FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Bhatt v Minister for Home Affairs [2021] FCA 1490
Appeal from: Bhatt v Minister for Home Affairs & Anor [2020] FCCA 1108 File number: VID 337 of 2020 Judgment of: O’BRYAN J Date of judgment: 29 November 2021 Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for leave to appeal from decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia not to reinstate application for judicial review – where Administrative Appeals Tribunal had dismissed application for student visa – where Federal Circuit Court had dismissed application for judicial review on basis of non-appearance at hearing – decision not attended by sufficient doubt to warrant reconsideration – leave to appeal refused Legislation: Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 24(1A)
Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) r 13.03C(1)(c), r 16.05(2)(a)
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 35.11
Cases cited: ALQ17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 16
Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397
House v King (1936) 55 CLR 499
Sekigawa v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2016) 237 FCR 276
Singh v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 633
SZUFS v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 991Division: General Division Registry: Victoria National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Number of paragraphs: 32 Date of hearing: 20 October 2021 Counsel for the Applicant The applicant appeared in person Solicitor for the First Respondent Clayton Utz ORDERS
VID 337 of 2020 BETWEEN: VIKESHKUMAR RAJENDRABHAI BHATT
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP, MIGRANT SERVICES AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
O’BRYAN J
DATE OF ORDER:
29 NOVEMBER 2021
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application for leave to appeal be dismissed.
2.The applicant pay the costs of the first respondent.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
O’BRYAN J:
Introduction
The applicant, Mr Vikeshkumar Rajendrabhai Bhatt (applicant), seeks leave to appeal from orders made by the Federal Circuit Court on 8 May 2020 dismissing his application (reinstatement application) to reinstate an application for judicial review after that application was dismissed for non-appearance pursuant to r 13.03C(1)(c) of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) (FCC Rules).
The decision of the Federal Circuit Court to dismiss the reinstatement application was a discretionary decision made under r 16.05(2)(a) of the FCC Rules to vary or set aside a judgment or order after it has been entered, if it was made in the absence of a party. The decision was interlocutory in nature, and the applicant accordingly requires leave to appeal to this Court: Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 24(1A); SZUFS v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 991 (SZUFS) at [2] per Reeves J. The test for whether leave ought to be granted was stated by the Full Court of the Federal…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read Bhatt v Minister for Home Affairs and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2021] FCA 1490
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court were whether the decision of the Federal Circuit Court was attended by sufficient doubt to warrant reconsideration and, if so, whether substantial injustice would be occasioned if the Court did not exercise its discretion to grant leave to appeal. The court considered whether the Federal Circuit Court had erred in dismissing the reinstatement application, and whether there was a House v King style error in the primary judge's assessment of the underlying merits of the substantive application for judicial review.
The court found that the decision of the Federal Circuit Court was not attended by sufficient doubt to warrant reconsideration. The court noted that the primary judge had identified the relevant considerations guiding the exercise of his discretion, and had addressed each of those considerations in turn. The court was not satisfied that the primary judge had erred in his assessment of the applicant's explanation for his non-appearance at the hearing or in his consideration of the merits of the substantive application for judicial review. The court also noted that the Minister submitted that the question of substantial injustice need not be addressed by the Court, given that the Federal Circuit Court's decision was plainly correct and the test set out in Décor was cumulative.
Accordingly, the court dismissed the application for leave to appeal and ordered that the applicant pay the costs of the first respondent.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application for leave to appeal be dismissed.
2. The applicant pay the costs of the first respondent.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Minister submitted that in any event, in circumstances where:(a)the Federal Circuit Court's decision was plainly correct; and(b)the test set out in Décor is cumulative,the question of substantial injustice need not be addressed by the Court.Consideration For the following reasons, I consider that the decision of the Federal Circuit Court is not attended by sufficient doubt to warrant reconsideration. The decision of the Federal Circuit Court to dismiss the reinstatement application was a discretionary one (pursuant to r 16.05(2)(a) of the FCC Rules). It is necessary, therefore, to identify an error in the exercise of that discretion of the kind contemplated in House v King (1936) 55 CLR 499 (House v King) at 505 (Dixon, Evatt and McTiernan JJ), namely acting upon a wrong principle, allowing extraneous or irrelevant matters to guide or affect the decision; mistaking the facts; or not taking into account some material consideration: ALQ17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 16 (ALQ17) at [7] per Perram J; see also SZUFS at [26] per Reeves J. As summarised above, the primary judge dismissed the reinstatement application on the basis of two findings:(a)first, that the applicant did not have an adequate explanation for his non-appearance at Court on 27 November 2019; and(b)second, based on a high-level consideration of the underlying application, the applicant’s substantive application for review of the Tribunal decision lacked sufficient merit. In respect of the first of these findings, the applicant had provided to the Court a report from a psychologist which diagnosed him with anxiety and depression, and expressed an opinion that his chronic stress (and associated problems with memory and attention span) provided a reasonable explanation as to his failure to attend the hearing on 27 November 2019. The primary judge dismissed the utility of this report as an explanation, noting that it was prepared after the hearing (in January – February 2020), and did not explain the applicant’s failure to attend the Court hearing in November 2019. Further, in respect of the applicant’s submission that he had not received a reminder about the hearing date, the primary judge noted that the Court does not issue reminders to litigants about their upcoming hearing dates, and the applicant had received the benefit (albeit more than a year in advance) of the reminder from the Minister’s solicitors as to the hearing date. Reasonable minds may differ as to the adequacy of the explanation offered by the applicant for his non-appearance at the hearing. However, on the material before the primary judge, I am not prepared to conclude that this finding was made in error. As to the second finding, with respect to the underlying merits of the substantive Application for Review, I was not taken to and cannot identify any House v King style error in the primary judge’s assessment of the underlying merits. As to the long list of grounds of application advanced by the applicant, the grounds are formulaic and do not truly engage with the primary judge’s reasons. Insofar as they raise any failure on the part of the primary judge to afford procedural fairness, I do not consider that there is anything that arises on the material to substantiate such a ground. The applicant’s grounds of application also allege that the primary judge acted unreasonably in reaching his decision, that the primary judge approached the application with a predetermined mind, and that the primary judge otherwise failed to consider or appropriately weigh the evidence and submissions advanced by the applicant. Upon a close analysis of the decision of the primary judge, I am not satisfied that any of these grounds have merit. As is apparent from the reasoning extracted above, the primary judge identified the considerations relevant to the exercise of his discretion, with reference to the applicable authorities, and addressed each of those considerations in turn. I consider that the primary judge had appropriate regard to the materials before him. The primary judge’s ultimate decision not to reinstate the application logically followed from his conclusions in respect of each of the two key findings set out above.