FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 2)BHR17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2021] FedCFamC2G 64
File number(s): SYG 939 of 2017 Judgment of: JUDGE CAMERON Date of judgment: 22 September 2021 Catchwords: MIGRATION – Persecution – review of Administrative Appeals Tribunal (“Tribunal”) decision – protection visa – fear of persecution by reason of membership of a particular social group.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – Allegation that the Tribunal’s decision affected by jurisdictional error by reason that it failed to analyse whether a law of general application was reasonably appropriate and adapted to addressing the identified national objects.
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 5H, 5J, 36, 474 Cases cited: Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476
Applicant S v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2014) 217 CLR 387
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZNWC (2010) 190 FCR 23
Division: General Number of paragraphs: 22 Date of last submission/s: 11 November 2020 Date of hearing: 11 November 2020 Counsel for the Applicants: Mr A. N. Silva Counsel for the Respondents: Mr G. Johnson Solicitor for the Respondents: HWL Ebsworth ORDERS
SYG 939 of 2017 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
BETWEEN: BHR17
First Applicant
BHS17
Second Applicant
BHU17 (and another named in the Schedule)
Third Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
JUDGE CAMERON
DATE OF ORDER:
22 SEPTEMBER 2021
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.A writ of certiorari issue bringing into this Court to be quashed the decision of the second respondent dated 14 March 2017.
2.A writ of mandamus issue directing the second respondent to determine according to law the applicants’ application made to it on 1 July 2015.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
JUDGE CAMERON
INTRODUCTION
The applicants are citizens of Malaysia who arrived in Australia on 19 February 2011. On 11 December 2014 the first applicant lodged an application for a protection visa with what is now the Department of Home Affairs, alleging that he feared persecution in Malaysia because of his Tamil ethnicity and his Christian faith. In the application, his wife and children, the second to fourth applicants, were included in the application as members of the family unit.
On 10 June 2015 the applicants’ application was refused by a delegate of the first respondent (“Minister”). The applicants then applied to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (“Tribunal”) for a review of that departmental decision. They were unsuccessful before the Tribunal and applied to this Court for judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision.
On 9 January 2018 and again on 22 November 2019 the parties provided the Court with proposed consent orders to quash the decision of the Tribunal. On both occasions the request to make consent orders was refused.
In this judicial review proceeding the Court’s task is to determine whether the Tribunal’s decision is affected by jurisdictional error as that is the only…
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- Case
- [2021] FedCFamC2G 64
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that the Tribunal had indeed erred in its assessment of the Malaysian law. The Tribunal had concluded that the law was appropriate and adapted to achieving legitimate national objectives, such as promoting peace and tolerance, protecting general welfare, preventing civil strife, and safeguarding the state religion. However, the court held that the Tribunal had not adequately analysed why the law was deemed appropriate and adapted to these objectives, which was a critical step in its assessment. The court quashed the Tribunal’s decision and issued a writ of mandamus directing the Tribunal to reconsider the applicants’ application according to law.
The court emphasised that the Tribunal’s failure to properly analyse the appropriateness and adaptation of the Malaysian law to the stated national objectives constituted a jurisdictional error. The court noted that while the Tribunal had identified relevant national objectives, it had not sufficiently examined whether the law in question was indeed the most suitable means to achieve those objectives. This oversight was significant, as it impacted the Tribunal’s overall assessment of the applicants’ risk of persecution. The court concluded that the Tribunal’s decision needed to be set aside, and the matter should be remitted for reconsideration.
Orders
Orders of the court
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1. A writ of certiorari issue bringing into this Court to be quashed the decision of the second respondent dated 14 March 2017.
2. A writ of mandamus issue directing the second respondent to determine according to law the applicants’ application made to it on 1 July 2015.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The fourth ground was abandoned at the hearing of the application. CONSIDERATION Prior to the hearing in this matter, the parties had invited the Court to make orders for the setting aside of the Tribunal’s decision and the issuing of a writ of mandamus addressed to the Tribunal requiring it to reconsider the matter. The proposed consent orders included a note setting out the reasons why those orders were made, were they to have been. Prior to the hearing of this application I was not satisfied that it was appropriate to make those orders. Having further considered the parties’ arguments, I have changed my mind and find that the Tribunal did err in finding that the Malaysian law prohibiting conversion of Muslims to other religions was appropriate and adopted to achieve a legitimate object of that country. This is because although the Tribunal identified relevant Malaysian national objectives, which it described as;… the promotion of peace and tolerance, the protection of general welfare in Malaysia, the prevention of civil strife there and the protection of the state religion enshrined in the Malaysian Constitution … it had not first analysed why, it said, the law in question was “appropriate and adapted” to the achievement of those objects. The relevant passages from the Tribunal’s decision were, first, para.21, where it said:I acknowledge that the law prohibiting the evangelising of Muslims is a discriminatory law, as it does not work the other way, say, against Christians converting to the state religion Islam or against Muslims assisting Christians to become Muslim, but as discussed below, I find that the relevant laws and sanctions are “appropriate and adapted to achieving [a] legitimate object of the country”, in this case the promotion of peace and tolerance, the protection of general welfare in Malaysia, the prevention of civil strife there and the protection of the state religion enshrined in the Malaysian Constitution, even though the implementation of these laws and sanctions may place additional burdens on non-Muslims including evangelical Christians. The second relevant passage was para 108, where the Tribunal said:As outlined earlier, I accept that the law prohibiting the evangelising of Muslims is a discriminatory law, as it does not forbid, for example, conversion by Christians or Hindus to the state religion Islam; also, it does not forbid Muslims from persuading Christians and others to become Muslim. However, having regard to independent country information above, including references to Islam being essentially the state religion in Malaysia, I find that the relevant laws and sanctions are “appropriate and adapted to achieving [a] legitimate object of the country”, in this case the promotion of peace and tolerance, the protection of general welfare in Malaysia, the prevention of civil strife there and the protection of the state religion enshrined in the Malaysian Constitution, even though the implementation of these laws and sanctions may place additional burdens on non-Muslims including evangelical Christians.