Bilsborough and Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services

DECISION AND REASONS FOR DECISION [2002] AATA 522

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL ) N2001/1367

GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION ) N2001/1368

Re      ANTHONY BILSBOROUGH LORRAINE BILSBOROUGH
  Applicants
           And    SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY AND COMMUNITY SERVICES
  Respondent
DECISION

Tribunal Professor T Sourdin, Member

Date28 June 2002
PlaceSydney

Decision The Tribunal sets aside the Social Security Appeals Tribunal decision dated 13 August 2000 and in substitution therefore decides: 1. In respect of Mrs Bilsborough the Tribunal finds that no debt is due to the Respondent in respect of the period prior to 1 October 1997. In respect of the period from 1997 to 14 September 2000 the Tribunal orders that the debt be waived. 2. In respect of Mr Bilsborough's application, the Tribunal finds that no debt is due to the Respondent in respect of the period prior to 1 October 1997. In respect of the period 1 October 1997 to 14 September 2000 the Tribunal sends the matter back to the chief executive officer of Centrelink for reconsideration and notes that there is a debt which is recoverable from 1 October 1997.

[SGD] Prof T Sourdin Member
CATCHWORDS
SOCIAL SECURITY – overpayments – whether a debt is owed to the Commonwealth- whether the debt should be repaid- whether the debt is solely attributable to administrative error- whether the Respondent received the payments in good faith- obligation to notify the department- recipient notification notice - whether Applicant failed or omitted to comply with notices –– special circumstances

Social Security Act 1991 - sections 1224, 1237A, 1237 AAD
Student and Youth Assistance Act 1973- section 289(1)

Gerhardt and Department Employment, Education and Training (Unreported, AAT 10941, 17 May 1996)
Re Vitalone and Secretary, Department of Social Security (1995) 38 ALD 169
Re Secretary, Department of Social Security and Hoy (1998) 52 ALD 477
Dingli & Secretary, to Department of Social Security (AAT 11436, 28 November 1996)

REASONS FOR DECISION

Professor T Sourdin Member

The Applicants in these applications are Mr Anthony Bilsborough and Lorraine Bilsborough ("the Applicants"). The Respondent is the Secretary to the Department of Family and Community Services ("the Respondent"). The application is in respect of a review of the decision of Social Security Appeals Tribunal ("the SSAT") on 13 August 2000 to set aside part of the decision of a Centrelink delegate to:
·Recover two debts of $23,596.98 from Anthony Bilsborough for disability support pension and newstart allowance for the period 30 May 1997 to 14 September 2000 and 27 March 1995 to 29 May 1997.
·Recover a debt of $2075.11 for overpayment of newstart allowance for the period of 27 March 1995 to 17 May 1996 and $13,619.50 in respect of carers payments for the period 18 May 1996 to 14 September 2000.
A hearing was held before the Administrative Appeals Tribunal ("the Tribunal") on 13 May 2002. At the hearing of these applications, the Applicants were represented by Ms Jackie Finlay of the Welfare Rights Centre. The Respondent was represented by Ms Hannelore Schuster, an advocate from the Advocacy and Administrative Law Team at Centrelink.
Both Applicants gave oral evidence to the Tribunal and the following documents were taken into evidence:

Exhibit          Document    Date
TD1 Documents lodged under section 37 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 ("T-documents") T1-T58; pp1-307
A1      Applicant's Statement of Facts and Contentions          6 May 2000
A2      Applicant's List of authorities        13 May 2002
A3      Report from Westmead Hospital & Community Health Services from Dr J McMahon     2 December 1998
R1      Respondent's Statement of Facts and Contentions     11 May 2002
R2      Respondent's Statement of Issues          10 October 2001
R3      Correspondence between Centrelink & the Applicants 6 December 2001

background

Part of the background to these applications has been summarised by the SSAT in its statement of reasons. In summary, Mr Anthony Bilsborough had an accident at work and injured his lower back on 4 April 1995. At that time, he was working on a casual basis, and he was from time to time a recipient of Social Security benefits. On 19 May 1995, Mr Bilsborough claimed sickness allowance. At that time he indicated that he was intending to claim compensation in respect of his work injury.
On 31 May 1995, Anthony Bilsborough entered into a de facto relationship with Mrs Lorraine Bilsborough (nee Norman). On 1 June 1995, Mr and Mrs Bilsborough advised the Department of their de facto relationship. On the 30th June 1995, Mr Bilsborough began to receive monthly workers compensation payments from Alliance Australia in respect of his work injury. On the 8th September 1995, Mr Bilsborough lodged a sickness allowance review form. Mr Bilsborough indicated on that form that he was receiving compensation.
It would appear that the Department received this information but did not require Mr Bilsborough to forward details in respect of his compensation payments. It is not disputed that Mr Bilsborough indicated on his sickness allowance review and on all of his original documentation (when seeking sickness allowance) that he was intending to claim compensation and that he was receiving compensation payments.
On the 25th of September 1995, Mrs Bilsborough lodged a claim for carer pension. At the same time, Mr Bilsborough completed documentation in relation to this claim. Mr Bilsborough indicated that he had claimed compensation.
On the 14th of November 1995, Mr and Mrs Bilsborough were the victims of a home invasion. Mr Bilsborough was stabbed four times and Mrs Bilsborough was assaulted. On 5 March 1996, a field officer, employed by the Department, conducted a sickness allowance review with both Mr and Mrs Bilsborough present. A review form was completed and compensation questions were answered in respect of the victims compensation claims Mr and Mrs Bilsborough had made as result of the home invasion. In the section marked "other matters", the field officer referred to Mr Bilsborough's periodic workers compensation payments. Mr Bilsborough indicated that the form was completed in relation to criminal compensation only as the Respondent was already aware of the workers compensation matter. The field officer completed a "review action" checklist. The field officer indicated on that form in answer to the question "Are compensation details known to the Department?" -"details on file, not coded".
On 9 May 1996, Mr Bilsborough lodged a disability support pension claim form. He ticked that he was in receipt of compensation and a form was issued by the Respondent. In relation to that form, Mr Bilsborough indicated that he was claiming criminal injuries compensation.
On 21 January 1997, a field assessor conducted a sickness allowance review with Mr Bilsborough. A question was asked in respect of injuries or claims in respect of the period since Mr Bilsborough started getting sickness allowance. Mr Bilsborough's workplace injury predated his receipt of sickness allowance. On 10 June 1997, Mr Bilsborough lodged a disability support pension claim form. At that stage he completed the compensation questions on the understanding that they referred to his criminal injuries compensation claim only.
It would appear that at some stage Mr Bilsborough was successful in relation to his disability support pension grant. However, in evidence, Mr Bilsborough indicated that he did not become aware of his disability support pension grant until sometime later. On 13 June 1997, the Respondent contacted Mr Bilsborough's solicitor, who handled both his workplace injury and criminal injuries compensation claim. Compensation clearance was granted on 24 June 1997. From 15 December 1997 to 7 June 1999 Mr Bilsborough received four disability support pension rate notices.
Throughout this period, it would appear that Mrs Bilsborough received little correspondence from the Department. Mrs Bilsborough appears to have received four letters in September 1999. She participated in a sickness allowance review with Mr Bilsborough in March 1997. A social worker report for carer pension (T30,pp161-163) was prepared on a December 1997 when the social worker noted at p162: :
"I believe Mr Bilsborough requires physical and emotional support and constant supervision from his wife Mrs Bilsborough due to his present health condition….. I consider that Mrs Bilsborough is providing a significant level personal care to her husband. I believe that Mrs Bilsborough is not able to work outside her family home at the same time to provide the same level of care to her husband. Under this circumstance, I consider Mrs Bilsborough to meet the requirements of carer pension."
In October 1999, Mr Bilsborough received $25,000 from the Victims Compensation Tribunal in respect of the injuries sustained in the home invasion. Mr Bilsborough received three disability support pension rate notices in 2000. On 8 September 2000, Mr Bilsborough's workers compensation claim was settled for a lump sum payment of $75,000. The Respondent imposed a compensation preclusion period until December 2001. On the 14th of December 2000, Mr Bilsborough was issued with the notices in respect of a newstart allowance debt and a disability support pension debt.
Mrs Bilsborough also obtained a victims' compensation payment of $25,000 in September 1999. Mrs Bilsborough was assaulted in the home invasion and required hospitalisation. She indicated in her evidence that she was still trying to come to terms with the assault and was unable to enjoy hobbies such as crochet that she enjoyed prior to the assault. Mrs Bilsborough also indicated that she had continuing headaches and stress as a result of the assault which had required hospitalisation and surgical attention.
There is no dispute that both Mr and Mrs Bilsborough were overpaid the amounts noted by the Respondent in the notices sent to them.
issues
The issue to be considered by the Tribunal in these applications are whether there is a debt due to the Commonwealth, and whether a debt should be recovered.
In respect of the period prior to 1 October 1997, it was submitted that any overpayment was not recoverable as result of the operation of section 1224 of the Social Security Act 1991 ("the Act"). Section 1224 provides:
"1224 (1) if:
(a)       an amount has been paid to a recipient by way of Social Security payments or fares allowance; and
(b)        the amount was paid because the recipient or another person:
(i) made a false statement or a false representation; or
(ii)          failed or omitted to comply with a provision of the Social Security will all this act as enforce immediately before 20 March 2000, the 1947 act or the Social Security (fares allowance) rules 1998;
the amount so paid is a debt due by the recipient to the Commonwealth."

The second issue in this matter is whether if any debt is owed, it should be waived pursuant to section 1237A or 1237AAD of the Act. Section 1237A raises two ancillary issues: whether the debt was solely due to an administrative error made by the Commonwealth and whether the Applicants' received the payments in good faith.
Section 1237AAD requires a consideration of whether special circumstances make it desirable to waive the debt. Section 1237 AAD of the Act provides:
"1237AAD The Secretary may waive the right to recover all or part of a debt if the Secretary is satisfied that:
(a) the debt did not result wholly or partly from the debtor or another person knowingly:
(i) making a false statement or false representation; or
(ii) failing or omitting to comply with a provision of this Act or the 1947 Act, and
(b) there are special circumstances (other than financial hardship alone) that make it desirable to waive; and
(c)it is more appropriate to waive than to write off the debt or part of the debt."
Section 1237A(1) of the Act provides:
"1237A(1) Subject to subsection (1A), the Secretary must waive the right to recover the proportion of a debt that is attributable solely to an administrative error made by the Commonwealth if the debtor received in good faith the payment or payments that gave rise to that proportion of the debt.
Note: Subsection (1) does not allow waiver of a part of a debt that was caused partly by administrative error and partly by one or more other factors (such as error by the debtor)"

the evidence

Both Mr and Mrs Bilsborough gave evidence. Mr Bilsborough indicated that he considered that Centrelink and the Department knew about his weekly compensation payments because he had advised them about the payments. He indicated that he had provided information and understood that it had been accepted. He said that he had not read notices that were received closely and had only understood that he was to advise of any changes. He indicated that he had advised the Department of changes that had taken place and that the Department had been advised of the victims compensation claim as well as the workers compensation claim.
Mrs Bilsborough's contact with the Department was minimal. She had participated in reviews where the compensation payments had been discussed. She was aware that the Department had been advised about the payments that had been made. She received very few notices and could not be said to have had notice that the Department did not understand what Mr Bilsborough's income was.
Mrs Bilsborough complied with notices which did not refer to an income amount until October 1999 (T36). She was advised to notify the Department if her income increased. Her income did not increase. Her husband had continued to receive the same payments that he had received since 1995. Mrs Bilsborough knew that her husband had advised the Department of his compensation claims because she had been present when he advised the field officers who had conducted reviews. The field officers had noted down information relating to the compensation which had not then been acted upon by the Department.
Mrs Bilsborough indicated in her evidence that she knew that her husband was getting workers compensation payments and that she understood that the Department was aware of the payments because "he had told them". She said that she had little recollection of getting any forms that were sent to her, and her husband had completed all of his own paperwork.
Both Mr and Mrs Bilsborough also gave evidence about their current situation. Mr Bilsborough has considerable back and related problems. At the SSAT it was noted that Mr Bilsborough uses a wheelchair. The SSAT considered on the evidence presented to it that: "On the medical evidence, there was no basis for Mr Bilsborough's suggestion that he requires a wheelchair and uses it on medical advice."
The SSAT considered that the medical evidence supported a finding that Mr Bilsborough's evidence was not credible (T3). In particular the SSAT considered at T3, p13):
"the Tribunal was unable to conclude that Mr Bilsborough was a truthful witness and did not consider he was making any attempt to give the tribunal the true picture of the situation. It is clear that his claims about his disability and wheelchair use a quite untrue and that he must be aware of this fact. The tribunal was forced to conclude that Mr Bilsborough was a witness of limited credibility and, as a result, it did not accept his evidence on many points particularly those concerned with this level of disability where his evidence was directly contradicted by the weight of medical evidence."

At the hearing before the AAT medical evidence was produced that supported Mr Bilsborough's claim that he required a wheelchair. A letter from Dr John McMahon the Neurosurgery Registrar of Westmead dated 2 December 1998 (Exhibit A3) stated that:
"I have recently been involved in the care of Anthony Bilsborough who has a severe cervical canal stenosis producing weakness and paraesthesia of the limbs. He is severely affected by his neurological condition and requires a walking stick for mobility and has required a wheelchair.
His condition has been progressively worsening since I first examined him in April 98. I have examined him today and have found generalised weakness which is worse than previously.
I believe that he requires assistance in order to obtain a wheelchair. His condition will progressively worsen and he is already at this stage of requiring a wheelchair to maintain some independence."

The medical evidence tendered to the AAT suggests that Mr Bilsborough does indeed, require the use of a wheelchair. This evidence (that was not before the SSAT) casts some doubt upon the findings of the SSAT in respect of Mr Bilsborough's credibility. In any event, this Tribunal did consider that Mr Bilsborough or Mrs Bilsborough were credible witnesses in relation to all key issues.
The T-documents contain a number computer-generated copies of the letters sent to Mr and Mrs Bilsborough. As noted above, there were few letters sent to Mrs Bilsborough until late 1999.
submissions and consideration
It was submitted by Ms Schuster for the Applicants, that there had been no contravention of the Act by Mr or Mrs Bilsborough in respect of the period prior to 1 October 1997. In respect of the period prior to 1 October 1997 debts were raised by the Respondent under Section 1224 of the Act. As noted previously, section 1224 of the act differs from the current section. Essentially, if the overpayment arises as a result of the actions of the recipient or another person in making a false statement or false representation or failing or omitting to comply with a provision of the Social Security law then a debt can be validly raised and recovered.
Here, the overpayment arose as a result of the Respondent's failure to act. It is clear that in a number of claims and review forms Mr Bilsborough notified the Respondent that he was claiming or receiving workers compensation. The Tribunal agrees with the Applicant that the answers provided by Mr Bilsborough should have led to the correct administrative procedures and decisions being made by the Respondent. It seems clear that Mr Bilsborough and Mrs Bilsborough sought to ensure on a number of occasions that the Respondent was properly informed in respect of the workers compensation claim as well as the victims compensation claims.
The consequence of this finding is that there was no failure or omission to comply with a requirement of the Act nor was there any false statement or false representation by the Applicants. It follows that there is no debt due by the Applicants to the Respondent pursuant to section 1224 of the Act.
Accordingly, the Tribunal finds that there is no recoverable debt in respect of either Mr or Mrs Bilsborough in respect of the period prior to 1 October 1997.
In relation to the period post 1 October 1997, Ms Finlay submitted that the debt should be waived pursuant to either section 1237A(1) or section 1237AAD of the Act. Taking first section 1237A(1) of the Act, it provides that:

"…the Secretary must waive the right to recover the proportion of a debt that is attributable solely to an administrative error made by the Commonwealth if the debtor received in good faith the payment or payments that gave rise to that proportion of the debt."

In this case, I am satisfied that Mr and Mrs Bilsborough received the payments in good faith as that expression was interpreted by Justice Finn of Federal Court in Secretary, DEETYA v Prince (1997) 26 AAR 385 at pp387-388. Mr and Mrs Bilsborough thought that they had complied with their obligations to notify the Department or Centrelink of their changing circumstances.
However, the primarily issue in respect of the period post 1 October 1997, is not whether Centrelink has made an administrative error but whether the debt is attributable to that administrative error and, if it is, whether it is solely attributable to that error.

The Applicant's submitted that the overpayment arose solely due to administrative error and should therefore be waived. In an unreported decision of Gerhardt and Department Employment, Education and Training (Unreported, AAT 10941, 17 May 1996), the meaning of "solely" as it formerly appeared in section 289(1) of the Student and Youth Assistance Act 1973 was considered. That sub-section was in terms similar to section 1237A(1) of the Act and a submission had been made that the word "solely" did not mean that the error had been made exclusively by the Commonwealth. After reviewing the authorities, it was noted that the word "solely" meant "exclusively", "only" or "to the exclusion of all else".
There is no substantive difference between section 289(1) of the Student and Youth Assistance Act 1973 and section1237A(1) of the Act. Consequently, it is appropriate to take the same view in relation to section 1237A(1).
This means that the Secretary's duty to waive does not extend to those debts which are attributable to errors or other factors which are independent of the Commonwealth's administrative error. It makes no difference that those other errors or factors are minor. If those other errors or factors follow as a result of the Commonwealth's administrative error (i.e. they are incidental to the Commonwealth's error), then it may be that the debt is attributable solely to the Commonwealth's administrative error.
In relation to the issue of whether the debt is attributable solely to the Commonwealth administrative error it is appropriate to consider the applications of Mr and Mrs Bilsborough separately. In relation to Mr Bilsborough the Tribunal agrees that it was incumbent upon Mr Bilsborough to read and examine the notices forwarded to him by the Respondent. It is clear that Mr Bilsborough received a number of notices from the Respondent (this can be contrasted with the situation of Mrs Bilsborough referred to below). In view of the notices sent to Mr Bilsborough and received by him, the Tribunal considers that Mr Bilsborough's inaction or lack of attention to detail contributed to the administrative error.
The situation with Mrs Bilsborough is somewhat different. Mrs Bilsborough received very few notices and in fact received little correspondence from the Respondent until late 1999. It could be said that her lack of attention to detail in the period post October 1999 contributed in some way to the administrative error of the Respondent. However, it is difficult to consider that the administrative error was not entirely the responsibility of the Respondent up to that date. The Tribunal considered the decisions in Re Vitalone and Secretary, Department of Social Security (1995) 38 ALD 169 and in Re Secretary for Department of Social Security and Hoy (1998) 52 ALD 477.
In relation to notification obligations generally, the Tribunal, in Re Secretary, Department of Social Security and Hoy (supra), said at ALD 480:

"The primary responsibility in cases like the present is the responsibility of the DSS to ensure that the notification obligations imposed by the recipient notification notices given under the various provisions of the Act - including section 872 - are expressed with sufficient certainty as to leave a recipient in no reasonable doubt as to the content of the relevant obligation. It is especially important that the DSS ensure that such notices are certain in their meaning because of the potentially very adverse possible consequences to the recipient in the event of failure to comply with the notification requirements of such a notice - namely, the incurring of a debt to the Commonwealth and a criminal penalty of up to six months imprisonment."

In Re Secretary, Department of Social Security and Hoy (supra), a similar argument to that raised by the Respondent in this application was considered and rejected at ALD 480:
"Before parting with this case the tribunal notes that, in the course of a written submission made on behalf of the Applicant, it was stated in connection with the requirement of the notice of 20 September 1995 that the Respondent notify the DSS if she or her partner "change jobs":
"If Mrs Hoy had been unsure if it [that is, the change in Mr Hoy's employment circumstances on 16–19 January 1996] constituted a change of jobs she may have requested clarification from the department but she did not."
The Tribunal's comment on that submission is this. The primary responsibility in cases like the present is the responsibility of the DSS to ensure that the notification obligations imposed by recipient notification notices given under the various provisions of the Act — including s 872 — are expressed with sufficient certainty as to leave a recipient in no reasonable doubt as to the content of the relevant obligation. It is especially important that the DSS ensure that such notices are certain in their meaning because of the potentially very adverse possible consequences to the recipient in the event of failure to comply with the notification requirements of such a notice — namely, the incurring of a debt to the Commonwealth and a criminal penalty of up to six months imprisonment. As regards cases like the present, if recipient notification notices are intended to impose a broad obligation to notify the DSS of changes in employment circumstances generally — not merely changes of jobs in the strict sense — that intention can easily be made clear by a simple re-wording of such notices."

A similar approach was adopted by the Tribunal in Dingli & Secretary, to Department of Social Security (AAT 11436, 28 November 1996):
"7. The Respondent relies on s.1224(1)(b)(ii) and says Mrs. Dingli failed to comply with a provision of the Act. It is contended that the notice of 20 September 1993 amounted to a requirement pursuant to s.68(1)(a) of the Act that Mrs. Dingli notify the Department if the combined income her husband and herself went above $76 per week. I reject that argument. Their combined income was already above $76 per week. It did not go above $76 per week after the receipt of that notice. Therefore no event occurred which Mrs. Dingli was required to notify the Department of. "
The situation in this case can be distinguished from that in Dingli & Secretary, to Department of Social Security (supra),where the Applicant had failed to include vital information on her claim form:
"8. However in my view Mrs. Dingli's claim form of May 1992 included a false representation within the meaning of s.1224(1)(b)(i) of the Act. As I have said, she made no response in relation to her husband to the question asking whether she or he had been employed in the previous twelve months. The claim form also required her to state the gross amount per week that her husband was then earning, and the gross amount earned by him in the last twelve months. She left those parts of the form blank. As a result, her form conveyed the impression that her husband was not earning anything, and had not earned anything in the last twelve months. Submitting the form with the parts in question left blank therefore amounted to a representation that her husband was not earning an income and had not done so within the previous twelve months. "

On the basis of these decided cases, it may well be that the debts in relation to Mrs Bilsborough arose solely due to administrative error. (perhaps at least until October 1999 when notification may have occurred). In any event it is not necessary to consider this matter further in relation to Mrs Bilsborough in view of the findings made below.
The power to waive the debt is found in section 1237AAD. That provides:
"The Secretary may waive the right to recover all or part of a debt if the Secretary is satisfied that:
(a) the debt did not result wholly or partly from the debtor or another person knowingly:
(i) making a false statement or a false representation; or
(ii) failing or omitting to comply with a provision of this Act or the 1947 Act: and
(b) there are special circumstances (other than financial hardship alone) that make it desirable to waive; and
(c) it is more appropriate to waive than to write off the debt or part of the debt."

mrs bilsborough

In respect of the first limb of that test the Tribunal is satisfied and agrees that there is administrative error in this case. In respect of Mrs Bilsborough that error appeared to be more profound than was the case with Mr Bilsborough who at least received some notification from the Department from time to time. Having regard to this, the Tribunal concludes that Mrs Bilsborough did not knowingly fail in her obligations and therefore passes the test in subsection 1237 AAD (a).
The case to which regard is usually had in considering the meaning of the words "special circumstances" is that of Beadle v Director-General of Social Security (1985) 60 ALR 225 (Bowen CJ, Fisher and Lockhart JJ). As Kiefel J said in Groth v Secretary, Department of Social Security (1995) 40 ALD 541 at ALD 545:
"The phrase 'special circumstances', it has been said, although imprecise is sufficiently understood not to require judicial gloss: Beadle's case (at ALR 229; ALD 674), and for the present purposes it is sufficient to observe that it would require something to distinguish Mr Groth's case from others, to take it out of the usual or ordinary case. "
In this case, the Tribunal is satisfied, in respect of Mrs Bilsborough that there are some special circumstances that create a conjunction of circumstances that would suggest that the debt should be waived. In this regard, the Tribunal also notes that Mrs Bilsborough was a victim of the home invasion, has very few assets, and presented to the Tribunal as a coherent and consistent witness.
Mr Bilsborough
In respect of Mr Bilsborough the Tribunal does not find that Mr Bilsborough passes the test in subsection 1237 AAD (a). The Tribunal considers that Mr Bilsborough should have become aware as a result of the notices that he received, that the payments were incorrect and that he decided not to pursue the matter further. In this regard, it seems clear that the Respondent had made administrative error . However, the Tribunal does not accept that the Respondent did not seek to rectify those administrative error by forwarding notices to Mr Bilsborough. Whilst Mr Bilsborough undoubtedly suffers from continuing and severe health problems that include depression, mood swings, cervical stenosis and problems with his lumbar sacral spine, the Tribunal does not consider in all the circumstances that it is appropriate to waive the debt in respect of section 1237 AAD the act.

DETERMINATION

For these reasons, I make the following orders:
1. In respect of Mrs Bilsborough the Tribunal finds that no debt is due to the Respondent in respect of the period prior to 1 October 1997. In respect of the period from 1997 to 14 September 2000 the Tribunal orders that the debt be waived.
2. In respect of Mr Bilsborough's application, the Tribunal finds that no debt is due to the Respondent in respect of the period prior to 1 October 1997. In respect of the period 1 October 1997 to 14 September 2000 the Tribunal said the matter back to the chief executive officer of Centrelink for reconsideration and notes that there is a debt which is recoverable from 1 October 1997.
I certify that the preceding 52 paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of Professor T Sourdin, Member
Signed:         S.Swamy           .....................................................................................
  Associate
Date of Hearing  13 May 2002
Date of Decision  28 June 2002
Representrative for the Applicant Jackie Finlay
Advocate for the Respondent      Hannelore Schuster

[2002] AATA 522

28 June 2002

Key Legal Topics

Areas of Law

Social Security Law

Legal Concepts

Overpayments

Administrative Error

Administrative Law

Good Faith

Obligation to Notify

Recipient Notification Notice