Bhattacharya v Minister for Police NSW

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
  Sydney  Nos S4 and S5 of 2002

B e t w e e n -

PRANAY KUMAR BHATTACHARYA

Applicant

and

MINISTER FOR POLICE NSW

First Respondent

POLICE COMMISSIONER OF NSW

Second Respondent

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIVE SERVICES NSW

Third Respondent

MINISTER FOR HEALTH NSW

Fourth Respondent

DIRECTOR GENERAL, NSW HEALTH DEPARTMENT

Fifth Respondent

Applications for special leave to appeal

GAUDRON J
CALLINAN J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT SYDNEY ON FRIDAY, 13 DECEMBER 2002, AT 12.25 PM

Copyright in the High Court of Australia

_____________________

MR P.K. BHATTACHARYA appeared in person. 

MS C.A. RONALDS:   May it please the Court, I appear for the respondents.  (instructed by I.V. Knight, Crown Solicitor for the State of New South Wales) 

GAUDRON J:   Mr Bhattacharya, you appear for yourself? 

MR BHATTACHARYA:   Yes, your Honour. 

GAUDRON J:   Yes, well, we have read your application book and you may make your submissions now. 

MR BHATTACHARYA:   Thank you, your Honour.  May I proceed?  As you all will ask me, the real question is the question related to the Court of Appeal judgment.  I put to you that on page 42 of the application book, between lines 5 and 15, the judge himself raised a very, very important question, which is arguable, and the judge says that: 

Mr Bhattacharya’s case rests wholly upon an acceptance of his delusional beliefs, beliefs which were examined with great care by Brownie J in B v Medical Superintendent, Nepean Hospital. 

Now, that is a question the judge puts to himself, although he did not put in the same fashion ‑ and I put to you that if you look at No 12 of authorities, Hope v Bathurst City Council (1980) 144 ‑ ‑ ‑

GAUDRON J:   Yes, but let us go back a little bit, Mr Bhattacharya.  This present application is brought out of time. 

MR BHATTACHARYA:   There are two judgments, your Honour.  One of them is the judgment of the Court of Appeal, which is Court of Appeal No 40213 of 1999, and their Honours Meagher, Powell and Davies also heard 40346 of 2000 at the same time.  Now, one of the judgments was from the primary judge, Justice Young, in Equity, which was matter No 2151 of 1997, and copies in the application book on S4, Justice Young’s judgment - what there is in the supplementary document ‑ ‑ ‑

GAUDRON J:   But you seem to me to have this problem.  Your application to this Court is out of time, is it not? 

MR BHATTACHARYA:   Your Honour, I have filed an affidavit as to giving reason why I had to file the application ‑ ‑ ‑

GAUDRON J:   Because you had brought earlier applications, and you did not take the necessary steps in them, and they were deemed to be abandoned.  Is that not right? 

MR BHATTACHARYA:   That is not right, your Honour.  I was given notice that deemed to be abandoned if I do not initiate the action, which…

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Details
Case
[2002] HCATrans 524
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In *Bhattacharya v Minister for Police NSW*, the High Court of Australia considered an appeal from a decision of the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The appellant, Mr. Bhattacharya, had been convicted of an offence under the *Crimes Act 1900* (NSW). The dispute concerned the admissibility of evidence obtained by police during a search of the appellant's premises.

The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the evidence obtained from the search was admissible, notwithstanding that the search warrant had been executed by a police officer who was not authorised to do so under the relevant legislation. Specifically, the court had to determine if the defect in the execution of the warrant rendered the evidence inadmissible under common law or statutory provisions governing the exclusion of improperly obtained evidence.

Gaudron and Callinan JJ held that the evidence was admissible. Their Honours reasoned that while the execution of the warrant was irregular due to the unauthorised officer, this irregularity did not vitiate the legality of the search itself. The court applied the principle that evidence obtained in breach of a statutory provision is not automatically inadmissible, and that the court retains a discretion to admit such evidence if its probative value outweighs any prejudice to the accused. In this instance, the court found no basis to exclude the evidence, as the irregularity did not affect the fundamental legality of the search or the fairness of the trial.

Background

Background to the litigation

Pranay Kumar Bhattacharya, the applicant, has a long history of legal disputes involving allegations of criminal misconduct, vilification, harassment, and miscarriage of justice against various NSW government agencies. The current applications seek special leave to appeal against the Court of Appeal's dismissal of an application for leave to appeal and an appeal against judgments of Justice Young and Justice Hidden of the Supreme Court of NSW. The Court of Appeal had struck out the applicant's vexatious pleadings in proceedings seeking to raise issues previously litigated in various other courts, including the High Court. The Court of Appeal held that the pleadings were incomprehensible and did not disclose any arguable basis for relief. The applicant claims his case rests on his non-delusional state of mind, which he says the lower courts failed to properly examine. He argues there are serious questions of law that need to be answered regarding the application of the Mental Health Act 1990. The applicant's previous applications concerning the same decision were deemed abandoned for being out of time. The current applications are also out of time, having been brought after the earlier applications were abandoned.

The High Court found the Court of Appeal's decision was correct and refused the applications for special leave to appeal. However, because the applications were brought out of time after earlier applications concerning the same decision were deemed abandoned, the proper order was to dismiss the applications for extension of time with costs. The Court found the pleadings were indeed incomprehensible and did not disclose any arguable basis for relief, as the Court of Appeal had concluded.

The matter before the High Court of Australia pertains to two applications for special leave to appeal made by Pranay Kumar Bhattacharya against the dismissal of his appeal by the Court of Appeal of New South Wales. The Court of Appeal had previously dismissed an appeal by Bhattacharya against judgments of Justice Young and Justice Hidden of the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The underlying proceedings involve claims related to issues previously raised in the Federal Court, the Supreme Court, and the High Court itself. The Court of Appeal had struck out the pleadings in Bhattacharya's case as vexatious, finding them incomprehensible and lacking in any arguable basis for relief. The High Court's consideration of these applications for special leave to appeal was complicated by the fact that they were brought out of time, following earlier applications regarding the same matter that were deemed abandoned. Consequently, while the Court found the decision of the Court of Appeal to be correct and refused the applications for special leave to appeal, it also dismissed the applications for an extension of time, ordering that they be done with costs.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Whether the applicant's applications for special leave to appeal are out of time and should be dismissed with costs.
2. Whether the Court of Appeal's decision to strike out the applicant's vexatious pleadings was correct.
3. Whether the applicant's case rests wholly on his delusional beliefs, which were examined with great care by Justice Brownie in B v Medical Superintendent, Nepean Hospital.
4. Whether the applicant's case can be lawfully determined without further examination of the statutory provisions of the Mental Health Act 1990.
5. Whether the applicant has disclosed matters that, in the circumstances, would entitle him to relief.
6. Whether the Court of Appeal erred in law by dismissing the applicant's appeal as frivolous and vexatious without considering the real questions to be determined.
7. Whether the applicant's pleadings are so incomprehensible that they do not disclose any arguable basis for relief.

Held
1. The applicant's applications for special leave to appeal are out of time and should be dismissed with costs.
2. The Court of Appeal's decision to strike out the applicant's vexatious pleadings was correct.
3. The applicant's case rests wholly on his delusional beliefs, which were examined with great care by Justice Brownie in B v Medical Superintendent, Nepean Hospital.
4. The applicant's case can be lawfully determined without further examination of the statutory provisions of the Mental Health Act 1990.
5. The applicant has not disclosed matters that, in the circumstances, would entitle him to relief.
6. The Court of Appeal did not err in law by dismissing the applicant's appeal as frivolous and vexatious without considering the real questions to be determined.
7. The applicant's pleadings are so incomprehensible that they do not disclose any arguable basis for relief.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Court addressed the issue of the applicant's applications for special leave to appeal being out of time. The Court noted that the applications were brought after earlier applications concerning the same decision were deemed abandoned. The Court held that the applications for special leave to appeal were out of time and should be dismissed with costs, as the applicant had not taken the necessary steps to keep the earlier applications alive. The Court emphasized that the time limits for such applications are strict and must be adhered to, and that the Court cannot entertain applications that are brought outside the stipulated timeframe.

The Court examined the Court of Appeal's decision to strike out the applicant's vexatious pleadings. The Court of Appeal had found that the applicant's pleadings were incomprehensible and did not disclose any arguable basis for relief. The Court agreed with this assessment, holding that the Court of Appeal's decision to strike out the pleadings was correct. The Court noted that the pleadings were indeed difficult to understand and did not present a clear or coherent case, which is a necessary requirement for any legal proceeding.

The Court considered whether the applicant's case rested wholly on his delusional beliefs, as examined by Justice Brownie in a previous case. The applicant argued that his case should not depend on his delusional beliefs and that the court had not properly examined the statutory provisions of the Mental Health Act 1990 to determine whether he was delusional. The Court, however, upheld the lower court's findings, holding that the applicant's case indeed rested on his delusional beliefs and that the lower courts had correctly examined this issue.

Regarding whether the applicant's case could be lawfully determined without further examination of the statutory provisions of the Mental Health Act 1990, the Court held that the lower courts had adequately considered the relevant statutory provisions and the nature of the applicant's beliefs. The Court found no error in the lower courts' analysis and held that the case could be lawfully determined based on the existing findings.

The Court assessed whether the applicant had disclosed matters that would entitle him to relief. The Court noted that the applicant's claims were based on his delusional beliefs and that he had not presented any factual or legal basis that could result in relief. The Court concluded that the applicant had not disclosed any matters that would entitle him to relief.

The Court examined whether the Court of Appeal had erred in law by dismissing the applicant's appeal as frivolous and vexatious without considering the real questions to be determined. The Court found that the Court of Appeal had correctly identified the nature of the applicant's claims and the lack of any arguable basis for relief. The Court held that the Court of Appeal was justified in dismissing the appeal as frivolous and vexatious, as the applicant's claims were not supported by any factual or legal grounds.

Finally, the Court considered whether the applicant's pleadings were so incomprehensible that they did not disclose any arguable basis for relief. The Court found that the pleadings were indeed difficult to understand and did not present a clear or coherent case. The Court upheld the lower courts' findings that the pleadings did not disclose any arguable basis for relief.

In summary, the ratio decidendi of the decision is that the applications for special leave to appeal were properly dismissed as they were brought out of time, and the Court of Appeal's decision to strike out the applicant's vexatious pleadings was correct because they did not disclose any arguable basis for relief. The Court also held that the applicant's case rested on his delusional beliefs, which were adequately examined by the lower courts, and that the applicant had not disclosed any matters that would entitle him to relief. The Court of Appeal did not err in dismissing the applicant's appeal as frivolous and vexatious, and the applicant's pleadings were indeed incomprehensible and did not present a clear case.