said that on 27 December 1967 he became very frightened after hearing loud explosions from below deck. It was suggested that another severe stressor was experienced on 3 February 1968 when Mr Binding again heard explosions from below deck, some of which occurred after he had heard a loudspeaker message to the effect that there was a threat of floating mines which may have been coming down the river. Mr Binding said that as a result of this message Sydney changed its position.
issues before the tribunal
4. The issue before me is whether Mr Binding‘s PTSD is war-caused for the purposes of the Veterans’ Entitlements Act 1986 (the VE Act). The parties have accepted a diagnosis of PTSD. I find that Mr Binding suffers from PTSD. It is common ground that if Mr Binding’s claim is successful, the earliest date of effect is 19 April 2004, that is 3 months before the date of Mr Binding’s claim for acceptance of PTSD as war-caused.
mr binding’s evidence
5. Mr Binding said that prior to his first period in Vung Tau Harbour on 27 December 1967, he had turned 21 years of age and had served on HMAS Duchess for a period of approximately 3 months in the FESR. Mr Binding initially said that he had never seen any action while in the FESR. However, in cross-examination he confirmed that he had been part of a gun crew which had fired upon and sunk a crewed vessel. Mr Binding added however that from where he was performing his duties he could not see the target of this fire.
First visit to Vung Tau Harbour – 27 December 1967
6. Mr Binding said that on entering Vung Tau Harbour on 27 December 1967 he saw US jets flying in the distance and “fire balls” which he presumed to be the result of jets dropping bombs. Mr Binding added however that the sight of these jets and seeing the “fire balls” did not upset him unduly as neither Sydney nor he, were personally at risk.
7. Mr Binding said that prior to his first trip to Vietnam he had never heard of scare charges. He said however that on 27 December 1967 the ship’s loudspeaker system had advised all crew members that scare charges would be used. He said that 30 minutes after that announcement was made he heard the first of a number of scare charges. In the meantime he had been advised by others that the reason for using scare charges was to protect the ship from sabotage by divers or from floating mines.
8. Mr Binding said that he was an able seaman in the catering corps and his normal work station was on or about the water line on the Sydney. He added however that his tasks included ensuring that provisions were transferred from storage rooms to the various galleys around the ship. He said that the dry store was one deck below water line and that the cool storage areas were two decks below that. Mr Binding said that to his best recollection he was in the dry store area when he heard the first scare charge. He described this as a huge explosion and indicated that he was very frightened. He said that he went immediately to an above water line deck, but was told to return to his duties. Mr Binding said that the sound of scare charges continued at about 30 minute intervals. He said that at one stage a second announcement was made to the effect that the charges would be suspended while divers entered the water. Mr Binding described the sound of the scare charges as not very loud when heard from above the water line, but much louder when heard from below the water line. Mr Binding said that he understood that scare charges were for the ship’s protection. Mr Binding said that he continued to be afraid until the Sydney left Vung Tau Harbour at about 4.00pm that same day.
Second visit to Vung Tau Harbour – 3 February 1968
9. On this occasion Mr Binding said that an announcement was again made over the loudspeaker system to the effect that scare charges would be used. His duties were the same as on his first trip, that is with the catering corps where he remained for these two, and for three subsequent, trips to Vung Tau Harbour. Mr Binding said that on this occasion he would have been one deck below the water line when he heard the first scare charge following the announcement. Mr Binding said that he again panicked and did not want to stay below the water line. He remained at his work station as he had been told by a leading hand to continue to work. He said that at about mid to late morning there was a further announcement of a suspicion that mines may be coming down the river and entering the Harbour. He said that some time later Sydney moved north east, perhaps one nautical mile. Mr Binding said that before the ship moved he heard further explosions and this time left his work station to travel to the flight deck. A piped announcement asked him to return to his duty station. He said that he did not return immediately as he was in fear for his life, particularly by drowning below decks. He said that he was ordered by a petty officer to return to his duty station and having been given a direct order, did return. He was paraded before a supply officer who, according to Mr Binding, told him that “men were expendable but ships were not”. Mr Binding found this comment very disturbing.
10. Mr Binding said that while standing on the flight deck he had noted US patrol boats which appeared to be screening Sydney. He considered that the US patrol boats were likely to have been screening the ship from mines, although he added that he had only heard of a suspicion that mines may be coming down the river. Mr Binding said that he was given extra duties comprising an extra 3 hours duty each day for 14 days.
11. Mr Binding said that he did not want to remain on the Sydney and asked the supply officer to transfer him. His request was refused. Mr Binding said that his state of mind deteriorated thereafter.
12. Mr Binding referred to three subsequent visits to Vung Tau Harbour. He said that on these trips he also “got into trouble” as he was still fearful of being below decks. He said that other catering crew members slept near the cool rooms (below water line) but due to his fear, he slept on a deck above the water line.
13. Mr Binding said that he had not suffered depression before travelling to South Vietnam. He did report feeling anxious later on while serving on HMAS Diamentina. He said that while serving on that ship he was again required to work below decks, “so I went to pieces”. Mr Binding was referred to a daily medical record dated 9 June 1971. This record refers to Mr Binding complaining of feeling hot and sweaty at any time during the day. It records Mr Binding as having been troubled in this fashion for 3 weeks. The record goes on to refer to no previous illness of note: “Says work worries him … not in favour with his wife. Quite likes Navy”. It was put to Mr Binding that neither in this last mentioned record nor in subsequent medical records where Mr Binding was recorded as suffering from anxiety, did he make any reference to his experiences in South Vietnam. Mr Binding said that at that time he did not appreciate the significance of his visits to Vung Tau Harbour.
14. Mr Binding said that he suffered a breakdown and was an inpatient at the Adelaide Clinic for approximately 2 months following a suicide attempt. He had been under the care of psychiatrist, Dr Ash, since 2001.
15. In relation to his second trip to South Vietnam and his evidence of an announcement to the effect that there was a suspicion that floating mines may be coming down the river, Mr Binding said that he could not recall the words used. He said that there was just a suspicion of mines. He said that it was not until about midday that Sydney actually moved and that between the time he heard the announcement of the possibility of floating mines and Sydney moving, he heard at least one further scare charge.
dr ash
16. Dr Ash confirmed the diagnosis of PTSD and said that it was not unusual for symptoms of PTSD to be delayed for some time after the traumatic event.
commodore mulcare
17. Commodore Mulcare was the author of a report provided by Writeway Research Services Pty Ltd. Commodore Mulcare confirmed that scare charges were an integral and common part of Operation Awkward which was an operation aimed at protecting the Sydney while loading and unloading in Vung Tau Harbour. Commodore Mulcare said that the sound of scare charges varied depending on the distance they were laid from the point of observation, the depth at which they were detonated and whether the point of observation was below or above the water line. He said that all crew members were advised of the reason for the use of scare charges, and that they were used every time Sydney was in Vung Tau Harbour. He went on to say that Sydney was never the subject of an attack on any of its numerous trips to Vung Tau Harbour.
18. Attachment 4 to Commodore Mulcare’s report was an Executive Officer’s Temporary Memorandum No 140/67 – “Security of the Ship While Unloading” (the Memorandum). This document commences by saying that there is a risk of enemy damage to the Sydney and that the likely forms of attack are by frogman from ashore; by swimmers from sampans or even from driftwood; by small river mines being floated down onto the ship and by gun or mortar fire from shore. Commodore Mulcare said that the intent of this document was to fully inform crew members of the conditions they may encounter in Vung Tau Harbour and to ensure that each member knew the role they were to play in Operation Awkward.
19. Operation Awkward included a requirement that boats patrolling Sydney were to drop scare charges. Commodore Mulcare was referred to a written requirement that sentries be posted at FX and AX and that each was to be given a rifle and 10 rounds and 10 scare charges. Commodore Mulcare said that although the use of scare charges directly from the Sydney would be possible without dropping the scare charge onto attending vessels, it would be highly unusual for the scare charges to be dropped directly from the Sydney. He said that the usual course of events was that charges were dropped from a patrolling boat. Commodore Mulcare said that part of the defensive procedures was to ensure that Sydney did not remain in Vung Tau Harbour for any longer than was necessary. To this end the ship always left as soon as loading and unloading had been completed.
20. Commodore Mulcare was referred to Attachment 8 to his report, the Sydney’s Report of Proceedings for February 1968, particularly paragraph 7 which indicated that as soon as back loading had been completed, Sydney shifted berth to a less hostile position south of Cape St Jacques’ light to complete securing for sea. The report goes on to say that the Captain entertained two distinguished visitors to luncheon while anchored in this alternative position. Commodore Mulcare said that this was not an indication that the vessel had been moved in order to protect two important visitors from the danger of floating mines. He said that Sydney would normally have sailed to open seas as soon as back loading had been completed. He said that the only reason Sydney delayed for approximately an hour and a half was because of the need for the important visitors to be returned to shore following their luncheon. Commodore Mulcare drew the analogy with repairing a truck on a busy road then moving the truck to a side street before stopping for lunch.
21. It was suggested to Commodore Mulcare that after reading the Memorandum (Security of the Ship While Unloading), sailors may have become alarmed. Commodore Mulcare said that it was always better to keep sailors informed and that he was not aware of sailors being made anxious by reading such a document. He said that the document was intended to cover all contingencies. He said the possibilities were quite endless. This direction was posted around the ship as one of the precautions taken to ensure that the ship and ship’s company remained safe.
legislative background
22. Section 9 of the VE Act provides for when an injury or disease is taken to be war-caused, and provides relevantly as follows:
“9 War-caused injuries or diseases
(1)Subject to this section, for the purposes of this Act, an injury suffered by a veteran shall be taken to be a war-caused injury, or a disease contracted by a veteran shall be taken to be a war-caused disease, if:
(a)the injury suffered, or disease contracted, by the veteran resulted from an occurrence that happened while the veteran was rendering operational service;
(b)the injury suffered, or disease contracted, by the veteran arose out of, or was attributable to, any eligible war service rendered by the veteran; …”
23. The expression “operational service” is defined in ss 6 to 6F of the VE Act. Under s 6C, a person renders operational service if he or she is, inter alia, allotted for duty in an operational area. The expression “operational area” is defined in s 5B(1) by reference to Schedule 2 of the VE Act. This Schedule includes in Item 8 of Column 1, the Vietnam (Southern Zone) during the period from and including 31 July 1962 to and including 11 January 1973.
24. Section 13(1) of the VE Act provides, in effect, that where a veteran has become incapacitated from a war-caused injury or a war-caused disease, the Commonwealth is liable to pay a pension by way of compensation to the veteran.
25. As the applicant has performed operational service, as defined in s 6 of the VE Act, the determination of whether his asserted condition is war-caused is to be made by applying ss 120(1) and 120(3) of the VE Act. Those sections provide relevantly as follows:
“120 Standard of proof
(1)Where a claim under Part II for a pension in respect of the incapacity from injury or disease of a veteran, or of the death of a veteran, relates to the operational service rendered by the veteran, the Commission shall determine that the injury was a war-caused injury, that the disease was a war-caused disease or that the death of the veteran was war-caused, as the case may be, unless it is satisfied, beyond reasonable doubt, that there is no sufficient ground for making that determination.
Note: This subsection is affected by section 120A.
…
(3)In applying subsection (1) or (2) in respect of the incapacity of a person from injury or disease, or in respect of the death of a person, related to service rendered by the person, the Commission shall be satisfied, beyond reasonable doubt, that there is no sufficient ground for determining:
(a) that the injury was a war-caused injury or a defence-caused injury;
(b)that the disease was a war-caused disease or a defence-caused disease; or
(c) that the death was war-caused or defence-caused;
as the case may be, if the Commission, after consideration of the whole of the material before it, is of the opinion that the material before it does not raise a reasonable hypothesis connecting the injury, disease or death with the circumstances of the particular service rendered by the person.
Note: This subsection is affected by section 120A.”
26. Under s 120A of the VE Act, in the case of applications lodged after 1 June 1994, where the Repatriation Medical Authority (RMA) has made a Statement of Principles (SoP) in respect of a particular kind of injury or disease, the reasonableness of an hypothesis is to be assessed by reference to that SoP. This follows from s 120A(3), which provides:
“(3)For the purposes of subsection 120(3), a hypothesis connecting an injury suffered by a person, a disease contracted by a person or the death of a person with the circumstances of any particular service rendered by the person is reasonable only if there is in force:
(a)a Statement of Principles determined under subsection 196B(2) or (11); or
(b)a determination of the Commission under subsection 180A(2);
that upholds the hypothesis.
Note: See subsection (4) about the application of this subsection.”
Subsection (4) of s 120A excludes the operation of subsection (3) in certain circumstances which are not relevant to the present proceedings.
27. Section 196A of the VE Act provides for the establishment of the RMA. Section 196B of the VE Act provides, in effect, that if the RMA is of the view that there is sound medical-scientific evidence that indicates that a particular kind of injury, disease or death can be related to operational service rendered by veterans, the RMA must determine a SoP in respect of that kind of injury, disease or death setting out the factors that must as a minimum exist, and which of those factors must be related to service rendered by a person, before it can be said that a reasonable hypothesis has been raised connecting an injury, disease or death of that kind with the circumstances of the veteran’s service. The reference in s 196B(2) to a particular kind of injury, disease or death being “related to service” is expounded in s 196B(14). This provides relevantly, in effect, that a factor causing an injury is “related to service” rendered by a person if it resulted from an occurrence that happened while the person was rendering that service, or if it arose out of, or was attributable to, that service.
consideration
28. The claimed condition of PTSD is the subject of SoPs. I will set out the relevant provisions of the SoPs below. I note that where a SoP exists I must apply the test prescribed by s 120A(3) of the VE Act, as explained in Repatriation Commission v Deledio (1998) 83 FCR 82 at [97] in the following way:
“1 The Tribunal must consider all the material which is before it and determine whether that material points to a hypothesis connecting the injury, disease or death with the circumstances of the particular service rendered by the person. No question of fact finding arises at this stage. If no such hypothesis arises, the application must fail.
2 If the material does raise such a hypothesis, the Tribunal must then ascertain whether there is in force an SoP determined by the Authority under s 196B(2) or (11). If no such SoP is in force, the hypothesis will be taken not to be reasonable and, in consequence, the application must fail.
3 If an SoP is in force, the Tribunal must then form the opinion whether the hypothesis raised is a reasonable one. It will do so if the hypothesis fits, that is to say, is consistent with the "template" to be found in the SoP. The hypothesis raised before it must thus contain one or more of the factors which the Authority has determined to be the minimum which must exist, and be related to the person’s service (as required by ss 196B(2)(d) and (e)). If the hypothesis does contain these factors, it could neither be said to be contrary to proved or known scientific facts, nor otherwise fanciful. If the hypothesis fails to fit within the template, it will be deemed not to be “reasonable” and the claim will fail.
4 The Tribunal must then proceed to consider under s 120(1) whether it is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the death was not war-caused, or in the case of a claim for incapacity, that the incapacity did not arise from a war-caused injury. If not so satisfied, the claim must succeed. If the Tribunal is so satisfied, the claim must fail. It is only at this stage of the process that the Tribunal will be required to find facts from the material before it. In so doing, no question of onus of proof or the application of any presumption will be involved.”
29. I am satisfied that the material before me points to an hypothesis connecting Mr Binding’s condition of PTSD with his operational service. That hypothesis is that Mr Binding experienced stressful events during his operational service which caused him to develop PTSD.
30. In relation to the second Deledio step I note that SoPs have been determined by the RMA pursuant to s 196(2) of the VE Act in respect of PTSD. The SoP in respect of PTSD is Instrument No 3 of 1999, as amended by Instrument No 54 of 1999.
31. I now turn to the third step as enunciated in Deledio. This entails determining whether the relevant hypothesis complies with one or more of the factors referred to in the relevant SoPs. This step involves considering all of the material before me, but without making any finding of fact at this stage of the process. The history given by a veteran to a medical practitioner can constitute material before the Tribunal for this purpose: Lees v Repatriation Commission (2002) 125 FCR 331.
32. It is contended in this case that the relevant factor set out in clause 5 of the SoP is 5(a):
“experiencing a severe stressor prior to the clinical onset of post-traumatic stress disorder”
Under the definitions described in clause 8 of the SoP, “experiencing a severe stressor” has been defined as follows:
“… the person experienced, witnessed, or was confronted with an event or events that involved actual or threat of death or serious injury, or a threat to the person’s, or another person’s, physical integrity.
In the setting of service in the Defence Forces, or other service where the Veterans’ Entitlements Act applies, events that qualify as stressors include:
(i)threat of serious injury or death; or
(ii)engagement with the enemy; or
(iii)witnessing casualties or participation in or observation of casualty clearance, atrocities or abusive violence.”
33. It was held by Mansfield J in Stoddart v Repatriation Commission (2003) 74 ALD 366 that the test for a severe stressor is in two parts. The first question is, would a reasonable person in the position and with the knowledge of the veteran objectively perceive the event relied upon as a threat of death or serious injury or to the physical integrity of self or others, and secondly, if so, did the threat convey that perception to the veteran in the sense that the veteran subjectively experienced that threat. Mr Binding’s counsel suggested that in considering the material before me, in order to see whether that material gives rise to an hypothesis which meets or fits the template described in clause 5(a) of the relevant SoP, I should consider the fact that Mr Binding was an apprehensive young man who had been provided with a Memorandum containing the reasons for and the nature of Operation Awkward and, on his evidence, had also heard a specific announcement to the effect that floating mines may be coming down the river and into Vung Tau Harbour. I was also asked to consider that Mr Binding was working below the water line when he heard loud explosions and further that the explosions were at irregular intervals, the implication being that a below deck observer may not be able to distinguish between hearing an exploding scare charge and a floating mine.
34. I was asked by the Commission’s representative to consider that at the time of his first trip to Vung Tau Harbour Mr Binding had previously seen operational service with the FESR and had taken part in a firing upon a manned vessel and that he had been told or warned of the intended use of scare charges and their reason for use. Further, it was suggested that in relation to his second trip to Vung Tau Harbour, Mr Binding had about 4 weeks earlier experienced scare charges from both above and below the water line. The ship’s crew had again been advised of the imminent use of scare charges. It was suggested by the Commission that I should find, on Commodore Mulcare’s evidence, and the lack of specificity of Mr Binding’s evidence, an announcement specifically relating to floating mines was not made. However, I remind myself that at this third stage of the methodology suggested in Deledio I am not to make findings of fact.
35. I consider that the material in relation to Mr Binding’s first day in Vung Tau Harbour (27 December 1967) does not meet the template for acceptance of his PTSD as being war-caused. Particularly the material does not indicate that the objective element of the definition of a severe stressor, as described by Mansfield J in Stoddart, arises on the material relating to this first trip. In reaching this view I considered, amongst other things, the fact that Mr Binding was a person who had previously seen operational service with the FESR and had been in the Navy for approximately 4 years. He, along with other members of the ship’s crew, had been told of the use of scare charges and the reason for their use, that is to deter sabotage attempts on the Sydney and thus to protect her crew. In these circumstances I do not consider that the material before me, relating to Mr Binding’s first trip to Vung Tau Harbour, meets the relevant SoP.
36. The circumstances of the second visit to Vung Tau Harbour were similar to the first, although on this visit Mr Binding had prior experience of scare charges, having heard those detonations approximately 4 weeks earlier in the same context. He had again been specifically warned and advised in relation to the use of scare charges on this second visit. The material however, and here I refer to Mr Binding’s evidence, on this occasion included evidence of a specific warning of the possibility of floating mines entering Vung Tau Harbour. Even assuming that a specific announcement was made in relation to floating mines, I do not consider the material before me meets or fits the relevant SoP.
37. If I am wrong in my view of the material relating to Mr Binding’s second visit to Vung Tau Harbour, I will now consider the fourth stage of the process explained in Deledio. This involves making findings of fact from the material before me, bearing in mind the provisions of s 120(1) of the VE Act to the effect that the claim will succeed unless I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that there is no sufficient ground for determining that Mr Binding’s PTSD was war-caused. If I am not so satisfied Mr Binding’s claim must succeed by virtue of s 120(1) of the VE Act. In considering this issue, I note the decision of Byrnes v Repatriation Commission (1993) 177 CLR 564 at [13], where Mason CJ, Gaudron and McHugh JJ said:
“If a reasonable hypothesis is established, subs.(1) of s.120 is applied. The claim will succeed unless: (a) one or more of the facts necessary to support the hypothesis are disproved beyond reasonable doubt; or (b) the truth of another fact in the material which is inconsistent with the hypothesis, is proved beyond reasonable doubt, thus disproving, beyond reasonable doubt, the hypothesis.”
38. One of the facts suggested to support the hypothesis connecting Mr Binding’s second visit to Vung Tau Harbour with his PTSD is an announcement over the loudspeaker to the effect that floating mines may be heading down the river and into Vung Tau Harbour thus posing a threat to Sydney.
39. Commodore Mulcare said that his perusal of the records confirmed that Sydney completed loading and unloading without incident. No record was found of any specific warning about floating mines. Commodore Mulcare said that if a specific set of mines was detected then Sydney would have moved immediately and that records would have been created of such a specific threat.
40. After carefully considering the evidence of Commodore Mulcare and that of Mr Binding, and if necessary to do so I would find myself satisfied, beyond reasonable doubt, that an announcement of a specific threat of floating mines, precipitating the Sydney changing mooring positions, did not occur. It may be that Mr Binding was simply confused (understandable after the passing of so many years) with the information he had read in the Memorandum which referred to the possible forms of attack as including small river mines being floated down on the ship. While I appreciate that Mr Binding was likely to have found all of his trips and particularly his first two trips to Vung Tau Harbour concerning, I would find beyond reasonable doubt that a necessary component of the suggested hypothesis relating to the second visit, does not exist. I refer particularly to a loudspeaker announcement specifically relating to the threat from floating mines.
41. I am satisfied, beyond reasonable doubt, that there is no sufficient ground for determining that the condition of PTSD was related to Mr Binding’s operational service in South Vietnam. There is no suggestion that Mr Binding’s PTSD was related in any way to any other period of eligible service and having considered the material, I find that there are no circumstances connecting the applicant’s PTSD with his eligible war service.
decision
42. I affirm the decision under review.
I certify that the 42 preceding paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of Mr J G Short (Member)
Signed: .....................................................................................
AssociateDates of Hearing 27/28 April 2006
Date of Decision 14 June 2006
Counsel for the Applicant Mr S Churches
Solicitor for the Applicant Tindall Gask Bentley
Counsel for the Respondent Mr G Doube
Solicitor for the Respondent DVA
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