FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| BHY16 & ORS v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR | [2019] FCCA 1080 |
| Catchwords: MIGRATION – Reinstatement – repeated non-appearance and discontinuance of application – further application for reinstatement – no merit – dismissed. |
| Legislation: Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth), rr.13.03C, 16.05 Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s.36 Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), Sch.2 cl.866.221 |
| First Applicant: | BHY16 |
| Second Applicant: | BHZ16 |
| Third Applicant: | BIB16 |
| Fourth Applicant: | BIC16 |
| First Respondent: | MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION |
| Second Respondent: | ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL |
| File Number: | MLG 1140 of 2016 |
| Judgment of: | Judge A Kelly |
| Hearing date: | 17 April 2019 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 17 April 2019 |
| Orders pronounced | 17 April 2019 |
| Delivered at: | Melbourne |
| Delivered on: | 26 April 2019 |
REPRESENTATION
| Counsel for the Applicants: | In person |
| Solicitor advocate for the Respondents: | Ms Kowalewska |
| Solicitors for the Respondents: | Australian Government Solicitor |
ORDERS
The Application for Reinstatement filed on 25 March 2019 be dismissed.
The first applicant pay the costs of the second respondent fixed at $2,000.
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT MELBOURNE |
MLG 1140 of 2016
| BHY16 |
First Applicant
| BHZ16 |
Second Applicant
| BIB16 |
Third Applicant
| BIC16 |
Fourth Applicant
And
| MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION |
First Respondent
| ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL |
Second Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Introduction
These reasons for judgment explain why orders were made on 17 April 2019 dismissing an application for reinstatement of this proceeding.
By application filed on 31 May 2016, judicial review was sought of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal) made on 9 May 2016 affirming a decision of a delegate of the first respondent (Minister) not to grant the applicants protection visas.
Background
The first and second applicants, husband and wife aged 38 and 33 years respectively, are citizens of Malaysia. The third and fourth applicants, aged 6 and 5 years respectively, are their children.
The second applicant first visited Australia between 2 February 2010 and 24 April 2010 as the holder of a visitor visa. On 9 March 2014, the applicants all arrived in Australia as holders of Class UD subclass 601 (Electronic Travel Authority) visas. They have remained in Australia since that time.
On 17 April 2014, the applicants lodged an application…
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- Case
- [2019] FCCA 1080
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the Court was whether to exercise its discretion to reinstate the discontinued application. This required the Court to consider the threshold for demonstrating an "arguable" ground of review, as opposed to the level of satisfaction required at a final hearing. The Court also had to determine if the applicants had provided a satisfactory explanation for their repeated non-appearance and whether the filing of a notice of discontinuance presented a further impediment to reinstatement.
In reaching its decision, the Court applied the principles established in cases such as *CAL15* and *MZABP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection*, which hold that for reinstatement, grounds of review need only be shown to be "arguable" – meaning not fanciful, illogical, or devoid of merit, but possessing a level of rationality and basis in the material. The Court found that the applicants had not demonstrated an arguable basis for their non-appearance, particularly given the multiple prior listings for hearing. Furthermore, the grounds of review were considered too generalised and unsupported by particulars to demonstrate jurisdictional error. The Court also noted that the filing of a notice of discontinuance acted as a bar to reinstatement.
The Court ultimately dismissed the application for reinstatement, finding that the applicants had failed to demonstrate an arguable case on judicial review and had not provided a satisfactory explanation for their repeated non-appearance.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The exercise of discretion in favour of an order for reinstatement does not require the court to be satisfied of the grounds of review to the same level as apply at a final hearing of an application for judicial review: CAL15 at [5]. Rather, on an application for reinstatement, the threshold which is applicable to a consideration of the merits of the application is whether the grounds for judicial review were shown to be ‘arguable’: CAL15, [5] citing MZABP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection.[6] There, Mortimer J stated at [6]:The threshold is whether a ground of review is “arguable”. That means it is not fanciful, illogical, impermissible or devoid of merit, but has a level of rationality and a basis in the material before the Court sufficient for the Court to be satisfied it is appropriate to hear full argument, with the parties having a fair opportunity to prepare for such argument. Thus, at the level of assessing whether a ground is “arguable”, the Court should not expect a ground of judicial review to be fully developed, especially by an unrepresented asylum seeker whose first language is not English. (emphasis added)[6] [2015] FCA 1391 at [62] More recently, in Savrimootoo v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection,[7] Mortimer J referred to CAL15 and described the discretion to reinstate a proceeding as a broad one. [7] [2018] FCA 1167 at [47]. The assessment upon an application for reinstatement, which requires the court to consider whether a ground of review is arguable, is evaluative. As Ryan J observed in MZYEZ, it follows from the principles considered above that the “decision whether or not to reinstate a proceeding is essentially discretionary, and so attracts the application of the principles” stated by Dixon, Evatt and McTiernan JJ in House v The King[8]: cf BAL17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection.[9][8] (1936) 55 CLR 499 at 504 to 505[9] [2018] FCA 792 at [10] (Bromwich J). I apply these principles in the present application. I did not consider that the applicants had demonstrated an arguable basis for explanation for their non-appearance. As noted, the proceeding had been listed for hearing on three occasions and in those circumstances, the affidavit did not provide any satisfactory explanation for their failure to appear on 24 January 2019. No question was raised whether there any prejudice was suffered by the Minister if the matter were to be reinstated. The decisive consideration against the grant of relief was that the applicants did not demonstrate an arguable case on judicial review. The grounds of review were so generalised and unsupported by particulars that they were incapable of supporting a conclusion that the Tribunal’s decision was affected by jurisdictional error. As the applicants were self-represented, I have considered the Reasons of the Tribunal and do not identify any error in the decision. For completeness, I consider that the filing of the notice of discontinuance was a further bar to the reinstatement of the application: cf Virdi v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCCA 2661 and cases cited.