Biddle v Miele Australia Pty Ltd

Case [2025] VSCA 244

SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA

COURT OF APPEAL
S EAPCI 2025 0060
ADRIAN BIDDLE Applicant
v
MIELE AUSTRALIA PTY LTD & ORS
(ACCORDING TO THE ATTACHED SCHEDULE) 		Respondents

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JUDGE: BEACH JA
WHERE HELD: Melbourne
DATE OF HEARING: On the papers 
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 3 October 2025
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: [2025] VSCA 244
JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM: [2025] VSC 146 (O’Meara J)

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PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Appeal – Overarching obligations – Whether respondents breached overarching obligations – Application under s 29 of Civil Procedure Act 2010 for orders against respondents for alleged breaches of overarching obligations – Applicant failing to prove any breach of overarching obligations – Application dismissed by primary judge – Proposed appeal having no prospects of success – Application for leave to appeal totally without merit – Application for leave to appeal refused.

Civil Procedure Act 2010, ss 16, 17, 18, 21 and 29; Supreme Court Act 1986, s 14D.

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Counsel
Applicant: In person
Respondents: Mr RT Wodak

Solicitors
Applicant:
Respondents: MST Lawyers

BEACH JA:

  1. Adrian Biddle (‘the applicant’) is a former employee of Miele Australia Pty Ltd (‘Miele’), his employment having been terminated in April 2023. After his employment was terminated, he commenced a proceeding in the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (‘VCAT’) against Miele and three employees of Miele. In that proceeding, the applicant advances 34 claims of having been treated unfavourably in breach of the Equal Opportunity Act 2010. Central to that proceeding is the applicant’s claim that he suffers from a disability known as ‘functional neurological disorder’ (‘FND’ or ‘the Disability’).

  2. After commencing his proceeding at VCAT, the applicant made an application that Miele make discovery of various identified categories of documents.[1] On 23 July 2024, Senior Member A Smith made orders in favour of the applicant in respect of some categories of documents, adjourned the application in respect of other categories of documents, and dismissed the application in respect of the remaining categories of documents.

    [1]As to the power of VCAT to make orders akin to orders for discovery, see s 80 of the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (‘the VCAT Act’).

  3. On 19 August 2024, the applicant filed a notice of appeal, in which he sought leave to appeal to the Trial Division, pursuant to s 148 of the VCAT Act, against the orders made in VCAT on 23 July 2024 (‘the first appeal’). Following the filing of that notice of appeal, the parties filed various affidavits and submissions in relation to the first appeal and a second appeal (‘the second appeal’) commenced by the applicant on 6 November 2024.

  4. On 17 December 2024, the applicant filed a summons seeking leave to discontinue the second appeal. On 29 January 2025, he filed a summons (‘the s 29 summons’) in the first appeal, seeking ‘interlocutory relief in this proceeding made under s 29 of the Civil Procedure Act 2010’ (‘CPA’). The s 29 summons was addressed to Jennifer Sung, the solicitor with the carriage of these…

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AGLC
Biddle v Miele Australia Pty Ltd [2025] VSCA 244
Case
[2025] VSCA 244
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The applicant, Biddle, sought leave to appeal against the dismissal of an application under section 29 of the Civil Procedure Act 2010 for orders against the respondents, Miele Australia Pty Ltd, for alleged breaches of overarching obligations. The matter was before the Court of Appeal which heard the application for leave to appeal. The primary judge had dismissed the application on the basis that the applicant had failed to prove any breach of overarching obligations. The applicant had also sought orders prohibiting the respondents and their legal representatives from participating further in the proceeding, on the basis that the respondents' conduct prejudiced the applicant's case and made it highly improbable that the proper administration of justice could occur.

The legal issues before the Court of Appeal were whether the primary judge was correct in finding that the application for leave to appeal was totally without merit, and whether the primary judge was correct in finding that the application for leave to appeal had no prospects of success. The Court of Appeal held that the primary judge was correct in finding that the application for leave to appeal was totally without merit. The Court found that the applicant had not demonstrated that any question of law of general public importance arose in the case, or that there were any other grounds upon which leave to appeal should be granted. The Court also found that the primary judge was correct in finding that the application for leave to appeal had no prospects of success. The Court found that the applicant had not demonstrated that there was any possibility that the Court of Appeal would reach a different conclusion from the primary judge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application for leave to appeal. The Court held that the application was totally without merit and had no prospects of success. The Court found that the primary judge had correctly determined that the applicant had failed to prove any breach of overarching obligations, and that the applicant had not demonstrated any grounds upon which leave to appeal should be granted. The Court found that the applicant had not demonstrated that there was any possibility that the Court of Appeal would reach a different conclusion from the primary judge.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

At the conclusion of his written submissions, the applicant invited the Court to make orders prohibiting the respondents and their legal representatives from participating further in the proceeding. Specifically, the applicant submitted:It should be evident to the Court that when the ‘objectionable’ statements in affidavit form and submissions are excluded, there is nothing remaining that justifies the appearance of the respondents and their legal representatives in this proceeding. In light of the alleged breaches, and potential damage to the prospects of my case if further breaches occurred during the hearing, the Court should accept that it is highly improbable that the proper administration of justice could occur in the hearing if the respondents and their legal representatives were still allowed to participate. Evidence of the Disability As the existence of the Disability is central to the applicant’s case, it is now necessary to describe the Disability in a little detail. In the Trial Division, the evidence that the applicant suffers from FND came solely from the applicant. He described the condition in a number of his affidavits and submissions. For present purposes, it is sufficient to refer to the evidence he gave about the matter in his affidavit sworn on 9 December 2024. In that affidavit, the applicant deposed to having been diagnosed with FND by a neurologist on 19 September 2024. He then said:The diagnosis of FND is not accompanied by any medical information that can identify or confirm the manifestations or limitations associated with my medical condition.I have not provided evidence of my diagnosis in this affidavit because it was not filed with VCAT until 24 November 2024.The diagnosis of FND is a self-reported hidden and complex medical condition/injury, which is the result of a car accident on 3 November 2021, that is not easily observable during objective testing. I am not able to adequately describe my symptoms to anyone, whether medical professionals or family and friends.My disability includes a mystery persistent ‘brain fog’ … The applicant described his disability as comprising of, but not being limited to: ‘reduced attention to detail’; ‘reduced ability to act promptly and efficiently’; ‘diminished ability to process and manage excessive stimuli’; ‘diminished ability to accurately and succinctly interact with others in writing or verbally’; and ‘diminished self-regulation and self-awareness’. While no medical evidence was placed before the judge, it appears from the material filed by the applicant at first instance and in this Court that a medical report dated 19 September 2024, written by Associate Professor Peter Hand, exists and is exhibited to the applicant’s witness statement exhibited to Ms Sung’s second affidavit of 25 November 2024. It seems that the parties were content to proceed at first instance on the basis that, notwithstanding that both sides had copies of Associate Professor Hand’s report of 19 September 2024, in determining the s 29 summons, the judge was to be deprived of whatever benefit he might have gained from reading that report.

Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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