BFW16 v Minister for Home Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BFW16 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 191

Appeal from: BFW16 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2018] FCCA 2371
File number(s): NSD 1674 of 2018
Judge(s): DERRINGTON J
Date of judgment: 27 February 2019
Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from Federal Circuit Court’s refusal to grant Constitutional writ – whether the Tribunal failed to comply with s 424A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – whether “view” formed by tribunal about appellant’s failure to make a particular claim earlier was “information” – appeal dismissed
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth)
Cases cited:

BVE16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 922

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZLFX (2009) 238 CLR 507

MZXBQ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2008) 166 FCR 483

SZBYR v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 81 ALJR 1190

SZTGV v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 229 FCR 90

VAF v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 236 FCR 549

Date of hearing: 21 February 2019
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 23
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr D Godwin
Solicitor for the Appellant: Hodges Legal
Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms N Laing
Solicitor for the First Respondent: DLA Piper

ORDERS

NSD 1674 of 2018
BETWEEN:

BFW16

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

DERRINGTON J

DATE OF ORDER:

27 FEBRUARY 2019

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal is dismissed.

2.The appellant is to pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

DERRINGTON J:

Introduction

  1. This is an appeal from a decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (FCC) delivered on 30 August 2018 which refused an application pursuant to s 476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act) seeking review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the Tribunal) made on 12 May 2016. The Tribunal had affirmed the decision of a delegate of the Minister (the delegate) made on 20 November 2014, to refuse the grant of a protection visa to the appellant.

    Background

  2. The appellant is a citizen of Bangladesh who arrived in Australia on 28 March 2013 as an “unauthorised maritime arrival”.  He was taken into immigration detention and was interviewed by an officer from the Department of Immigration and Border Protection on 11 April 2013.  He was subsequently granted a bridging visa and released from detention.  On 1 July 2013, with the assistance of a registered migration agent, he applied for a protection visa.  In support of his application he provided a statutory declaration dated 6 June 2013 which set out his several claims for protection.  He was interviewed by the delegate on 3 November 2014 and, a week later, he sent to the delegate an email containing additional written submissions.  The…

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Details
Case
[2019] FCA 191
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This case involved an appeal against the Federal Circuit Court’s refusal to grant a Constitutional writ, with the appellant being a citizen of Bangladesh who had applied for a protection visa in Australia. The appeal focused on whether the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the Tribunal) had failed to comply with s 424A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) and whether the view formed by the Tribunal about the appellant’s failure to make a particular claim earlier constituted “information.” The appellant argued that the Tribunal did not properly consider the relevant information under s 424A of the Act and that its reasons did not adequately address the appellant’s claims. The central legal issue was whether the Tribunal's reasons constituted a breach of s 424A, specifically if the Tribunal’s “view” about the appellant’s failure to mention his brother-in-law's threats during an earlier interview amounted to “information” under the Act.

The court examined the principles established in previous cases, confirming that the statutory criterion in s 424A does not apply to the Tribunal’s reasoning process or its published reasons, but rather to specific pieces of evidence that would be the reason, or part of the reason, for affirming the decision under review. The court noted that the Tribunal’s disbelief in the applicant’s evidence due to inconsistencies or implausibilities, or gaps in the evidence, does not constitute “information” under the section. The Tribunal’s evaluative appraisals, thought processes, or determinations are also not considered “information.” The court found that the Tribunal’s reasons sufficiently identified the key issues and provided adequate reasons for its decision, including the inconsistency in the appellant’s claims and the lack of credible evidence supporting his claims of threats and harassment. The court concluded that the Tribunal’s reasons did not breach s 424A of the Act and dismissed the appeal.

The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal. The court held that the Tribunal had properly considered the relevant information and provided adequate reasons for its decision, which aligned with the statutory requirements under s 424A of the Act.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal is dismissed.

2. The appellant is to pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

This is an appeal from a decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (FCC) delivered on 30 August 2018 which refused an application pursuant to s 476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act) seeking review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the Tribunal) made on 12 May 2016. The Tribunal had affirmed the decision of a delegate of the Minister (the delegate) made on 20 November 2014, to refuse the grant of a protection visa to the appellant.Background The appellant is a citizen of Bangladesh who arrived in Australia on 28 March 2013 as an “unauthorised maritime arrival”. He was taken into immigration detention and was interviewed by an officer from the Department of Immigration and Border Protection on 11 April 2013. He was subsequently granted a bridging visa and released from detention. On 1 July 2013, with the assistance of a registered migration agent, he applied for a protection visa. In support of his application he provided a statutory declaration dated 6 June 2013 which set out his several claims for protection. He was interviewed by the delegate on 3 November 2014 and, a week later, he sent to the delegate an email containing additional written submissions. The delegate refused the application for a visa on 20 November 2014. On 10 December 2014, the appellant applied to the Tribunal for a review of the delegate’s decision. A hearing occurred before the Tribunal on 27 April 2016 at which the appellant attended and he gave oral evidence. Subsequent to the hearing he provided further written submissions in support of his claims. On 12 May 2016, the Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision. Before the Tribunal the appellant advanced his claim for a protection visa on 3 bases. First he claimed that because of his religious practice of Tabligh Jamaat (TJ), which involves wearing conservative Islamic dress, he received threats and harassment. He said he was mistakenly taken by members of the Awami League to be a follow of Jamaat-e-Islami (JI). Secondly, he claimed that he had an imputed political opinion in opposition to the Bangladesh Government because of his religious practice and dress. Thirdly, he claimed his brother-in-law threatened him over a dispute about a dowry and custody of his sister’s children. He claimed that his brother-in-law was strongly backed by the Awami League. Whilst the Tribunal accepted the appellant was a follower of TJ, wore conservative Islamic dress and that he had a custody and dowry dispute with his former brother-in-law, it rejected the suggestion that he faced harassment or threats because of his religion, imputed political opinion, or for any other reason. In its reasons it identified at length its concerns about the vagueness of his evidence concerning the difficulties he faced in his home village and the lack of details of the alleged threats which he said caused him to leave Bangladesh. It also noted that he had provided a number of inconsistent statements about the difficulties he faced as a member of TJ and as a perceived follower of JI. In considering the inconsistency of the claims the Tribunal recorded in its reasons its concern as to the omission by the appellant, during his interview with the Department, to raise until prompted any difficulties which he had with his brother-in-law. At [47] the Tribunal records:Also, at the Department interview after describing the difficulties he faced by members of the Awami League, he was asked apart from those groups whether he faced any trouble from anyone else in Bangladesh and he said no. He only mentioned the difficulties he faced from his brother-in-law when directly asked, then described in detail the dispute with his sister over the dowry and their child and then mentioned that he was targeted by him because of his recent practice of Tabligh and as his brother-in-law is associated with the Awami League. The Tribunal is of the view if the applicant's brother-in-law had threatened him with death either directly or indirectly as is his claim because of his association with Tabligh or because of the difficulty with his sister or he feared return because of his brother-in-law for any reason that he would have raised that without being prompted. This adds to the finding that the applicant was not targeted in Bangladesh by his brother-in-law or through his family either before or after he left Bangladesh, directly or indirectly. It adds to the finding that he is not credible as to facing the difficulties he claims in Bangladesh and the reasons he departed.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Whether the Tribunal failed to comply with s 424A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth).
2. Whether the “view” formed by the Tribunal about the appellant’s failure to make a particular claim earlier was “information” for the purposes of s 424A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth).

Held
1. The court held that the Tribunal did not fail to comply with s 424A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth).
2. The court held that the “view” formed by the Tribunal about the appellant’s failure to make a particular claim earlier was not “information” for the purposes of s 424A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth).

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Minister submits that the “information” in question was the appellant’s response to the question posed to him by the delegate and that was not something that, on its terms, was a rejection, denial or undermining of his claims. He submits that the Tribunal’s reasons makes it clear that it relied upon the following chain of reasoning:(a)a consideration of what had been said earlier in the protection interview;(b)the “view” that, if his claims were true, he would have raised them earlier without being directly prompted; and(c)a deduction that because it was not raised without prompting, the account was false.Consideration For present purposes attention needs to be directed to s 424A(1) of the Act which provides:(1) Subject to subsections (2A) and (3), the Tribunal must:(a)give to the applicant, in the way that the Tribunal considers appropriate in the circumstances, clear particulars of any information that the Tribunal considers would be the reason, or a part of the reason, for affirming the decision that is under review; and(b)ensure, as far as is reasonably practicable, that the applicant understands why it is relevant to the review, and the consequences of it being relied on in affirming the decision that is under review; and(c) invite the applicant to comment on or respond to it. There is no need to analyse the authorities which have considered the operation of s 424A in recent years. That has been recently done by Gleeson J in BVE16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 922. I am grateful for her Honour’s analysis and I am able to summarise, albeit without citation of all of the relevant authorities, some of the relevant principles which her Honour identified:(a)The statutory criterion does not operate upon “the reasoning process of the Tribunal” or its published reasons: SZBYR [17].(b)The “reason” for affirming a decision under review is dependent upon the statutory criteria for making the decision the first place. Consideration needs to be given to the ultimate determination being, in this case, whether the appellant was a person to whom Australia owed protection obligations under the Convention: SZBYR [17]. (c)Individual pieces of evidence which, of themselves, are a mere step in the evaluative process are unlikely to constitute “the reason, or part of a reason, for affirming a decision under review”. Such pieces of evidence do not contain, in their terms, a rejection, denial or undermining of the applicant’s claim to be persons to whom Australia owes protection obligations: SZBYR [17]. (d)The Tribunal’s mere disbelief of an applicant’s evidence arising from inconsistencies or implausibilities is most unlikely to be capable of being characterised as “information”: SZBYR [18]. (e)Similarly, even if the evaluative view of the applicant’s evidence showed it was insufficient to establish a Convention nexus, it is difficult to see how that insufficiency in the mind of the Tribunal constitutes “information”: SZBYR [18]. (f)The Tribunal’s subjective evaluative appraisals, being thought processes or determinations, are not information: VAF v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 236 FCR 549 at 555.(g)Similarly, identified gaps in the evidence before the Tribunal, or defects or lack of detail or specificity in evidence is not “information” for the purposes of s 424A. Further, conclusions arrived at by the Tribunal in its evaluative task of weighing up the evidence by reference to such defects or gaps is not information: SZBYR [18]. (h)The contextual elements of s 424A show that the concept of “information” is directed towards evidentiary material or documentation which adversely affects the claim in a significant and substantial manner, in the sense of it being the reason, or part of the reason, for its conclusion. Generally, the Court must assess the information in the context of its “dispositive relevance” to the claims being advanced: MZXBQ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2008) 166 FCR 483 (MZXBQ), [27]. (i)Necessarily, the above considerations point inexorably to the conclusion that material going merely to credibility is not within the section. The lack of credibility does not involve a rejection, denial or undermining of the applicant’s claim: MZXBQ [29]. (j)The “dispositive relevance” of information must reach the level that it “would”, not “could” or “might”, be the reason or part of the reason for affirming the decision under review: Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZLFX (2009) 238 CLR 507, [25].