Bijiga Defa v The Cake Syndicate Pty Ltd T/A Susan Day Cakes

[2018] FWC 3694

[2018] FWC 3694

FAIR WORK COMMISSION

DECISION

Fair Work Act 2009
s.394—Unfair dismissal

Bijiga Defa
v
The Cake Syndicate Pty Ltd T/A Susan Day Cakes
(U2018/2284)

COMMISSIONER BISSETT MELBOURNE, 6 JULY 2018

Application for an unfair dismissal remedy – jurisdictional objection – genuine redundancy – jurisdictional objection dismissed – applicant unfairly dismissed – compensation granted.

[1] Mr Bijiga Defa commenced working for The Cake Syndicate T/A Susan Day Cakes (Respondent) on 9 May 2016 as the Maintenance Manager. At that time the Respondent was privately owned by Mr Gus Cantone and Mr Allan Rich.

[2] On 30 June 2017 the Respondent was acquired by the Kin Group, a national company in the food industry. Mr Bruce van Twest was apparently appointed to the Respondent by the Kin Group at the time of the acquisition to assess the business, develop new strategic direction and improve profitability. On 1 November 2017 Mr van Twest took over as the General Manager of the Respondent.

[3] In late August 2017 the Respondent decided to appoint an Engineering Manager. Mr Rodney Meagher was appointed to this position. It appears that this decision was taken by Mr van Twest who approached Mr Meagher directly about the position. Mr van Twest had worked with Mr Meagher in the past.

[4] On 18 December 2017 the Respondent appointed Ms Panayiota (Penny) Crick to the position of Operations Manager. Between 18 and 28 December 2017 Ms Crick conducted a review of the overall Operations structure including production, engineering (maintenance), planning/supply chain, CI [sic], OHS and quality. Through this process she says that she identified changes necessary to improve costs and efficiency. These changes impacted on 17 positions (out of 175) with three roles identified as being redundant. Mr Defa’s position of Maintenance Manager was one of the roles identified for redundancy.

[5] Ms Crick said that she determined that the Maintenance Manager role would be “better managed by the Engineering Manager and the Maintenance team members” in part because of what she said was “duplications between the Engineering Manager, Maintenance Manager and Maintenance team member roles.”

[6] Ms Crick was on leave in January 2018 so the redundancies were not advised and/or implemented until February 2018. On 12 February 2018 Ms Crick and Mr Meagher met with Mr Defa and notified him of the decision to make his position redundant. Mr Defa’s employment was terminated that day. He was paid four weeks’ pay in lieu of notice and four weeks redundancy pay.

[7] On 5 March 2018 Mr Defa made an application to the Fair Work Commission (Commission) seeking relief from unfair dismissal pursuant to s.394 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (FW Act). The Respondent in its Form F3 – Employer Response to Unfair Dismissal raised a jurisdictional objection to the application contending that the dismissal was a genuine redundancy.

[8] Further to the hearing of the application my chambers communicated with the parties as to the name of the Respondent. Both parties advised that the correct name is The Cake Syndicate T/A Susan Day. As a consequence of this I have ordered that the name of the Respondent in this matter be changed.

What is a genuine redundancy?

[9] Section 396 of the FW Act requires that a number of matters be considered prior to considering the merits of an application for unfair dismissal. These are whether the application was made within time (in this case it was); whether the applicant is protected from unfair dismissal (which he is); whether the dismissal is consistent with the Small Business Fair Dismissal Code (which does not apply in this case); and whether the dismissal was a genuine redundancy.

[10] A genuine redundancy is defined in s.389 of the FW Act:

389 Meaning of genuine redundancy

(1) A person’s dismissal was a case of genuine redundancy if:

(a) the person’s employer no longer required the person’s job to be performed by anyone because of changes in the operational requirements of the employer’s enterprise; and

(b) the employer has complied with any obligation in a modern award or enterprise agreement that applied to the employment to consult about the redundancy.

(2) A person’s dismissal was not a case of genuine redundancy if it would have been reasonable in all the circumstances for the person to be redeployed within:

(a) the employer’s enterprise; or

(b) the enterprise of an associated entity of the employer.

[11] It is not disputed that Mr Defa was not covered by a modern award.

[12] Mr Defa says however that his redundancy was a sham and it is not that the Respondent no longer wanted his job performed by anyone because of changes in the operational requirements of the business. Mr Defa submits that Mr Meagher was parachuted into the position of Engineering Manager with the intent of Mr Meagher taking over the functions performed by Mr Defa.

The state of the evidence

[13] Mr Defa took issue with much of the witness statement filed by Ms Crick on the grounds that it consisted substantially of hearsay evidence. The Respondent said that the hearsay evidence provided important context of the decision of the Respondent to make Mr Defa redundant.

[14] Ms Crick was the only witness called by the Respondent even though quite important decisions were taken prior to her joining the company that certainly had a bearing on later decisions taken by her. Ms Crick said, and I do not doubt, that she made the decision that Mr Defa’s position be made redundant. In circumstances however where she relies on documents and events that occurred prior to her commencement and where these cannot be verified as to their accuracy (in terms of events) or provenance (origins), the reliance on hearsay where these events and documents are subject to dispute and where so much rests on them leads me to conclude that her hearsay evidence should not be relied on by me in making my decision.

[15] Whilst it is trite that the Commission is not bound by the rules of evidence, documents produced by a party to proceedings need to be verifiable and events (such as the reasons for employing a person or why certain decisions have been taken) need to be able to be tested. Mr van Twest, Mr Meagher and Mr Condone, who all played some role in the events leading up to Mr Defa’s dismissal, were not called to give evidence. No cogent reason was given for this.

[16] I have considered if it is at all possible to give any weight to the hearsay evidence of Ms Crick but, in the circumstances, find I cannot do so without substantial disadvantage to Mr Defa. The Respondent claimed the jurisdictional hurdle. The onus is on the Respondent to prove to the Commission that there was a genuine redundancy.

[17] I have also taken into account that the Respondent (and Mr Defa) were legally represented. The Respondent’s representative is no stranger to proceedings in the Commission and should understand the dangers in producing to the Commission unverifiable claims and documents and the implications of a decision not to call particular witnesses.

[18] I have therefore not had regard to paragraphs 4 and 5, the first sentence in paragraph 6, the first and second sentence of paragraph 7, paragraphs 8, 11, 13 and 14, and from “Mr van Twest told me…” to the end of paragraph 32 in Ms Crick’s first statement; 1 and the second and third sentence of paragraph 2, and paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of Ms Crick’s second statement.2

[19] It follows that the documents referred to in those paragraphs will also not be considered by me although I do pass comment on some of them as necessary below.

[20] In making this decision I do not question the integrity of Ms Crick as a witness and the evidence she sought to give, but it could be of little probative value to the Commission in making my decision. The evidence I have decided not to admit at best could only be taken as evidence of what Ms Crick says was conveyed to her of events prior to her commencement with the Respondent. It could not be accepted as the truthfulness of the events described. For example, I do not question that Ms Crick was advised that in late August 2017 the Respondent decided to employ an Engineering Manager and that she was told that the Respondent considered whether anyone already employed at the site had the skills and experience to fulfil the role. Whether this is actually what happened in August 2017 cannot be known with any confidence without the ability to take evidence from the person who made those decisions at that time.

[21] I should also observe that the material filed by Mr Defa in these proceedings has been scant and was of little benefit to the Commission in preparation for the hearing.

The evidence of Ms Penny Crick

[22] Ms Crick says, and I accept, that she is a highly experienced Operations Manager with over 30 years’ experience in the manufacturing field. I also accept that she is well experienced in assessing business needs and making swift decisions as to the work required to be done and positions required to be filled. I have no doubt that, in deciding that the Maintenance Manager position was no longer required and the Engineering Manager position should stay, she made a decision based on what she considered to be in the best interests of the business.

[23] Ms Crick said that in undertaking her assessment of the production area she “assessed the roles being performed by all staff” including Mr Defa. She said that splitting the work done by Mr Defa amongst the Engineering Manager and other maintenance staff would allow for a “more streamlined approach to both maintenance and capital renewal and improvement strategy.”

[24] Ms Crick said that Mr Defa’s role as Maintenance Manager was no longer required by the Respondent and “its redundancy resulted from a well-documented, business wide review of costs and efficiency, that affected all parts of the…business”. Ms Crick agreed that she had not provided any of that documentation to the Commission from the review.

[25] Ms Crick said that, in making her decision to make the Manufacturing Manager position redundant, she spoke to senior managers of the Respondent including Mr Meagher but she did not speak to Mr Defa about his role and what work he actually did. Instead, Ms Crick said she relied on a position description for Mr Defa’s role that was provided to her. Ms Crick agreed that this position description was not dated and not signed by Mr Defa, even though it did have space for such notation. She said that her knowledge of Mr Defa’s role came from what others had told her and her general understanding from her experience of the role of a maintenance manager.

[26] Ms Crick agreed that, at this time, she did not have a position description of the Engineering Manager role and she subsequently prepared a position description for the role. She agreed that she was not aware what was envisaged of the Engineering Manager role when it was created and filled as she did not work for the Respondent at the time. Ms Crick denied that she had created the position description for the Maintenance Manager role at the same time she created the position description of the Engineering Manager role.

[27] Ms Crick agreed that the Respondent had been asked by Mr Defa for the metadata in relation to the documents contained in her witness statement at Attachments PC-2 and PC-3 and says that Mr van Twest determined it should not be provided.

[28] Ms Crick further said that, as a result of the review she undertook, two other employees were made redundant and 17 people overall had their jobs effected.

The evidence of Mr Bijiga Defa

[29] Mr Defa’s evidence is that Mr van Twest joined the Respondent in about September 2017 and shortly thereafter created the Engineering Manager’s position. Mr Defa said he did not see how that role differed from his role of Maintenance Manager and did not understand that the Engineering Manager position was advertised externally. Mr Defa also said that about two weeks after the position was created, Mr Meagher commenced as the Engineering Manager. Mr Defa said that after Mr Meagher commenced at the Respondent he worked collaboratively with him but did not report to him.

[30] Mr Defa gave evidence that, during his employment, he regularly provided strategic advice as to the replacement and/or repair of equipment including developing the long term site equipment master plan, that he conducted a site wide strategic review and provided advice on replacing and/or repairing machinery, and that he regularly submitted capital expenditure reports to the Operations Manager and General Manager which were approved. In particular, he gave evidence that he was responsible for the procurement and transportation of an 800L mixing machine from Italy, a metal detector and checkweigher system from Japan, several flow wrapper machines, and for the subsequent installation and commissioning of the machinery.

[31] Mr Defa produced a PowerPoint Presentation 3 he said he developed with respect to strategic advice he provided to the Respondent. He said that such advice and presentations, including that produced by the Respondent,4 were developed collaboratively. He said however that he was responsible for putting the business case forward for specific actions and was responsible for the capital expenditure requests and delivery of new equipment to the Respondent.

[32] Mr Defa said that he had never seen a position description for his role and, whilst he had access to the Respondent computer drives, he had not seen the organisation charts produced by Ms Crick that showed he reported to Mr Meagher.

Consideration

[33] It is without a doubt the responsibility of the Respondent, in this instance, to prove to the Commission, on the balance of probabilities, that the dismissal of Mr Defa was due to a genuine redundancy. That the Respondent decided to reduce the number of employees by making Mr Defa’s position redundant does not prove that the redundancy was genuine. By the same token, that the Respondent had employed an Engineering Manager three months prior to deciding that Mr Defa’s position was redundant does not mean the redundancy was a sham.

[34] In this case however, the Respondent has not put sufficient reliable evidence before the Commission that would allow the Commission to be satisfied that Mr Defa’s dismissal was a genuine redundancy.

[35] In Perry v Savills (Vic) Pty Limited 5 Senor Deputy President Watson said of the term “genuine”:

[34] The term “genuine” has been applied in the context of the [Workplace Relations] Actand its predecessor Acts in the qualifying of disputes and demands, when considering the existence or otherwise of an industrial dispute. “Genuine”, in that context, was not a statutory term but a qualification applied to the term “industrial dispute” as it arose in the Act. The qualification “genuine”, in that context, has been used to distinguish genuine demands from demands “not in truth sought” or “part of a hoax”. In that context the term “genuine” has long been associated with “real”.

[35] The qualification “genuine” applied to operational reasons suggests that operational reasons advanced by an employer may not be genuine in all circumstances…

[endnotes omitted]

[36] Whilst these observations were in the context of previous legislation, the reasoning applies equally to the use of the word “genuine’ as it appears in s.387 of the FW Act.

[37] Nothing has been put to me to indicate that there was a genuine operational need to reduce the number of employees. No reliable evidence has been put on costs pressures or duplication of roles or change in strategic direction that indicates that the dismissal was a genuine redundancy.

[38] Whilst I do not suggest Ms Crick was not sincere in the work she did, she undertook a review between 18 and 28 December 2017, which included two weekend days (Saturday and Sunday and two public holidays (Christmas Day and Boxing Day)). In effect, five or perhaps seven working days. Even if the Respondent was operational on Christmas Day and Boxing Day, these would be unusual days to conduct such an important review. Further, Ms Crick spoke to Mr Meagher but had no conversation with Mr Defa or other maintenance staff about their roles. How she could reach a decision as to the operational needs of the business without doing so eludes me.

[39] Even if I accepted Ms Crick’s hearsay evidence, this would not assist the Respondent’s cause. It is clear from the hearsay evidence that Mr van Twest had very firm views as to the competence of Mr Defa. Mr van Twest apparently decided in September 2017 that Mr Defa did not have the skills to fulfil the requirements of the Engineering Manager based on a position description that did not exist at the time. In November 2017 Mr van Twest apparently considered making Mr Defa’s position redundant partly because of concerns about Mr Defa’s performance in his role. This suggests a predetermined view within the organisation as to the future of Mr Defa before Ms Crick arrived. This may well have been conveyed to Ms Crick either directly or indirectly in her discussions with Mr van Twest and Mr Meagher. This, however, cannot be known as neither was called to give evidence and Ms Crick cannot give evidence as to their intentions.

[40] These comments are not to impugn the integrity of Ms Crick. She was an honest and forthright witness. Ms Crick firmly believes that she did not do anyone else’s bidding but without the evidence of others involved in the decision-making from August 2017 onwards, this is not certain. Ms Crick was not employed at the time Mr Meagher was employed so she could not have been part of any decision at that time to replace Mr Defa with Mr Meagher.

[41] This aside, I am not convinced on the basis of the material before me and on Ms Crick’s evidence, that she has demonstrated changed requirements of the business such that the Maintenance Manager’s role could be considered genuinely redundant. I am therefore not satisfied that the requirements of s.389(1)(a) have been met.

[42] The parties agreed that Mr Defa’s employment was not covered by an award or an agreement. They also agree that there was therefore no obligation to consult. If there had been such an obligation it clearly was not met. I do not need to determine if any such obligation exists given my finding above.

[43] For these reasons I am not satisfied that the dismissal of Mr Defa was due to a genuine redundancy.

Was Mr Defa unfairly dismissed?

[44] In determining if a person was unfairly dismissed it is necessary to consider whether the dismissal was harsh, unjust or unreasonable.

[45] Section 387 of the FW Act states:

387  Criteria for considering harshness etc.

In considering whether it is satisfied that a dismissal was harsh, unjust or unreasonable, the FWC must take into account:

(a) whether there was a valid reason for the dismissal related to the person’s capacity or conduct (including its effect on the safety and welfare of other employees); and

(b) whether the person was notified of that reason; and

(c) whether the person was given an opportunity to respond to any reason related to the capacity or conduct of the person; and

(d) any unreasonable refusal by the employer to allow the person to have a support person present to assist at any discussions relating to dismissal; and

(e) if the dismissal related to unsatisfactory performance by the person—whether the person had been warned about that unsatisfactory performance before the dismissal; and

(f) the degree to which the size of the employer’s enterprise would be likely to impact on the procedures followed in effecting the dismissal; and

(g) the degree to which the absence of dedicated human resource management specialists or expertise in the enterprise would be likely to impact on the procedures followed in effecting the dismissal; and

(h) any other matters that the FWC considers relevant.

[46] I have considered each of the relevant elements under s.387.

Section 387(a) – a valid reason for dismissal related to capacity or conduct

[47] No reason in relation to capacity or conduct was put as a reason for Mr Defa’s dismissal. Whilst Mr Defa’s performance was alluded to in the evidence of Ms Crick, this was not a matter pursued by the Respondent or in proceedings before the Commission.

[48] I am therefore satisfied that there was no valid reason for Mr Defa’s dismissal.

Section 387(b) – whether the person was notified of that reason

[49] As there was no valid reason for his dismissal, Mr Defa could not have been advised of it.

Section 387(c) – whether the person was given an opportunity to respond

[50] Again, given that there was no valid reason for the dismissal of Mr Defa that he was advised of, he could not have been given an opportunity to respond.

Section 387(d) – unreasonable refusal by the employer to allow the person to have a support person present to assist at any discussions relating to dismissal

[51] Mr Defa did not request a support person in any meeting. This matter is therefore not relevant.

Section 387(e) – unsatisfactory performance

[52] Mr Defa’s employment was not terminated for poor performance. This is therefore not a relevant consideration.

Section 387(f) & (g) – the size of the employer’s business and absence of dedicated human resource management specialists or expertise

[53] The Respondent has 175 employees increasing to over 220 employees during the peak periods. An organisation of this size would reasonably be expected to have developed policies and procedures in relation to matters associated with a decision to terminate the employment of an employee. It would also be expected to have access to human resources staff.

[54] I would note that, in this case, there is no evidence of the involvement of human resources or other legal staff or of any policies or procedures of the business in dealing with the dismissal of an employee.

Section 387(h) – any other matters

[55] No other matters were put to the Commission.

Harsh, unjust or unreasonable

[56] This is not a case where the redundancy is not genuine because of a failure to meet the consultation requirements of an award or agreement such that it would take little time to rectify the deficiency. In this case it is not apparent that there were operational reasons for making the position of Maintenance Manager redundant. Whilst it may be that there are proper operational reasons for such a decision, it was not in evidence before the Commission.

[57] For the reason given above, I am satisfied that the decision to dismiss Mr Defa was unjustified and was unreasonable.

Conclusion

[58] For these reasons I am satisfied that Mr Defa was unfairly dismissed.

Remedy

[59] Mr Defa does not seek reinstatement and, in the circumstances, I am satisfied that reinstatement would not be appropriate. I shall therefore consider compensation.

[60] Section 392 of the FW Act states:

392 Remedy—compensation

Compensation

(1) An order for the payment of compensation to a person must be an order that the person’s employer at the time of the dismissal pay compensation to the person in lieu of reinstatement.

Criteria for deciding amounts

(2) In determining an amount for the purposes of an order under subsection (1), the FWC must take into account all the circumstances of the case including:

(a) the effect of the order on the viability of the employer’s enterprise; and

(b) the length of the person’s service with the employer; and

(c) the remuneration that the person would have received, or would have been likely to receive, if the person had not been dismissed; and

(d) the efforts of the person (if any) to mitigate the loss suffered by the person because of the dismissal; and

(e) the amount of any remuneration earned by the person from employment or other work during the period between the dismissal and the making of the order for compensation; and

(f) the amount of any income reasonably likely to be so earned by the person during the period between the making of the order for compensation and the actual compensation; and

(g) any other matter that the FWC considers relevant.

Misconduct reduces amount

(3) If the FWC is satisfied that misconduct of a person contributed to the employer’s decision to dismiss the person, the FWC must reduce the amount it would otherwise order under subsection (1) by an appropriate amount on account of the misconduct.

Shock, distress etc. disregarded

(4) The amount ordered by the FWC to be paid to a person under subsection (1) must not include a component by way of compensation for shock, distress or humiliation, or other analogous hurt, caused to the person by the manner of the person’s dismissal.

Compensation cap

(5) The amount ordered by the FWC to be paid to a person under subsection (1) must not exceed the lesser of:

(a) the amount worked out under subsection (6); and

(b) half the amount of the high income threshold immediately before the dismissal.

(6) The amount is the total of the following amounts:

(a) the total amount of remuneration:

(i) received by the person; or

(ii) to which the person was entitled;

(whichever is higher) for any period of employment with the employer during the 26 weeks immediately before the dismissal; and

(b) if the employee was on leave without pay or without full pay while so employed during any part of that period—the amount of remuneration taken to have been received by the employee for the period of leave in accordance with the regulations.

[61] I do not consider that the order I shall make will have any adverse consequences on the viability of the Respondent (s.392(2)(a)).

[62] Mr Defa commenced employment with the Respondent in May 2016. He was therefore employed with the Respondent for a period of approximately 21 months.

[63] I consider that if the Respondent undertook a proper review of its maintenance functions and properly considered the work of all the relevant employees including the Engineering Manager, Maintenance Manager and maintenance employees it would have been able to reach a reasoned and proper judgement as to the operational needs of the business. Had this occurred, I am satisfied that it would have taken a period of about eight weeks. In this time Ms Crick could have properly spoken to all employees and consulted management with respect to the strategic needs of this part of the business given its intent to continue to grow the business. A more appropriate staffing decision would have arisen from a more robust process. Whether the Maintenance Manager position would still have been made redundant cannot be known although was probable given the advent of the more senior position of Engineering Manager.

[64] Further, it is likely that the issues with Mr Defa’s performance that were alluded to in the evidence of Ms Crick may have been addressed. It is unlikely that a proper process on such a matter would have concluded within three months.

[65] The assessment of how long a person would otherwise have remained employed had they not been dismissed (and therefore remuneration received had the dismissal not occurred) is difficult to make and little assistance was provided in submissions. In all of the circumstances, I am satisfied that had the decision not been made in December 2017 and conveyed to Mr Defa in February 2018, a robust and supportable review of the maintenance group with the Respondent would have taken place. I have no reason to consider that the Respondent would have arrived at a different decision (that is, it did require an Engineering Manager and Maintenance Manager) but it would have arrived at this decision in an open and transparent way. This does leave the possibility that Mr Defa would not have been made redundant. There would, of course, in such circumstances have been greater consideration of the redeployment opportunities for Mr Defa. I do not, however, consider that Mr Defa would have remained with the Respondent for any lengthy period of time. If it was intended that Mr Meagher take over the role performed by Mr Defa this would have inevitably occurred but with perhaps a better sense of proper process. In these circumstances, I am satisfied that Mr Defa would have remained employed with the Respondent for a further period of four months had his employment not been terminated when it was (s.392(2)(b)). Mr Defa’s lost remuneration is therefore ($1,862.92 per week x 17.3 weeks) $32,228.52 plus 9.5% superannuation (s.392(2)(c)).

[66] Mr Defa gave evidence that he had applied for 10 to15 jobs although produced evidence only in relation to six positions.

[67] Mr Defa suggested that it was to the Respondent to demonstrate that Mr Defa had not taken reasonable steps to mitigate his loss but it does not seem to me that this is the case. The FW Act requires that the Commission take into account efforts of the person to mitigate their loss. To an extent, Mr Defa needs to provide me of evidence that he has done so. The respondent to a matter can counter such evidence should they so choose. In this case Mr Defa has provided evidence of six positions he has applied for over a four month period. Whilst I am satisfied he has made attempts to mitigate his loss I am not convinced of the intensity of those attempts. For this reason, I have decided to reduce the lost remuneration by 15% (s.392(2)(d)).

[68] I have also decided to reduce the resulting amount by a further 10% for contingencies to $24,654.82 plus 9.5% superannuation.

[69] I am satisfied that Mr Defa has not earned any income or that he is likely to earn any income prior to the issue of any order (s.392(2)(e)-(f)).

[70] Mr Defa was paid four weeks’ pay in lieu of notice. I have decided to deduct this amount from the compensation amount ($1,826.92 per week x 4 weeks = $7,307.68). I have not made a deduction for the redundancy payment made as I have factored into my considerations above that it is possible Mr Defa would still have been made redundant. This amount should be deducted from the amount calculated above (s.392(2)(g)).

[71] There is no claim that Mr Defa engaged in misconduct so no reduction for this reason is warranted. (s.392(3)).

[72] I have not had regard to any shock, or distress of Mr Defa is reaching this decision (s.392)(4)).

[73] The amount I shall order does not exceed the compensation cap (s.392(5)).

[74] For these reasons I will order that the Respondent pay to Mr Defa an amount of $17,347.14 plus 9.5% superannuation as compensation. An order 6 to this effect will be issued with this decision.

COMMISSIONER

Appearances:

A. Jenshel, of counsel, for the Mr Bijiga Defa.

J. Krins for The Cake Syndicate Pty Ltd T/A Susan Day Cakes.

Hearing details:

2018.

Melbourne:

June 19.

Printed by authority of the Commonwealth Government Printer

<PR608361>

 1   Exhibit R1.

 2   Exhibit R2.

 3   Exhibit A3.

 4   Exhibit R4 – PowerPoint Presentation headed “Equipment – 8. Machinery Performance Control”.

 5   PR973103.

 6   PR608791.