BGG15 v Minister for Immigration

[2015] FCCA 3057

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BGG15 & ORS v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR [2015] FCCA 3057

Catchwords:
MIGRATION – Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Migration & Refugees Division) – protection visa – whether Tribunal properly applied the “real risk” test – whether the Tribunal properly applied the “significant chance of harm” test – bias – whether Tribunal engaged in one-sided consideration of material – no jurisdictional error identified – application dismissed.

Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.36(2)(a), 36(2)(aa), 476

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZQRB [2013] FCAFC 33
NAHI v The Minister [2004] FCAFC 10

First Applicant: BGG15

Second Applicant: BGH15

Third Applicant: BGI15

Fourth Applicant: BGJ15

First Respondent: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION

Second Respondent: ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

File Number: SYG 1854 of 2015

Judgment of: Judge Street

Hearing date: 16 November 2015

Date of Last Submission: 16 November 2015

Delivered at: Sydney

Delivered on: 16 November 2015

REPRESENTATION

Solicitors for the Applicants: Mr N Daawer
Ariana Defence Lawyers

Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr T Reilly

Solicitors for the First Respondent: DLA Piper

ORDERS

1. The application is dismissed.

2. The First and Second Applicants pay the costs of the First Respondent fixed in the amount of $6825.

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
AT SYDNEY

SYG 1854 of 2015

BGG15

First Applicant

BGH15

Second Applicant

BGI15

Third Applicant

BGJ15

Fourth Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

1. This is an application for a Constitutional writ within the Court’s jurisdiction under s.476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) in respect of a decision of the Tribunal dated 10 June 2015 affirming a decision of the delegate not to grant the applicants protection visas. The third and fourth applicants are children. The first and second applicants were found to be citizens of Egypt and their claims were assessed against that country.

2. The claims of the first applicant can be summarised as follows: 

   ·The applicant is a devout Coptic Orthodox Christian. He was raised in a Coptic Orthodox family.

   ·When the applicant was in secondary school he participated in the church choir. One day whilst outside the church he was insulted by some Muslim men. The men threw stones at the applicant. This was the first time the applicant had felt persecuted due to his religion.

   ·The applicant had married on 10 May 2001. He states that after he was married his feelings of persecution increased as he came to know what it were like to feel responsible for a Christian woman in Egypt. The applicant’s wife was readily identifiable as a Christian as she did not wear a veil and she wore a cross around her neck. The applicant’s wife was frequently insulted as a result.

   ·On 25 January 2011 the applicant and his wife were travelling to the applicant’s mother in law’s home when they were stopped at a makeshift checkpoint. When the men stopped the applicant’s car and saw a cross inside they called the applicant an infidel. The men tried to pull the applicant out of the car and started beating him. One of the men then tried to pull the applicant’s wife out of the car but the applicant was able to prevent this. The men continued to beat and insult the applicant. The applicant was saved by some men who arrived shortly after who intervened to assist the applicant.

   ·On 23 April 2011, the day before Easter, the applicant attended mass at St Mary’s church in [X]. When the applicant returned to his car he discovered it had been vandalised. As nothing was taken from the car but religious items such as crosses and CDs of hymns had been destroyed, the applicant knew his car had been targeted because it had a cross inside it. The applicant reported the matter to the police but hey refused to make an official report as nothing had been stolen.

   ·The applicant states that as a Coptic businessman he was frequently treated unfairly including by customers and also by members of the council.

   ·On 6 October 2012 the applicant was travelling to China with a large amount of cash as was his custom to purchase supplies for his business. The applicant states he always declared the amounts of money he was travelling with and he never had to pay any tax on this money. On this occasion, the applicant was involved in an altercation with a customs officer who accused the applicant of failing to declare the money he was travelling with. The officer called the applicant and infidel and told the applicant he would put him behind bars. The applicant was taken to the to the public prosecution office but the applicant did not attend as he was in China at the time. The applicant was subsequently acquitted of any wrongdoing and the matter is now considered closed.

   ·The day after Christmas in 2012, the applicants was in his shop when he was visited by some friends, both Muslim and Christian, who came to wish the applicant a merry Christmas. Sheikh Ashraf Abdel El Aza then entered the applicant’s shop and began yelling at the Muslim men for blaspheming and exchanging greetings with an infidel. The applicant told the Sheikh that he could think what he wanted but he wasn’t forced to greet the applicant. The Sheik is connected to the Muslim Brotherhood.

   ·Three weeks later the applicant went to the port pick up a shipment for his business but the workers would not release the shipment. One of the Christian workers at the dock told the applicant that a Muslim man named Ashraf had paid the workers to delay the shipments release for several months. The applicant lost a large amount of money as a result.

   ·During January and February 2013 the security guard in the applicant’s building told the applicant a bearded man had enquired about the applicant by name. The guard confirmed the applicant lived in the building. Towards the end of February the applicant’s wife was shopping with their daughters when a man grabbed the applicant’s youngest daughter and began running away with her. The applicant’s wife began screaming and the security guard and other people in the area began chasing after the man. The man subsequently released the applicant’s daughter and ran away. The security guard told the applicant that this had been the same man who had enquired about the applicant previously.

   ·Following this incident the applicant knew that he could not remain in Egypt any longer. He applied for an was granted a visa for China. The applicant then travelled back to Egypt on two separate occasions but his wife and children remained in China. Following the refusal of their tourist visa application in China, the applicant and his family returned to Egypt where they applied for a further tourist visa. This visa was granted on 5 August 2013 and the applicant and his family arrived in Australia on 22 August 2013.

   ·The applicant fears harm from the Muslim Brotherhood if he were to return to the Egypt. He does not believe that the Egyptian authorities will be able to protect him or that he could live safely and reasonably elsewhere in Egypt.

3. The second applicant’s claims are materially consistent with those raised by the first applicant.  The second applicant claims she wears a cross around her neck and does not wear a veil and she is readily identifiable as a Christian and that she has experienced harm for this reason in the past.

4. The Tribunal made a number of preliminary findings adverse to the applicants relevantly as follows: 

   47. …The Tribunal makes the following preliminary findings:

   • The Tribunal has seen the applicants' (4) passports at hearing and accepts they are nationals of Egypt as claimed. I therefore accept that Egypt is their country of reference for the purposes of assessing refugee protection claims; and their receiving country for the purposes of assessing complementary protection claims.

   • Based on the evidence presently before me, I am not satisfied the applicants have statutory effective protection in any safe third country (pursuant to subsections 36(3)-(5) of the Act).

   • The Tribunal accepts the applicant was subject to abuse and mistreatment prior to June 1991, at which time he was attending a choir at secondary school (prior to 1991).

   • The Tribunal accepts the applicant was physically mistreated and abused at a checkpoint in Cairo, “directly” after the January 2011 revolution.

   • The Tribunal accepts the applicant's car was broken into on 23 April 2013.

   • The Tribunal accepts the applicant was subject to the incidents he claimed in his business.

   • The Tribunal accepts the applicant was charged with an offence at an airport in Egypt. However, I accept the applicant was then found to be innocent and the money taken from him at the time (in October 2012) was returned.

   • The Tribunal accepts that the delivery of a container with products for sale, was improperly withheld from him in January 2013.

   • The Tribunal accepts the applicants' daughters were mistreated as claimed. I also accept that a kidnap attempt on the applicants' youngest daughter was made in January/February 2013.

   • The Tribunal accepts the applicants travelled to China and elsewhere, as claimed.

   • The Tribunal accepts the applicant's store was destroyed in riots in August 2013 (though his brother continues to operate the business/store in Cairo).

   • The Tribunal accepts the Egyptian police did not always record, or properly investigate, some of the incidents to which the applicants were subject.

5. The applicants appeared before the Tribunal to give evidence and present arguments and were assisted by an interpreter as well as being represented by their registered migration agent. 

6. The first applicant’s migration history is as follows:

   Applicant 1 claims to have been born in Cairo, Egypt and to have resided there for most of his life. Applicant 1 claims that since May 2009 he has travelled to China frequently on business. A detailed list of the applicant 1’s travel is to China has been provided with applicant 1’s PV application (folio 89). Applicant 1 also claims to have travelled to Dubai for approximately 10 days in 2000 for work purposes and to have travelled to Turkey for approximately a week in June 2011. Applicant 1 initially applied for tourist visa for Australia while in China on 04/06/2013. This application was refused on 07/06/2013. Applicant 1 then returned to Egypt where he lodged a further tourist visa application for Australia on 22/07/2013. This application was granted on 05/08/2013 and applicant 1 arrived in Australia on 22/08/2013. Applicant 1 lodged a protection visa application on 12/09/2013.

7. The second applicant’s migration history is as follows:

   Applicant 2 claims to have been born in Cairo, Egypt and to have resided there until 31/05/2012 when she travelled to China. Applicant 2 then remained in China until 26/08/2012 when she returned to Egypt. Applicant then remained in Egypt until 12/03/2013 when she again travelled to China. Applicant 2 then remained in China until 13/08/2013 when she one again returned to Egypt. Applicant 2 initially applied for tourist visa for Australia while in China on 04/06/2013. This application was refused on 07/06/2013. Following her return to Egypt on 13/08/2013, applicant 2 lodged a further tourist visa application on 22/07/2013. This visa was granted on 05/08/2013. And applicant 2 arrived in Australia on 22/08/2013. Applicant 2 lodged a protection visa application on 12/09/2013.

8. Prior to the hearing, the Tribunal received submissions dated 30 April 2015 on behalf of the applicants, including preliminary submissions on country information.  Those submissions were identified in para.44 of the Tribunal’s reasons, and it is clear that there was an intellectual engagement with those submissions from the Tribunal’s reasons in para.54 and following, including para.55. 

9. Relevantly, the Tribunal concluded:

   61. As stated above, the Tribunal has largely accepted most of the applicants' claims of mistreatment, particularly that which occurred after the January 2011 revolution and prior to Morsi being removed from office. However, based on the country information considered, I am not satisfied the Coptic Christian applicants have a real chance of being persecuted, including for reason of their religion, should they return to Cairo. I am satisfied that is why the applicant husband's mother, brother and two sisters continue to reside in Cairo, apparently unharmed. The applicant conceded he had regular contact with them in Cairo, and though asked, he did not say there were any claims by them of any harm. I therefore do not accept the applicants have a real chance of being seriously harmed for any of the reasons discussed above, should they return to Cairo.

   Treatment of Coptic Christians in business:

   62. At hearing, the migration agent confirmed that Australians cannot understand the way in which retribution and punishment are delivered in Egypt to Christians at the hands of Muslim activists; particularly once those Christians had been targeted, there was no escape. It was claimed the applicant's targeting by Ashraf, a competing local businessman who was in the (now banned) Muslim Brotherhood, would continue should the applicant return. It was also claimed Ashraf could use his influence to cause the applicant further harm. Be that as it may, and though my decision is not based on same, I put to the applicant that I may think his principal concern in Egypt was the ongoing harm he feared he would be subject to by Ashraf and he could simply relocate within his home area (Cairo) to find safety; as he had apparently done when he temporarily lived at his mother-in-law's home (some 20-30 minutes away by car from his own home in Cairo). The applicant then said he was well-known as a businessman in Egypt and he could not escape; however, his brother continues to operate their same business at the same premises in Cairo, apparently unharmed. Though the applicant had regular contact with his family, no claim was made that the brother was being banned in Egypt. Furthermore, the applicant has started a business in Sydney in the approximately 2 years since he arrived, and he therefore appears capable of commencing a new business elsewhere in his home region (Cairo), should he wish to.

   63. Further, and more importantly, based on the country information considered, I am not satisfied that Muslim Brotherhood members, or Islamists, have the capacity or willingness to harm someone like the applicant, who I am satisfied was engaged in a business struggle with a Muslim man named Ashraf, and which struggle became personal between those two men. In my view, changing house and business location within the same city, and to a nearby suburb, is not necessarily relocation for the purposes of the Refugees Convention. Be that as it may, and based on the country information herein, I do not accept there is a real chance the unprecedented violence against Copts in 2013 to early 2014, will again occur in the reasonably foreseeable future. Further, neither do I accept the applicants would be subject to such violence on return, for any of the reasons claimed. That is also because I am not satisfied that Ashraf, assuming he had not been arrested, would continue to hold any of the power he held while the Muslim Brotherhood was (ostensibly) in power.

   …

   68. That said, and though the Islamists have been removed from office, the Tribunal accepts that some Coptic businesses and property (particularly those connected to the “coup”), may be targeted in Egypt. However, I do not accept that without more, Coptic businesses (or businessmen) have a real chance of being subject to serious or significant harm for that reason, in Egypt. Neither am I satisfied the applicant personally has a real chance of serious or significant harm for this reason should he return to Egypt.

   …

   72. At any rate, the Tribunal accepts the applicant wife did not wear a veil in Egypt, and that during the time of former President Morsi, she was distressed by the mistreatment to which she was subject. However, based on the country information considered, I am not satisfied she would suffer serious or significant harm for this reason should she return to Egypt.

   73. Next the applicant wife claimed, by statutory declaration dated 22 April 2014, she would always wear a cross around her neck which also identified her as a Christian. When she went out with her husband, she was “always forced to endure degrading treatment and comments, curses, insults and threats because” they were identified as Christians. After discussing it with her at hearing, I accept the incidents occurred. I also accept these incidents were serious during the time former President Morsi was in office. However, based on the country information and the findings herein, I am not satisfied she would suffer serious or significant harm for this reason should she now return to Egypt.

   …

   75. That said, and for the reasons set out elsewhere, lam not satisfied she (or her daughters) has a real chance of suffering serious or significant harm for any of the reasons claimed, should she now return to Egypt. Though clearly distressing, based on the country information considered, I am not satisfied the daughters have a real chance of (for instance) being subject to further kidnap attempts in Cairo.

   76. Further, even after considering those of the applicants claims that I have accepted cumulatively, I remain satisfied they do not have a real chance of persecution for a Refugees Convention reason should they return to Egypt.

10. It was in those circumstances that the Tribunal turned to consideration of the issue of complementary protection and correctly identified the legislative provisions in s.36(2)(a) and s.36(2)(aa), as well as the real risk test referred to in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZQRB (2013) 296 ALR 525 at [242]-[244].

11. The grounds of the application are as follows:

    A. Refugee and in need of protection

    1. Biased Decision and made Jurisdictional Error

    The First and Second Respondent made bias decision and made a jurisdictional error in relation to finding “the applicant do not have statutory effective protection in a third country” under Subsection 36(3) of the Migration Act 1958. They ignored relevant factual evidence to be considered under Subsection 36(2} of the Migration Act. By doing this the Respondents deviated from deciding the matter on merits basis with bias, where an impartial and unbiased decision maker would come to a decision of finding in favour of the applicant under Subsection 36(2) of the Migration Act having considered the factual circumstance of the applicants claim.

    Particulars:

    The applicants departed their home country before entering Australia and this is the time that he finally decides to leave the home country for ever as the threat amounted to the level that the applicant could no longer live in the country due to the elevated risk to his life and the life of his family members including wife and daughters. However, the applicants had travelled to other countries to temporarily for business purposes and to reduce the risk of harm their lives but return to his beloved home country with hope of change in political and security circumstance in order to live in his own country safe and well. He is a successful businessman with an established business and life, having much better opportunities and life style in his home country than anywhere else in the world. Further the main applicant's nature of being very stubborn and naive believing in political promises of the authorities, politicians and international community for bringing law and order in to the country and ignoring the heavy presence of radical Islamists from Muslim Brotherhood, their ambitions, drive and desire for enforcing and spreading of radical Islam in their narrow minded ways, he returned to his home country being persistent to continue living there.

    But unfortunately by passing days, weeks and months the situation had worsen and the applicant life and the lives of his family members were put in more risk and danger by way of kidnaping, and daily persecutions of multiple aspects of their lives.

    Up their arrival into Australia they claimed to be refugees and in need of protection under Section 36 (2) of the Migration Act and under the United Nations Refugee Convention 1951 and its relevant protocols.

    The First and the Second respondent ignored those facts in applying the test required by law, deviated from deciding the matter on merits basis with bias, where an impartial and unbiased decision maker would come to a decision of finding in favour of the applicant under Subsection 36(2) of the Migration Act having considered the factual circumstance of the applicants claim. And this constitutes a jurisdictional error and even being bias in decision making.

    2. Breach of Procedural Fairness and jurisdictional Error

    The First and Second Respondent had breached procedural fairness in particular the “No Evidence Rule” as did not act fairly in reaching to the unreasonable decision while even accepting applicants claim of persecution and having fear of return because of the persecution and risk of harm for the convention ground of religion under the Refugee Convention and Section 91R {1} (a), (b) and (c) of Migration Act if he returns to Egypt, however the First Respondent concluded that the applicants don't have well-founded fear of return and there is no real risk of significant harm. This decision was taken in the absence of any logically probative adverse evidence or information as required by the principle of Procedural Fairness.

    The Second Respondent failed to correct the failure and error of the First Respondent and affirm his/her decision and made the same error as the First Respondent and consequently breached the rule of Procedural Fairness.

    Particulars:

    The First and Second Respondent had breached the rule of procedural fairness in particular not finding applicants having well-founded fear of persecution in their home country and not being in real risk of significant harm if applicants are returned to Egypt, while expressly accepting the claim of serious harm and systematic and discriminatory conduct as required by Subsection 91R (1)(b) and (c) of the Migration Act. Further the First Respondent accept that the harm feared amount to persecution.

    Further he/she accepts the existence of serious harm to the applicants being Christian Coptic Orthodox believer but in the absence of any probative evidence he concludes that there is no real chance of being persecuted.

    Accepting the persecution of Christian Coptic orthodox and their systematic and discriminatory conduct and subject of serious harm for the reason of being of Christian Coptic Orthodox faith but come to the conclusion that there is no real chance of persecution. There is no logic in this decision and it is dichotomous in its roots and it is baseless and unfair. An unbiased and fair decision maker will not come to that conclusion have in mind the factual circumstance of the case and in the absence of any contrary probative evidence. This constitutes a breach of procedural fairness.

    Likewise the Second Respondent failed to correct the failure of upholding the procedural fairness and error of the First Respondent while he agrees with the First Respondent in accepting the serious harm, systematic discrimination and persecution of Chritian Coptic Orthodox believers and in particular the claim of the applicants but unfairly affirms his/her decision and makes the same error as the First Respondent and consequently breached the rule of Procedural Fairness.

    The First Respondent refers to Chan v MIEA (1989) 169 CLR 379, 389, 406-7 and 396-8 referring to the test of “real chance” which may be below a 50 per cent chance but not a remote chance, and concludes in the absence of any logical probative evidence the there is no real chance of fear of persecution. This constitutes stipulation and breaches procedural fairness. Further if may constitute Jurisdictional error by not applying the named test correctly considering the accepted factual situation of the applicants claim.

    B. Complementary Protection

    1. Jurisdictional Error

    The First and Second Respondent made jurisdictional error in wrongly applied the test of “real risk of significant harm” guided by the MIAC v SZQRB [2013] FCAFC 33.

    Particulars:

    The First Respondent accepts the harmed claimed by the applicant is significant harm for the purposes of subsection 36(2) (a) of the Migration Act but finds against it concluding no real risk of significant harm base on his on speculations on the future of political and security situation in Egypt while not being expert in that area or being an expert of Egyptian politics and security of Egypt and Middle East but allows himself to predict the future of Egypt. He or she refers to Country report/information which clearly support the applicants claim but find against it.

    The “real risk of significant harm” require logical probative evidence in order to determine the level of risk. The First Respondent determined the level of “real risk of significant harm” in the absence of logical probative evidence. Therefore applying the test wrongly. This constitute jurisdictional error.

    The First Respondent accepted that significant harm, systematic discrimination and persecution of Christian Coptic Orthodox believer in Egypt by radical Muslims particularly Muslim Brotherhood but in his finding he or she stipulated that Muslim Brotherhood currently has no potential or capacity to significantly harm the applicant for the reason of a large number of Muslim Brotherhood being jailed while he or she is not an expert on Muslim Brotherhood and there is no evidence and information to explain or highlight the structure, number of members, MB's current objective and strategies and its capacity for conducting terrorist activities.

    Further the First Respondent ignore the current situation in Middle East and the spread of Daesh and IS in the region and their activities, desire and intention in Middle East and in the Globe. But the First Respondent stipulates a prosper Egypt under the rule of law and democracy where Christian Coptic minority be safe, protected from persecution, harm and systematic discrimination.

    The Second Respondent did not correct the error of the First Respondent and by affirmed his/her decision the Second Respondent made the same error as the First Respondent did by not applying the test correctly. The test of the “real risk of significant harm” which requires logical probative evidence in order to determine the level of risk. The “real risk of significant harm” was determined in the absence of logical probative evidence. Therefore applying the test wrongly. This constitute jurisdictional error.

1. There is no substance in the application. In relation to the issue raised by ground 1, the solicitor for the applicant submitted that the adverse findings in relation to the applicants in the present case, as well as what was said to be a one-side confinement to a particular report or reports, gave rise to a case of apprehended bias. Bias must be clearly alleged and properly proved. I am not satisfied that any case of bias is made out. I accept the force of the propositions advanced by the first respondent that it is rare that a court will find that the decision maker has breached natural justice or an arguable case of apprehended bias simply based on the decision maker’s findings.

2. The reasons in the present case do disclose an intellectual engagement with the applicant’s submissions and the reference to the applicant’s country information. I reject the proposition that the Tribunal engaged in a one-sided selection of material.  It was a matter for the Tribunal to determine what country information it accepted and what weight it gave that country information; see NAHI v The Minister [2004] FCAFC 10 at [11] and [13].

3. Whilst the grounds of the application refer to the first respondent, it is only the conduct of the second respondent that can give rise to any jurisdictional error before this Court.  I do not regard the findings and the country material referred to by the Tribunal as being conduct by reason of which a fair minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the Tribunal might not bring an impartial independent mind to the determination of the matter on its merits.

4. I reject the submission that the Tribunal has engaged in any conduct that identifies a subjective approach to the applicant’s case. It was a matter for the Tribunal to determine what weight to give to the country information before it and to make findings in respect of the applicant’s claims both in respect of protection and complementary protection. The adverse findings by the Tribunal have a logical and rational basis on the evidence before the Tribunal. There is no jurisdictional error made out by ground 1.

5. In relation to ground 2, to the extent that it is put that there was no evidence to support the adverse findings made by the Tribunal, for the reasons I have given, that contention is without substance. It is clear from the Tribunal’s reasons that there was evidence that provided a logically probative basis for the findings made. Ground 2 fails to make out any jurisdictional error.

6. In relation to ground 3, the Tribunal correctly identified the relevant tests to be applied in respect of complementary protection and the authorities concerning a real risk of suffering harm, as identified in s.36(2)(aa) and s.36(2A).

7. The solicitor for the applicant submitted that there had been a speculative approach by the Tribunal in its application of the real risk test.  I reject that submission.  There is nothing in the reasons of the Tribunal referring to real risk that supports the assertion that the Tribunal was going beyond an application of the correct test to the material before the Tribunal.

8. The solicitor for the first respondent identified that the application of that test was one in which the Tribunal relied upon the facts and country information to which it had referred in the adverse determination in respect of the application for protection under ss.36(2)(a) – (b). The reference by the Tribunal to the facts and country information that the Tribunal has accepted does not disclose error in the approach adopted by the Tribunal in applying the complementary protection test.

9. Ground 3 fails to identify any jurisdictional error. At the commencement of the case, the solicitor for the applicants sought to tender two reports, which were marked MFI 1 and 2. Those reports post-dated the Tribunal’s decision and were in Arabic. It was submitted that these reports provided more up-to-date information for the Court to take into account in determining whether there is a jurisdictional error. The statutory review conducted by the Tribunal was conducted on the evidence and material before the Tribunal.

10. Post-dated material is not relevant to and cannot establish a jurisdictional error by seeking to identify other country information. It was in these circumstances that the purported tender was rejected. Further, the purported tender would have required an adjournment for a translation of the documents from Arabic into English. This was a case where orders were made on 21 July 2015 fixing the matter for hearing and providing an opportunity for filing an amended application and submissions and affidavit evidence.

11. I am satisfied that an adjournment for the purpose of translation would have had no utility as the material was not admissible and would have only unnecessarily increased the costs of the parties in circumstances where the proceedings for reasons given are doomed to failure. The solicitor for the applicants also made application from the bar table to adduce evidence from the applicants concerning their fears and their family in relation to the treatment of Coptic Christians in Egypt. This Court does not have jurisdiction to make fresh findings of fact in relation to the fears of the applicants. It was for that reason that the application to adduce fresh evidence in that regard was refused. The application is dismissed.

I certify that the preceding twenty-two (22) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge Street

Associate: 

Date:  24 November 2015