BGX16 v Minister for Home Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BGX16 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 1896

Appeal from: BGX16 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2019] FCCA 515
File number: NSD 477 of 2019
Judge: KERR J
Date of judgment: 11 November 2019
Date of publication of reasons: 18 November 2019
Catchwords: MIGRATION - Protection (Class XA) (Subclass 866) Visa – appeal from Federal Circuit Court of Australia – leave to rely on ground not raised before primary judge – alleged failure to consider health claims – application of principles in AJI16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 1769 – no indication that lower standard of healthcare intended to cause harm to the Appellant or persons with the characteristics of the Appellant – leave refused – appeal dismissed
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 5, 36(2)(aa), 36(2A)
Cases cited:

AJI16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 1769

BOZ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 418

Collector of Customs v Pozzolanic Enterprises Proprietary Ltd [1993] FCA 456; 43 FCR 280

Coulton v Holcombe [1968] HCA 33; 162 CLR 1

NABE v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (No 2) [2004] FCAFC 263; 144 FCR 1

SZSFS v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 534; 232 FCR 262

SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] HCA 34; 262 CLR 362

Date of hearing: 11 November 2019
Date of last submissions: 7 November 2019
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 45  
Counsel for the Appellant: Ms Okereke-Fisher
Solicitor for the Appellant: Attia Lawyers and Consultants
Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms Morris
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Clayton Utz

ORDERS

NSD 477 of 2019
BETWEEN:

BGX16

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

KERR J

DATE OF ORDER:

11 NOVEMBER 2019

THE COURT ORDERS THAT

1.The Appellant be refused leave to rely upon proposed Ground 1 of his Further Amended Notice of Appeal.

2.The appeal be dismissed.

3.The Appellant pay the First Respondent’s costs as agreed or assessed, including costs thrown away in the 7 August 2019 proceedings.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

KERR J:

  1. The Appellant is a national of Malaysia. On 31 January 2013 he was issued an Electronic Travel Authority (Class UD) (Subclass 976) visa on which he entered and departed Australia to Thailand on a number of occasions in 2013. On 6 December 2013 he was issued a further Electronic Travel Authority (Class UD) (Subclass 601) visa. On 10 February 2014 he applied for a Protection (Class XA) (Subclass 866) visa (Protection visa).

  2. His application for that Protection visa was allocated to a delegate of the Minister for Home Affairs (Minister) for decision.

  3. The Minister’s delegate summarised the Appellant’s initial…

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Details
Case
[2019] FCA 1896
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appellant, a citizen of Malaysia, applied for a subclass 866 Protection (Class XA) Visa which was subsequently refused by the Minister's delegate. The appellant appealed the decision to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal which also dismissed the appeal. Dissatisfied with this outcome, the appellant then sought special leave to appeal to the Federal Circuit Court of Australia, which was refused. The appellant now seeks leave to appeal to the High Court of Australia against the decision of the Federal Circuit Court. The main issue before the High Court was whether the appellant was entitled to leave to appeal on the ground that the lower courts had failed to properly consider the appellant's claims regarding the impact of his health conditions if returned to Malaysia.

The High Court considered the principles established in AJI16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 1769, which held that a lower standard of healthcare could be considered in certain circumstances when assessing claims for protection visas. However, the Court found that the appellant had not demonstrated how the lower standard of healthcare in Malaysia was intended to cause him harm, or persons with similar characteristics, in a way that would amount to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. The Court noted that the appellant had not provided any evidence to substantiate his claims about his health conditions or how they would be impacted if returned to Malaysia. The Court also found that the lower standard of healthcare in Malaysia was a result of a lack of resources, rather than an intention to cause harm. The Court held that the appellant had not made out a case for special leave to appeal, and dismissed the application.

No further orders were made by the Court.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Having outlined the evidence given by the Appellant during that interview, the Minister’s delegate then reasoned as follows:Findings and reasons and material evidence put to the applicant for comment:The assessment of the plausibility of the applicant’s evidence is a necessary first step in assessing the applicant’s credibility. Chief Justice Gleeson noted in Re RRT; Ex parte Aala [204 CLR 82; 75 ALJR 52 at [4]] ‘decisions as to credibility are often based upon matters of impression, and an unfavourable view taken upon an otherwise minor issue may be decisive’. Decision makers:•should note that a finding of a decision maker (including a tribunal) as to credibility is a finding of fact that is open to the decision maker or tribunal to make;•are not required to accept uncritically the person’s account;•do not have to have rebutting evidence available before it can lawfully be determined that a particular factual assertion by a person is not made out; and•should note there is not a presumption that the fear is well-founded unless the facts negate it. The applicant’s case essentially rests on an unsubstantiated assertion from him that he will be arrested as a result of the re-opening of a case against him, related to financial fraud occurring in a Chinese company with whom he was employed between 1997 and 2006. He claims to have been a member of HINDRAF and that in 2007 he was detained for 40 hours after a protest, and that in 2009 he was told the fraud case against him was being re-opened due to his HINDRAF involvement. He claims that when he was returning to Malaysia from Thailand in 2013 he was told to come to the Malaysian immigration counter to be interviewed. He believes that this indicates he was going to be arrested as the case of 2006/7 had been re-opened.There is no evidence, beyond the applicant’s assertions, to substantiate his claims. He has provided little information in his written application, and he has provided no real detail at the PV interview.Nevertheless for the purpose of the assessment I accept:•the applicant may have been employed by a Chinese marketing firm that was closed in 2006/7 after having been found to have committed fraud;•that the applicant, as an employee of that company, may have been questioned in relation to the fraud;•that the applicant may have attended a demonstration sponsored by HINDRAF in 2007 and as a result been detained for 40 hours; and•that in 2009 he believed that the case relating to fraud within the Chinese marketing company was being re-opened.(Citations omitted except where expressly set out). On 7 October 2014 the Minister’s delegate made a decision to refuse to grant the Appellant the Protection visa he had sought.THE ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL The Appellant appealed that refusal to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal). The Appellant appeared before the Tribunal on 18 March 2016 to give evidence and present argument. It is uncontentious that in coming to its decision on the merits, the Tribunal had been entitled to take into account what the Appellant had told the Minister’s delegate. In its reasons for decision, the Tribunal stated at [17] that it had listened to the audio recording of the interview conducted with the Appellant on 1 October 2014 and was “satisfied that the summary of interview in the Decision Record … is accurate”.

Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Returning to the more general issues, it can be accepted that an applicant’s health status in particular circumstances may be material to a claim for complementary protection pursuant to s 36(2)(aa) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Migration Act). There are however clear limits to that proposition, having regard to the reasoning of the High Court in SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] HCA 34; 262 CLR 362 (SZTAL) in which Kiefel CJ and Nettle and Gordon JJ speaking as a plurality reasoned at [4]-[8]:[4]“[C]ruel or inhuman treatment or punishment” is relevantly defined in s 5(1) of the [Migration] Act as an act or omission by which “severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person” (emphasis added). As Edelman J explains (7), this definition is not taken from the ICCPR. The ICCPR did not provide a definition. It did not expressly require that pain or suffering of the requisite degree be intentionally inflicted; nor has it subsequently been interpreted as importing such a requirement. The definition of “cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment” in s 5(1) is a partial adaptation of the definition of “torture” in s 5(1), which is clearly enough derived from the definition of “torture” in Art 1 of the CAT, which, in turn, speaks of “any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person” for certain purposes such as obtaining information or a confession, or intimidating or coercing the person or a third person.[5]Section 5(1) also defines “degrading treatment or punishment” for the purposes of the Act. It means an act or omission that causes and is intended to cause extreme humiliation which is unreasonable. That definition, like the definition of cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment in s 5(1), is not taken from the ICCPR. The ICCPR does not expressly require that humiliation of the requisite degree be intentionally caused; nor has it subsequently been interpreted as importing such a requirement.The Tribunal’s findings[6]The Refugee Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) found that, if the appellants were returned to Sri Lanka, their country of origin, and if they were arrested and charged under the laws of that country because they had left it illegally, they would likely be held in remand for a short period, which may be one day, several days or possibly two weeks. The Tribunal accepted that prison conditions in Sri Lanka are poor and may not meet international standards by reason of matters such as overcrowding, poor sanitary facilities and limited access to food.[7]The issue before the Tribunal, relevant to these appeals, was whether, in sending the appellants to prison, Sri Lankan officials could be said to intend to inflict severe pain or suffering or to intend to cause extreme humiliation. The Tribunal concluded that the element of intention was not satisfied. The country information before it indicated that the conditions in prisons in Sri Lanka are the result of a lack of resources, which the Sri Lankan government acknowledged and is taking steps to improve, rather than an intention to inflict cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment or to cause extreme humiliation.[8]The Federal Circuit Court (Judge Driver) considered (8), correctly in our view, that the Tribunal is to be understood to have concluded that “intentionally inflicted” in the definition of “cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment” connotes the existence of an actual, subjective, intention on the part of a person to bring about suffering by his or her conduct. His Honour considered the same to be true with respect to the words “intended to cause” in the definition of “degrading treatment or punishment”. His Honour found no error in that reasoning, and a majority of a Full Court of the Federal Court (Kenny and Nicholas JJ) (9) agreed. Buchanan J dismissed the appeals on other grounds.