FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BGX16 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 1896
Appeal from: BGX16 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2019] FCCA 515 File number: NSD 477 of 2019 Judge: KERR J Date of judgment: 11 November 2019 Date of publication of reasons: 18 November 2019 Catchwords: MIGRATION - Protection (Class XA) (Subclass 866) Visa – appeal from Federal Circuit Court of Australia – leave to rely on ground not raised before primary judge – alleged failure to consider health claims – application of principles in AJI16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 1769 – no indication that lower standard of healthcare intended to cause harm to the Appellant or persons with the characteristics of the Appellant – leave refused – appeal dismissed Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 5, 36(2)(aa), 36(2A) Cases cited: AJI16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 1769
BOZ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 418
Collector of Customs v Pozzolanic Enterprises Proprietary Ltd [1993] FCA 456; 43 FCR 280
Coulton v Holcombe [1968] HCA 33; 162 CLR 1
NABE v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (No 2) [2004] FCAFC 263; 144 FCR 1
SZSFS v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 534; 232 FCR 262
SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] HCA 34; 262 CLR 362
Date of hearing: 11 November 2019 Date of last submissions: 7 November 2019 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 45 Counsel for the Appellant: Ms Okereke-Fisher Solicitor for the Appellant: Attia Lawyers and Consultants Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms Morris Solicitor for the First Respondent: Clayton Utz ORDERS
NSD 477 of 2019 BETWEEN: BGX16
Appellant
AND: MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
KERR J
DATE OF ORDER:
11 NOVEMBER 2019
THE COURT ORDERS THAT
1.The Appellant be refused leave to rely upon proposed Ground 1 of his Further Amended Notice of Appeal.
2.The appeal be dismissed.
3.The Appellant pay the First Respondent’s costs as agreed or assessed, including costs thrown away in the 7 August 2019 proceedings.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
KERR J:
The Appellant is a national of Malaysia. On 31 January 2013 he was issued an Electronic Travel Authority (Class UD) (Subclass 976) visa on which he entered and departed Australia to Thailand on a number of occasions in 2013. On 6 December 2013 he was issued a further Electronic Travel Authority (Class UD) (Subclass 601) visa. On 10 February 2014 he applied for a Protection (Class XA) (Subclass 866) visa (Protection visa).
His application for that Protection visa was allocated to a delegate of the Minister for Home Affairs (Minister) for decision.
The Minister’s delegate summarised the Appellant’s initial…
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- Case
- [2019] FCA 1896
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The High Court considered the principles established in AJI16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 1769, which held that a lower standard of healthcare could be considered in certain circumstances when assessing claims for protection visas. However, the Court found that the appellant had not demonstrated how the lower standard of healthcare in Malaysia was intended to cause him harm, or persons with similar characteristics, in a way that would amount to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. The Court noted that the appellant had not provided any evidence to substantiate his claims about his health conditions or how they would be impacted if returned to Malaysia. The Court also found that the lower standard of healthcare in Malaysia was a result of a lack of resources, rather than an intention to cause harm. The Court held that the appellant had not made out a case for special leave to appeal, and dismissed the application.
No further orders were made by the Court.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Returning to the more general issues, it can be accepted that an applicant’s health status in particular circumstances may be material to a claim for complementary protection pursuant to s 36(2)(aa) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Migration Act). There are however clear limits to that proposition, having regard to the reasoning of the High Court in SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] HCA 34; 262 CLR 362 (SZTAL) in which Kiefel CJ and Nettle and Gordon JJ speaking as a plurality reasoned at [4]-[8]:[4]“[C]ruel or inhuman treatment or punishment” is relevantly defined in s 5(1) of the [Migration] Act as an act or omission by which “severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person” (emphasis added). As Edelman J explains (7), this definition is not taken from the ICCPR. The ICCPR did not provide a definition. It did not expressly require that pain or suffering of the requisite degree be intentionally inflicted; nor has it subsequently been interpreted as importing such a requirement. The definition of “cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment” in s 5(1) is a partial adaptation of the definition of “torture” in s 5(1), which is clearly enough derived from the definition of “torture” in Art 1 of the CAT, which, in turn, speaks of “any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person” for certain purposes such as obtaining information or a confession, or intimidating or coercing the person or a third person.[5]Section 5(1) also defines “degrading treatment or punishment” for the purposes of the Act. It means an act or omission that causes and is intended to cause extreme humiliation which is unreasonable. That definition, like the definition of cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment in s 5(1), is not taken from the ICCPR. The ICCPR does not expressly require that humiliation of the requisite degree be intentionally caused; nor has it subsequently been interpreted as importing such a requirement.The Tribunal’s findings[6]The Refugee Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) found that, if the appellants were returned to Sri Lanka, their country of origin, and if they were arrested and charged under the laws of that country because they had left it illegally, they would likely be held in remand for a short period, which may be one day, several days or possibly two weeks. The Tribunal accepted that prison conditions in Sri Lanka are poor and may not meet international standards by reason of matters such as overcrowding, poor sanitary facilities and limited access to food.[7]The issue before the Tribunal, relevant to these appeals, was whether, in sending the appellants to prison, Sri Lankan officials could be said to intend to inflict severe pain or suffering or to intend to cause extreme humiliation. The Tribunal concluded that the element of intention was not satisfied. The country information before it indicated that the conditions in prisons in Sri Lanka are the result of a lack of resources, which the Sri Lankan government acknowledged and is taking steps to improve, rather than an intention to inflict cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment or to cause extreme humiliation.[8]The Federal Circuit Court (Judge Driver) considered (8), correctly in our view, that the Tribunal is to be understood to have concluded that “intentionally inflicted” in the definition of “cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment” connotes the existence of an actual, subjective, intention on the part of a person to bring about suffering by his or her conduct. His Honour considered the same to be true with respect to the words “intended to cause” in the definition of “degrading treatment or punishment”. His Honour found no error in that reasoning, and a majority of a Full Court of the Federal Court (Kenny and Nicholas JJ) (9) agreed. Buchanan J dismissed the appeals on other grounds.