FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Bilaczenko v Financial Ombudsman Service Ltd [2013] FCA 1268
Citation: Bilaczenko v Financial Ombudsman Service Ltd [2013] FCA 1268 Parties: NICHOLAS BILACZENKO v FINANCIAL OMBUDSMAN SERVICE LTD File numbers: SAD 215 of 2013 and SAD 216 of 2013 Judge: MANSFIELD J Date of judgment: 29 November 2013 Date of hearing: Heard on the papers Date of last submissions: 10 September 2013 Place: Adelaide Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: No catchwords Number of paragraphs: 49 Counsel for the Applicant: The applicant appeared in person Counsel for the Respondent: M Wise Solicitor for the Respondent: Arslan Lawyers
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
SAD 215 of 2013
BETWEEN: NICHOLAS BILACZENKO
Applicant
AND: FINANCIAL OMBUDSMAN SERVICE LTD
Respondent
JUDGE:
MANSFIELD J
DATE OF ORDER:
29 NOVEMBER 2013
WHERE MADE:
ADELAIDE
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application is refused.
2.The applicant pay to the respondent its costs of the application.
Note:Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
SAD 216 of 2013
BETWEEN: NICHOLAS BILACZENKO
ApplicantAND: FINANCIAL OMBUDSMAN SERVICE LTD
Respondent
JUDGE:
MANSFIELD J
DATE OF ORDER:
29 NOVEMBER 2013
WHERE MADE:
ADELAIDE
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application is refused.
2.The applicant pay to the respondent its costs of the application.
Note:Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
SAD 215 of 2013 AND
SAD 216 of 2013
BETWEEN: NICHOLAS BILACZENKO
ApplicantAND: FINANCIAL OMBUDSMAN SERVICE LTD
Respondent
JUDGE:
MANSFIELD J
DATE:
29 NOVEMBER 2013
PLACE:
ADELAIDE
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
The applicant seeks extensions of time to apply for leave to appeal from two decisions of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (FCC), both given on 31 May 2013.
THE CLAIMS AT FIRST INSTANCE
The two claims by the applicant against the respondent were brought in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (FCC) in June and July 2012.
One application claimed jurisdictional review of the respondent’s “decision” to fail to “examine stockbroker fraud” and “stockbroker trading systems malfunctions”, on the grounds that the respondent “acted in bad faith for want of jurisdiction” and made “an unauthorised” determination identified as No 17815.
The other complained of “contract impropriety” by the respondent having no authority to make a determination identified as No 17129.
The respondent is a public company limited by guarantee which operates as an internal dispute resolution scheme sponsored by the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC). The relevant conduct of the respondent took place during a period when its relationship with ASIC was governed by a Dispute Resolution Scheme Management Deed of 30 April 2008.
Under that Deed, the respondent provided dispute resolution services free of charge to consumers such as the applicant in relation to their complaints against financial service providers (FSP).
In the content of a complaint, the consumer is…
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- Case
- [2013] FCA 1268
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined the definitions of "decision to which this Act applies" and "enactment" as set out in section 3 of the ADJR Act. It noted that the determinations in question were contractually based and were final decisions under the signed contract, which precluded judicial review. The court found that the determinations did not fall within the scope of the ADJR Act and, therefore, were not subject to judicial review. The court also considered the relevant principles for granting leave to appeal, which require the decision challenged to be attended by sufficient doubt and substantial injustice if leave were refused. The applicant argued that the FCC had erred in concluding that the respondent's determinations were not amenable to judicial review and that the respondent had enforced its determinations in the courts. However, the court found that the applicant's arguments did not sufficiently demonstrate the requisite doubt or substantial injustice necessary to grant leave to appeal.
In conclusion, the court dismissed the applications for leave to appeal against the FCC's decisions. The applicant was held to have failed to demonstrate that the FCC's determinations were attended by sufficient doubt or substantial injustice, thus not meeting the criteria for leave to appeal. The orders made by the FCC, including the dismissal of the applicant's claims and the imposition of costs, were upheld.
Orders
Orders of the court
Full text does not contain this section.
Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The relevant principles for granting leave to appeal are also well settled: Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397 at 398-399. The decision challenged must be shown to be attended by sufficient doubt to warrant it being considered by an appellate court, and there must be substantial injustice to the putative appellant if leave to appeal were refused, supposing the decision challenged to be wrong.CONSIDERATION The material in support of the two applications is much the same. Each application was made on 21 August 2013, and refers to a FCC judgment given on 2 June 2013. The dismissal orders in each instance were made on 31 May 2013, and the costs orders on 2 July 2013. Nothing turns on that date difference. In each case, the applicant asserts that he was unaware of the time within which he should have sought leave to appeal. In each case, the application was accompanied by the same draft notice of appeal. It asserts “2 conflicting judes [sic] determinations”, and that the determination was to the applicant’s detriment. It seeks remittal of the two matters to the respondent for reconsideration, presumably after setting aside both the orders of the FCC and the two determinations of the respondent. In each case, the application was accompanied by the same lengthy affidavit of the applicant. He says he lost $10,855 and $47,500 in share trading through the two FSPs the subject of his complaints to the respondent by “ongoing malfunctions and bad financial data processing of their electronic share trading platform”. He says market buy and sell orders were executed at the wrong share prices and “numerous variations of these ongoing malfunctions of financial detriment”. There is then a general criticism of “internet computer technology” used in a variety of industries, including by Australian stockbrokers, and of the detriments that flawed technology may have caused. He refers to lack of capacity to address the asserted flaws, the ignoring of evidence of falsified electronic records, and bad faith by the respondents’ case manager apparently in relation to his two complaints. It is only at that point that the focus appears to return to his two complaints to the respondents. He seems to assert that the respondent made the two determinations by “unconscionable conduct for the purpose of concealing a faulty Consumer Product and liability”. The affidavit then says, as the FCC noted, that he sought judicial review of the two determinations of the respondent “on the basis of breach of contract”. The affidavit then identifies and addresses several proposed grounds of appeal:(1)double costs: as the two matters were heard together by the FCC, it had “no jurisdiction” to order two sets of costs, and that it would be fair to order a single set of costs;(2)wrong respondent: the applicant should have named FICS as the respondent in the FCC proceedings, and in that context refers to the terms of the two applications to the FCC referred to above;(3)error in concluding that the respondents’ determinations were not amenable to judicial review under the ADJR Act;(4)error in concluding that the respondents’ determinations were not judicially reviewable, when the respondent itself enforced its determinations “in the courts”, although (as the argument set out in the affidavit suggests) the error appears to be based upon the assertion that the decision in Mickovski was erroneous, and that the decisions in Masu Financial Management Pty Ltd v Financial Industry Complaints Service Ltd [2004] NSWSC 826 (Masu) and D’Souza v Royal Australian and New Zealand College of Psychiatrists [2005] VSC 161 had correctly applied the English decision in Datafin to the opposite effect. (I take that ground to be a refinement of (3). I also observe that the applicant wrongly attributes to two judges then of the Supreme Court of Victoria the same identity, although nothing turns on that.)(5)contract law: the applicant was entitled to, but was not given, procedural fairness by the respondent [although in the subsequent text in the affidavit there are no particulars which would identify how he was deprived of procedural fairness, as the text suggests really a complaint about the outcome of the two determinations], and that they are reviewable “not merely as private contract but under an ADJR Act”.