BHR17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection
[2021] FedCFamC2G 64
•22 September 2021
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 2)BHR17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2021] FedCFamC2G 64
File number(s): SYG 939 of 2017 Judgment of: JUDGE CAMERON Date of judgment: 22 September 2021 Catchwords: MIGRATION – Persecution – review of Administrative Appeals Tribunal (“Tribunal”) decision – protection visa – fear of persecution by reason of membership of a particular social group.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – Allegation that the Tribunal’s decision affected by jurisdictional error by reason that it failed to analyse whether a law of general application was reasonably appropriate and adapted to addressing the identified national objects.
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 5H, 5J, 36, 474 Cases cited: Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476
Applicant S v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2014) 217 CLR 387
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZNWC (2010) 190 FCR 23
Division: General Number of paragraphs: 22 Date of last submission/s: 11 November 2020 Date of hearing: 11 November 2020 Counsel for the Applicants: Mr A. N. Silva Counsel for the Respondents: Mr G. Johnson Solicitor for the Respondents: HWL Ebsworth ORDERS
SYG 939 of 2017 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
BETWEEN: BHR17
First Applicant
BHS17
Second Applicant
BHU17 (and another named in the Schedule)
Third Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
JUDGE CAMERON
DATE OF ORDER:
22 SEPTEMBER 2021
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.A writ of certiorari issue bringing into this Court to be quashed the decision of the second respondent dated 14 March 2017.
2.A writ of mandamus issue directing the second respondent to determine according to law the applicants’ application made to it on 1 July 2015.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
JUDGE CAMERON
INTRODUCTION
The applicants are citizens of Malaysia who arrived in Australia on 19 February 2011. On 11 December 2014 the first applicant lodged an application for a protection visa with what is now the Department of Home Affairs, alleging that he feared persecution in Malaysia because of his Tamil ethnicity and his Christian faith. In the application, his wife and children, the second to fourth applicants, were included in the application as members of the family unit.
On 10 June 2015 the applicants’ application was refused by a delegate of the first respondent (“Minister”). The applicants then applied to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (“Tribunal”) for a review of that departmental decision. They were unsuccessful before the Tribunal and applied to this Court for judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision.
On 9 January 2018 and again on 22 November 2019 the parties provided the Court with proposed consent orders to quash the decision of the Tribunal. On both occasions the request to make consent orders was refused.
In this judicial review proceeding the Court’s task is to determine whether the Tribunal’s decision is affected by jurisdictional error as that is the only basis upon which it can be set aside: s.474 of the Migration Act1958 (“Act”); Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476.
For the reasons which follow, the Tribunal’s decision will be set aside and the matter remitted to be determined according to law.
STATUTORY CRITERIA FOR THE GRANT OF A PROTECTION VISA
The version of the Act applicable to this proceeding prescribes the conditions for the grant of a protection visa relevantly in the following terms:
36 Protection visas—criteria provided for by this Act
…
(2) A criterion for a protection visa is that the applicant for the visa is:
(a)a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the person is a refugee; or
(aa)a non-citizen in Australia (other than a non-citizen mentioned in paragraph (a)) in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the Minister has substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the non-citizen being removed from Australia to a receiving country, there is a real risk that the non-citizen will suffer significant harm; or
…
(2A) A non-citizen will suffer significant harm if:
(a)the non-citizen will be arbitrarily deprived of his or her life; or
(b) the death penalty will be carried out on the non-citizen; or
(c) the non-citizen will be subjected to torture; or
(d)the non-citizen will be subjected to cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment; or
(e)the non-citizen will be subjected to degrading treatment or punishment.
5H Meaning of refugee
(1)For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person in Australia, the person is a refugee if the person:
(a)in a case where the person has a nationality—is outside the country of his or her nationality and, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country; or
(b)in a case where the person does not have a nationality—is outside the country of his or her former habitual residence and owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, is unable or unwilling to return to it.
…
5J Meaning of well-founded fear of persecution
(1)For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person, the person has a well-founded fear of persecution if:
(a)the person fears being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion; and
(b)there is a real chance that, if the person returned to the receiving country, the person would be persecuted for one or more of the reasons mentioned in paragraph (a); and
(c)the real chance of persecution relates to all areas of a receiving country.
…
(4)If a person fears persecution for one or more of the reasons mentioned in paragraph (1)(a):
…
(b) the persecution must involve serious harm to the person; and
…
(5)Without limiting what is serious harm for the purposes of paragraph (4)(b), the following are instances of serious harm for the purposes of that paragraph:
(a) a threat to the person’s life or liberty;
(b) significant physical harassment of the person;
(c) significant physical ill-treatment of the person;
(d)significant economic hardship that threatens the person’s capacity to subsist;
(e)denial of access to basic services, where the denial threatens the person’s capacity to subsist;
(f)denial of capacity to earn a livelihood of any kind, where the denial threatens the person’s capacity to subsist.
…
BACKGROUND FACTS
In its decision the Tribunal summarised the facts alleged in support of the applicants’ claim for protection. As summarised by the Tribunal, the applicants relevantly made the following claims:
a)they would face discrimination in Malaysia as a result of their Christian faith, Christian names and Tamil ethnicity, notwithstanding that the Malaysian Constitution permits citizens to profess and practise their religious beliefs;
b)in Malaysia they have faced and would continue to face persecution while participating in evangelical outreach activities, especially to groups such as animist communities.
c)were it not for Malaysian laws that prohibited it, they would also proselytise to Muslims but because the laws did prohibit that, they would have to repress or change their behaviour to avoid religious persecution or harm;
d)the first and second applicant joined a Tamil Methodist Church in 2005 and through this church had become involved in outreach activities to convert the Orang Asli villagers by handing out and reading the Bible. While participating in outreach work they were threatened with harm by local Muslims and were:
i)verbally abused in June 2010;
ii)wounded by shattered glass when their car was wilfully damaged in August 2010; and
iii)forcefully removed from their vehicle in November 2010 and beaten and threatened with death if they returned;
e)according to a letter from their former minister, every two months until late 2010 the first and second applicants ministered, as well as taught English, Bible songs and stories, to the Orang Asli villagers. The minister stated in his letter that this work “put their lives at risk” and that the Department of Aboriginal Affairs was “not too pleased” about the outreach activities because they wanted to convert the Orang Asli villagers to Islam;
f)in December 2010 whilst on their way out to dinner, two teenagers shouted “God is Great” and that just before Christmas day a rock was thrown through a window of their home. These occurrences made them feel unsafe at home but they continued to reside in that house without incident between December 2010 and February 2011, when they moved. They had not reported these incidents to the police as they were scared that they would face charges for attempting to convert the Orang Asli villagers;
g)since arriving in Australia the applicants have participated in a different church and claim to have continued their outreach work in country NSW with Aboriginal Australians and Hindu Tamils. The applicants claim that they would face persecution in Malaysia unless they stopped their missionary and evangelical calling; and
h)the third and fourth applicants:
i) had been harassed and bullied by teachers and students because they would not participate in the Malaysian public school Koranic curriculum; and
ii)would face harm because they could not speak Malay and had been “Australianised”.
Before the Tribunal, the applicants confirmed that their outreach work related to the animist Orang Asli villagers, not to Muslims. When asked about their approach to Malaysian laws prohibiting the conversion of Muslims, they told the Tribunal that the Bible told them to “help the marginalised” and their evidence at the hearing mostly related to outreach amongst the Orang Asli communities. The applicants claimed that evangelism was “so core to their beliefs that not being allowed to evangelise to Muslims in Malaysia and being punished for even appearing to do so amounted to persecution for reasons of religion”.
The Tribunal noted that the applicants’ adviser said at the Tribunal hearing that the applicants no longer felt it was moral for them to act within the guidelines of respect for Islam and Malaysian law, irrespective of whether these laws are obeyed by evangelical churches in Malaysia.
The Tribunal’s decisions and reasons
After discussing the claims made by the applicants and the evidence before it, the Tribunal found that it was not satisfied that the applicants are persons to whom Australia has protection obligations under s.36(2)(a) or (aa) of the Act. The Tribunal’s decision was based on the following findings and reasons:
a)the Tribunal accepted that the applicants had practised Christianity prior to arriving in Australia. It found that the applicants would return to their home area and would attend either the Tamil Methodist Church or an evangelical church because they enjoyed being part of that community. However, the Tribunal was not satisfied that the applicants would face a real chance of persecution for being Christians, evangelical Christians, Christians who ministered to the animist communities or Christians who associated with an evangelical church whilst abroad;
b)based on independent country information, the Tribunal found the applicants would or might continue to participate in church outreach activities, including proselytising to non-Muslim persons of different faiths and beliefs and nearby communities such as the Orang Asli villagers. However, it found that any harm they might face as a result of participating in such outreach programs was “discriminatory … not systemic [sic]”. The Tribunal found that independent country information indicated that, in this region, the church continued its outreach programs without “evident harm” and without “significant” interference from the state;
c)the Tribunal accepted that the applicants had been harassed by local Muslims and had regard to the comments of the applicants’ former minister regarding the Malaysian Department of Aboriginal Affairs, but found the evidence did not indicate a rival Muslim ministry or departmental program to convert the Orang Asli. The Tribunal accepted that had the applicants made a complaint to the police an investigation might have caused further problems between missionaries and local Muslims or that the police might have ignored it. However, because the Methodist church publicised its successful ministry of the Orang Asli communities, the Tribunal was not satisfied that Muslim or governmental groups had implemented a rival conversion program or had harmed any Christian outreach workers apart from the incidents that had occurred in 2010;
d)the Tribunal was not satisfied that the applicants would face a real chance of harm or persecution in the reasonably foreseeable future by returning to their outreach work and by continuing to proselytise to non-Muslim groups;
e)the Tribunal accepted that, based on Malaysian laws and social trends, if a person proselytised to Muslims they might face prosecution and/or targeted societal violence amounting to persecution or significant harm. The Tribunal noted the information that the applicants no longer wanted to be bound by any of the accommodations that evangelical churches had made to anti-conversion laws in Malaysia, finding these accommodations immoral, but found that the applicants would not in fact evangelise to Muslims in Malaysia because to do so was against the law and the applicants were “law abiding citizens”. The Tribunal found that Malaysian churches require that their congregations abide by Malaysian laws and although the applicants would prefer not to they would observe their church’s directions;
f)because Malaysian laws prevent persons proselytising to Muslims but do not prevent Muslims evangelising to Christians, the Tribunal recognised that the laws were discriminatory in nature. However, it found that these laws supported:
… peace and tolerance, the protection of general welfare in Malaysia, the prevention of civil strife there and the protection of the state religion enshrined in the Malaysian Constitution, …
and so despite restricting non-Muslims, they were “appropriate and adapted to achieving a legitimate object of the country”;
g)the Tribunal found that although the applicants indicated that they would proselytise to Muslims if permitted by Malaysian law, they evidently did not intend or wish to do so because they had not participated in evangelism to Muslims in their six or seven years in Australia;
h)the Tribunal found that, in Malaysia, the applicants would be free to practise their faith and proselytise to faiths other than Islam. It found that Christianity did not require the applicants to proselytise to Muslims and their lives would not be threatened if they restricted their evangelism to non-Muslims. It found that these circumstances would modify the applicants’ liberties but would not threaten their “liberty”, because that concept was nuanced and took “meaning from the requirement of s.91R(1) of the Act that persecution involve serious harm”. The Tribunal found that they would not suffer “significant harm” by following the law prohibiting them from evangelising to Muslims;
i)the Tribunal noted that the Kuala Lumpur Wesley Methodist School’s website listed Methodist schools around Malaysia and it asked the first and second applicants whether they would consider sending their children to a non-state school. The first and second applicants asserted that these schools were only nominally Christian which the Tribunal did not accept as it was unsupported by evidence and the website of the Wesley Methodist School in Kuala Lumpur showed that it employed Tamil and Chinese teachers. The first and second applicants indicated that because their children could no longer speak Malay it would be impractical to send them to a state school; and
j)the Tribunal accepted that the third and fourth applicants had suffered bullying and harassment at Malaysian state schools and that their race and religion were “essential and significant factors”. However, it found that they would not continue to suffer persecution or significant harm because the first and second applicants would send their children to private or church-run schools which would present only a remote possibility that they would be bullied for their ethnicity or faith. The Tribunal was also not satisfied that the third and fourth applicants would face significant persecution or harm as a result of being “Australianised”.
THE PROCEEDING IN THIS COURT
In the amended application the applicants alleged:
1.The Tribunal made jurisdictional error in finding that the Malaysian Law prohibiting conversion from Islam to other religions while allowing for conversion from other religions to Islam was appropriate and adopted to achieve a legitimate object of the country.
Particulars
(a) See [108], [13], [21];
(b)That law is discriminatory based on religion and it was not appropriate and or adopted to achieve a legitimate object of the country thus the applicants were not bound to obey that law; and
(c) See transcript Pg 10 In 36-40:
[BHR17]: I mean we don’t – the government is saying converting Islam and Koran is illegal but to us the calling of the bible is to reach out to every nation and to preach the gospel of Christ is a greater calling than what the government is imposing on us.
2.The Tribunal made jurisdictional error in misunderstanding s91R and specifically what is meant by harm which is “systemic”.
Particulars
(i)At [102] (See also [19]) the Tribunal found that the harm the applicants faced in the past, when they were conducting outreach amongst aboriginal communities on behalf of their church, was discriminatory but not “systemic”.
(ii)What is required for “systemic” is that the harm encountered by the applicants were targeted which was the case here.
3.The Tribunal made jurisdictional error because it was unreasonable in finding that the parent applicants will not proselytise to Muslims in Malaysia even if they are permitted because they have no intention or wish to do so.
Particulars
(i)In [111] the Tribunal made the relevant finding. It is based on the proposition that the applicants have not engaged in any outreach to Muslims in the last six or seven years in Australia. (See also [110] & [22])
(ii)It is unreasonable because in Malaysia the overwhelming majority are Muslims and are encountered everywhere in everyday life, where as in Australia it is not the case and it is not necessary for the applicants to have sought Muslims specifically to convert as the Tribunal expected the applicants to do.
(iii)It is contradictory to its earlier finding at [106] & [20] where the Tribunal found that the applicants and the church of their choice in Malaysia would evangelise amongst Muslims is Malaysian law did not forbid them.
(iv) See also Transcript Pg 11 Ln 23-26.
4.The Tribunal made jurisdictional error in that the Tribunal misunderstood s91R(1) and asked a wrong question.
Particulars
(a)The question is not as the Tribunal suggested in [109] & [23] whether obeying the law against proselytising to Muslims will involve significant harm or but what harm they will encounter if they do proselytise Muslims.
(b)Tribunal wants the applicants to modify their behaviour (refer case S395/2002)
5.The Tribunal made jurisdictional error in that the Tribunal failed to consider whether the choice of the applicants not to proselytise Muslims was an involuntary choice influenced by the fear of harm that would happen if they proselytise Muslims
Particulars
The Tribunal stated at [20] that given the laws and social trends in Malaysia, it accepted that a person could face prosecution and/or targeted societal violence amounting to persecution or significant harm if he or she evangelises to Muslims. Therefore, the Tribunal should have asked the above question it was supposed to ask. See [107].
6.The Tribunal made jurisdictional error in that there was a breach of s414 and/or s415 because the Tribunal was to act independently without any interference from anybody else either openly or even subconsciously in conducting its hearing and making its decision
Particulars
Whereas the presence of any new member being trained would not have been interfering in the conduct of the hearing by the Tribunal member, the presence of a Senior Member as an observer as part of the process in the Tribunal’s appraisal of Members was an interference in the exercise of the powers of the Tribunal by the presiding Member.
[Tribunal Member]: What else? If anyone needs to go to the bathroom at any time, please let me know. There’s water here, there’s tissues and don’t hesitate to ask if you need a break. Ok. Now, to start with, I’ll just ask for some basic family background – sorry, I haven’t mentioned the observer. This hearing is being observed as part of the Tribunal’s appraisal of Members - - -
[BHR17]: Okay.
[Tribunal Member]: - - - so I’m on my very best behaviour today. Okay. I’m being observed by a senior member and she’ll be here for the duration of the hearing.
The fourth ground was abandoned at the hearing of the application.
CONSIDERATION
Prior to the hearing in this matter, the parties had invited the Court to make orders for the setting aside of the Tribunal’s decision and the issuing of a writ of mandamus addressed to the Tribunal requiring it to reconsider the matter. The proposed consent orders included a note setting out the reasons why those orders were made, were they to have been. Prior to the hearing of this application I was not satisfied that it was appropriate to make those orders. Having further considered the parties’ arguments, I have changed my mind and find that the Tribunal did err in finding that the Malaysian law prohibiting conversion of Muslims to other religions was appropriate and adopted to achieve a legitimate object of that country. This is because although the Tribunal identified relevant Malaysian national objectives, which it described as;
… the promotion of peace and tolerance, the protection of general welfare in Malaysia, the prevention of civil strife there and the protection of the state religion enshrined in the Malaysian Constitution …
it had not first analysed why, it said, the law in question was “appropriate and adapted” to the achievement of those objects.
The relevant passages from the Tribunal’s decision were, first, para.21, where it said:
I acknowledge that the law prohibiting the evangelising of Muslims is a discriminatory law, as it does not work the other way, say, against Christians converting to the state religion Islam or against Muslims assisting Christians to become Muslim, but as discussed below, I find that the relevant laws and sanctions are “appropriate and adapted to achieving [a] legitimate object of the country”, in this case the promotion of peace and tolerance, the protection of general welfare in Malaysia, the prevention of civil strife there and the protection of the state religion enshrined in the Malaysian Constitution, even though the implementation of these laws and sanctions may place additional burdens on non-Muslims including evangelical Christians.
The second relevant passage was para 108, where the Tribunal said:
As outlined earlier, I accept that the law prohibiting the evangelising of Muslims is a discriminatory law, as it does not forbid, for example, conversion by Christians or Hindus to the state religion Islam; also, it does not forbid Muslims from persuading Christians and others to become Muslim. However, having regard to independent country information above, including references to Islam being essentially the state religion in Malaysia, I find that the relevant laws and sanctions are “appropriate and adapted to achieving [a] legitimate object of the country”, in this case the promotion of peace and tolerance, the protection of general welfare in Malaysia, the prevention of civil strife there and the protection of the state religion enshrined in the Malaysian Constitution, even though the implementation of these laws and sanctions may place additional burdens on non-Muslims including evangelical Christians.
In Applicant S v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2014) 217 CLR 387 Gleeson CJ and Gummow and Kirby JJ said:
… A law of general application is capable of being implemented or enforced in a discriminatory manner.
The criteria for the determination of whether a law or policy that results in discriminatory treatment actually amounts to persecution were articulated by McHugh J in Applicant A. His Honour said that the question of whether the discriminatory treatment of persons of a particular race, religion, nationality or political persuasion or who are members of a particular social group constitutes persecution for that reason ultimately depends on whether that treatment is ‘‘appropriate and adapted to achieving some legitimate object of the country [concerned]’’. These criteria were accepted in the joint judgment (of Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ in Chen. As a matter of law to be applied in Australia, they are to be taken as settled. This is what underlay the Court’s decision in Israelian. Namely, that enforcement of the law of general application in that particular case was appropriate and adapted to achieving a legitimate national objective.
In Applicant A, McHugh J went on to say that a legitimate object will ordinarily be an object the pursuit of which is required in order to protect or promote the general welfare of the State and its citizens. His Honour gave the examples that (i) enforcement of a generally applicable criminal law does not ordinarily constitute persecution; and (ii) nor is the enforcement of laws designed to protect the general welfare of the State ordinarily persecutory. Whilst the implementation of these laws may place additional burdens on the members of a particular race, religion or nationality, or social group, the legitimacy of the objects, and the apparent proportionality of the means employed to achieve those objects, are such that the implementation of these laws is not persecutory.
The joint judgment in Chen expanded on these criteria:
Whether the different treatment of different individuals or groups is appropriate and adapted to achieving some legitimate government object depends on the different treatment involved and, ultimately, whether it offends the standards of civil societies which seek to meet the calls of common humanity. Ordinarily, denial of access to food, shelter, medical treatment and, in the case of children, denial of an opportunity to obtain an education involve such a significant departure from the standards of the civilised world as to constitute persecution. And that is so even if the different treatment involved is undertaken for the purpose of achieving some legitimate national objective.
(at 402-403 [42]-[55]) (References omitted) (bold emphasis added)
It can be seen from the highlighted passage in the above quotation that the Tribunal relied on the plurality’s reasons in Applicant S. It also appears that, in reaching its conclusion, the Tribunal had regard to the country information it quoted earlier in its reasons to the effect that although religious violence had reduced, religious intolerance existed in Malaysia. In para.105 of its reasons it had accepted that:
… a person could face prosecution and/or targeted societal violence amounting to persecution or significant harm if he or she evangelises,- or is imputed to be evangelising, to Muslims.
However, the Tribunal did not, for instance, say why it thought the law in question was appropriate and adapted to achieving the national objects it identified.
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZNWC (2010) 190 FCR 23 was a case in which the applicant was a member of the particular social group “Bangladeshi ship deserters” and alleged that he faced persecution in Bangladesh as such. The question was whether a Bangladeshi law which punished merchant seamen who deserted a Bangladeshi ship, or a Bangladeshi seaman who deserted a foreign owned ship, with up to 5 years’ imprisonment was a law that served a legitimate object of Bangladesh and, if it did, whether it was a measure that was appropriate and adapted to achieve that national object. In that case Perram J said, Moore J agreeing:
Whilst it is clear that the Tribunal did identify a legitimate object it is just as plain that it overlooked examination of whether the means adopted to achieve that aim — a sentence of five years imprisonment for leaving non-military employment — were appropriate and adapted to that aim. Whether a law is appropriate and adapted invites an analysis based on notions of proportionality (“[i]n this context, there is little difference between the test of ‘reasonably appropriate and adapted’ and the test of proportionality”: Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520 at 567 fn 272; Roach v Electoral Commissioner (2007) 233 CLR 162 at [85] per Gummow, Kirby and Crennan JJ).
To undertake that inquiry it would have been necessary to consider the extent of the State interest identified by the Tribunal — here the object of securing Bangladesh’s reputation as a source of merchant seamen and of ensuring employment as well as future remittances … [and] to ask whether the penalties which were likely to be imposed were proportionate to the legitimate objects identified. Contrary to the submissions of the Minister, I do not accept that the Tribunal considered any of these questions. The closest it came was its view that the penalties were “harsh” but that, of course, was only half of the inquiry; the other half was whether that harshness was a proportionate solution to the problems identified.
It is not obvious one way or the other whether the merchant shipping laws were appropriate and adapted in that sense. That observation underscores, however, the fact that the Tribunal did not ask itself the questions which were required of it. That being so, it did not undertake the inquiry consigned to it so that there was a constructive failure to exercise its jurisdiction …. (at 36 [54]-[57])
The reasons of the Tribunal in this matter manifest the same sort of error that Perram J identified in SZNWC – they fail to give any indication that the Tribunal analysed whether the law in question was reasonably appropriate and adapted to addressing the identified national objects and it may be inferred that such an analysis was not performed. That failure amounts to a constructive failure to exercise jurisdiction.
In the circumstances, it is not necessary to consider the other grounds of the amended application.
CONCLUSION
Jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal has been demonstrated.
Consequently, the Tribunal’s decision will be set aside and the matter remitted to it to be determined according to law.
I certify that the preceding twenty-two (22) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Cameron. Associate:
Dated: 22 September 2021
SCHEDULE OF PARTIES
SYG 939 of 2017 Applicants
Fourth Applicant:
BHV17
0
8
1