Billing and Davey and Anor

[2017] FCCA 2468

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BILLING & DAVEY & ANOR [2017] FCCA 2468

Catchwords:
FAMILY LAW – Parenting – consideration of the principles of In The Marriage of Rice and Asplund.

Legislation:

Family Law Act 1975, ss.60B, 60CA, 60CC, 61DA, 65DAA

In The Marriage of Rice and Asplund (1978) 6 Fam LR 570
King & Finneran [2001] FamCA 344
In the marriage of McEnerney [2001] FamCA 344
Marsden & Winch [2009] FamCAFC 152
DL & W [2012] FamCAFC 5
Goode v Goode [2006] FamCA 1346
In the Marriage of Bennett (1990) 14 Fam LR 397
Saad (1993) FLC 92-332

Applicant: MR BILLING

First Respondent: MS DAVEY

Second Respondent MS MITCHELL

File Number:

MLC 10850 of 2007 &

MLC 8380 of 2011

Judgment of: Judge Williams

Hearing date: 18 August 2017

Date of Last Submission: 18 August 2018

Delivered at: Melbourne

Delivered on: 13 October 2017

REPRESENTATION

Counsel for the Applicant: Mr Thompson of Counsel

Solicitors for the Applicant:	Johnston Family Lawyers
First Respondent:	In person

Counsel for the Second Respondent: Mr Sweeney of Counsel

Solicitors for the Second Respondent: Mills Oakley Lawyers

ORDERS

1. The proceeding MLC10850 of 2007 Mr Billing & Ms Davey and proceeding MLC8380 of 2011 Mr Billing & Ms Mitchell are consolidated.

2. The Initiating Applications of the father filed 8 November 2016 in proceeding MLC10850 of 2007 Mr Billing & Ms Davey and proceeding MLC8380 of 2011 Mr Billing & Ms Mitchell are dismissed.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment under the pseudonym Billing & Davey & Anor is approved pursuant to s.121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
AT MELBOURNE

MLC 10850 of 2007 & MLC 8380 of 2011

MR BILLING

Applicant

And

MS DAVEY

First Respondent

And

MS MITCHELL

Second Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Introduction

1. The applicant Mr Billing and Ms Davey, the respondent in proceedings MLC 10850 of 2007, are the parents of the child X (X) born (omitted) 2004. X is aged 13 years.

2. The applicant Mr Billing and Ms Mitchell, the respondent in proceedings MLC 8380 of 2011, are the parents of the child Y, (Y) born (omitted) 2009. Y is aged 8 years.

3. Final parenting orders in relation to X were made by Judge Bender by consent on 20 February 2012.

4. In summary the orders provide:

   a)X live with his mother and spend six nights each fortnight with his father;

   b)In odd numbered years X spend the first week of each school term holiday with his father, and in even numbered years X spend the second week of each school term holiday period with his father;

   c)X live with his parents on a week about basis during the long summer school holidays.

5. The first final parenting orders in relation to Y were made by Judge Hughes on 27 July 2012. The orders were made by Her Honour after a contested hearing of 5 days duration.

6. In summary the orders provide:

   a)Y live with her mother and spend progressively increasing time with her father until 1 February 2015, when Y spends a fifth night per fortnight with her father, during school terms;

   b)from 1 February 2015, half of each school term holiday period, and during the summer holidays, on a week about basis, to coincide with X’s holiday time with his father;

   c)from 2016 Y spend half of each long summer holiday with each parent in a block.

7. Paragraph 12 of the July 2012 orders provides as follows:

   The mother has liberty to arrange for the child to attend (omitted) School in 2013 and 2014 and (omitted) School for her primary and secondary school education, at the mother sole expense.

8. On 28 June 2013 the father filed a further initiating application (“the second application”) in the preceding in relation to Y, seeking to vary the orders of 27 July 2012.

9. The second application sought orders, inter alia, for Y to spend time with her father as follows:

   a)From 1 February 2015 for five nights a fortnight during school term;

   b)School term holidays on a week about basis, to coincide with X’s holidays;

   c)From 2016 for one half of the school long summer holidays in a block, to be determined by the father;

   d)Time on specific special occasions.

10. In support of the second application, the father filed an affidavit sworn 27 June 2013. The father also filed a further amended initiating application on 27 April 2014 and an affidavit in support sworn 25 June 2014.

11. The second application was resolved by final consent orders made by Her Honour Judge Stewart on 22 July 2014.

12. The orders of 22 July 2014 provide in summary:

    a)Y to spend specified time with her father between (omitted) 2014 and (omitted) 2015;

    b)Y spend half each long summer school holidays with each parent in a block, with the parties to agree upon which half of the long summer holidays Y should spend with each parent. In default of agreement, Y spend the first half of the school holiday period with the father in odd years and the second half of the school holiday period with the father in even years;

    c)Each party, to advise the other of medical or dental appointments;

    d)A passport for Y;

13. On 8 November 2016 the father filed an initiating application in the proceeding relating to X and in the proceeding relating to Y. Both applications were listed on 6 December 2016.

14. Both applications seek :

    a)Each set of proceedings be consolidated with the other;

    b)During school term time X and Y live week about with each parent.

15. The application in relation to X, inter alia, also seeks:

    a)X’s school term holidays with the father be increased to one half of the holidays, with the father to have the second block.

    b)A “right of option for care order.”

    c)Specific birthday times;

    d)That each parent ensure that X attend all schooling days unless ill injured or otherwise agreed;

    e)As an interim order only, X spend time with each parent in the long summer school holidays in a block, with the father to have the second block in even numbered years and the mother to have the second block in odd numbered years.

16. The application in relation to Y, inter-alia, also seeks:

    a)Specific times for the calculation of the school term holidays;

    b)Discharge of July 2012 orders relating to Easter arrangements;

    c)A “right of option for care order.”

    d)Specific birthday times;

    e)That each parent ensure that Y attend all schooling days unless ill injured or otherwise agreed;

    f)As an interim order only, specific times for calculation of the summer holiday blocks.

17. On the first court date 6 December 2016, the matter was adjourned by Judge Small to my duty list 4 April 2017.

18. On the first date the matter was listed before me, 4 April 2017, both respondent mothers raised the issue that there has been no material, substantial or significant change in the circumstances, since the making of the orders of February 2012 for X and July 2014 for Y. They sought that the father’s applications should be dismissed under what is commonly referred to as the principle in In the Marriage of Rice and Asplund[1] (“Rice & Asplund”).

    [1] In the Marriage of Rice and Asplund (1978) 6 Fam LR 570.

19. On that date orders were made by  consent as follows:

    a)To obtain a family report from Ms R, family consultant.

    b)The father to be responsible at first instance for the payment of Ms R’s report;

    c)The parties file a financial statement within 21 days prior to the return date;

    d)A restraint on the parties discussing the proceedings or proposals with the children;

    e)Each of the respondent mothers be entitled to obtain copies of the material filed in the other child’s proceeding.

20. The orders providing for Ms R’s report were made on the basis that the mothers were entitled to pursue the Rice & Asplund argument.

21. On 18 August 2016 I heard the Rice & Asplund submissions. Ms Mitchell was represented by counsel, Mr Sweeney, Ms Davey appeared on her own behalf, and Mr Billing was represented by counsel, Mr Thompson.

22. Both counsel sought that the Rice & Asplund application be determined on the basis of submissions on effectively a “threshold” basis. The matter therefore proceeded before me on submissions as to the preliminary issue of whether or not the applications should be dismissed on consideration of the principals in Rice & Asplund.

23. Both counsel, most helpfully, provided written submissions. Ms Davey made oral submissions.

Consolidation of the two proceedings

1. At paragraph 11 of his written submissions, counsel for Mr Billing addressed his client’s application for consolidation of the two proceedings.

2. Neither Counsel for Ms Mitchell nor Ms Davey specifically addressed the issue of consolidation of the two sets of proceedings.

3. It is apparent that the issues in both sets of proceedings overlap and that the outcome of one case will have an impact on the child, the subject of the other proceedings.

4. Both applications reflect similar factual and legal issues.

5. I accordingly intend to make an order to consolidate the two sets of proceedings.

The Applicable Law

Rice & Asplund

1. In Rice & Asplund, the judgment which gives rise to the often quoted principal, the mother sought to revisit parenting orders nine months after final parenting orders were made. The trial judge allowed the mother’s application and varied the previous orders. However, on appeal, the Full Court at p.572 said:  

   The principles which, in my view, should apply in such cases are that the court should have regard to any earlier order and to the reasons for and the material on which that order was based. It should not lightly entertain an application to reverse an earlier custody order. To do so would be to invite endless litigation for, …change is an ever present factor in human affairs. Therefore, the court would need to be satisfied by the applicant that, …there is some changed circumstance which will justify such a serious step, some new factor arising or, at any rate, some factor which was not disclosed at the previous hearing which would have been material

2. As has been noted, it is normal to expect some change in circumstances following a contested hearing and with the expiration of time. However, should it eventuate that there existed at the time of the hearing a factor which was not disclosed, which would have been material then a further hearing may be warranted[2]

   [2] Langham & Langham (1981) FLC 91-014.

3. Collier J in King & Finneran [2001] Fam CA 344, considered the rationale of the principal as follows:

   [41] ‘The rule in Rice v Asplund is a rule evolved to protect children from involvement in further unnecessary litigation. To require a court to make a detailed determination of the matters set out in section 68 F (now s60CC) would defeat the purpose of that protection…’

   [44] ‘To apply the test in Rice v Asplund is to make an assessment on the material then available to the court as to whether or not the matters raised in that material make it necessary or proper in the best interests of the children, the subject of litigation, to allow further proceedings…’

   [49] ‘To be either significant or substantial is to indicate that the matter is of importance, of consequence, of real worth, of ample or considerable amount, quantity, size, et cetera. When related to a change in circumstances, this clearly requires that the change or changes relied upon must be of consequence and must be more than that which would occur by the passage of time, or in the usual course of human activity.’

4. The public policy aspect was further noted by Nygh J In the marriage of McEnerney [2001] Fam CA 344.

5. The Full Court in Marsden & Winch [2009] FamCAFC 152, at paragraph [50] stated:

   ‘…in a particular case a court should be willing to embark upon another hearing concerning the child and parent, or whether to do so would itself be demonstrably contrary to the best interests of the child, is a decision to be made in each particular case. How is that decision to be made? The court must look at:

   (1) The past circumstances, including the reasons for the decision and the evidence upon which it was based.

   (2) Whether there is a likelihood of orders being varied in a significant way, as a result of a new hearing.

   (3) If there is such a likelihood, the nature of the likely changes must be weighed against the potential detriment to the child or children caused by the litigation itself. Thus, for example, small changes may not have sufficient benefit to compensate for the disruption caused by significant re-litigation.’

6. The application of the rule involves a two-step process. The Full Court in Marsden  & Winch (supra) at paragraph [58], described a two-step process to be followed:

   ‘…there is a requirement:

   (1) for a prima facie case of changed circumstances to have been established; and

   (2) for a consideration as to whether that case is a sufficient change of circumstances to justify embarking on a hearing.’

7. The dual considerations of the rule were further developed by the Full Court in DL & W [2012] FamCAFC 5. Their Honours considered an appeal from a Federal Magistrate at first instance, dismissing a father’s application to relitigate parenting matters, where the Court found significant changes in circumstances, but, on consideration of the potential costs and benefits to the child from a new trial dismissed the application.

8. In determining the second step of the process, the court is not required to either follow the legislative pathway of Goode v Goode [2006] FamCA 1346 , nor is it required to undertake an assessment of all of the s60CC factors. The Full Court in DL & W , at paragraph 77, adopted the view of Collier J in King & Finnernan , that to require the court to do so would defeat the entire purpose of the rule in Rice & Asplund.

9. The principal was again the subject of consideration by the Full Court in Searson (2016) FCCA 3195. At paragraph 27 of Searson, the Full Court provided guidance how to determine whether a  prima facie case of changed circumstances is established;

   “27. The evidence before the court at the time the orders were made and, axiomatically, the evidence upon which those orders were founded needs to be compared and contrasted with the evidence before her honour in respect of the central issue, which confronted her.”

Mother’s Submissions

1. I will firstly address the mothers’ submissions in relation to Rice & Asplund.

Submissions on behalf of Ms Mitchell

1. Counsel for Ms Mitchell submitted:

   a)The “rule” in Rice & Asplund required the court to be satisfied as to a substantial and significant change of circumstances, prior to permitting the parties to embark on re-litigating parenting issues;

   b)The father had failed to establish a prime facie case of a substantial change of circumstances.

2. The chronology of the orders is highly relevant to determine whether a substantial change of circumstances exists.

3. The orders pertaining to X were made on 20 February 2012 and predated both sets of orders pertaining to Y. The orders pertaining to Y made on 27  July 2012 were made when:

   a)It was known that Y was to attend (omitted) School for her education and that X was attending a state school. Paragraph 12 of the orders of 27 July 2012 refer to Y’s proposed education at (omitted) School.

   b)The time that X and Y would spend with their father could differ. Paragraphs 5 of the orders of 27 July 2012 refer to this issue.

4. The matters referred to in the preceding paragraph were obviously known at the time the further orders pertaining to Y were made by consent on 22 July 2014.

5. Despite his knowledge that X’s attendance at a state school and Y’s attendance at a private school would result in different holiday periods, the father consented to the orders on 22 July 2014, which had the effect that:

   a)There would always be a discrepancy between the children’s school term holiday time;

   b)The children would not be spending long summer holiday time together in a block;

   c)The children’s fortnightly term time with their father would coincide for a five day block, but X would spend an additional overnight time with his father.

6. He referred me to the comments of Kent J at paragraph 60 of  Searson (supra) ,where the court must necessarily “ assume the acceptance of the mother’s evidence on the question of whether a sufficient change in circumstances was demonstrated”

7. Counsel submitted that on the applicant’s evidence there was no  prima facie case established in accordance with the “test” in Searson. Even taken at its highest, the evidence of the father does not establish that there has been a change of circumstances since the making of the 2014 orders to warrant the court considering a variation of those orders.

8. I was referred to four further relevant matters as follows:

   a)Children’s time not corresponding;

   b)Schooling issues;

   c)Changing the orders to create the “grounds”;

   d)The welfare report.

Children’s time not corresponding

1. It was submitted that this issue was raised in the 2013/2014 proceeding. The father filed lengthy affidavits in support of that application, which included that compliant. Specifically, at paragraph 27 of an affidavit filed 25 June 2014, the father in support of a proposed variation of orders, referred to “the mothers demand meant that my time with X and Y would not correspond”. At paragraphs 32 of the same affidavit, the father states that he interprets the orders were made “specifically with the intention so that the siblings can share time together”.

Schooling issues

1. The father asserts at paragraphs 30 of his affidavit filed 8 November 2016, “in the lead up to Y’s trial it was not known what school Y would be attending.” Counsel for Ms Mitchell submitted that even if that was not known in 2012, it was certainly known at the time of the 2014 proceedings. Paragraphs 35 to 51 of the father’s affidavit of 25 June 2014 refer to this issue.

2. Both the affidavit filed by the father in the 2013/2014 proceedings and the affidavit filed on 8 November 2016 in support of the current application, refer to the same complaint that the holiday times of the children schools do not coincide.

3. The father also complained about the birthday arrangements in paragraphs 63 to 67 of his affidavit filed 24 June 2014. It is the same complaint that is made in these current proceedings.

4. The affidavit filed in support of the 2013/2014 proceedings is in strikingly similar terms to that filed in the current proceedings, which alleges a substantial change of circumstances.

5. The applicant had an opportunity in 2014 to address the non-alignment of the children’s school holidays; however, the application was compromised without doing so. The same circumstances as existed prior to the 2014 consent orders, does not constitute “a substantial change”.

Changing the orders to create the grounds

1. It was submitted by counsel that the father’s application was fundamentally flawed, as it attempts to agitate that the court should change the orders for the children, and this change itself would then create a substantial change. It was submitted that the applicant has misunderstood the onus he bears.

The welfare report

1. The welfare report of Ms R, psychologist, does nothing to establish any significant change of circumstances sufficient to warrant reopening the change of residence proposed by the father.

2. The report and its recommendations do not require a change to the current orders and at best are to be regarded as “tinkering” with the existing orders. They do not warrant relitigating the living arrangements of the children.

3. Ms R’s report was not obtained as to determine the Rice & Asplund threshold issue, and her recommendations should not be determinative of this legal issue.

Ms Davey submissions

1. Ms Davey is a self represented litigant who made the following oral submissions:

   a)The orders pertaining to X were made by consent in February 2012;

   b)There has been no change in X’s circumstances since that date;

   c)All parties, namely Ms Davey, Ms Mitchell and Mr Billing have been aware since 2012 that X attends a government school and that Y would and currently does attend (omitted) School, a private school;

   d)The orders pertaining to Y, refer to holidays as “gazetted” holidays, which indicates all parties were aware of the holiday discrepancies as from 2012;

   e)X does not want any change to the existing term time arrangements, nor extended holidays, and that is apparent from the report of Ms R;

   f)X is 13½ and should have an opportunity to have his views respected. He does not want or seek any change to the existing arrangements;

   g)Any attempt to re litigate the arrangements will have a hugely negative impact on X.

1. She otherwise adopted the legal submissions of counsel for Ms Mitchell.

Father’s Submissions

1. Counsel for the father relied on written submissions, dated 4 April 2017.

2. The basis of the father’s application is that:

   ‘the two current orders operate independently of each other, so that the applicant has in respect of Y five nights a fortnight in a strict regime and half school holidays and for a X six nights a fortnight in a split regime and half of the holidays. The central problem is that the two sets of orders do not operate so as to promote the children’s best interests to ensure, as far as practical, the two children are together during the week and at holidays. The current orders operate independently of each other and so do not promote the best interests of the children to synchronise time with the father.’[3]

   [3] Paragraph 6 of the written submissions of the applicant.

3. The applicant seeks to prioritise the synchronicity of the orders so that both children when spending time with the father, as far as practical are together and not separated. The father alleges that the children have expressed their wishes for this to occur and refers to annexures to his affidavit of 3 April 2017 and two statements in his affidavit of 3 April 2013.

4. Counsel for the father invited me to look at the circumstances, subsequent to the 2012 orders pertaining to Y, rather than any change in circumstances which had arisen subsequent to the July 2014 orders pertaining to Y.

5. Additionally, the father asserts that since 2014 the children had each been expressing a desire to spend more time together, and that since then, the needs of both children had changed.

6. It was submitted that the recommendations of Ms R constituted a change of circumstances sufficient to warrant a reopening of the living and spend time with arrangements for both children. The recommendations could not be described as “tinkering”, but proposed a new way forward for each family, which was in the interests of the children. The current orders were not operating in the best interests of the children.

7. Counsel for the father also made submissions about the desirability of consolidating the two sets of proceedings. To do so would enable the children’s relationship with each other to be prioritised. The two cases reflect similar legal issues.

8. During his submissions, counsel for the father advised that the father no longer sought a week about arrangement for both children. He sought that Y’s time would be increased to 6 nights a fortnight, to coincide with X’s time. Upon questioning by me, I was advised that Y and X spend five nights a fortnight together at their father’s home. I was advised that the primary issue, as far as the father was concerned, was the alignment of the children’s holiday time.

Discussion and Consideration

1. As correctly identified by counsel for Ms Mitchell, the starting point in such applications, is for the applicant to establish a prima facie case of changed circumstances. I will address the father’s evidence in relation to both term living arrangements and holiday time.

Term living arrangements

1. The current term living arrangements for the children provide for X and Y to spend five nights a fortnight, together with each other in the care of their father. Much of the father’s evidence in his affidavits sworn in support of the current application focuses on what he describes as the misalignment of the children’s existing time with each other. In my view there is no misalignment of time. The only differential is that X spends six nights a fortnight with his father and Y spends five nights a fortnight.

2. The father’s current application seeks that both children spend a week about arrangement with their respective parents. This proposal was abandoned during submissions and I was advised that the only change to term living arrangements currently sought by the father was to increase Y’s time to 6 nights a fortnight.

3. The father’s reasons for seeking the” realignment” of time do not identify any significant change in circumstances. The reasons detailed in his affidavit sworn 7 November 2016, refer to matters such as changes in maturity, changes in relationships and information available at the time orders were made.

4. In his affidavit sworn 3 April 2017, the father refers to conversations, whereby X allegedly requested to spend additional time with Y.

5. The family report states that X is content with the existing term time arrangements. It also reports that X emphatically stated that he does not want arrangements to change to a week about.  X also identifies that he enjoys the time with his father when Y is not present. [4]He has also told the family consultant that he prefers the week about during the summer holidays.[5]  X’s reported view is contrary to the father’s evidence.

   [4] Paragraph 51 of the family report.

   [5] Paragraph 54 of the family report.

6. Paragraphs 63 and 64 of the family report refer to Y’s preferences. Y also enjoys individual time with each parent, and does not have a view about the period of time to be spent with her father. The family consultant suggests that from Y’s perspective, there is no need for a change in current arrangements.

7. On the evidence before me, I am satisfied that neither child has expressed a desire to change the existing arrangements.

8. The reasons offered by the father do not, in my view, satisfy the requirement for significant or substantial changes, and may be regarded as changes “ which would occur by the passage of time, or in the usual course of human activity”  as referred to by Collier J in King & Finneran (supra). 

Holiday time

1. As previously referred to, the orders for X were made in February 2012, and at that time the father was aware that X attended a government school and would do so in the future. He was aware that Y’s mother wanted her to attend (omitted) School, a private school. The judgement of Her Honour, Federal Magistrate Hughes[6] (as she then was) refers to the father having received correspondence from (omitted) School in late 2011, that the mother had placed Y on the waiting list for (omitted) School in late 2010. Late 2011, predates the making of the orders pertaining to X.

   [6] Paragraphs 99 – 101.

2. The first orders for Y were made in July 2012, after five days of hearing. During the course of that hearing, the father and Ms Mitchell agreed that Y would attend (omitted) School. Paragraph 12 of those orders reflects that agreement. I have difficulty accepting that the father was unaware of the differing holiday times between private and state school education at that time. Additionally, the orders of July 2012 are peppered with references to the time between X and Y, coinciding to the extent possible.

3. The second set of proceedings initiated by the father in June 2013 sought orders in relation to Y’s holiday time with her father.

4. Paragraphs 34 and 35 of the father’s affidavit sworn 25 June 2014 refer in significant detail to the differences between the (omitted) School holiday periods, and the public school gazetted holidays. I accept that as at June 2014 the father was acutely aware of the differing holidays of the two schools. Notwithstanding this knowledge, he resolved the 2013 proceedings by consent, in terms of the orders made by Judge Stewart on 22 July 2014.

5. In my view it is not open to the father to now allege that the non-alignment of school holidays is a change of circumstances which would justify fresh court proceedings in relation to both X and Y. The father had that opportunity prior to the conclusion of the 2013 proceedings.

Other orders sought by Father

1. In his application filed 8 November 2016, the father sought additional parenting orders. In relation to both X and Y, he sought orders as follows: (adopting the terminology of the applications)

   a)right of first option for care order;

   b)birthday times;

   c)attendance upon school;

   In relation to Y, he also seeks that order 9 of the 27 July 2012 orders, relating to Easter, be discharged.

2. The father’s evidence for the “right of first option for care order” as set out in his affidavits filed in these proceedings, do not, in my view, constitute a change in circumstances which would warrant further litigation involving both children.

3. In relation to the proposed change to birthday orders, the husband refers to events which occurred on (omitted) 2014, Y’s fifth birthday. The husband had the opportunity to address this issue in the 2013 proceedings, as orders were not made until July 2014. This does not constitute a change of circumstances

4. The father’s evidence supporting an order compelling attendance at school is vague and non-specific. It cannot be regarded as a change in circumstances.

5. There is no evidence why the father seeks to discharge the orders for Easter time, which could be regarded as a change in circumstances.

Recommendations of the Family Report

1. The father seeks to rely on the recommendations of the family report as a change in circumstances. The recommendations of the family consultant do not constitute a change in circumstances.

2. In my view, the benefit of obtaining a family report was to clarify that neither X, nor Y wanted a change in the existing care arrangements.

Conclusion

1. In my view the father does not identify in his material any prima facie change of circumstances. He is unable to refer to any specific change in circumstances which have arisen since the making of the 2012 orders for both children, or since the making of the July 2014 orders pertaining to Y, which warrant embarking on further litigation to determine school term and holiday arrangements for either child or the ancillary orders sought by him.  

2. I intend to make orders dismissing the applications of the father filed 8 November 2016, in both proceedings.

I certify that the preceding eighty nine (89) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge Williams

Date: 13 October 2017