FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BIM21 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FCA 307
Appeal from: BIM21 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FedCFamC2G 902 File number(s): VID 961 of 2023 Judgment of: BURLEY J Date of judgment: 28 March 2024 Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for extension of time and leave to appeal from a decision of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (FCFCOA) – FCFCOA judge conducted a de novo review of a decision of a Registrar to summarily dismiss an application for review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal under r 13.13(a) of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) – no reasonable prospects of success – application dismissed Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 426(1A)(b), 426A, 441A(5)(b), 441C(5), 477
Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) rr 13.06(1)(c), 17.05(2), 21.02(1)
Federal Court of Australia Rules 2011 (Cth) r 35.13.
Cases cited: Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corp [1948] 1 KB 223
Bechara v Bates [2021] FCAFC 34; 286 FCR 166
BIM21 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FedCFamC2G 902
BIM21 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs (MLG 1065 of 2021, decision of Registrar delivered on 27 July 2023)
Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries [1991] FCA 844; 33 FCR 397
Harris v Caladine [1991] HCA 9; 172 CLR 84
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW [2018] HCA 30; 264 CLR 541
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li [2013] HCA 18; 249 CLR 332
MZYEZ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2010] FCA 530
SZNZL v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2010] FCA 621; 186 FCR 271
Tu’uta Katoa v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] HCA 28; 403 ALR 604
Division: General Division Registry: Victoria National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Number of paragraphs: 35 Date of hearing: 29 February 2024 Counsel for the Applicant: The Applicant appeared in person with the assistance of an interpreter Solicitor for the First Respondent: Ms K Whittemore of Sparke Helmore Lawyers Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent entered a submitting appearance ORDERS
VID 961 of 2023 BETWEEN: BIM21
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
BURLEY J
DATE OF ORDER:
28 MARCH 2024
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application for an extension of time and leave to appeal be dismissed.
2.The applicant pay the respondent’s costs, to be taxed, if not agreed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
BURLEY J:
THE APPLICATION
The applicant seeks an extension of time for leave to appeal from a decision of a judge of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2)…
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- Case
- [2024] FCA 307
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court had to determine whether to exercise its discretion to extend the time within which to seek a review of the dismissal order. The primary judge considered the merits of the proposed substantive application, the length of the delay, the explanation for the delay, and any relevant prejudice to the Minister. The primary judge also considered the factors relevant to setting aside an earlier order made in the absence of a party, including whether there was a reasonable excuse for the absence, any prejudice to the other party, and whether the applicant had a reasonably arguable prospect of success on the substantive application.
The primary judge dismissed the application for an extension of time and leave to appeal, finding that neither ground advanced by the applicant had any reasonable prospect of success. The primary judge noted that the applicant had provided her email address for correspondence and had not notified the Tribunal of her engagement of a solicitor, meaning she was deemed to have received the invitation to attend the hearing. The primary judge also found that the applicant's grounds of appeal were legally incoherent and did not address the decision of the primary judge.
The court dismissed the application for an extension of time and leave to appeal, and ordered that the applicant pay the respondent's costs, to be taxed if not agreed. The entry of orders was dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application for an extension of time and leave to appeal be dismissed.
2. The applicant pay the respondent’s costs, to be taxed, if not agreed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The question of whether leave to appeal will be granted will be determined on the basis of whether in all of the circumstances the judgment of the primary judge is attended by sufficient doubt to warrant it being reconsidered on appeal and whether substantial injustice would result if leave were refused, supposing the decision of the primary judge to be wrong; Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries [1991] FCA 844; 33 FCR 397 at 398-399. The grant of an extension of time depends also on the putative merits of the proposed appeal and is overlaid with consideration of the effects of the delay, any explanation for it and the balancing of any prejudice that may arise from the delay with any injustice that may arise from failing to grant leave. The draft grounds of appeal advanced, insofar as they are directed to the conduct of the Minister and the Tribunal are, in the context of the present application, legally incoherent. However, because the applicant is self-represented, I shall assume in her favour that the grounds advanced are addressed to the decision of the primary judge and that they contend that the primary judge failed to apprehend the defect alleged in the decision of the Tribunal. Nonetheless, I consider that neither ground has any reasonable prospect of success. The first provides no basis upon which it may be said that the primary judge failed to assess the application before him. If, assuming in favour of the applicant, it seeks to replicate the first ground considered by the primary judge (that the applicant was not properly invited to the Tribunal hearing), it must also fail for the cogent reasons given by the primary judge, which are supported by the factual matters to which he referred. During the course of argument, the applicant said that she had not received the invitation to attend the hearing at the Tribunal because the solicitor who was representing her at the time had not provided it to her. She said that she “constantly” had a solicitor, although not the same one throughout the history of the matter. The applicant was unable to explain the discrepancy between this submission and the content of her affidavit in which she deposed to the fact that she did not have money to find a lawyer. Instead, when asked about this, she denied any knowledge of the affidavit in support of her present application. However, it is not necessary for present purposes to address this apparently new evidence and to resolve the conflict to which I have referred. In her visa application, the applicant provided her own email address for the purposes of correspondence, with no representative noted. The invitation to attend the hearing before the Tribunal was sent to that email address pursuant to s 441A(5)(b) of the Migration Act. As the primary judge noted at [34], by sending a document in that manner, a person is taken to have received the document, regardless of whether it was actually received; s 441C(5) of the Migration Act. If the applicant did engage a solicitor, such person was not notified to the Tribunal as a person to whom correspondence should be sent. Having not done so, it could not, in any event, derogate from the deemed receipt to which the primary judge correctly referred.