Bidald Consulting Pty Ltd v Miles Special Builders Pty Ltd

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Reported Decision:

54 ACSR 228

New South Wales


Supreme Court


CITATION:

Bidald Consulting Pty Ltd v Miles Special Builders Pty Ltd [2005] NSWSC 397

HEARING DATE(S): 26/04/05
 
JUDGMENT DATE : 


29 April 2005

JURISDICTION:

Equity Division
Corporations List

JUDGMENT OF:

Barrett J

DECISION:

Winding up application adjourned. Section 459S extension granted.

CATCHWORDS:

CORPORATIONS - winding up - application by creditor for winding up in insolvency - subsequent deed of company arrangement purports to extinguish plaintiff's debt - pending application by plaintiff for order setting deed aside - whether s.444E(2)(b) precludes application by plaintiff for adjournment of winding up application - whether extinguishment of plaintiff's debt means that winding up application must now be dismissed

LEGISLATION CITED:

Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), Division 4 Part 5.4, ss.444D, 444E, 444H, 459E

CASES CITED:

De Montfort v Southern Cross Exploration NL (1987) 17 NSWLR 468
Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Barroleg Pty Ltd (1997) 25 ACSR 167
Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Guy Holdings Pty Ltd (1994) 14 ACSR 580
Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Sun Heating Pty Ltd [1983] 2 NSWLR 78
Motor Terms Co Pty Ltd v Liberty Insurance Ltd (1967) 116 CLR 177
Percey v Calvert [2004] TASSC 115
Re William Hockley Ltd [1962] 1 WLR 555
Roberts v Wayne Roberts Concrete Constructions Pty Ltd (2004) 50 ACSR 204

PARTIES:

Bidald Consulting Pty Ltd t/as Forstaff - Plaintiff
Miles Special Builders Pty Limited - Defendant

FILE NUMBER(S):

SC 2858/04

COUNSEL:

Mr M.R. Aldridge SC - Plaintiff
Mr G. Lucarelli - Defendant

SOLICITORS:

Kemp Strang - Plaintiff
Colin Biggers & Paisley - Defendant

LOWER COURT JURISDICTION:

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF NEW SOUTH WALES
EQUITY DIVISION
CORPORATIONS LIST

BARRETT J

FRIDAY, 29 APRIL 2005

2858/04 – BIDALD CONSULTING PTY LTD t/as FORSTAFF v MILES SPECIAL BUILDERS PTY LIMITED

JUDGMENT

1 Almost a year ago, on 13 May 2004, the plaintiff filed an originating process seeking an order for the winding up of the defendant. The plaintiff proceeds under Division 4 of Part 5.4 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) alleging insolvency of the defendant and relying on non-compliance with a statutory demand. When the proceedings came before Gzell J for hearing on 1 March 2005, it emerged that the directors of the defendant had, on the preceding evening, resolved to appoint administrators under Part 5.3A of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). The winding up application was thereupon adjourned to 11 April 2005.

2 By the time the winding up application came back before the court on 11 April 2005, the defendant had executed a deed of company arrangement. This occurred on 6 April 2005. The deed contains a provision as follows:

          “6. DEBTS OR CLAIMS EXTINGUISHED
          The Creditors must accept their entitlements under this Deed in full satisfaction and complete discharge of all debts or claims present or future, actual or contingent which they claim to have against the Company as at the Commencement Date and each claim against the Company before the Commencement Date is extinguished.”

3 There is a definition…

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Details
Case
[2005] NSWSC 397
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Bidald Consulting Pty Ltd, a creditor, sought to wind up Miles Special Builders Pty Ltd, a debtor, on the basis of insolvency. Miles subsequently entered into a deed of company arrangement with its other creditors, which purported to extinguish Bidald's debt. Bidald then applied to set the deed aside and, while that application was pending, applied to the court to adjourn the winding up application. Miles opposed the adjournment, arguing that the provisions of section 444E(2)(b) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) precluded an adjournment. The court had to determine whether s.444E(2)(b) precluded an adjournment in this case and, if the debt was extinguished by the deed of company arrangement, whether the winding up application had to be dismissed.

The court considered the meaning and effect of s.444E(2)(b) in light of the surrounding statutory provisions. It found that the section did not preclude an adjournment in this case, as it related to the dismissal of an application for an order appointing an administrator to a company, rather than an adjournment of a winding up application. The court also found that, while the deed of company arrangement purported to extinguish Bidald's debt, that did not necessarily mean that the winding up application had to be dismissed. The court could still consider the application on its merits, including whether the deed of company arrangement was fair and equitable to all creditors.

Miles Special Builders Pty Ltd's application to dismiss Bidald Consulting Pty Ltd's winding up application was dismissed. The court held that s.444E(2)(b) did not preclude an adjournment of the winding up application and that the extinguishment of Bidald's debt by the deed of company arrangement did not mean that the winding up application had to be dismissed. The court ordered that the winding up application be adjourned to allow Bidald to apply to set the deed of company arrangement aside.

Background

Background to the litigation

Bidald Consulting Pty Ltd, a creditor, lodged an application for the winding up of Miles Special Builders Pty Ltd, alleging insolvency on the part of the latter. The winding up application was filed in the Supreme Court of Queensland. A subsequent deed of company arrangement was executed, which purported to extinguish Bidald Consulting's debt to Miles Special Builders. Pending this, Bidald Consulting filed an application seeking to set aside the deed of company arrangement. The case involves whether section 444E(2)(b) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) precludes Bidald Consulting from applying for an adjournment of the winding up application and whether the extinguishment of the debt under the deed of company arrangement necessitates the dismissal of the winding up application.

The winding up application by Bidald Consulting against Miles Special Builders was filed in the Supreme Court of Queensland. Following this, a deed of company arrangement was executed between Miles Special Builders and its creditors, including Bidald Consulting. This deed purported to extinguish Bidald Consulting's debt. Bidald Consulting subsequently filed an application seeking to set aside the deed of company arrangement. The court had to determine whether it could adjourn the winding up application under s.444E(2)(b) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), given the circumstances of the deed of company arrangement.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Whether section 444E(2)(b) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) precludes the plaintiff from applying for an adjournment of the winding up application.
2. Whether the extinguishment of the plaintiff's debt under the deed of company arrangement means that the winding up application must now be dismissed.

Held
1. The court concluded that section 444E(2)(b) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) does not preclude the plaintiff from applying for an adjournment of the winding up application.
2. The court concluded that the extinguishment of the plaintiff's debt under the deed of company arrangement does not mean that the winding up application must now be dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court began by examining section 444E(2)(b) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), which deals with the circumstances under which a winding up application may be dismissed or adjourned. The court considered whether the provision precludes the plaintiff from applying for an adjournment in light of the pending application for an order setting aside the deed of company arrangement. It was determined that the provision does not operate to preclude the plaintiff's application for an adjournment. The court reasoned that the statutory provision is concerned with the circumstances under which an application may be dismissed and does not address the ability to seek an adjournment.

Turning to the second issue, the court assessed whether the extinguishment of the plaintiff's debt under the deed of company arrangement necessitated the dismissal of the winding up application. The court noted that the extinguishment of the debt by the deed did not affect the substantive merits of the winding up application. The court held that the winding up application could proceed notwithstanding the extinguishment of the debt, as the primary concern of the court was the solvency of the company, rather than the existence of specific debts. Therefore, the extinguishment of the debt did not result in the dismissal of the winding up application.

In reaching these conclusions, the court relied on the plain language of section 444E(2)(b) and distinguished between the circumstances under which a winding up application may be dismissed or adjourned. The court did not depart from prior authority but rather applied established legal principles to the unique facts of the case. The ratio decidendi of this decision is that the provisions of section 444E(2)(b) do not preclude a creditor from seeking an adjournment of a winding up application, and the extinguishment of a debt under a deed of company arrangement does not necessitate the dismissal of the winding up application.