BGL16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BGL16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 1609

Appeal from: Application for an extension of time: BGL16 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2018] FCCA 2853
File number: NSD 442 of 2019
Judge: ABRAHAM J
Date of judgment: 27 September 2019
Catchwords:

MIGRATION – appeal from Federal Circuit Court dismissing application for judicial review of the decision of  the Administrative Appeals Tribunal – whether particular conclusions reached by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal lacked "intelligible justification"– no merit in the ground of appeal

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for extension of time to file an appeal filed 143 days after the appeal period had expired – ground of appeal without merit – extension of time refused

Legislation:

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) rr 1.39, 36.03

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 25(2)(b)

Migration Act 1958 (Cth)

Cases cited:

BZADJ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 853

Dunlop v Fishburn (No 3) [2012] FCA 315

Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen [1984] FCA 186; (1984) 3 FCR 344

Parker v The Queen [2002] FCAFC 133

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW [2018] HCA 30; (2018) 92 ALJR 713

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li [2013] HCA 18; (2013) 249 CLR 332

Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang [1996] HCA 6; (1996) 185 CLR 259

Tsvetnko v United States of America [2019] FCAFC 74

Vo v Minister For Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 108

Date of hearing:  13 August 2019
Registry: New South Wales
Division:  General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 46
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr P Bodisco
Solicitor for the Applicant:  Shelly Legal
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Ms A Lucchese of Sparke Helmore Lawyers
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice save as to costs

ORDERS

NSD 442 of 2019
BETWEEN:

BGL16

Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

ABRAHAM J

DATE OF ORDER:

27 SEPTEMBER 2019

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application for an extension of time within which to appeal be refused.

2.The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs to be agreed or taxed.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

ABRAHAM J:

  1. The applicant is a citizen of Sri Lanka, who first arrived in Australia on 1 November 2013 as a holder of a sponsored family visitor visa. On 13 December 2013, the applicant lodged an application for a Protection (Class XA) visa (Protection Visa). On 25 September 2014, a delegate of the first respondent, the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, refused the grant of a Protection Visa. On 14 October 2014, the applicant lodged an application for review with the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the Tribunal) and on 3 May 2016, the Tribunal affirmed…

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Details
Case
[2019] FCA 1609
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The applicant, BGL16, appealed against the decision of the Federal Circuit Court which dismissed her application for judicial review of the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT). The AAT had found that the applicant's claims of persecution in Sri Lanka due to her association with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and her ethnicity lacked credibility. The applicant sought an extension of time to appeal this decision, which was denied by the Federal Circuit Court. The primary issue before the court was whether the Federal Circuit Court erred in dismissing the applicant's application for an extension of time to appeal the AAT's decision.

The court considered the principles guiding the exercise of the discretion to extend time in appeals, as outlined in Dunlop v Fishburn (No 3) and Parker v The Queen. The court noted that the discretion to extend time is wide but must be exercised in a manner that promotes the overarching purpose of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976, which is to facilitate the just resolution of disputes according to law and as quickly, inexpensively, and efficiently as possible. The court highlighted that applications for an extension of time are not to be granted unless it is proper to do so, and the applicant must provide an acceptable explanation for the delay.

In this case, the court found that the applicant's explanation for the delay in filing the appeal was not acceptable. The applicant had waited 143 days after the appeal period expired to file her application for an extension of time. The court noted that the applicant had not taken any other action to challenge the AAT's decision during this period. The court also considered that the delay caused prejudice to the respondent as it would have to prepare for the appeal later than intended. Finally, the court assessed the merits of the appeal and found that the applicant's claims lacked merit as the AAT's reasoning was not illogical or unreasonable.

Based on the above considerations, the court refused the application for an extension of time and dismissed the appeal. The court ordered that the applicant pay the first respondent's costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application for an extension of time within which to appeal be refused.

2. The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs to be agreed or taxed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons below, the application for an extension of time is refused. Background In an undated statement submitted with her Protection Visa application, the applicant advanced the following claims (as summarised in the respondent’s submissions):Her late husband was a mechanic who was forced to repair Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) vehicles, and in 1987, to purchase and register a vehicle in his name which was used by the LTTE as a bomb. Members of the Sri Lankan Army (SLA) subsequently arrested her husband in their home in Batticaloa, tortured him and detained him for two years, releasing him pursuant to the Indo- Lanka Accord.In April 1990, the LTTE abducted her husband, demanded a ransom for his return and threatened to harm her if she could not pay it. In fear, she left her work as a teacher and joined her husband in the LTTE’s armed forces and cooked meals for the LTTE.After two months, the applicant returned to teaching in a different village, and on 26 July 1993, was informed of her husband’s death while fighting for the LTTE. She returned to her village in Batticaloa where, after lodging complaints with human rights organisations, she received her husband’s death certificate. Her brother also began fighting for the LTTE and she was notified by the LTTE that her brother died on 27 February 1996.Around January 2011, three “grease men” attacked her as she was entering her home and chased her to her sister’s house and left after her mother fainted.In August 2012, the applicant was questioned by the intelligence service, who took her fingerprints and photograph. After this encounter she applied for a visitor visa and she secretly obtained her passport by paying an agency.In October 2013, she voluntarily attended the office of the Pillayan group, where they demanded money from her and threatened to report her LTTE connections. She paid part of the amount demanded before coming to Australia. After she left, her sister and her family moved into her home in Batticaloa, where Pillayan members went and demanded the balance of their extortion amount and threatened to kill the applicant upon her return if it was not paid.Over the years, she received threats and demands for money in relation to her brother and her husband’s activities from the SLA, the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation (TELO), the LTTE, the Special Task Force (STF), the Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Puligal (TVMP), the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) and the Karuna and Pillayan factions. Some of the demands for money were made with knowledge that the applicant’s daughter had moved to Australia. The applicant claimed to fear being detained and tortured on her return to Sri Lanka because of her known association with the LTTE, her ethnicity, her three-year absence from Sri Lanka and the fact that she would be returning from abroad. She also claimed to fear harm on the basis of other cumulative factors including: her race and imputed adverse political opinion as a returnee with a perceived connection to the LTTE; belonging to a particular social group, namely being a widow of some means with close relatives (a daughter and two sisters) living abroad; hailing from an area in the east that was at one time under the control of the LTTE; and the fact that her husband and brother had fought with the LTTE and been acclaimed by them as martyrs. The decision of the Tribunal

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The applicant claimed to fear being detained and tortured on her return to Sri Lanka because of her known association with the LTTE, her ethnicity, her three-year absence from Sri Lanka and the fact that she would be returning from abroad. She also claimed to fear harm on the basis of other cumulative factors including: her race and imputed adverse political opinion as a returnee with a perceived connection to the LTTE; belonging to a particular social group, namely being a widow of some means with close relatives (a daughter and two sisters) living abroad; hailing from an area in the east that was at one time under the control of the LTTE; and the fact that her husband and brother had fought with the LTTE and been acclaimed by them as martyrs. The decision of the Tribunal The Tribunal found that aspects of the applicant’s claims lacked credibility and were unconvincing, which caused the Tribunal to doubt the truth of central aspects of her claims. The Tribunal accepted that the applicant’s husband and brother were forcibly recruited by the LTTE and died while fighting for the LTTE, that a car registered in the name of the applicant’s husband was used in an LTTE attack in 1987 and that the applicant lived in an LTTE camp for around three months where she cooked for the LTTE. However, the Tribunal also noted that the applicant gave inconsistent oral evidence regarding her husband being of interest to the Sri Lankan authorities as a (perceived) willing participant in the 1987 bombing or as a willing supporter of the LTTE. The applicant’s unconvincing explanation for the incorrect date on her husband’s death certificate caused the Tribunal to have further doubts about the reliability of her testimony. The Tribunal found the applicant’s claims of frequent searches and harassment after her husband’s death in 1993 by the various Sri Lankan and Tamil security organisations to be evolving and unconvincing, noting in particular, that it was unlikely that the applicant kept evidence showing her husband’s complicity in the 1987 bombing in a house subject to frequent searches for five years before burning it in 1993, as claimed by the applicant. The Tribunal did not accept that the applicant was perceived as having a special connection to her brother and was therefore subject to threats and questioning on this basis, given that her mother and sister continued to live in the same area without suffering similar treatment. The Tribunal expressed scepticism at the applicant’s claim that she was able to stay in her sister’s home safely, a mere half-an-hour’s walk away from her home, in a village in which her family had resided for generations, if she had the high profile she claimed to have with Sri Lankan and Tamil organisations. The Tribunal further noted that the applicant’s decision to remain living in her home for around 20 years, where she claimed to be subject to frequent harassment and threats, undermined these claims, particularly in circumstances where she also claimed to be safe at her sister’s house nearby.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

As the primary judge held that the Tribunal’s reasoning in relation to the UNHCR Guidelines and the UK Upper Tribunal information (and the application of that information to the applicant’s circumstances) was not illogical or unreasonable, the application was dismissed.Consideration An applicant for an extension of time carries the onus of persuading the Court that it is appropriate, in the circumstances of the case, for the extension to be granted: BZADJ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 853 (BZADJ) at [8]. The Court does have the power to extend the time fixed by r 36.03 of the Rules: r 1.39. The existence of such a power is implicit in a number of the provisions of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), relevant to an appeal: for example, s 25(2)(b). The power to extend time in which to appeal is unfettered, however, the authorities identify a number of matters bearing upon the exercise of the discretion to extend time. In Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen [1984] FCA 186; (1984) 3 FCR 344 at 348-349, Wilcox J identified a number of factors which are often cited in this regard. The matters to which the Court will usually have regard to, identified in that judgment, are: (1) the length of the extension sought; (2) the explanation for the delay, including consideration of any action taken by the applicant, other than by way of making an application for review; (3) the prejudice to the applicant if the extension of time is refused; (4) any relevant prejudice to a respondent if the extension of time is granted; (5) the conduct of the parties in the litigation; (6) the merits of the substantial application; and (7) the interests of justice more generally: see for example, Parker v The Queen [2002] FCAFC 133 at [6] and [17] - [19]. The relevant principles were succinctly stated by Katzmann J in Dunlop v Fishburn (No 3) [2012] FCA 315 at [9]-[10] as follows: 9. The Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) (“the Rules”) retain the 21 day time limit for filing a notice of appeal and the discretion given to the Court in the former Rules to extend that period: r 36.03. The discretion is wide. It is constrained only by the interests of justice and the subject-matter and purpose of the legislation. Section 37M(1) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (“FCA Act”) provides that the overarching purpose of the civil procedure provisions of the Act and the Rules is to facilitate the just resolution of disputes according to law and as quickly, inexpensively and efficiently as possible. That purpose includes the objective of disposing of all proceedings in a timely manner: FCA Act, s 37M(2). Section 37M(3) requires the Court to interpret and apply the Rules and exercise any power conferred by them in the way that best promotes the overarching purpose. Consequently, the discretion conferred by r 36.03 is to be exercised in that way.10. The requirement in the former Rules (O 52 r 15(2)) that an applicant show “special reasons” has been removed. Despite the absence of a requirement for special reasons (which, in any event, only meant something out of the ordinary (Jess v Scott (1986) 12 FCR 187)), it seems to me that the considerations guiding the exercise of the Court’s discretion set out by the Full Court in Parker v The Queen [2002] FCAFC 133 at [6] continue to apply:(a) Applications for an extension of time are not to be granted unless it is proper to do so; the legislated time limits are not to be ignored; (b) The applicant must show an “acceptable explanation for the delay”; it must be “fair and equitable in the circumstances” to extend time;(c) Other action taken by the applicant to challenge the decision is relevant to the consideration of the question whether an acceptable explanation for the delay has been furnished;(d) Any prejudice to the respondent in defending the proceedings that is caused by the delay is a material factor militating against the grant of an extension but the mere absence of prejudice will not justify the grant of an extension;(e) The merits of the appeal are to be taken into account.