BHR17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 2)

BHR17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2021] FedCFamC2G 64

File number(s): SYG 939 of 2017
Judgment of: JUDGE CAMERON
Date of judgment: 22 September 2021
Catchwords:

MIGRATION – Persecution – review of Administrative Appeals Tribunal (“Tribunal”) decision – protection visa – fear of persecution by reason of membership of a particular social group.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – Allegation that the Tribunal’s decision affected by jurisdictional error by reason that it failed to analyse whether a law of general application was reasonably appropriate and adapted to addressing the identified national objects.

Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 5H, 5J, 36, 474
Cases cited:

Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476

Applicant S v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2014) 217 CLR 387

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZNWC (2010) 190 FCR 23

Division: General
Number of paragraphs: 22
Date of last submission/s: 11 November 2020
Date of hearing: 11 November 2020
Counsel for the Applicants: Mr A. N. Silva
Counsel for the Respondents: Mr G. Johnson
Solicitor for the Respondents: HWL Ebsworth

ORDERS

SYG 939 of 2017

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)

BETWEEN:

BHR17

First Applicant

BHS17

Second Applicant

BHU17 (and another named in the Schedule)

Third Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

JUDGE CAMERON

DATE OF ORDER:

22 SEPTEMBER 2021

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.A writ of certiorari issue bringing into this Court to be quashed the decision of the second respondent dated 14 March 2017.

2.A writ of mandamus issue directing the second respondent to determine according to law the applicants’ application made to it on 1 July 2015.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

JUDGE CAMERON

INTRODUCTION

  1. The applicants are citizens of Malaysia who arrived in Australia on 19 February 2011.  On 11 December 2014 the first applicant lodged an application for a protection visa with what is now the Department of Home Affairs, alleging that he feared persecution in Malaysia because of his Tamil ethnicity and his Christian faith.  In the application, his wife and children, the second to fourth applicants, were included in the application as members of the family unit.

  2. On 10 June 2015 the applicants’ application was refused by a delegate of the first respondent (“Minister”).  The applicants then applied to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (“Tribunal”) for a review of that departmental decision.  They were unsuccessful before the Tribunal and applied to this Court for judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision. 

  3. On 9 January 2018 and again on 22 November 2019 the parties provided the Court with proposed consent orders to quash the decision of the Tribunal.  On both occasions the request to make consent orders was refused.

  4. In this judicial review proceeding the Court’s task is to determine whether the Tribunal’s decision is affected by jurisdictional error as that is the only…

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Details
Case
[2021] FedCFamC2G 64
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The matter of BHR17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection was heard in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia, where the applicants, BHR17, sought review of a decision made by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the Tribunal). The applicants, who had previously practiced Christianity in Malaysia, were seeking a protection visa based on their fear of persecution due to their religious beliefs. The Minister for Immigration and Border Protection opposed the application, arguing that the applicants did not qualify for a protection visa. The legal issues before the court included whether the Tribunal had erred in its analysis of the Malaysian law prohibiting the conversion of Muslims to other religions and whether this error affected the Tribunal’s decision.

The court found that the Tribunal had indeed erred in its assessment of the Malaysian law. The Tribunal had concluded that the law was appropriate and adapted to achieving legitimate national objectives, such as promoting peace and tolerance, protecting general welfare, preventing civil strife, and safeguarding the state religion. However, the court held that the Tribunal had not adequately analysed why the law was deemed appropriate and adapted to these objectives, which was a critical step in its assessment. The court quashed the Tribunal’s decision and issued a writ of mandamus directing the Tribunal to reconsider the applicants’ application according to law.

The court emphasised that the Tribunal’s failure to properly analyse the appropriateness and adaptation of the Malaysian law to the stated national objectives constituted a jurisdictional error. The court noted that while the Tribunal had identified relevant national objectives, it had not sufficiently examined whether the law in question was indeed the most suitable means to achieve those objectives. This oversight was significant, as it impacted the Tribunal’s overall assessment of the applicants’ risk of persecution. The court concluded that the Tribunal’s decision needed to be set aside, and the matter should be remitted for reconsideration.

Orders

Orders of the court

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1. A writ of certiorari issue bringing into this Court to be quashed the decision of the second respondent dated 14 March 2017.

2. A writ of mandamus issue directing the second respondent to determine according to law the applicants’ application made to it on 1 July 2015.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The Tribunal noted that the applicants’ adviser said at the Tribunal hearing that the applicants no longer felt it was moral for them to act within the guidelines of respect for Islam and Malaysian law, irrespective of whether these laws are obeyed by evangelical churches in Malaysia.The Tribunal’s decisions and reasons After discussing the claims made by the applicants and the evidence before it, the Tribunal found that it was not satisfied that the applicants are persons to whom Australia has protection obligations under s.36(2)(a) or (aa) of the Act. The Tribunal’s decision was based on the following findings and reasons: a)the Tribunal accepted that the applicants had practised Christianity prior to arriving in Australia. It found that the applicants would return to their home area and would attend either the Tamil Methodist Church or an evangelical church because they enjoyed being part of that community. However, the Tribunal was not satisfied that the applicants would face a real chance of persecution for being Christians, evangelical Christians, Christians who ministered to the animist communities or Christians who associated with an evangelical church whilst abroad; b)based on independent country information, the Tribunal found the applicants would or might continue to participate in church outreach activities, including proselytising to non-Muslim persons of different faiths and beliefs and nearby communities such as the Orang Asli villagers. However, it found that any harm they might face as a result of participating in such outreach programs was “discriminatory … not systemic [sic]”. The Tribunal found that independent country information indicated that, in this region, the church continued its outreach programs without “evident harm” and without “significant” interference from the state;c)the Tribunal accepted that the applicants had been harassed by local Muslims and had regard to the comments of the applicants’ former minister regarding the Malaysian Department of Aboriginal Affairs, but found the evidence did not indicate a rival Muslim ministry or departmental program to convert the Orang Asli. The Tribunal accepted that had the applicants made a complaint to the police an investigation might have caused further problems between missionaries and local Muslims or that the police might have ignored it. However, because the Methodist church publicised its successful ministry of the Orang Asli communities, the Tribunal was not satisfied that Muslim or governmental groups had implemented a rival conversion program or had harmed any Christian outreach workers apart from the incidents that had occurred in 2010;d)the Tribunal was not satisfied that the applicants would face a real chance of harm or persecution in the reasonably foreseeable future by returning to their outreach work and by continuing to proselytise to non-Muslim groups;e)the Tribunal accepted that, based on Malaysian laws and social trends, if a person proselytised to Muslims they might face prosecution and/or targeted societal violence amounting to persecution or significant harm. The Tribunal noted the information that the applicants no longer wanted to be bound by any of the accommodations that evangelical churches had made to anti-conversion laws in Malaysia, finding these accommodations immoral, but found that the applicants would not in fact evangelise to Muslims in Malaysia because to do so was against the law and the applicants were “law abiding citizens”. The Tribunal found that Malaysian churches require that their congregations abide by Malaysian laws and although the applicants would prefer not to they would observe their church’s directions;f)because Malaysian laws prevent persons proselytising to Muslims but do not prevent Muslims evangelising to Christians, the Tribunal recognised that the laws were discriminatory in nature. However, it found that these laws supported:… peace and tolerance, the protection of general welfare in Malaysia, the prevention of civil strife there and the protection of the state religion enshrined in the Malaysian Constitution, …and so despite restricting non-Muslims, they were “appropriate and adapted to achieving a legitimate object of the country”;g)the Tribunal found that although the applicants indicated that they would proselytise to Muslims if permitted by Malaysian law, they evidently did not intend or wish to do so because they had not participated in evangelism to Muslims in their six or seven years in Australia;h)the Tribunal found that, in Malaysia, the applicants would be free to practise their faith and proselytise to faiths other than Islam. It found that Christianity did not require the applicants to proselytise to Muslims and their lives would not be threatened if they restricted their evangelism to non-Muslims. It found that these circumstances would modify the applicants’ liberties but would not threaten their “liberty”, because that concept was nuanced and took “meaning from the requirement of s.91R(1) of the Act that persecution involve serious harm”. The Tribunal found that they would not suffer “significant harm” by following the law prohibiting them from evangelising to Muslims;i)the Tribunal noted that the Kuala Lumpur Wesley Methodist School’s website listed Methodist schools around Malaysia and it asked the first and second applicants whether they would consider sending their children to a non-state school. The first and second applicants asserted that these schools were only nominally Christian which the Tribunal did not accept as it was unsupported by evidence and the website of the Wesley Methodist School in Kuala Lumpur showed that it employed Tamil and Chinese teachers. The first and second applicants indicated that because their children could no longer speak Malay it would be impractical to send them to a state school; and j)the Tribunal accepted that the third and fourth applicants had suffered bullying and harassment at Malaysian state schools and that their race and religion were “essential and significant factors”. However, it found that they would not continue to suffer persecution or significant harm because the first and second applicants would send their children to private or church-run schools which would present only a remote possibility that they would be bullied for their ethnicity or faith. The Tribunal was also not satisfied that the third and fourth applicants would face significant persecution or harm as a result of being “Australianised”. THE PROCEEDING IN THIS COURT

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The fourth ground was abandoned at the hearing of the application. CONSIDERATION Prior to the hearing in this matter, the parties had invited the Court to make orders for the setting aside of the Tribunal’s decision and the issuing of a writ of mandamus addressed to the Tribunal requiring it to reconsider the matter. The proposed consent orders included a note setting out the reasons why those orders were made, were they to have been. Prior to the hearing of this application I was not satisfied that it was appropriate to make those orders. Having further considered the parties’ arguments, I have changed my mind and find that the Tribunal did err in finding that the Malaysian law prohibiting conversion of Muslims to other religions was appropriate and adopted to achieve a legitimate object of that country. This is because although the Tribunal identified relevant Malaysian national objectives, which it described as;… the promotion of peace and tolerance, the protection of general welfare in Malaysia, the prevention of civil strife there and the protection of the state religion enshrined in the Malaysian Constitution … it had not first analysed why, it said, the law in question was “appropriate and adapted” to the achievement of those objects. The relevant passages from the Tribunal’s decision were, first, para.21, where it said:I acknowledge that the law prohibiting the evangelising of Muslims is a discriminatory law, as it does not work the other way, say, against Christians converting to the state religion Islam or against Muslims assisting Christians to become Muslim, but as discussed below, I find that the relevant laws and sanctions are “appropriate and adapted to achieving [a] legitimate object of the country”, in this case the promotion of peace and tolerance, the protection of general welfare in Malaysia, the prevention of civil strife there and the protection of the state religion enshrined in the Malaysian Constitution, even though the implementation of these laws and sanctions may place additional burdens on non-Muslims including evangelical Christians. The second relevant passage was para 108, where the Tribunal said:As outlined earlier, I accept that the law prohibiting the evangelising of Muslims is a discriminatory law, as it does not forbid, for example, conversion by Christians or Hindus to the state religion Islam; also, it does not forbid Muslims from persuading Christians and others to become Muslim. However, having regard to independent country information above, including references to Islam being essentially the state religion in Malaysia, I find that the relevant laws and sanctions are “appropriate and adapted to achieving [a] legitimate object of the country”, in this case the promotion of peace and tolerance, the protection of general welfare in Malaysia, the prevention of civil strife there and the protection of the state religion enshrined in the Malaysian Constitution, even though the implementation of these laws and sanctions may place additional burdens on non-Muslims including evangelical Christians.