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IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
1
SOUTH AUSTRALIAN DISTRICT REGISTRY ) No. G 2 5 of 1 9 8 2 1
GENERAL D I V I S I O N l
On appcal f r o m a s i n g l e Judge 01 t hc Federal C o u r t oE A u s t r a l i a BETWEEN : ABORIGINAL DEVELOPMENT COMMISSION
A p p e l l a n t
AND : ~
RALKON AGRICULTUFWL COMPANY P T Y . 1,IhlITED
R e s p o n d e n t
O R D E R
JUDGES : Fox J . , l l r o o d w a r d J. and Toohey J .
DATE OF ORDER: 1 ( J N o v e m b e r 1 9 8 2
WHERE MADE : A d e l a i d e
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
The appcal be d i s m i s s e d w i t h cos t s
- .. . - .
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA ) .
GENERAL D I V I S I O N 1
On appeal f r o m a s i n g l e Judge of
the Federa l C o u r t of A u s t r a l i a BETWEEN :
A B O R I G I N A L DEVELOPMENT COFLVISS ION
Appellant
AND :
-
RALKON AGRICULTUP\AL COMFANY PTY. LIMITED
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGNENT
FOX J . , 1VOODWRD J . and TOOHEY J.
This i s an appeal f rom a d e c i s i o n o f 111s Honour
Mr, Jus t ice Keely in which he ex tended the time a l lowed
€or t h e making o f an app l l ca t lon unde r the Admlnis t ra t ive Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1 9 7 7 ("the Judic la l Revlew
- Act"), f o r an o rde r o € review, and dlsmissed an object lon to the competency o f t h e a p p l i c a t l o n t h e n made.
L.
The b a s i s o f t h e o b ~ e c t i o n t o competency was
t h a t t h e a p p l i c a n t was not a person who was aggrieved
by the cha l lenged dec is ion wi th in the meaning o f
ss . 5 ancl 6 o f t h e J u d i c i a l Revlew Act. Before us it was
conceded by counsel f o r t h e a p p e l l a n t t h a t t h e a p p l i c a n t was a "person a g g r i e v e d " , a n d t h e o b ~ e c t i o n t o competency
was as a consequence abandoned. Counsel a t t h e same time
wishcd t o make c l e a r t o us h i s s u b m i s s i o n t h a t t h e applicant was n o t i n f a c t a d v e r s e l y a f f e c t e d by t h e
dec is lon because i t d i d n o t impinge on any l eg i t ima te
c la im o r r l g h t t h a t t h e a p p l i c a n t h a d .
This conten t ion 15, however, subsumed i n t h e
remain lng pr inc ipa l ground of appea l , namely tha t h i s Honour wrongly exerc ised h ls d i scre t ion because the
appl ica t ion could not succeed , and therefore , as counse l
pu t i t , to ex tend t ime fo r making it was a f u t i l i t y .
The case concerns a d e c i s i o n by the Abor ig ina l
Development Commission, e s t ab l i shed unde r the Abor igmal
Development Commission Act 1 9 8 0 , t o g r a n t a l e a s e o f l and t o t he Po in t IkLeay Community Council . An o f f e r t o
g r a n t t h a t l e a s e was made on 2 3 March 1 9 8 1 and t h i s has
been t r ea t ed a s t he dec i s ion unde r cha l l engc . In f a c t ,
thc Poin t FlcLeay Community Counci l for several months
ac t ive ly opposed the gran t t o i t of the lease and favoured
a g r a n t t o t h e p r e s e n t applicant, which now conducts, and
a t a l l ma te r l a l t imes had conduc ted , Ea rmmg ope ra t lons
on t h e s u b ~ e c t l a n d . The P o m t FlcLeay Conununity Council
1s n o t a p a r t y t o t h e a p p l i c a t l o n .
The grounds 01 f u t i l l t y a l l e g e d a r e :
( a ) t h a t , a s m a t t e r s s t a n d , no l e a s e of t he l and
can cons i s t en t ly wl th the Act b e g r a n t e d t o the app l i can t ; and
( b ) t h a t t h e l e a s e h a v i n g b e e n r e g l s t e r e d , t h e
t i t l e o f t h e P o i n t irkLeay Community Council
15, a s it has been sa id , i nde feas ib l e . We have l i s t ened w i t h a t t e n t l o n t o t h e c a r e f u l
arguments o f counse l bu t are o f t h e v i e w t h a t t h e m a t t e r s
r a l s c d do n o t c o n s t i t u t e a b a s i s f o r i n t e r f e r i n g w i t h t h e
e x e r c i s e o f h i s Honour's d i s c r e t i o n . I t i s important t o
emphas l se t ha t t he appea l , a s i t has developed, is a g a i n s t a d e c l s i o n oi a procedural nature , where the Judge
has a d l s t m c t d i s c r e t i o n .
An a p p e l l a t e c o u r t m u s t b e p a r t i c u l a r l y c a u t i o u s
In upse t t i ng such a d e c i s i o n . In f a c t , wc f i n d o u r s e l v c s
In agreement with the conclusion reached by the l ea rned Judge in this case. The submission is in cffcct that the applicant cannot succeed in his appllcation. To entertaln such a submisslon, going to substantive matters in thc
course of an appllcatlon to extend tune, 1 s plainly fraught with risk. Some arguments presentcd on behalf of the
respondent may be aflected by evidcnce, or even by change
of circumstances. Quest3ons o f law are raised which arebest dealt wlth on a hcarlng.
This is not a case in which it is clear that the
application must fail or that any orders made by the Court, if the appllcation succceds, would necessarily be futlle.
In putting the matter this way WC may of course be doing
less than justice, perhaps much less than justice, to the applicant's case, but we have not heard its counsel.
It was contended also that there had been undue
delay in making the application for an extension of time, but in our new this contention does not succeed. The
lease was not granted until J L I ~ ) ~ 1981 and a demand f o r
possession of the land was not made until September 1981. His Honour, as it seems to us, had regard to these and
all other relevant clrcumstances, and WC can find no basis for interfering with the exercise of his discretion.
IVe t h e r e f o r e a r e o f t he v i ew tha t t he appea l shou ld be
d l smls sed , w i th cos t s , and t h a t 1s t he o rde r wc make.
I certify that this and the precedmg four (4) pages are a true copy of the judgment of their Honours Mr. Justice
Fox, Mr. Justice Woodward and Mr.
Justi ce Toohey.
fl&Z65&U d'd.d&'?!fO Associate
Dai-e: 10 flBUOL2bcP jqe.2.
- AGLC
- Bill Acceptance Corporation Ltd v GWA Ltd [1982] FCA 269
- Case
- [1982] FCA 269
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that the grounds of appeal did not provide a basis for interfering with the primary judge's exercise of discretion. It was noted that the appeal was against a procedural decision, and the court must be particularly cautious in overturning such decisions. The court concluded that the primary judge had considered all relevant circumstances, including the timing of the lease and the demand for possession of the land, and there was no basis for interfering with the exercise of discretion.
Ultimately, the court dismissed the appeal, finding that the application for an extension of time was not futile, and there was no undue delay in making the application. The court emphasised that the appeal was against a procedural decision and that the substantive merits of the case were not before the court. The appeal was dismissed with costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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