Bilaczenko v Financial Ombudsman Service Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Bilaczenko v Financial Ombudsman Service Ltd [2013] FCA 1268

Citation: Bilaczenko v Financial Ombudsman Service Ltd [2013] FCA 1268
Parties: NICHOLAS BILACZENKO v FINANCIAL OMBUDSMAN SERVICE LTD
File numbers: SAD 215 of 2013 and SAD 216 of 2013
Judge: MANSFIELD J
Date of judgment: 29 November 2013
Date of hearing: Heard on the papers
Date of last submissions: 10 September 2013
Place: Adelaide
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: No catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 49
Counsel for the Applicant: The applicant appeared in person
Counsel for the Respondent: M Wise
Solicitor for the Respondent: Arslan Lawyers

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

SAD 215 of 2013

BETWEEN:

NICHOLAS BILACZENKO
Applicant

AND:

FINANCIAL OMBUDSMAN SERVICE LTD
Respondent

JUDGE:

MANSFIELD J

DATE OF ORDER:

29 NOVEMBER 2013

WHERE MADE:

ADELAIDE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application is refused.

2.The applicant pay to the respondent its costs of the application.

Note:Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

SAD 216 of 2013

BETWEEN:

NICHOLAS BILACZENKO
Applicant

AND:

FINANCIAL OMBUDSMAN SERVICE LTD
Respondent

JUDGE:

MANSFIELD J

DATE OF ORDER:

29 NOVEMBER 2013

WHERE MADE:

ADELAIDE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application is refused.

2.The applicant pay to the respondent its costs of the application.

Note:Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

SAD 215 of 2013 AND
SAD 216 of 2013

BETWEEN:

NICHOLAS BILACZENKO
Applicant

AND:

FINANCIAL OMBUDSMAN SERVICE LTD
Respondent

JUDGE:

MANSFIELD J

DATE:

29 NOVEMBER 2013

PLACE:

ADELAIDE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. The applicant seeks extensions of time to apply for leave to appeal from two decisions of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (FCC), both given on 31 May 2013.

    THE CLAIMS AT FIRST INSTANCE

  2. The two claims by the applicant against the respondent were brought in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (FCC) in June and July 2012.

  3. One application claimed jurisdictional review of the respondent’s “decision” to fail to “examine stockbroker fraud” and “stockbroker trading systems malfunctions”, on the grounds that the respondent “acted in bad faith for want of jurisdiction” and made “an unauthorised” determination identified as No 17815.

  4. The other complained of “contract impropriety” by the respondent having no authority to make a determination identified as No 17129.

  5. The respondent is a public company limited by guarantee which operates as an internal dispute resolution scheme sponsored by the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC). The relevant conduct of the respondent took place during a period when its relationship with ASIC was governed by a Dispute Resolution Scheme Management Deed of 30 April 2008.

  6. Under that Deed, the respondent provided dispute resolution services free of charge to consumers such as the applicant in relation to their complaints against financial service providers (FSP).

  7. In the content of a complaint, the consumer is…

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Details
Case
[2013] FCA 1268
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Bilaczenko v Financial Ombudsman Service Ltd involved the applicant seeking to challenge the decisions of the Financial Ombudsman Service Ltd (the respondent) in relation to two separate complaints about financial services providers (FSPs). The primary dispute centred on whether the respondent's decisions were subject to judicial review under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) (ADJR Act). The Federal Circuit Court (FCC) had previously dismissed the applicant's claims, leading to the present appeals to the High Court. The key legal issues before the court were whether the respondent's determinations were decisions of an administrative character made under an enactment, thus falling within the scope of the ADJR Act, and whether the contractual nature of the determinations precluded judicial review.

The court examined the definitions of "decision to which this Act applies" and "enactment" as set out in section 3 of the ADJR Act. It noted that the determinations in question were contractually based and were final decisions under the signed contract, which precluded judicial review. The court found that the determinations did not fall within the scope of the ADJR Act and, therefore, were not subject to judicial review. The court also considered the relevant principles for granting leave to appeal, which require the decision challenged to be attended by sufficient doubt and substantial injustice if leave were refused. The applicant argued that the FCC had erred in concluding that the respondent's determinations were not amenable to judicial review and that the respondent had enforced its determinations in the courts. However, the court found that the applicant's arguments did not sufficiently demonstrate the requisite doubt or substantial injustice necessary to grant leave to appeal.

In conclusion, the court dismissed the applications for leave to appeal against the FCC's decisions. The applicant was held to have failed to demonstrate that the FCC's determinations were attended by sufficient doubt or substantial injustice, thus not meeting the criteria for leave to appeal. The orders made by the FCC, including the dismissal of the applicant's claims and the imposition of costs, were upheld.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The applicant made a further complaint No 17815 to the respondent in respect of a different FSP on 28 February 2007. That complaint was dismissed by the respondent on 19 March 2009. That decision was the subject of the other application to the FCC, and now to this Court.FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT DECISIONS The primary judge in the FCC was confronted with a claim by the respondent that each application should be summarily dismissed relevantly because its determinations were not subject to judicial review. The hearing of the summary dismissal claims led to the making of orders on 30 May 2013 to that effect, and to the present applications to this Court. The FCC’s reasons for deciding that the two determinations were not subject to judicial review under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) (the ADJR Act) can be shortly stated. The two determinations were not decisions to which the ADJR Act applied, so as to give the FCC jurisdiction to entertain the applications under s 5 of the ADJR Act, because they were not decisions of an administrative character made under an enactment. The terms “decision to which this Act applies” and “enactment” are both defined in s 3 of the ADJR Act. In reaching that view, the FCC regarded the decision of the Court of Appeal in England in R v Panel on Take-overs & Mergers: Ex parte Datafin plc [1987] QB 815 (Datafin) as clearly distinguishable. It was common ground that the two determinations were “contractually based”. The FCC also had a second reason for summarily dismissing the application concerning determination No 17129. It accepted that, unlike determination No 17815, determination No 17129 was a “final” decision pursuant to the signed contract which precluded any judicial review of it. As noted, it did not preclude the applicant from separately pursuing proceedings in a court of appropriate jurisdiction directly against the FSP concerned. The particular issue arises only in relation to determination No 17815 because the Financial Industry Complaints Service Ltd (FICS), as the predecessor of the respondent, had Rules which at the time of the later complaint included clause 36.2 which would prevent judicial review in any event. The respondent relied on Mickovski v Financial Ombudsman Service Ltd [2012] VSCA 185 (Mickovski) at [31] to support that proposition. The FCC accepted that contention. For reasons which appear below, it is not necessary to address that issue. As noted, on 31 May 2013 the FCC summarily dismissed the applicant’s claims under r 13.10 of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth). Such a decision is interlocutory: Rana v University of South Australia (2004) 136 FCR 344, so leave to appeal is necessary. Subsequently, in each matter, on 2 July 2013 the FCC ordered the applicant to pay costs of each of his applications fixed in the sums of $17,071.53 and $16,552.72 respectively. As leave to appeal should have been sought under r 35.14 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) within 14 days of the order challenged as prescribed by r 35.13, and the applications were not made within the prescribed time, the applications for extensions of time were also necessary.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The relevant principles for granting leave to appeal are also well settled: Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397 at 398-399. The decision challenged must be shown to be attended by sufficient doubt to warrant it being considered by an appellate court, and there must be substantial injustice to the putative appellant if leave to appeal were refused, supposing the decision challenged to be wrong.CONSIDERATION The material in support of the two applications is much the same. Each application was made on 21 August 2013, and refers to a FCC judgment given on 2 June 2013. The dismissal orders in each instance were made on 31 May 2013, and the costs orders on 2 July 2013. Nothing turns on that date difference. In each case, the applicant asserts that he was unaware of the time within which he should have sought leave to appeal. In each case, the application was accompanied by the same draft notice of appeal. It asserts “2 conflicting judes [sic] determinations”, and that the determination was to the applicant’s detriment. It seeks remittal of the two matters to the respondent for reconsideration, presumably after setting aside both the orders of the FCC and the two determinations of the respondent. In each case, the application was accompanied by the same lengthy affidavit of the applicant. He says he lost $10,855 and $47,500 in share trading through the two FSPs the subject of his complaints to the respondent by “ongoing malfunctions and bad financial data processing of their electronic share trading platform”. He says market buy and sell orders were executed at the wrong share prices and “numerous variations of these ongoing malfunctions of financial detriment”. There is then a general criticism of “internet computer technology” used in a variety of industries, including by Australian stockbrokers, and of the detriments that flawed technology may have caused. He refers to lack of capacity to address the asserted flaws, the ignoring of evidence of falsified electronic records, and bad faith by the respondents’ case manager apparently in relation to his two complaints. It is only at that point that the focus appears to return to his two complaints to the respondents. He seems to assert that the respondent made the two determinations by “unconscionable conduct for the purpose of concealing a faulty Consumer Product and liability”. The affidavit then says, as the FCC noted, that he sought judicial review of the two determinations of the respondent “on the basis of breach of contract”. The affidavit then identifies and addresses several proposed grounds of appeal:(1)double costs: as the two matters were heard together by the FCC, it had “no jurisdiction” to order two sets of costs, and that it would be fair to order a single set of costs;(2)wrong respondent: the applicant should have named FICS as the respondent in the FCC proceedings, and in that context refers to the terms of the two applications to the FCC referred to above;(3)error in concluding that the respondents’ determinations were not amenable to judicial review under the ADJR Act;(4)error in concluding that the respondents’ determinations were not judicially reviewable, when the respondent itself enforced its determinations “in the courts”, although (as the argument set out in the affidavit suggests) the error appears to be based upon the assertion that the decision in Mickovski was erroneous, and that the decisions in Masu Financial Management Pty Ltd v Financial Industry Complaints Service Ltd [2004] NSWSC 826 (Masu) and D’Souza v Royal Australian and New Zealand College of Psychiatrists [2005] VSC 161 had correctly applied the English decision in Datafin to the opposite effect. (I take that ground to be a refinement of (3). I also observe that the applicant wrongly attributes to two judges then of the Supreme Court of Victoria the same identity, although nothing turns on that.)(5)contract law: the applicant was entitled to, but was not given, procedural fairness by the respondent [although in the subsequent text in the affidavit there are no particulars which would identify how he was deprived of procedural fairness, as the text suggests really a complaint about the outcome of the two determinations], and that they are reviewable “not merely as private contract but under an ADJR Act”.