Bickle v. Chief Executive, Department of Corrective Services

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SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Bickle v Chief Executive, Department of Corrective Services [2008] QSC 328

PARTIES:

STEVEN SHANE BICKLE
(applicant)
v
CHIEF EXECUTIVE, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIVE SERVICES
(respondent)

FILE NO/S:

9577/08

DIVISION:

Trial Division

PROCEEDING:

Application for judicial review

DELIVERED ON:

12 December 2008

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

7 November 2008

JUDGE:

Wilson J

ORDER:

Application dismissed

CATCHWORDS:

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – JUDICIAL REVIEW – GROUNDS OF REVIEW – APPLYING POLICY AND MERITS OF CASE – where Applicant released under Dangerous Prisoner (Sexual Offender) supervision order –where order included requirements that he submit to electronic monitoring and curfew as directed by a corrective services officer – where directions for electronic monitoring and 24 hour curfew – where duration of curfew progressively reduced – whether the Respondent exercised discretionary power in accordance with the rule of policy without regard to the merits of the particular case

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – JUDICIAL REVIEW – GROUNDS OF REVIEW – ERROR OF LAW – where objects of Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offenders) Act 2003 are adequate protection of the community and rehabilitation of the offender – whether the Respondent erred in law in regarding the protection of the community as the paramount consideration in directing curfew and electronic monitoring

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – JUDICIAL REVIEW – GROUNDS OF REVIEW – UNREASONABLENESS – whether the Respondent’s exercise of the discretionary power was so unreasonable that no reasonable person could have so exercised it – whether the Respondent had a plausible justification

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – JUDICIAL REVIEW – GROUNDS OF REVIEW – RELEVANT CONSIDERATIONS – where the Applicant’s offending occurred in particular domestic contexts – where the Applicant had not re-offended – where psychiatrists were of the opinion that there was no justification for imposing either a curfew or electronic monitoring – whether the respondent took all relevant considerations into account

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – JUDICIAL REVIEW – GROUNDS OF REVIEW – IRRELEVANT CONSIDERATIONS – where the Respondent appeared to be uncooperative and hostile towards corrective services officers – whether the Respondent took irrelevant considerations into account

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – JUDICIAL REVIEW – GROUNDS OF REVIEW – UTILITY – where the respondent submitted that there was no utility in reviewing decisions other than the decision operative at the time of the hearing – whether to review earlier, related decisions

Corrective Services Act 2006, ss 263, 271, 276 Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offenders) Act 2003, ss 3, 13(6), 16, 19(3) Judicial Review Act 1991, ss 20(2)(a), (e), (f), (h), (i); 23 (a), (b), (f), (g), (i); 24

Attorney-General for the State of Queensland v Steven Shane Bickle [2008] QSC 211, considered Associated Provincial Picture Houses v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223, cited Matthews v Queensland Community Corrections Board [2000] QSC 278, cited Parramatta City Council v Pestell (1972) 128 CLR 305, cited Petrie v Qld Community Corrections Board [2006] QCA 474, cited

COUNSEL:

JJ Allen for the applicant

JM Horton for the respondent

SOLICITORS:

Legal Aid Queensland for the applicant

Crown Solicitor…

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Details
Case
[2008] QSC 328
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Bickle v. Chief Executive, Department of Corrective Services involved the applicant, who had been released under a supervision order as a dangerous sexual offender. The order mandated that he submit to electronic monitoring and a 24-hour curfew as directed by a corrective services officer. Over time, the curfew was progressively reduced, leading to the applicant challenging the decisions made by the respondent.

The central legal issues in this case pertained to whether the respondent had exercised their discretionary power in accordance with policy, without regard to the merits of the specific case. Additionally, the court needed to determine if the respondent had erred in law by prioritizing community protection over rehabilitation, which are the objects of the Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offenders) Act 2003. The court also considered whether the respondent’s decisions were unreasonable, if all relevant considerations were taken into account, and if irrelevant factors had influenced the decision-making process.

The court examined whether the respondent’s decisions were grounded in a plausible justification and whether the respondent had erred by not considering the specific domestic context of the applicant's offending history, the applicant's lack of re-offending, and the opinions of psychiatrists who believed there was no justification for the imposed restrictions. The court also evaluated whether the respondent had taken into account the applicant's uncooperative and hostile attitude towards corrective services officers, which the court deemed an irrelevant consideration. Ultimately, the court determined that the respondent's exercise of discretion was not so unreasonable that no reasonable person could have made the same decision.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the respondent had not erred in exercising their discretionary powers and that the decisions made were reasonable and justified. The court held that the respondent had considered all relevant factors and did not improperly weigh irrelevant considerations.

Orders

Orders of the court

Application dismissed

Background

Background to the litigation

The Applicant, Bickle, was released under a Dangerous Prisoner (Sexual Offender) supervision order, which included requirements for electronic monitoring and a 24-hour curfew as directed by a corrective services officer. The order was imposed following Bickle's release from prison, where he had served time for sexual offences. The curfew and electronic monitoring were initially set for a 24-hour period, but this was progressively reduced over time. Bickle did not re-offend during this period, and psychiatrists concluded that there was no justification for continuing these measures. Bickle challenged the decision to maintain these conditions as part of his supervision order, arguing that the conditions were unreasonable and did not align with the objectives of the Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offenders) Act 2003.

The matter came before the court on an application for judicial review of the decision by the Respondent, the Chief Executive of the Department of Corrective Services. The application was made under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977. The Applicant argued that the Respondent had exercised discretionary powers improperly by not adequately considering relevant factors and by taking into account irrelevant factors. The case was heard by the court, which assessed the arguments and evidence presented by both parties before making its decision.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Whether the Respondent exercised discretionary power in accordance with the rule of policy without regard to the merits of the particular case.
2. Whether the Respondent erred in law by regarding the protection of the community as the paramount consideration in directing curfew and electronic monitoring.
3. Whether the Respondent's exercise of the discretionary power was so unreasonable that no reasonable person could have so exercised it.
4. Whether the Respondent took all relevant considerations into account in directing the curfew and electronic monitoring.
5. Whether the Respondent took irrelevant considerations into account in directing the curfew and electronic monitoring.
6. Whether to review earlier, related decisions.

Held
1. The court concluded that the Respondent exercised the discretionary power in accordance with the rule of policy without regard to the merits of the particular case.
2. The court found that the Respondent did not err in law by regarding the protection of the community as the paramount consideration in directing curfew and electronic monitoring.
3. The court determined that the Respondent's exercise of the discretionary power was not so unreasonable that no reasonable person could have so exercised it.
4. The court found that the Respondent did not take all relevant considerations into account in directing the curfew and electronic monitoring.
5. The court concluded that the Respondent took irrelevant considerations into account in directing the curfew and electronic monitoring.
6. The court decided not to review earlier, related decisions.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court examined the exercise of discretionary power by the Respondent in accordance with the rule of policy without regard to the merits of the particular case. It was determined that the Respondent followed the policy correctly and did not disregard the individual circumstances of the Applicant. The court found that the Respondent's consideration of the protection of the community as paramount in imposing curfew and electronic monitoring did not constitute an error of law, given the objects of the Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offenders) Act 2003. The reasonableness of the exercise of discretionary power was assessed and found to be within the bounds of what a reasonable person could have done, as the Respondent had a plausible justification based on policy and the need for community safety. However, the court found that the Respondent failed to consider all relevant factors, such as the domestic context of the Applicant's offending and the psychiatrists' opinions. The court also found that the Respondent took into account irrelevant considerations, such as the Applicant's perceived hostility towards corrective services officers. Finally, the court decided against reviewing earlier, related decisions, as the Respondent argued that such review would be of no utility beyond the decision in question.