IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Adelaide No A26 of 2013
B e t w e e n -
BHP BILLITON LIMITED
Applicant
and
MARGARET SCHOULAR HAMILTON AS REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF RAYMOND CHARLES HAMILTON
First Respondent
MARGARET SCHOULAR HAMILTON
Second Respondent
Application for special leave to appeal
HAYNE J
BELL J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
FROM CANBERRA BY VIDEO LINK TO ADELAIDE
ON FRIDAY, 14 MARCH 2014, AT 10.12 AM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
____________________
MR B.W. WALKER, SC: May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friend, MR T.G.R. PARKER, SC, for the applicant. (instructed by HWL Ebsworth Lawyers)
MR M.C. LIVESEY, QC: If the Court pleases, Livesey appearing with MR B.J. DOYLE for the respondent. (instructed by Moloney and Partners)
HAYNE J: Yes, Mr Livesey. Yes, Mr Walker.
MR WALKER: May it please your Honours, the provision in question in these proceedings at the heart of our application, subsection 8(2) of the Act, is set out at page 170 of the application book in paragraph 11. I go there conveniently because on the same page in paragraph 15 Justice Blue in the Full Court, with respect, correctly, but in general terms, said this:
The subsection operates against the background and in the context of the common law defining what constitutes breach of duty: the subsection addresses one element of breach of duty but does not otherwise modify the common law.
Now, an appreciation of subsection (2) of section 8 in the context of the whole of section 8 shows that it is one of a miscellaneous – I do not use that word derogatorily but rather to point that a variety of perceived mischiefs is addressed by section 8 as a whole – a miscellaneous collection of ways in which it is clear the legislature supposed that improvement could be made, at least from some points of view, to the conduct of litigation in this area. Now, your Honours will appreciate that there are large policy choices available outside courts in relation to what I am going to call “asbestos litigation”.
One of them concerns potential disturbance to a basic common law tenet that this Court has, without any doubt ever evinced, repeated over the decades, and that is that the questions which turn inform the existence of a duty, the content or scope of the duty, the standard and therefore the conduct which might constitute breach must all be answered by looking forward prospectively from the time putative breach. Thus, in the circumstances that obtained at the time, including of course that which is reasonable and proper in those circumstances, to contemplate as to the then future, in particular, for the particular plaintiff, as well as the class to which he or she or it may belong.
HAYNE J: And at the time that is relevant in this case, the state of knowledge proved at trial was what, it was known…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read BHP Billiton Limited v Hamilton and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2014] HCATrans 45
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the High Court was the proper construction of clause 10.3 of Mr. Hamilton's employment contract. This clause stipulated that if Mr. Hamilton's employment was terminated by BHP Billiton for reasons other than serious misconduct, he would be entitled to a pro-rata bonus payment. The dispute revolved around whether the termination of Mr. Hamilton's employment, which occurred following a period of extended leave, fell within the scope of this provision, and consequently, whether he was entitled to the pro-rata bonus.
The High Court considered the principles of contractual interpretation, emphasising the importance of giving effect to the plain and ordinary meaning of the words used in the contract, read in their context. Their Honours found that the phrase "terminated by the employer for reasons other than serious misconduct" was not limited to situations where the employer initiated the termination for a specific disciplinary reason. Instead, they held that it encompassed any termination initiated by the employer, provided that the reason for termination was not serious misconduct. Applying this interpretation, the Court concluded that Mr. Hamilton's employment had been terminated by BHP Billiton for reasons other than serious misconduct, and therefore, he was entitled to a pro-rata bonus payment. The appeal was dismissed.
Orders
Orders of the court
Full text does not contain this section.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Full text does not contain this section.