FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BGL16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 1609
Appeal from: Application for an extension of time: BGL16 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2018] FCCA 2853 File number: NSD 442 of 2019 Judge: ABRAHAM J Date of judgment: 27 September 2019 Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from Federal Circuit Court dismissing application for judicial review of the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal – whether particular conclusions reached by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal lacked "intelligible justification"– no merit in the ground of appeal
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for extension of time to file an appeal filed 143 days after the appeal period had expired – ground of appeal without merit – extension of time refused
Legislation: Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) rr 1.39, 36.03
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 25(2)(b)
Migration Act 1958 (Cth)
Cases cited: BZADJ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 853
Dunlop v Fishburn (No 3) [2012] FCA 315
Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen [1984] FCA 186; (1984) 3 FCR 344
Parker v The Queen [2002] FCAFC 133
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW [2018] HCA 30; (2018) 92 ALJR 713
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li [2013] HCA 18; (2013) 249 CLR 332
Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang [1996] HCA 6; (1996) 185 CLR 259
Date of hearing: 13 August 2019 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 46 Counsel for the Applicant: Mr P Bodisco Solicitor for the Applicant: Shelly Legal Solicitor for the First Respondent: Ms A Lucchese of Sparke Helmore Lawyers Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice save as to costs ORDERS
NSD 442 of 2019 BETWEEN: BGL16
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
ABRAHAM J
DATE OF ORDER:
27 SEPTEMBER 2019
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application for an extension of time within which to appeal be refused.
2.The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs to be agreed or taxed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
ABRAHAM J:
The applicant is a citizen of Sri Lanka, who first arrived in Australia on 1 November 2013 as a holder of a sponsored family visitor visa. On 13 December 2013, the applicant lodged an application for a Protection (Class XA) visa (Protection Visa). On 25 September 2014, a delegate of the first respondent, the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, refused the grant of a Protection Visa. On 14 October 2014, the applicant lodged an application for review with the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the Tribunal) and on 3 May 2016, the Tribunal affirmed…
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- Case
- [2019] FCA 1609
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered the principles guiding the exercise of the discretion to extend time in appeals, as outlined in Dunlop v Fishburn (No 3) and Parker v The Queen. The court noted that the discretion to extend time is wide but must be exercised in a manner that promotes the overarching purpose of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976, which is to facilitate the just resolution of disputes according to law and as quickly, inexpensively, and efficiently as possible. The court highlighted that applications for an extension of time are not to be granted unless it is proper to do so, and the applicant must provide an acceptable explanation for the delay.
In this case, the court found that the applicant's explanation for the delay in filing the appeal was not acceptable. The applicant had waited 143 days after the appeal period expired to file her application for an extension of time. The court noted that the applicant had not taken any other action to challenge the AAT's decision during this period. The court also considered that the delay caused prejudice to the respondent as it would have to prepare for the appeal later than intended. Finally, the court assessed the merits of the appeal and found that the applicant's claims lacked merit as the AAT's reasoning was not illogical or unreasonable.
Based on the above considerations, the court refused the application for an extension of time and dismissed the appeal. The court ordered that the applicant pay the first respondent's costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application for an extension of time within which to appeal be refused.
2. The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs to be agreed or taxed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
As the primary judge held that the Tribunal’s reasoning in relation to the UNHCR Guidelines and the UK Upper Tribunal information (and the application of that information to the applicant’s circumstances) was not illogical or unreasonable, the application was dismissed.Consideration An applicant for an extension of time carries the onus of persuading the Court that it is appropriate, in the circumstances of the case, for the extension to be granted: BZADJ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 853 (BZADJ) at [8]. The Court does have the power to extend the time fixed by r 36.03 of the Rules: r 1.39. The existence of such a power is implicit in a number of the provisions of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), relevant to an appeal: for example, s 25(2)(b). The power to extend time in which to appeal is unfettered, however, the authorities identify a number of matters bearing upon the exercise of the discretion to extend time. In Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen [1984] FCA 186; (1984) 3 FCR 344 at 348-349, Wilcox J identified a number of factors which are often cited in this regard. The matters to which the Court will usually have regard to, identified in that judgment, are: (1) the length of the extension sought; (2) the explanation for the delay, including consideration of any action taken by the applicant, other than by way of making an application for review; (3) the prejudice to the applicant if the extension of time is refused; (4) any relevant prejudice to a respondent if the extension of time is granted; (5) the conduct of the parties in the litigation; (6) the merits of the substantial application; and (7) the interests of justice more generally: see for example, Parker v The Queen [2002] FCAFC 133 at [6] and [17] - [19]. The relevant principles were succinctly stated by Katzmann J in Dunlop v Fishburn (No 3) [2012] FCA 315 at [9]-[10] as follows: 9. The Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) (“the Rules”) retain the 21 day time limit for filing a notice of appeal and the discretion given to the Court in the former Rules to extend that period: r 36.03. The discretion is wide. It is constrained only by the interests of justice and the subject-matter and purpose of the legislation. Section 37M(1) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (“FCA Act”) provides that the overarching purpose of the civil procedure provisions of the Act and the Rules is to facilitate the just resolution of disputes according to law and as quickly, inexpensively and efficiently as possible. That purpose includes the objective of disposing of all proceedings in a timely manner: FCA Act, s 37M(2). Section 37M(3) requires the Court to interpret and apply the Rules and exercise any power conferred by them in the way that best promotes the overarching purpose. Consequently, the discretion conferred by r 36.03 is to be exercised in that way.10. The requirement in the former Rules (O 52 r 15(2)) that an applicant show “special reasons” has been removed. Despite the absence of a requirement for special reasons (which, in any event, only meant something out of the ordinary (Jess v Scott (1986) 12 FCR 187)), it seems to me that the considerations guiding the exercise of the Court’s discretion set out by the Full Court in Parker v The Queen [2002] FCAFC 133 at [6] continue to apply:(a) Applications for an extension of time are not to be granted unless it is proper to do so; the legislated time limits are not to be ignored; (b) The applicant must show an “acceptable explanation for the delay”; it must be “fair and equitable in the circumstances” to extend time;(c) Other action taken by the applicant to challenge the decision is relevant to the consideration of the question whether an acceptable explanation for the delay has been furnished;(d) Any prejudice to the respondent in defending the proceedings that is caused by the delay is a material factor militating against the grant of an extension but the mere absence of prejudice will not justify the grant of an extension;(e) The merits of the appeal are to be taken into account.