BIM21 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BIM21 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FCA 307

Appeal from: BIM21 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FedCFamC2G 902
File number(s): VID 961 of 2023
Judgment of: BURLEY J
Date of judgment: 28 March 2024
Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for extension of time and leave to appeal from a decision of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (FCFCOA) – FCFCOA judge conducted a de novo review of a decision of a Registrar to summarily dismiss an application for review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal under r 13.13(a) of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) – no reasonable prospects of success – application dismissed
Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 426(1A)(b), 426A, 441A(5)(b), 441C(5), 477

Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) rr 13.06(1)(c), 17.05(2), 21.02(1)

Federal Court of Australia Rules 2011 (Cth) r 35.13.

Cases cited:

Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corp [1948] 1 KB 223

Bechara v Bates [2021] FCAFC 34; 286 FCR 166

BIM21 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FedCFamC2G 902

BIM21 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs (MLG 1065 of 2021, decision of Registrar delivered on 27 July 2023)

Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries [1991] FCA 844; 33 FCR 397

Harris v Caladine [1991] HCA 9; 172 CLR 84

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW [2018] HCA 30; 264 CLR 541

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li [2013] HCA 18; 249 CLR 332

MZYEZ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2010] FCA 530

SZNZL v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2010] FCA 621; 186 FCR 271

Tu’uta Katoa v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] HCA 28; 403 ALR 604

Division: General Division
Registry: Victoria
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Number of paragraphs: 35
Date of hearing: 29 February 2024
Counsel for the Applicant: The Applicant appeared in person with the assistance of an interpreter
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Ms K Whittemore of Sparke Helmore Lawyers
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent entered a submitting appearance

ORDERS

VID 961 of 2023
BETWEEN:

BIM21

Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

BURLEY J

DATE OF ORDER:

28 MARCH 2024

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application for an extension of time and leave to appeal be dismissed.

2.The applicant pay the respondent’s costs, to be taxed, if not agreed.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

BURLEY J:

THE APPLICATION

  1. The applicant seeks an extension of time for leave to appeal from a decision of a judge of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2)…

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Details
Case
[2024] FCA 307
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of BIM21 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs involved an application by the applicant, BIM21, for an extension of time and leave to appeal a decision made by the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (FCFCOA). The primary issue was whether the court should grant an extension of time to file an application for judicial review of a decision made by the Registrar, who had dismissed an application to set aside orders made by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal under rule 13.13(a) of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021. The application for review was filed 32 days after the required deadline.

The court had to determine whether to exercise its discretion to extend the time within which to seek a review of the dismissal order. The primary judge considered the merits of the proposed substantive application, the length of the delay, the explanation for the delay, and any relevant prejudice to the Minister. The primary judge also considered the factors relevant to setting aside an earlier order made in the absence of a party, including whether there was a reasonable excuse for the absence, any prejudice to the other party, and whether the applicant had a reasonably arguable prospect of success on the substantive application.

The primary judge dismissed the application for an extension of time and leave to appeal, finding that neither ground advanced by the applicant had any reasonable prospect of success. The primary judge noted that the applicant had provided her email address for correspondence and had not notified the Tribunal of her engagement of a solicitor, meaning she was deemed to have received the invitation to attend the hearing. The primary judge also found that the applicant's grounds of appeal were legally incoherent and did not address the decision of the primary judge.

The court dismissed the application for an extension of time and leave to appeal, and ordered that the applicant pay the respondent's costs, to be taxed if not agreed. The entry of orders was dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application for an extension of time and leave to appeal be dismissed.

2. The applicant pay the respondent’s costs, to be taxed, if not agreed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

On 4 September 2023, the applicant filed an application for de novo review by a judge of the FCFCA of the decision of the Registrar made on 27 July 2023. By r 21.02(1) of the FCFCA Rules, such application ought to have been made within 7 days of the dismissal of the application to set aside the orders of 13 June 2023. It was accordingly filed some 32 days out of time. DECISION OF THE PRIMARY JUDGE On 14 September 2023, a judge of the FCFCA heard the application for review. The applicant attended and represented herself. The Minister was represented by their solicitor. The primary judge considered the two grounds advanced by the applicant’s application for judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision (set out above) as a hearing de novo, thereby not considering the correctness of the decision of the Registrar to dismiss the application to set aside the orders of 13 June 2023 but considering the application for an extension of time within which to seek a review of the dismissal order afresh. That was the appropriate course to take. In considering whether to exercise his discretion as to any extension of time, the primary judge noted that discretion must be exercised in the interests of justice. The primary judge accepted the Minister’s submission that the common considerations which inform the discretion to extend time under s 477 of the Migration Act may be relevant to this exercise of discretion and that those considerations include length of the delay, explanation for the delay, any relevant prejudice to the Minister and the merits of the proposed substantive application, citing Tu’uta Katoa v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] HCA 28; 403 ALR 604 at [12]. In relation to the de novo review, the primary judge went on to note that the Court has a discretion to set aside an earlier order made in the absence of a party under r 17.05(2)(a) of the FCFCA Rules, that the applicant had sought review of the Registrar’s order of 27 July 2023 refusing to set aside the earlier order on 13 June 2023 and that he was to conduct the review de novo on the basis that he is in the position of the Registrar before making the order on 27 July 2023. In deciding whether to set aside an earlier order, the primary judge relied on MZYEZ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2010] FCA 530 (Ryan J) at [7]:In circumstances where, as in the present case, a proceeding has been dismissed in a party’s absence and reinstatement is sought, a discretion falls to be exercised by the court before which the application for reinstatement is returnable. That discretion requires the consideration of three factors, and whether, on balance, they tend for or against the reinstatement. Those factors are:(a) whether there was a reasonable excuse for the party’s absence from the hearing in which the proceeding was struck out; (b) the existence and nature of any prejudice which might flow to the other party from the reinstatement, and the extent, if any, to which that prejudice can be assuaged by an adjournment, an order for costs or other relief which the court is empowered to grant; (c) whether the applicant has a reasonably arguable prospect of success on the substantive application. As North J said in MZKAJ v Minister for Immigration and Multi-Cultural and Indigenous Affairs (2005) FCA 1066 at [18]:The decision whether to reinstate the appeal depends, however, not only on the existence of a reasonable explanation for the need to adjourn the appeal, but also whether the appeal, if reinstated, has a reasonable chance of success. If not, there is no purpose in reinstatement.(Emphasis in original)

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The question of whether leave to appeal will be granted will be determined on the basis of whether in all of the circumstances the judgment of the primary judge is attended by sufficient doubt to warrant it being reconsidered on appeal and whether substantial injustice would result if leave were refused, supposing the decision of the primary judge to be wrong; Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries [1991] FCA 844; 33 FCR 397 at 398-399. The grant of an extension of time depends also on the putative merits of the proposed appeal and is overlaid with consideration of the effects of the delay, any explanation for it and the balancing of any prejudice that may arise from the delay with any injustice that may arise from failing to grant leave. The draft grounds of appeal advanced, insofar as they are directed to the conduct of the Minister and the Tribunal are, in the context of the present application, legally incoherent. However, because the applicant is self-represented, I shall assume in her favour that the grounds advanced are addressed to the decision of the primary judge and that they contend that the primary judge failed to apprehend the defect alleged in the decision of the Tribunal. Nonetheless, I consider that neither ground has any reasonable prospect of success. The first provides no basis upon which it may be said that the primary judge failed to assess the application before him. If, assuming in favour of the applicant, it seeks to replicate the first ground considered by the primary judge (that the applicant was not properly invited to the Tribunal hearing), it must also fail for the cogent reasons given by the primary judge, which are supported by the factual matters to which he referred. During the course of argument, the applicant said that she had not received the invitation to attend the hearing at the Tribunal because the solicitor who was representing her at the time had not provided it to her. She said that she “constantly” had a solicitor, although not the same one throughout the history of the matter. The applicant was unable to explain the discrepancy between this submission and the content of her affidavit in which she deposed to the fact that she did not have money to find a lawyer. Instead, when asked about this, she denied any knowledge of the affidavit in support of her present application. However, it is not necessary for present purposes to address this apparently new evidence and to resolve the conflict to which I have referred. In her visa application, the applicant provided her own email address for the purposes of correspondence, with no representative noted. The invitation to attend the hearing before the Tribunal was sent to that email address pursuant to s 441A(5)(b) of the Migration Act. As the primary judge noted at [34], by sending a document in that manner, a person is taken to have received the document, regardless of whether it was actually received; s 441C(5) of the Migration Act. If the applicant did engage a solicitor, such person was not notified to the Tribunal as a person to whom correspondence should be sent. Having not done so, it could not, in any event, derogate from the deemed receipt to which the primary judge correctly referred.