Beverland v The State of Western Australia
[2009] WASCA 2
•12 JANUARY 2009
JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
TITLE OF COURT : THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA)
CITATION: BEVERLAND -v- THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA [2009] WASCA 2
CORAM: McLURE JA
BUSS JA
MILLER JA
HEARD: 16 DECEMBER 2008
DELIVERED : 12 JANUARY 2009
FILE NO/S: CACR 56 of 2008
BETWEEN: RAYMOND JAMES BEVERLAND
Appellant
AND
THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Respondent
ON APPEAL FROM:
Jurisdiction : DISTRICT COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Coram :MARTINO DCJ
File No :IND 1590 of 2006
Catchwords:
Criminal law - Possession of methylamphetamine with intent to sell or supply to another - Evidence of commission of other offences - Offences contemporaneous with offence charged - Whether admissible evidence - Whether 'propensity' evidence - Evidence Act 1906 (WA) s 31A - Adequacy of judge's direction to jury
Evidence - Charge of possession with intent to sell or supply - Admissibility of contemporaneous drug dealing - Whether 'propensity' evidence - Evidence Act 1906 (WA) s 31A
Legislation:
Evidence Act 1906 (WA), s 31A, s 32
Misuse of Drugs Act 1981 (WA), s 6(1)(a), s 6(1)(c)
Result:
Appeal dismissed
Category: B
Representation:
Counsel:
Appellant: Mr R E Lindsay
Respondent: Mr J Mactaggart
Solicitors:
Appellant: Thames Legal
Respondent: Director of Public Prosecutions (WA)
Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):
Harriman v The Queen (1989) 167 CLR 590
Noto v The State of Western Australia [2006] WASCA 278; (2006) 168 A Crim R 457
R v Hiller [2007] HCA 13; (2007) 228 CLR 618
Shepherd v The Queen (1990) 170 CLR 573
Smith v The Queen [2001] HCA 50; (2001) 206 CLR 650
McLURE JA: I agree with Miller JA that the appeal should be dismissed. When evidence is admissible for one purpose but inadmissible for another purpose, it is ordinarily necessary to give a direction that the evidence not be used for the inadmissible purpose. If evidence is not admissible to prove propensity, a direction not to use the evidence for that purpose would usually be required. No such direction was required in this case. The evidence was relevant and admissible for many purposes, including propensity. The facts of this case are relevantly on all fours with that in Noto v The State of Western Australia (2006) 168 A Crim R 457 and Harriman v The Queen (1989) 167 CLR 590.
BUSS JA: I agree with Miller JA that the appeal should be dismissed. I also agree with the additional observations of McLure JA.
MILLER JA: The appellant was charged on indictment with the commission of four offences against the provisions of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1981 (WA). Count 1 alleged that, on 30 March 2006, at Perth he offered to sell or supply a prohibited drug, namely cannabis, to another. This was an offence against s 6(1)(c) of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1981. Count 2 alleged that, on 4 April 2006, at Ascot the appellant had in his possession a prohibited drug, namely methylamphetamine, with intent to sell or supply it to another. This was an offence against s 6(1)(a) of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1981. Count 3 alleged that, on 4 April 2006, at Ascot the appellant had in his possession a prohibited drug, namely a quantity of methylamphetamine, with intent to sell or supply it to another. This was also an offence against s 6(1)(a) of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1981. Count 4 alleged that, on 4 April 2006, at Ascot the appellant had in his possession a prohibited drug, namely heroin, with intent to sell or supply it to another. This also was an offence against s 6(1)(a) of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1981.
The appellant was arraigned before the trial judge in the District Court at Perth on 4 February 2008. He pleaded guilty to counts 1, 3 and 4 on the indictment, but not guilty to count 2. Judgments of conviction were entered in relation to counts 1, 3 and 4 and the appellant was remanded in custody until the following day.
On 5 February 2008, the appellant was tried on an indictment which contained only count 2. It was described as a 'dummy indictment'. He was convicted by verdict of the jury on that count. He now appeals by leave on a single ground, namely that the trial judge failed to adequately direct the jury on the evidence of the appellant's past criminal conduct.
The particulars to the ground contend that the trial judge failed to direct the jury about the distinction between propensity and prejudice arising from previous conduct, failed to identify and elicit what was distinctive about the propensity evidence and failed to direct the jury that the facts of the previous conduct were markedly different from the evidence at trial.
The course of the trial
At the outset of the appellant's trial, his counsel advised that admissions would be made. At the conclusion of the prosecutor's opening, his counsel made formal admissions pursuant to the provisions of s 32 of the Evidence Act1906. That section reads:
32. Admissions by accused persons in criminal
An accused person, either personally or by his counsel or solicitor, in his presence, may admit on his trial any fact alleged or sought to be proved against him, and such admission shall be sufficient proof of the fact without other evidence.
Counsel said:
These admissions are as follows: on 4 April 2006 at Ascot Raymond James Beverland - that's the accused - had on his person in a sunglass case a quantity of methylamphetamine with intent to sell or supply it to another. The second admission is as follows: on 4 April 2006 at Ascot Raymond James Beverland had on his person in a sunglass case heroin with intent to sell or supply it to another.
The prosecution case
The prosecution case was that, on 4 April 2006, the appellant was staying at the Ascot Inn. He was alleged on that day to have been in possession of 47.75 g of methylamphetamine which was found in a black bag on the ground beneath his white Mitsubishi van. This van was parked in the carpark of the Ascot Inn. The prosecution case was that, at the time the appellant was apprehended in possession of the black bag, he was in possession of another quantity of methylamphetamine. This amounted to 9.23 g found in a sunglasses case in his jeans pocket. In the same case, there were 3.44 g of low purity heroin.
The prosecution also relied on the fact that inside the appellant's motel room at the Ascot Inn, there was drug paraphernalia consistent with his being a dealer in drugs. There were clipseal bags and two sets of scales. One was a set of electronic scales. Also found was a substance known as dimethylsulfone, which was alleged to be for the purpose of mixing with drugs to increase the volume of the drug, but to reduce its purity.
The prosecution alleged that the appellant was apprehended on the evening of 4 April 2006 standing next to his white Mitsubishi van in the Ascot Inn carpark. The sliding door of the van was open and beneath the van, just where the appellant was standing, was a black bag, and next to it a mobile telephone. The black bag contained various items, including a white plastic spoon which was alleged to be a piece of paraphernalia commonly used by drug dealers, and a number of clipseal bags containing different quantities of methylamphetamine. Other items in the bag included a deodorant roll‑on stick and cameras. These latter items were analysed for fingerprint or forensic evidence, but nothing was obtained from them. Two hairs were found on the black bag and they were analysed for DNA. No DNA was retrievable from them.
Police established that the motor vehicle beside which the appellant was standing was registered in his name. The appellant was interviewed. He answered some questions, but declined to answer others. He said, in relation to the clipseal bags, that he had them for the purpose of storing screws for his laptop computers. He said that the scales were for kitchen use.
The evidence
Detective Sergeant Alan John Bavich (Det Sgt Bavich) testified that he went to the Ascot Inn in Epsom Avenue, Belmont, on the evening of 4 April 2006. He arrived at about 9 pm and met Detective Sergeant Stjepic (Det Sgt Stjepic). He then went to a room near the rear carpark of the Ascot Inn from which he could observe the carpark. He had under observation a white‑coloured Mitsubishi van, parked in the rear corner up against a wall. He described it as an 'express type van, a commercial type van'. Its registration number was 1BST 693. Det Sgt Bavich observed that the van was reversed into a bay so that the front of it was facing back towards the manager's office. It was already parked when he observed it.
Det Sgt Bavich left the room from which he was making observations and began to walk through the carpark. As he did so, he saw a person at the side of the van. He walked past the van and then walked back in the direction from which he had come. He saw that the person by the van was a male and he saw that the van had a sliding door. The door was open and the person was looking into the van.
Det Sgt Bavich began to walk towards the van. He described what then happened in the following terms:
And then what happened?‑‑‑I had my eye on the person I was looking at through the windows to the van. As I was walking towards the van I saw that person bob down and move towards what I thought was the rear of the van. It was sort of a bob down and move motion. I actually thought that person was going to run. From there I ran around the back of the van thinking he was going to take off. I ran around the back of the van and I saw that he was still standing at the side of the van. I then approached him.
Did you go between the van and the brick wall yourself?‑‑‑Yes.
And approached him?‑‑‑That's where I approached him, still standing at the side of the van here between the brick wall and the van.
Are you able to tell me anything about the sliding door at that time?‑‑‑The sliding door was open.
What did you do when you approached this person?‑‑‑I apprehended him. I grabbed him and moved him to the front of the van.
Det Sgt Bavich identified the person whom he apprehended as the appellant. He said that he searched the appellant and found in the front of his jeans pockets a soft sunglasses case. This had clipseal bags inside it. Within those bags was what Det Sgt Bavich believed was drugs. There were white crystals in the bags.
Detective Senior Constable Corey Henricus Andrew Dalton (Det Dalton) testified that, on 3 April 2006, he executed a search warrant at the Ascot Inn. He went to room 7 and with other officers conducted a search of that room. He located a set of purple plastic scales, on which there was a white crystal substance which was sent for analysis. He found two mobile telephones in the drawer of a dresser and he took possession of them. Also in that dresser, he located a clipseal bag containing a white crystal substance. There was another clipseal bag with a white crystal substance found inside a kettle on a bench. Both items were sent for analysis.
A glass tube was located on the dresser table in the bedroom. It contained a white crystal substance. It, too, was sent for analysis. A set of small electronic scales was located in a drawer. Several small clipseal bags were also found in a drawer.
On 4 April 2006, Det Dalton returned to the Ascot Inn. He located himself in a darkened street nearby. As a result of information he was given, he went to the carpark near room 7. He went to the side of a van, where he observed Det Sgt Bavich and the appellant. He inspected the van and he found underneath it on the left‑hand side near an open sliding door a black bag and a mobile telephone. He took possession of these and moved them to the front of the van near the appellant.
Det Sgt Stjepic gave evidence that he attended at the Ascot Inn late on the afternoon of 3 April 2006 and participated in a search of room 7. He returned on 4 April 2006, shortly after 7 pm, and carried out observations from room 6. From this room, he had a view across the carpark. He took a walk through the carpark to ascertain the best position to conduct surveillance of it. At the time he walked through, there was no vehicle in the bay next to the wall. Later, he saw a vehicle come into the bay. It was a white van and it was reversed into the bay next to the wall. A male person alighted from the vehicle. He fitted the description of the appellant. Det Sgt Stjepic contacted Det Sgt Bavich. He was then approximately 20 to 30 minutes away from the Ascot Inn. Det Sgt Stjepic continued surveillance, but lost sight of the man he had seen. He was not sure where he had gone. Det Sgt Bavich then took over from Det Sgt Stjepic and Det Sgt Stjepic left the area and met other officers a short distance away. He remained there until contacted by Det Sgt Bavich. He then returned and observed that the appellant had been arrested. Det Sgt Stjepic said that he had no dealings with the appellant. He did not tell him to drop anything. Det Sgt Stjepic said that he had walked through the area before the van reversed into the bay and there was no bag in that location.
Laurance Grant Webb, a senior forensic scientist, testified that he had examined hairs to ascertain whether any DNA profile could be found from them. No DNA profile could be recovered. He also examined a sunglasses case for DNA. He found a mixture of DNA profiles on the case, the major component of which matched a reference sample taken from the appellant.
Evidence of the appellant
The appellant gave evidence that he moved into the Ascot Inn in April 2006 because of a falling‑out with a girlfriend. He denied that a bag found under his van in the Ascot Inn carpark on 4 April 2006 belonged to him. He said he had never seen the bag before. He denied that the contents of the bag belonged to him.
The appellant said in evidence that, in April 2006, he used drugs and, in particular, methylamphetamine. He said that some days he used up to a gram of the drug.
The appellant testified that on the evening of 4 April, he had gone to his ex‑girlfriend's house to get his van. He drove it to the Ascot Inn and reversed it into a car bay. He then looked for his wallet. He described the search for his wallet as follows:
Where were you looking for your wallet?‑‑‑In the centre console of my van. When we were trying to fix the van, we had to lift the seats up because the engine's straight underneath the front seat. I thought it might have been on - in there and when we pulled the seat it would have falled [sic] down into the back so I was looking in the back of the van for it and that's when I was apprehended by the police.
When you say you were looking behind the seat. Is that what you said?‑‑‑Yes.
How were you looking behind the seat in the van? How were you accessing that?‑‑‑Through a sliding door on the side of the van.
The appellant said that he did not notice a black bag under his van. He said that, whilst he was looking for his wallet, he had a mobile telephone in his hand. He identified, as his telephone, the telephone which had been seized by police in the carpark.
The appellant said that, whilst looking for his wallet, he was arrested by police. He described the circumstances of the arrest as follows:
... The policeman come [sic] from behind the van and he asked if I was Raymond James Beverland and he just, like - he told me to drop - I had my phone in my hand and he told me to drop the phone.
Did you do that?---Yes, I did that straightaway.
The appellant admitted that police discovered a grey sunglasses case with amphetamine in it in the pocket of his jeans. He said that he then co‑operated with the police.
The appellant was cross‑examined about dealing in drugs. The following are extracts from that cross‑examination:
SCHOLZ, MR: In early April 2006, you were dealing drugs, weren't you?‑‑‑Yes.
You were dealing amphetamine. Sorry, you are going to have to say a word; you can't just shake your head?‑‑‑Yes.
You were also dealing in heroin?‑‑‑No.
...
SCHOLZ, MR: Through your lawyer, at the beginning of this trial, you admitted to this jury that you were in possession of heroin with intent to sell or supply, didn't you?‑‑‑Yes, but I did not believe it to be heroin.
And, as you have acknowledged, you were in possession of methylamphetamine with intent to sell or supply, and in total that was about slightly more than nine grams, wasn't it?‑‑‑Yes.
In fact, a number of the clipseal bags that you had in the sunglasses case were in the point bag form that we have heard some expert evidence from the policemen about, weren't they? One of them was .1 of a gram of powder in a clipseal bag. Do you remember that?‑‑‑No.
You had small quantities of the drug in the smaller clipseal bags, didn't you?‑‑‑I'm not - I had quantities of amphetamine in the bags, yes.
You had one large quantity; about eight point‑odd grams of methylamphetamine, and then you had some smaller bags in the sunglass case, didn't you?‑‑‑Yeah, I can't remember, sorry.
You can't remember?‑‑‑I just remember that I had a quantity of amphetamine on me, sorry.
And that's how you were making your money at that time, wasn't it, by selling drugs?‑‑‑Yeah.
The appellant admitted that he was paying rent for his room at the Ascot Inn and for the cost of other 'necessaries' with money he got from dealing in drugs. He said he did not know why there was dimethylsulfone in his room. He did not believe that he was using this to cut drugs. He admitted, however, that he had electronic scales for the purpose of weighing up and measuring drugs. He admitted that the clipseal bags in his room were to package quantities of drugs that he was selling. He admitted that, when he told police he had the clipseal bags for screws for his laptop, he had lied.
When cross‑examined about searching for his wallet, the appellant said:
But you didn't find your wallet?‑‑‑No.
And how long were you looking in your van for, do you say?‑‑‑I don't know. Roughly nine minutes or so.
In the dark?‑‑‑Yeah.
Could you see inside your van?‑‑‑Not really. I was just feeling around for it.
Feeling around for it?‑‑‑Yeah.
What you were really feeling around for or handling was the black bag, wasn't it?‑‑‑No.
Ground of appeal
The appellant's ground of appeal complains that the trial judge failed to adequately direct the jury in relation to evidence of 'the appellant's past criminal conduct'.
The ground is predicated on an understanding that evidence of the appellant's drug dealing activities constituted propensity evidence within the meaning of s 31A of the Evidence Act1906. Propensity evidence is defined in s 31A(1) to include 'similar fact evidence or other evidence of the conduct of the accused person'. It also includes evidence of the character or reputation of the accused person or of a tendency that the accused person has or had.
Propensity evidence is admitted under s 31A(2) if, either by itself or having regard to other evidence, it has significant probative value and that probative value compared to the degree of risk of an unfair trial is such that fair‑minded people would think that the public interest in adducing all relevant evidence of guilt must have priority over the risk of an unfair trial.
In the present case, there was no question about the admissibility of the evidence of the appellant's dealing in drugs. The appellant's counsel made formal admissions to that effect and the appellant himself admitted to it in his evidence.
The trial judge adverted to the issue of propensity evidence on the day prior to the trial, but there was no further reference to the question of admissibility of the evidence of the appellant's drug dealing. This was not surprising, as the appellant's drug dealing was admitted.
I would accept that the evidence constituted propensity evidence in the sense of 'other evidence of the conduct of the accused person' within the meaning of the definition in s 31A(1)(a) of the Evidence Act1906. It was also evidence of a 'tendency that the [appellant] had'. However, the evidence was also admissible under a number of other heads. It was relevant evidence because it related to the appellant's activities immediately prior to and on the day of his arrest in relation to the offence constituted by count 2 on the indictment. It was admissible evidence because counsel for the appellant made formal admissions about it and the appellant gave evidence about it.
Some general principles in relation to the admissibility of evidence are contained within the judgment of Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ in Smith v The Queen [2001] HCA 50; (2001) 206 CLR 650 at [6] ‑ [7]:
… Evidence is relevant or it is not. If the evidence is not relevant, no further question arises about its admissibility. Irrelevant evidence may not be received. Only if the evidence is relevant do questions about its admissibility arise. These propositions are fundamental to the law of evidence and well settled. They reflect two axioms propounded by Thayer and adopted by Wigmore [21]:
'None but facts having rational probative value are admissible,'
and
'All facts having rational probative value are admissible, unless some specific rule forbids."
In determining relevance, it is fundamentally important to identify what are the issues at the trial. On a criminal trial the ultimate issues will be expressed in terms of the elements of the offence with which the accused stands charged. They will, therefore, be issues about the facts which constitute those elements. Behind those ultimate issues there will often be many issues about facts relevant to facts in issue ... (References excluded)
In Palmer v The Queen (1998) 193 CLR 1, McHugh J at [55] said:
... a distinction exists between what is relevant [54] and what is admissible. In general, evidence of a relevant fact is excluded only when it infringes some policy of the law, one of which (even in civil cases) is that evidence of a relevant fact is not admissible if the probative value of that fact is so low that it cannot justify the time, convenience and cost of litigating its proof [see Evidence Act 1958 (Vict), s 37(b)]. If evidence going to credibility has real probative value with respect to the facts-in-issue, however, it ought not to be excluded unless the time, convenience and cost of litigating the issue that it raises is disproportionate to the light that it throws on the facts‑in‑issue.
McHugh J (in footnote 54) said:
I use relevant in the sense explained by Sir James Stephen in his Digest of the Law of Evidence, 5th ed (1887) art 1, p 2: 'The word "relevant" means that any two facts to which it is applied are so related to each other that according to the common course of events one either taken by itself or in connection with other facts proves or renders probable the past, present, or future existence or non-existence of the other.'
These fundamental principles have direct application to the present case. Whilst evidence of the appellant's behaviour on the day prior to and on the day of the alleged offence may have constituted propensity evidence, that evidence was also relevant and admissible evidence because it rendered probable the appellant's possession of the black bag which was found underneath the van.
The case against the appellant was a circumstantial one. The case was based upon a number of circumstances. They included:
(a)the fact that the appellant was dealing in drugs (methylamphetamine and heroin) at or about the time the black bag containing methylamphetamine was found underneath his van;
(b)the fact that the appellant had methylamphetamine and heroin in his possession (in his pockets) at the very time when the black bag was found beneath his van;
(c)the fact that there was evidence of drug dealing within the room he occupied at the Ascot Inn;
(d)the fact that there had been no black bag on the ground in the carpark before the appellant's van reversed into the car bay;
(e)the fact that the appellant was leaning into his van through an open door immediately prior to the time at which the black bag and his mobile telephone were found beneath the van at that location; and
(e)the fact that, when seen by Det Sgt Bavich, the appellant at first bobbed down behind the van.
Circumstantial evidence was described in Shepherd v The Queen (1990) 170 CLR 573 by Dawson J at 579 in the following terms:
Circumstantial evidence is evidence of a basic fact or facts from which the jury is asked to infer a further fact or facts. It is traditionally contrasted with direct or testimonial evidence, which is the evidence of a person who witnessed the event sought to be proved. The inference which the jury may actually be asked to make in a case turning upon circumstantial evidence may simply be that of the guilt of the accused. However, in most, if not all, cases, that ultimate inference must be drawn from some intermediate factual conclusion, whether identified expressly or not. Proof of an intermediate fact will depend upon the evidence, usually a body of individual items of evidence, and it may itself be a matter of inference. More than one intermediate fact may be identifiable; indeed the number will depend to some extent upon how minutely the elements of the crime in question are dissected, bearing in mind that the ultimate burden which lies upon the prosecution is the proof of those elements.
The present case was a classic case of the application of these principles. The facts in combination were relied upon by the prosecution to establish the guilt of the appellant: R v Hiller [2007] HCA 13; (2007) 228 CLR 618 per Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ at [46] et seq.
The trial judge's direction
The trial judge told the jury that the prosecution case was based upon the circumstantial evidence and relied upon a number of circumstances. He said:
In this case, the state submits that you can draw the inference that Mr Beverland put the bag on the ground under his van and that he knew it contained drugs from evidence, such as the evidence the drugs were worth a lot of money. The evidence that Mr Beverland was dealing in methylamphetamines at the time. That he possessed in his room scales for measuring drugs. That cutting agent was also found in his room and that his phone was found near the bag. The state submits to you that from all the evidence, the only inference reasonably available is that of guilt.
The trial judge described the defence case in the following way:
On the other hand, Ms in de Braekt has submitted to you that those inferences are not the only inference reasonably available and she has pointed to evidence that there was nothing odd or in the bag to identify it as belonging to Mr Beverland, that the bag did not fit him, that the hairs on the bag were not his apparently - in the sense that they were entirely nature [sic], they were different colour and different length - and that the carpark was not a secure area. It was accessible to the public and the fact that Mr Beverland had only $200 on him.
The trial judge told the jury that, before they could find the appellant guilty, the evidence against him would have to be inconsistent with any reasonable conclusion other than guilt. He made reference to the evidence of the appellant's drug dealing in the following way:
As you have heard, Mr Beverland admitted that on 4 April he had in his possession in his sunglasses case drugs with intention to sell or supply to another and you have also heard evidence that he had in his possession in the hotel room, items used for drug dealing such as the electronic scales and the clipseal bags.
That evidence is relevant in this case. As I have explained to you, it is relevant to determine whether the inference of guilt of this charge is the only inference reasonably available. But of course you must remember that your task in this trial is to decide whether or not the state has proved beyond reasonable doubt that Mr Beverland had in his possession the drugs in the black bag that was found under his van. It does not follow automatically that because he was in possession of the drugs in the sunglasses case, he was also in possession of the drugs in the black bag.
It is this last direction which is challenged by the ground of appeal.
I am unable to accept that the trial judge was required to direct the jury about the distinction between propensity and prejudice arising from the appellant's previous conduct. In my opinion, no direction in relation to propensity evidence was called for.
Even if the evidence of the appellant's drug dealing is taken to be propensity evidence, no 'propensity warning' was called for in this case. That is made clear in Noto v The State of Western Australia [2006] WASCA 278; (2006) 168 A Crim R 457 by McLure JA (Steytler P and Wheeler JA concurring):
Propensity evidence is admissible in this State if it satisfies the requirements of s 31A(2) of the Evidence Act.
When propensity evidence as such is admissible because it is sufficiently highly probative of a fact in issue, a propensity warning is not required. As stated by McHugh J in KRM v The Queen (supra) at 235:
'If evidence tendered to prove a subsidiary issue (including the relationship between the parties) reveals the criminal or discreditable conduct of the accused, the judge will often, but not always, have to give a propensity warning. … And if evidence has been admitted generally as propensity evidence, it is difficult to see how a propensity direction is ever required. In that class of case, the evidence is tendered to prove that the accused is the type of person who is likely to have committed the crime with which he or she is charged. To require a propensity direction would contradict the basis on which the propensity evidence is admitted. And that is so, whether the propensity evidence consists of uncharged acts or evidence supporting the charge in one count that is also relevant to charges in other counts in the presentment.'
If the evidence of the appellant's uncharged acts was admitted and relied on at trial as propensity evidence, a propensity warning was not required. [26] ‑ [28]
In the present case, the trial judge told the jury that it did not follow automatically that because the appellant was in possession of the drugs in the sunglasses case (and he might have said because of his drug dealing generally) he was also in possession of the drugs found in the black bag beneath his van. In my opinion, this was an adequate direction.
I can find no substance in the ground of appeal and I would dismiss it.
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