Bhatt v Minister for Home Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Bhatt v Minister for Home Affairs [2021] FCA 1490  

Appeal from: Bhatt v Minister for Home Affairs & Anor [2020] FCCA 1108
File number: VID 337 of 2020
Judgment of: O’BRYAN J
Date of judgment: 29 November 2021
Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for leave to appeal from decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia not to reinstate application for judicial review – where Administrative Appeals Tribunal had dismissed application for student visa – where Federal Circuit Court had dismissed application for judicial review on basis of non-appearance at hearing – decision not attended by sufficient doubt to warrant reconsideration – leave to appeal refused
Legislation:

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 24(1A)

Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) r 13.03C(1)(c), r 16.05(2)(a)

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 35.11

Cases cited: ALQ17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 16
Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397
House v King (1936) 55 CLR 499
Sekigawa v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2016) 237 FCR 276
Singh v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 633
SZUFS v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 991
Division: General Division
Registry: Victoria
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Number of paragraphs: 32
Date of hearing: 20 October 2021
Counsel for the Applicant The applicant appeared in person
Solicitor for the First Respondent Clayton Utz

ORDERS

VID 337 of 2020
BETWEEN:

VIKESHKUMAR RAJENDRABHAI BHATT

Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP, MIGRANT SERVICES AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

O’BRYAN J

DATE OF ORDER:

29 NOVEMBER 2021

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application for leave to appeal be dismissed.

2.The applicant pay the costs of the first respondent.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

O’BRYAN J:

Introduction

  1. The applicant, Mr Vikeshkumar Rajendrabhai Bhatt (applicant), seeks leave to appeal from orders made by the Federal Circuit Court on 8 May 2020 dismissing his application (reinstatement application) to reinstate an application for judicial review after that application was dismissed for non-appearance pursuant to r 13.03C(1)(c) of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) (FCC Rules).

  2. The decision of the Federal Circuit Court to dismiss the reinstatement application was a discretionary decision made under r 16.05(2)(a) of the FCC Rules to vary or set aside a judgment or order after it has been entered, if it was made in the absence of a party. The decision was interlocutory in nature, and the applicant accordingly requires leave to appeal to this Court: Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 24(1A); SZUFS v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 991 (SZUFS) at [2] per Reeves J. The test for whether leave ought to be granted was stated by the Full Court of the Federal…

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Details
Case
[2021] FCA 1490
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Bhatt v Minister for Home Affairs, the applicant, an Indian national, sought leave to appeal against the Federal Circuit Court's decision not to reinstate his application for judicial review of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal's decision to dismiss his application for a student visa. The primary judge of the Federal Circuit Court dismissed the application for judicial review on the basis of the applicant's non-appearance at a directions hearing. The applicant subsequently filed an application for reinstatement of the judicial review application, which was also dismissed by the Federal Circuit Court.

The legal issues before the court were whether the decision of the Federal Circuit Court was attended by sufficient doubt to warrant reconsideration and, if so, whether substantial injustice would be occasioned if the Court did not exercise its discretion to grant leave to appeal. The court considered whether the Federal Circuit Court had erred in dismissing the reinstatement application, and whether there was a House v King style error in the primary judge's assessment of the underlying merits of the substantive application for judicial review.

The court found that the decision of the Federal Circuit Court was not attended by sufficient doubt to warrant reconsideration. The court noted that the primary judge had identified the relevant considerations guiding the exercise of his discretion, and had addressed each of those considerations in turn. The court was not satisfied that the primary judge had erred in his assessment of the applicant's explanation for his non-appearance at the hearing or in his consideration of the merits of the substantive application for judicial review. The court also noted that the Minister submitted that the question of substantial injustice need not be addressed by the Court, given that the Federal Circuit Court's decision was plainly correct and the test set out in Décor was cumulative.

Accordingly, the court dismissed the application for leave to appeal and ordered that the applicant pay the costs of the first respondent.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application for leave to appeal be dismissed.

2. The applicant pay the costs of the first respondent.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons that follow, I dismiss the application. Background The Applicant is an Indian national. He arrived in Australia in December 2009 on a student visa. On 29 September 2016, the applicant applied for a Student (Temporary) (Class TU) (Subclass 500) visa. A delegate of the Minister refused the application on 6 March 2017, on the basis that the applicant was not a genuine temporary entrant as required by cl 500.212 of Sch 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (Regulations). On 20 June 2018, the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal) affirmed that decision on the same basis. On 18 July 2018, the applicant filed an application for judicial review in the Federal Circuit Court (Application for Review). He also filed an affidavit in support of his Application for Review sworn on 18 July 2018. The Application for Review was sealed by the Registry in the usual way and a coversheet was attached to the Application for Review. The coversheet informed the applicant that the matter would come on for directions on 27 November 2019 at 10am. On 2 August 2018, the solicitors for the first respondent (the Minister) served on the applicant by post and email a Notice of Appearance and Response. In the correspondence, the Minister’s solicitors reminded the applicant that the matter was listed on 27 November 2019 at 10am. On 27 November 2019, a Registrar of the Federal Circuit Court dismissed the judicial review application pursuant to r 13.03C(1)(c) of the FCC Rules as the applicant failed to attend the directions hearing scheduled for that day. On 14 February 2020, the applicant filed the reinstatement application to set aside the Registrar’s orders under r 16.05(2)(a) of the FCC Rules, accompanied by a supporting affidavit, which annexed a psychologist report dated 7 February 2020. The applicant submitted that he had a reasonable excuse for non-attendance at the directions hearing as:(a)he had a condition that prevented his appearance; and(b)he had not been reminded by the Federal Circuit Court of the directions hearing.Decision of the Federal Circuit Court The reinstatement application was heard on 20 April 2020. On 8 May 2020, the Court made orders dismissing the reinstatement application and delivered its reasons: Bhatt v Minister for Home Affairs & Anor [2020] FCCA 1108 (PJ). In his reasons, the primary judge set out the applicable legal principles guiding the exercise of his discretion, as follows (PJ at [15]):15.The following considerations, as set out by Driver J in SZUFS v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCCA 545 at [14], and affirmed by Reeves J in SZUFS v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 991 at [18], are relevant to the exercise of the discretion:a) Whether there was an adequate reason for the non-appearance of the party;b) Whether there was delay in making the application to set aside the orders made in the party’s absence;c) Whether there is any prejudice to the Minister in reinstating the matter that could not be adequately compensated for by an order for costs; andd) Whether an applicant has a reasonably arguable prospect of success on the substantive application.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

On 14 February 2020, the applicant filed the reinstatement application to set aside the Registrar’s orders under r 16.05(2)(a) of the FCC Rules, accompanied by a supporting affidavit, which annexed a psychologist report dated 7 February 2020. The applicant submitted that he had a reasonable excuse for non-attendance at the directions hearing as:(a)he had a condition that prevented his appearance; and(b)he had not been reminded by the Federal Circuit Court of the directions hearing.Decision of the Federal Circuit Court The reinstatement application was heard on 20 April 2020. On 8 May 2020, the Court made orders dismissing the reinstatement application and delivered its reasons: Bhatt v Minister for Home Affairs & Anor [2020] FCCA 1108 (PJ). In his reasons, the primary judge set out the applicable legal principles guiding the exercise of his discretion, as follows (PJ at [15]):15.The following considerations, as set out by Driver J in SZUFS v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCCA 545 at [14], and affirmed by Reeves J in SZUFS v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 991 at [18], are relevant to the exercise of the discretion:a) Whether there was an adequate reason for the non-appearance of the party;b) Whether there was delay in making the application to set aside the orders made in the party’s absence;c) Whether there is any prejudice to the Minister in reinstating the matter that could not be adequately compensated for by an order for costs; andd) Whether an applicant has a reasonably arguable prospect of success on the substantive application. The primary judge went on to briefly deal with (b) and (c). The primary judge noted in respect of (c) that the Minister had conceded that there was no prejudice to him that could not be cured by an order for costs. In respect of (b), the primary judge noted that he was not addressed at any length on the delay in the applicant filing his reinstatement application, and that any delay in the applicant filing the reinstatement application was not a matter that weighed in favour, or against, the applicant. The primary judge observed that the focus of the argument before him was whether the applicant had an adequate reason for his non-appearance on 27 November 2019, and whether the applicant had a reasonable prospect of success on the substantive application for review. In respect of the applicant’s explanation for his non-appearance on 27 November 2019, the primary judge observed as follows (PJ at [19]-[30]): 19.The Applicant filed an affidavit sworn on 12 February 2020 in support of his application for reinstatement. In it, he deposes that he had a reasonable excuse for his failure to attend Court on 27 November 2019 as he had a condition that prevented his appearance. The Applicant has attached to his affidavit, a psychological assessment prepared by a psychologist dated 7 February 2020 (‘Report’).20. The Report discloses, inter alia, the following:a)the Applicant first consulted the psychologist on 8 January 2020;b)the consultation lasted for 1.5 hours;c)the Applicant suffers from, inter-alia, depression, anxiety, and also stress. These stressors are said to have ‘formed the foundation for compelling circumstances and why these were beyond his control and why he failed in his performance in Australia as well as why he did not pay sufficient attention to the hearing date at The FCC last year’ (paragraph 47 of the Report).21.In the Report, the psychologist addresses, in various places, the failure of the Applicant to attend Court on 27 November 2019. Among other things, the psychologist refers to the Applicant not paying enough attention to important matters, such as attending the hearing because of cognitive deficits (paragraph 60 of the Report), and later, because of the malfunctioning of his brain and distress, anxiety and depression, ‘he did not make the right choices’ (that is, not attending the hearing on 27 November 2019) (paragraph 62 of the Report).22.In his oral submissions, the Applicant also submitted that the November 2019 Court hearing was not in his mind because the date had been given to him almost one and a half years earlier, and because he had not received a reminder from the Court of the hearing date.23.It is convenient to deal with the last mentioned points first. The Court does not issue reminders to litigants of their upcoming hearing dates. That a hearing date was allocated to the Applicant more than a year in advance is also not unusual given the length of the lists in this Court. There is nothing about these matters that is unique to this Applicant. If anything, it might be said that the Applicant in this matter at least had the benefit, albeit also more than a year in advance, of the reminder from the Minister’s solicitors as to the hearing date.24.I turn then to deal with the Report. The first aspect to note about the Report is that it flowed from an examination of the Applicant that took place on 8 January 2020. It is therefore a review and assessment of the Applicant’s mental health as at that date.25.The second aspect to note is that the psychologist, in being asked to assess the Applicant’s mental health, notes that the assessment is taking place in a context where the Applicant is ‘highly stressed’ because he was informed about the consequences of his failure to appear at Court and that this ‘gave rise to further episodes of depressed mood and anxiety as he could not understand why he missed the hearing’ (bullet point 2, page 2 of the Report). It follows that the assessment of the Applicant’s mental health and his stress and anxiety, is occurring in the context of the Applicant being informed of the consequence of his failure to attend Court on 27 November 2019.26.Third, there are aspects of the Report that indicate that quite apart from his mental health, the Applicant acknowledged to the psychologist that he should have paid more attention to the hearing date. At paragraph 5 on page 3 of the Report, the psychologist notes:‘Moreover, he developed cognitive deficits because of chronic stress and had problems with his concentration, attention span and memory. Because of the aforementioned problems, he realised that perhaps he should have paid more attention to the said FCCA hearing last year’.27. Similar sentiments are expressed by the psychologist at paragraphs 60 and 62 of the Report. These indications, when coupled with the submission the Applicant made to the Court during the hearing, suggest to me that the Applicant’s non-attendance, at least in part, arose because he did not pay sufficient attention to the date or forgot about the date.28.Finally, while the psychologist speaks to the stress, anxiety and depression affecting the Applicant and to the ‘cognitive deficits’ that resulted in him ‘not paying enough attention to important matters such as attending the said hearing last August’ (paragraph 60 of the Report), the Report is notable for what is omitted. There is nothing in the Report that I can see that indicates that the Applicant’s condition was acute, or more importantly, acute on or around 27 November 2019. There is also nothing in the Report to indicate that the Applicant was prevented from attending, or was rendered unable to attend, Court on that day because of his condition, or that he could not participate in the hearing on 27 November 2019.29.When all of these matters are considered, I am of the view that while the Applicant may have been or is suffering from anxiety and depression, it was not such as to prevent his attendance at, or participation in, the Court hearing listed for 27 November 2019.30.For all of the above reasons, I find that the Applicant does not have an adequate explanation for his non-appearance at Court on 27 November 2019.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Minister submitted that in any event, in circumstances where:(a)the Federal Circuit Court's decision was plainly correct; and(b)the test set out in Décor is cumulative,the question of substantial injustice need not be addressed by the Court.Consideration For the following reasons, I consider that the decision of the Federal Circuit Court is not attended by sufficient doubt to warrant reconsideration. The decision of the Federal Circuit Court to dismiss the reinstatement application was a discretionary one (pursuant to r 16.05(2)(a) of the FCC Rules). It is necessary, therefore, to identify an error in the exercise of that discretion of the kind contemplated in House v King (1936) 55 CLR 499 (House v King) at 505 (Dixon, Evatt and McTiernan JJ), namely acting upon a wrong principle, allowing extraneous or irrelevant matters to guide or affect the decision; mistaking the facts; or not taking into account some material consideration: ALQ17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 16 (ALQ17) at [7] per Perram J; see also SZUFS at [26] per Reeves J. As summarised above, the primary judge dismissed the reinstatement application on the basis of two findings:(a)first, that the applicant did not have an adequate explanation for his non-appearance at Court on 27 November 2019; and(b)second, based on a high-level consideration of the underlying application, the applicant’s substantive application for review of the Tribunal decision lacked sufficient merit. In respect of the first of these findings, the applicant had provided to the Court a report from a psychologist which diagnosed him with anxiety and depression, and expressed an opinion that his chronic stress (and associated problems with memory and attention span) provided a reasonable explanation as to his failure to attend the hearing on 27 November 2019. The primary judge dismissed the utility of this report as an explanation, noting that it was prepared after the hearing (in January – February 2020), and did not explain the applicant’s failure to attend the Court hearing in November 2019. Further, in respect of the applicant’s submission that he had not received a reminder about the hearing date, the primary judge noted that the Court does not issue reminders to litigants about their upcoming hearing dates, and the applicant had received the benefit (albeit more than a year in advance) of the reminder from the Minister’s solicitors as to the hearing date. Reasonable minds may differ as to the adequacy of the explanation offered by the applicant for his non-appearance at the hearing. However, on the material before the primary judge, I am not prepared to conclude that this finding was made in error. As to the second finding, with respect to the underlying merits of the substantive Application for Review, I was not taken to and cannot identify any House v King style error in the primary judge’s assessment of the underlying merits. As to the long list of grounds of application advanced by the applicant, the grounds are formulaic and do not truly engage with the primary judge’s reasons. Insofar as they raise any failure on the part of the primary judge to afford procedural fairness, I do not consider that there is anything that arises on the material to substantiate such a ground. The applicant’s grounds of application also allege that the primary judge acted unreasonably in reaching his decision, that the primary judge approached the application with a predetermined mind, and that the primary judge otherwise failed to consider or appropriately weigh the evidence and submissions advanced by the applicant. Upon a close analysis of the decision of the primary judge, I am not satisfied that any of these grounds have merit. As is apparent from the reasoning extracted above, the primary judge identified the considerations relevant to the exercise of his discretion, with reference to the applicable authorities, and addressed each of those considerations in turn. I consider that the primary judge had appropriate regard to the materials before him. The primary judge’s ultimate decision not to reinstate the application logically followed from his conclusions in respect of each of the two key findings set out above.