FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Biasin v State of Victoria [2017] FCA 161
File number: VID 92 of 2016 Judge: KENNY J Date of judgment: 27 February 2017 Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application by litigation representative for approval of settlement – whether settlement in best interests of applicant Legislation: Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1985 (Cth)
Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth)
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth)
Guardianship and Administration Act 1986 (Vic)
Cases cited: A on behalf of B v State of New South Wales(Department of Education and Training) (No 2) [2013] FCA 551
Butler v Djerriwarrh Employment & Education Services Inc [2015] FCA 296
Button v CSL Limited [2014] FCA 601
Davies v State of South Australia [2015] FCA 428
Fisher v Marin [2008] NSWSC 1357
Koenders v State of Victoria (Department of Education and Training) [2016] FCA 842
Moore v State of New South Wales [2014] FCA 477
Scandolera v State of Victoria [2015] FCA 1451; 331 ALR 525
Date of hearing: Heard on the papers Date of last submissions: 21 December 2016 Registry: Victoria Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 24 Solicitor for the Applicant: Arnold Thomas & Becker Counsel for the First Respondent: C J Tran Solicitor for the First Respondent: Legal Services, Department of Health & Human Services Solicitor for the Second Respondent: Victorian Government Solicitor Solicitor for the Third Respondent: K & L Gates ORDERS
VID 92 of 2016 BETWEEN: AMBER BIASIN (BY HER LITIGATION REPRESENTATIVE KAREN BIASIN)
Applicant
AND: STATE OF VICTORIA (DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES)
First Respondent
PUBLIC ADVOCATE (VICTORIA)
Second Respondent
MERRIMU SERVICES INC (REGISTRATION NUMBER A0011194N)
Third Respondent
JUDGE:
KENNY J
DATE OF ORDER:
27 FEBRUARY 2017
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.Pursuant to r 9.70 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), the settlement of this proceeding recorded in the Deed of Release marked as Annexure JR-1 to the affidavit of Mr Joseph Thomas Ridley dated 9 December 2016, be approved on condition that no costs associated with the litigation (whether party-party or solicitor-client or otherwise) be borne by the Applicant or her Litigation Representative.
2.The Applicant have leave to file a notice of discontinuance of this proceeding with no order as to costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
KENNY J:
Nature of the proceeding
Approval is sought for a settlement of this proceeding. The Court’s approval of the settlement is required under r 9.70 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) (Federal Court Rules).
The applicant, Ms Amber Biasin, has a moderate to severe intellectual disability and features of autism spectrum disorder. The Victorian Department of Health…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read Biasin v State of Victoria and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2017] FCA 161
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court's reasoning involved examining the requirement for the opinion of an independent lawyer as per r 9.71(2)(c) of the Federal Court Rules. It noted that the court does not need to accept the opinion of an independent lawyer but must determine for itself whether the settlement is in the applicant's best interests. The court considered whether the lawyer providing the opinion met the description of "independent" as per the rule, given that the lawyer had previously been involved in the proceeding as counsel for Ms Amber Biasin. The court concluded that while the rule might imply the need for an opinion from a lawyer with no prior association with the proceeding, the substantial costs of obtaining such an opinion would likely outweigh the benefits. Instead, the court interpreted the rule to mean that the opinion should be provided in furtherance of the lawyer's duty to assist the court and not in furtherance of any duty to a party in the proceeding.
In its decision, the court approved the settlement on the condition that no costs associated with the litigation be borne by the applicant or her litigation representative. The court also granted the applicant leave to file a notice of discontinuance of the proceeding without any order as to costs. The court's approval of the settlement was thus contingent upon ensuring that the applicant would not incur any litigation costs, thereby safeguarding her interests.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Pursuant to r 9.70 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), the settlement of this proceeding recorded in the Deed of Release marked as Annexure JR-1 to the affidavit of Mr Joseph Thomas Ridley dated 9 December 2016, be approved on condition that no costs associated with the litigation (whether party-party or solicitor-client or otherwise) be borne by the Applicant or her Litigation Representative.
2. The Applicant have leave to file a notice of discontinuance of this proceeding with no order as to costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The State supported the application for reasons set out in its submissions, filed with leave, dated 21 December 2016. Also before the Court was an affidavit, filed with leave, sworn by Ms Stella Stasinopoulos, a team leader in Disability Client Services, Individual Family Support, Hume and Moreland Area, DHHS. Consideration In deciding whether or not to approve a settlement under r 9.70 of the Federal Court Rules, for the purpose of making it binding on an applicant under a legal disability, it is well recognised that the Court must be satisfied that the settlement is in the best interests of the applicant, or beneficial to her interests: see, for example, Koenders v State of Victoria (Department of Education and Training) [2016] FCA 842 at [4] (Davies J); Scandolera v State of Victoria [2015] FCA 1451; 331 ALR 525 at [27] (Mortimer J); Davies v State of South Australia [2015] FCA 428 at [6] (Besanko J); Butler v Djerriwarrh Employment & Education Services Inc [2015] FCA 296 at [10] (Mortimer J); Button v CSL Limited [2014] FCA 601 at [31] (Barker J); Modra v State of Victoria (Department of Human Services Victoria & Department of Education and Early Childhood Development) [2013] FCA 1041 at [12] (Tracey J); and Smith v Marriott Support Services [2013] FCA 312 at [12] (Tracey J); see also Fisher v Marin [2008] NSWSC 1357 at [29] (Rothman J). The Court must determine this question for itself: see Fisher v Marin [2008] NSWSC 1357. In consequence, the Court need not accept the opinion of an independent lawyer supplied by the litigation representative in conformity with r 9.71(2)(c) of the Federal Court Rules. In this case, Ms Karen Biasin, as the litigation representative, relies on the written opinion of a lawyer who was involved in the proceeding as counsel for Ms Amber Biasin. This raises the question of whether the author of the opinion meets the description “independent lawyer” in r 9.71(2)(c). The same question has arisen in a similar way in other cases: see Wade v State of Victoria (No 2) [2012] FCA 1080 at [9] (Bromberg J) and Koenders v State of Victoria (Department of Education and Training) [2016] FCA 842 at [3] (Davies J). There is much force, so it seems to me, in the observations of Bromberg J in Wade v State of Victoria (No 2) [2012] FCA 1080 at [8]-[9] that:To my understanding, it has long been the practice of this Court (at least in the Victorian Registry) in applications such as this, to permit reliance upon an opinion as to the adequacy of a settlement given by the solicitor or counsel acting for the applicant in the proceedings. There is ambiguity as to what the word “independent” in r 9.71(2)(c) intends. I doubt that it was intended to effect a change in the long-standing practice to which I have referred. Arguably, the rule now imposes a requirement that a lawyer with no prior association with the proceeding provide an opinion. Whilst there may be cases where such an opinion would assist, the substantial additional costs involved in obtaining the opinion of the lawyer with no prior knowledge or familiarity with the proceeding, would likely far outweigh any potential benefits. It is more likely that what the rule intends is that the opinion prepared by the lawyer be provided in furtherance of the lawyer’s duty to assist the Court and not in furtherance of any duty the lawyer may have to a party in the proceeding. In my view, it is in that respect that the lawyer must be “independent”.