Best v Police
[2015] SASC 190
•3 December 2015
SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Magistrates Appeals: Criminal)
BEST v POLICE
[2015] SASC 190
Judgment of The Honourable Justice Bampton
3 December 2015
MAGISTRATES - APPEAL AND REVIEW - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - APPEAL TO SUPREME COURT - GROUNDS - CONVICTION ON EX PARTE HEARING
TRAFFIC LAW - OFFENCES - PARTICULAR OFFENCES - EXCEEDING PRESCRIBED SPEED LIMITS - GENERALLY
TRAFFIC LAW - OFFENCES - EVIDENCE - PROOF OF SPEED
Appeal against decision of a Magistrate - appellant convicted in his absence of driving at 113 km per hour on a road where the speed limit was 100 km per hour – appellant contends the trial should have been moved to accommodate his schedule and to a Court of competent jurisdiction, that the device used to detect his speed did not comply with the National Measurement Act 1960 (Cth), that under common law he has not hurt or caused any loss or injury, and that he was entitled to a trial by jury – whether the Magistrate erred in proceeding to hear the trial ex-parte – whether Magistrates Court has jurisdiction to hear the matter – whether the certificates tendered were valid and whether they needed to comply with the National Measurement Act – where appellant failed to attend trial.
Held:
1. Magistrates Court had jurisdiction – offence was a summary offence.
2. No error of the Magistrate was demonstrated.
3. Appeal dismissed.
Australian Road Rules r 20, r 21; Summary Procedure Act 1921 (SA) s 5, s 49, s 57, s 62BA; Road Traffic Act 1961 (SA) s 53A, s 79B, s 175A, s 175(3)(ba), s 175(3)(b); National Measurement Act 1960 (Cth) s 10; Road Traffic (Miscellaneous) Regulations 2014 (SA) reg 30, reg 27; Australian Constitution s 80, s 109, referred to.
Police v Young (2012) 114 SASR 567, applied.
Flavel v Van Reesema [2005] SASC 418; Moran v Police [2010] SASC 269; Millington v Police [2015] SASC 52; Anastasiou v Police [2013] SASC 112; Kuipers-Lloyd v Police [2013] SASC 137, considered.
BEST v POLICE
[2015] SASC 190Magistrates Appeal: Criminal
BAMPTON J.
Mr Best appeals against a conviction for speeding recorded in the Clare Magistrates Court on 8 September 2015.
At the hearing on 25 November 2015, I dismissed the appeal as no error had been demonstrated and there was no merit to the appeal. These are my reasons.
Background
On 26 August 2014 Mr Best was stopped by a motorcycle traffic officer performing mobile radar duties on Traeger Road at Pinery and issued with an expiation notice for an alleged breach of the Australian Road Rules.
The officer had, by means of a mobile radar, detected Mr Best traveling at 113 km per hour on a length of Traeger Road governed by a speed limit of 100 km per hour.
Mr Best elected to be prosecuted for the alleged breach. Accordingly by Complaint and Summons dated 5 November 2014 (the Complaint), issued pursuant to s 49 and s 57 of the Summary Procedure Act 1921 (SA), Mr Best was charged:
On the 26th day of August, 2014 at PINERY in the said State drove a vehicle namely a MOTOR VEHICLES SA REG NO WPD-427 on a length of road namely TRAEGER ROAD, to which a speed limit sign applied to you pursuant to rule 21(1) of the Australian Road Rules, over the speed limit of 100 kilometres per hour as indicated on the speed limit sign which was on the said road. Rule 20 of the Australian Road Rules. It is further alleged you were driving at a speed of about 113 kilometres per hour. This is a summary offence.
Mr Best was, by reference to the proof of service endorsed on the Complaint, served personally on 7 January 2015. Under the heading “Important Notice to Defendant” the Complaint warned that:
If you fail to appear on the hearing date set out below or on any day to which this matter is adjourned the Court may:-
● proceed in your absence or
● issue a warrant for your arrest.
The Complaint also notified that the matter would be heard on 2 February 2015 at 11.30 am at the Clare Magistrates Court.
In order to understand the history to this matter it is necessary to have regard to Mr Best’s correspondence with the Court and the seven hearings held in the matter.
Mr Best’s correspondence with the Court
As the Clare Court is a Circuit Court its business is conducted by a visiting Magistrate on Mondays. Until July this year the Tanunda Magistrates Court Registry was the relevant registry for the Clare Court. Following the restructuring of the Magistrates Court and the closure of the Tanunda Court Registry, the Adelaide Magistrates Court Registry became responsible for the Clare Circuit Court.
By email dated 7 January 2015 Mr Best wrote to the Registrar of the Tanunda Court saying he “would like to adjourn the matter to a Wednesday or Thursday as I work away and I am not available on other days I plead not guilty”.
On 12 January 2015 Mr Best was advised by the Tanunda Court Registry that:
Your email has been printed and placed on the file for 2nd Feb 2015. Unfortunately Clare sittings are only on Monday’s and there are no sittings on a Wednesday or Thursday of that week. You should be advised of the outcome of Court.
Mr Best did not attend the hearing at Clare on 2 February 2015. By letter dated 3 February 2015 the Registrar of the Magistrates Court notified Mr Best that his matter had been adjourned until 2 March 2015 at 2.00 pm for a pre-trial conference. The letter also stated “please note that this matter must be listed on a Monday if you do not appear the matter may be dealt with in your absence. Defendant to write to prosecution and attempt to negotiate the matter”.
By email dated 11 February 2015 Mr Best asked that the matter be transferred to the Elizabeth Magistrates Court as he worked on Mondays and Tuesdays. He said he worked away as a truck driver and he would lose a week’s pay if he attended on a Monday or Tuesday. He stated he was entitled to his day in court and that if his request for transfer to the Elizabeth Magistrates Court was not acceded to he requested the matter be “determined by a court of competent jurisdiction a court that conforms to chapter III of the Commonwealth Constitution Act…”.
The Acting Registrar of the Tanunda Magistrates Court by return email informed Mr Best that his email had been placed on the file for the Magistrate. The Acting Registrar also noted that by reference to previous correspondence Mr Best had been requested to contact the prosecution section at the Nuriootpa Police Station. Mr Best responded to the Acting Registrar stating he had contacted “them and they told me to email you they stated my email will be dealt with by you prior to or by the judge on the day of the 2nd of March 2015 I am happy to attend court but due to work commitments it cannot be on a Monday or Tuesday…”.
Mr Best did not attend Court on 2 March 2015 and by letter dated 5 March he was informed by the Registrar that on 2 March 2015 the Court adjourned his matter to a pre-trial conference on 4 May 2015 at Clare.
On 19 March 2015 Mr Best emailed the Registry again requesting the matter be transferred to the Elizabeth Magistrates Court and requesting all evidence “specifically the NSC certificate for the speed detecting device as is required by the 1960 National Weights and Measurements Act…”. By return email Mr Best was informed his email had been placed on the file for the Magistrate at Clare on 4 May 2015.
On 4 May 2015 Mr Harrop SM noted on the record of outcome that there was no appearance for Mr Best and that the prosecution had confirmed that full disclosure had been made. By letter dated 5 May 2015 Mr Best was informed his matter had been adjourned to a pre-trial conference on 1 June 2015 and that the matter must remain in the Clare Magistrates Court as it was contested. He was also informed that if he failed to attend the matter may be resolved in his absence.
Mr Best did not appear on 1 June 2015. Mr Harrop noted the history of the file, the contents of the previous emails and that a letter from the Registrar dated 3 February 2015 had been incorrectly addressed, with one number being omitted from the correct address. Mr Harrop determined it appropriate in the circumstances to adjourn the matter and instructed the Registrar to notify Mr Best of the next hearing date and that the matter must remain in Clare as it was contested.
As instructed, the Registrar wrote to Mr Best informing him that on 1 June the Court adjourned his matter until 6 July 2015 at Clare. The Registrar also informed Mr Best “PLEASE NOTE THAT MATTER MUST REMAIN AT CLARE AS THE MATTER IS CONTESTED”.
By email dated 9 June 2015 Mr Best again emailed the Court asking that the matter be heard in a court of competent jurisdiction. The Court’s email contact centre replied saying that his email had been placed on the file and that a Magistrate would make a determination regarding his request at the scheduled hearing on 6 July 2015. Mr Best responded asserting that his request regarding the Clare Court had been ignored:
… so after calling the atourney general and the court admin authority I was informed that emailing the Tanunda crts will generate a immediate response, not a file attached to a crt hearing set down for a months time I have emailed the Elizabeth Crts with the same question, I would appreciate a more formal response.
By reply email the email contact centre informed Mr Best that the “Tanunda Court as of July will no longer be handling the Clare Court circuit nor will Elizabeth Court have any jurisdiction over this court”. Mr Best was informed his email had been forwarded to the Adelaide Magistrates Court “to see if there is anything further that can be done with regards to changing and transferring your file prior to the hearing date”.
By email dated 16 June 2015 Mr Best was informed that his request to transfer the matter to either the Elizabeth or Adelaide Magistrates Court had been declined and that he would have to attend the Clare Magistrates Court on 6 July 2015. By reference to the Court file it appears the Duty Magistrate on 16 June declined to transfer the matter as it was contested.
On 16 June 2015 Mr Best emailed the Court saying that the refusal of his request was an abuse of process “… your decision is unacceptable and I may just let you hold court in my absence and appeal on abuse of process grounds to a court that does conform with my constitutional rights one with a jury of my piers”.
Mr Best did not attend the Clare Court on 6 July 2015. The Deputy Chief Magistrate proceeded to hear the matter in his absence. Mr Best was convicted and ordered to pay a fine of $149, Court fees of $250, prosecution costs of $100 and a Victims of Crime levy of $160.
On 8 July 2015 Mr Best filed an Application for Rehearing. The application apparently signed by Mr Best is on the Court file. I infer, by reference to the fact the application was given a hearing date of 22 July at the Elizabeth Magistrates Court, Mr Best attended the Elizabeth Magistrates Court Registry to complete the Form 19 Application for Rehearing. This is despite being informed the Adelaide Magistrates Court, not the Elizabeth Magistrates Court, was the Registry for the Clare Court.
The record of outcome for 22 July 2015 records that Mr Best appeared at the Elizabeth Magistrates Court and that Mr Chin SM set aside the conviction and penalty and listed the matter for rehearing at Clare on 8 September 2015 at 10.30 am noting that:
Mr Best is at liberty to make an application at least 14 days before trial date to have his trial transferred to another court for hearing in order to accommodation his personal schedule.
Whilst the transcript of the hearing before Mr Chin is not available I infer from the above notation that Mr Chin was made aware of Mr Best’s request for the matter not to be heard on a Monday at the Clare Magistrates Court.
On the following day, 23 July 2015, Mr Best sent an email to the Court requesting the matter be moved to a court that can accommodate his work schedule and to a court of competent jurisdiction. In response to an email from the Registry asking Mr Best for suitable dates on which he could attend, Mr Best responded by stating:
I am available on Wednesdays only, But !! you have misinterpreted my request for a court of competent jurisdiction one that conforms with Chapter III of the Commonwealth Constitution...
The Rehearing
The rehearing was heard by Ms O’Connor SM sitting at Clare on 8 September 2015.
As Mr Best failed to appear Ms O’Connor granted leave to the prosecution to proceed with the trial in his absence.
Ms O’Connor noted in her ex tempore judgment the history of the matter including the numerous emails from Mr Best to the Court. Her Honour noted that Mr Best had determined not to attend any court hearings on Monday or Tuesday, not take a day’s leave, not ask the Court to schedule the hearing during annual leave or any portion of leave, and not to instruct a solicitor.
Having detailed the history her Honour stated that Mr Best’s position in seeking to enforce his wishes in relation to the venue of the trial was unreasonable. Her Honour pointed out the matter involved an area policed by the Clare police and that the prosecutor handling the matter was not a prosecutor attached to the Elizabeth Magistrates Court.
The prosecution led evidence at the rehearing from the police officer who issued the expiation notice.
Her Honour noted that the officer was “extremely experienced” having operated equipment used to detect Mr Best’s speed “consistently over a period of 14 to 15 years”, and that he had “thoroughly explained how the equipment was tested and was operated by him.” The officer gave evidence outlining the basis for his assertion that he believed the equipment was accurate, that he used it correctly and that it detected the speed alleged in the expiation notice. The officer relied on the tests that were performed on the morning before Mr Best’s vehicle was detected driving at the alleged speed and on the accuracy of the speedometer of the vehicle he was driving.
Ms O’Connor also referred to the presumption provided by s 175A of the Road Traffic Act 1961 (SA) (the RTA) which permits the prosecution to establish that Mr Best was the driver, that he was on Traeger Road, that Traeger Road is signposted as alleged in the Complaint and that Traeger Road is a road.
The following certificates and report were received into evidence:
·A Certificate of Accuracy of the officer’s motorcycle’s speedometer as P2 pursuant to s 175(3)(b) of the RTA.
·A Certificate of Accuracy of the Traffic Speed Analyser-Radar Device as P3 pursuant to s 175(3)(ba) of the RTA.
·A Calibration Report for the Kustom Mobile Radar Traffic Speed Analyser used to detect Mr Best’s speed as exhibit P4. This report indicated the accuracy of the device used to detect Mr Best’s speed was within the specification of clause 2.5.2(a) “for a direct radar device: +2, -3 km/h”, as per the Australian Standard for Radar speed detection, AS 2898.2 - 2003. The reported uncertainty for the device was U± 1.0km/h.
Ms O’Connor found the prosecution case was overwhelming and that the charge was proved beyond reasonable doubt. Mr Best was convicted, fined $149 ordered to pay Court fees of $250, prosecution costs of $100 and a Victims of Crime levy of $160. In addition Mr Best was ordered to pay a further $100 toward prosecution costs on account of the prosecution presenting evidence on 6 July 2015 before the Deputy Chief Magistrate.
Grounds of appeal
In his Notice of Appeal, filed 23 September 2015, Mr Best complains that the “matter proceeded despite my absence after I advised the court I couldn’t be there by email”.
Mr Best’s grounds of appeal can be summarised as follows:
1The trial should not have proceeded ex-parte, should have been referred to a different Magistrates Court and listed on a day that suited him;
2The Magistrates Court is not a court of competent jurisdiction;
3The device used to measure his speed did not meet the National Measurement Act 1960 (Cth) and the certificates of accuracy were invalid and the method of testing it by the police did not comply with s 10 of the National Measurement Act;
4Under common law he has not hurt anybody or caused any loss or injury; and
5That he was entitled to a trial by jury.
Mr Best’s submissions on appeal
Before discussing each of the grounds of appeal I set out Mr Best’s written submissions forwarded to the Court by email:
To the Honourable Justice Bampton ,, I find it offensive to be polite that I am forced to bring this alleged and trifaling matter before the surpreme court based on clare courts only operating on Mondays and outside my available days to have this matter heard in my presence I corresponded with clare courts completely and will be excercising my common law and constitutional rights regarding this matter I hope this matter can be brought to a expedient resolve
Regarding my appeal of clare courts decision set down fotr the 25th November at 2.15 pm surpreme court , building 1 gouger street
my appeal is based on myself retaning the presumption of innocence until proven guilty and prosecution having to provide beyond a reasonable doubt my guilt , and my inability to attend clare courts on Mondays due to employment commitments which I clearly corresponded to the clare courts on all occasions requesting the matter be transferred to Elizabeth courts failing this I requested the matter transferred to a court of competent jurisdiction {forge vs asic ] so I could attend without loosing a weeks wages I have a letter from my employer explaining I have a set run once a week as a interstate truck driver adelaide Sydney Adelaide
I will be representing myself under common law not statute law to which I do not consent , I will be relying on Australian constitutional laws including section 1 legislative power section 2 governor general section 58 royal assent section 109 inconsitency of laws section 118 recognition of laws section 117 rights of residents in states section 80 trial by jury amongst the universal declaration of human rights , bill of rights 1689 , national measurement act and the nsc number assigned to this device , burdon of proof , fair trial aswell as presenting a letter from the ex chief justice sir harry gibbs which Is quite clear in spelling out that australia's current legal and political system in use in Australia and its states and territories has no basis in law I will therefore be seeking full dismissal under article 36 of the statute of the international court of justice where an international treaty is cited as a defence , failing this i will be requesting adjournment "sine die" and prosecution will have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that information provided regarding australia's sovereignty the constitution the treaty of Versailles , the statute of Westminster , the universal decleration of human rights do not apply to my common law rights and statutes within Australia
without prejudice kris best
I now turn to discuss each of Mr Best’s grounds of appeal.
The trial should not have proceeded ex-parte, should have been referred to a different Magistrates Court and listed on a day that suited Mr Best
Mr Best submitted that the Elizabeth Magistrates Court gave him liberty to have the matter heard on a day that suited his schedule and therefore the trial should not have proceeded in his absence.
The record of outcome for 22 July 2015 indicates Mr Chin SM ordered the rehearing be in the Clare Magistrates Court. As set out above, whilst there is no transcript of what transpired before Mr Chin, I infer that upon being informed that the rehearing would take place in Clare, Mr Best repeated his request that the matter not be heard in Clare, whereupon Mr Chin informed him he could apply to have the trial of the matter transferred to another Court. Mr Chin noted on the Court file:
Mr Best is at liberty to make an application at least 14 days before trial date to have his trial transferred to another court for hearing in order to accommodation his personal schedule.
The liberty or permission given to Mr Best to apply does not mean he was given liberty to have the matter heard on a particular day at a Court of his choice.
Mr Best applied by email on 23 July 2015 as referred to at [21]-[22] of Ms O’Connor’s judgment.
His request was declined and the trial was listed in Clare Magistrates Court on 8 September 2015. Ms O’Connor’s reasons for proceeding ex-parte at [24]-[25] demonstrate no error. Mr Best was aware of the date and location of the trial and he was warned that the matter could be determined in his absence if he failed to appear.
Out of the seven hearings in this matter Mr Best appeared once at the hearing of his application for a rehearing. Having had a conviction entered in his absence on 6 July 2015 Mr Best knew the consequences of failing to attend court and should have known that there was a risk the trial would proceed in his absence on 8 September 2015.
Whilst a defendant has a right to be present at trial, if a defendant voluntarily waives that right, the Court has a discretion to proceed in his or her absence.[1]
[1] Flavel v Van Reesema [2005] SASC 418.
Section 62BA of the Summary Procedure Act 1921 (SA) gives the Court the power to proceed in the absence of the defendant if the defendant fails to appear at the hearing.
Ms O’Connor gave clear reasons for her decision to proceed to hear the trial in Mr Best’s absence.[2] She concluded that, upon reviewing the evidence and the material that Mr Best had submitted to the Court, his defence was without merit.[3]
[2] At [24]–[27].
[3] At [26], [30] and [32].
I too concluded that the defence is without merit.
The Magistrates Court is not a court of competent jurisdiction
Mr Best first asserted that the Magistrates Court was not a court of competent jurisdiction in correspondence with the Magistrates Court. Ms O’Connor dealt with this argument in [30]–[36] of her judgment.
Mr Best supplemented his written submissions at the hearing of the appeal by referring to a letter purportedly written by Sir Harry Gibbs, as demonstrating that the current legal system has no basis in law. This is of no relevance to this appeal.
The question of whether the Magistrates Court is competent to deal with matters of this nature was raised and rejected in Moran v Police,[4] and in Millington v Police.[5]
[4] [2010] SASC 269 at [12] Kelly J.
[5] [2015] SASC 52 at [14]–[16] Parker J.
Section 79B of the RTA sets out the provisions that apply to prescribed offences detected by photographic detection devices. Regulation 30 of the Road Traffic (Miscellaneous) Regulations 2014 (SA) provides that, for the purposes of the definition of “prescribed offence” in s 79B(1) of the RTA, an offence against a provision of Part 3 of the Australian Road Rules (Speed Limits) is prescribed. Rule 20 is included in Part 3 of the Australian Road Rules. Accordingly, an offence against r 20 is a prescribed offence for the purposes of s 79B of the RTA. A speeding offence against r 20 is a summary offence by virtue of s 5(2)(a) of the Summary Procedure Act 1921 (SA). It is therefore appropriate that a prosecution for an alleged breach of r 20 is heard by a Magistrate. The appropriate court to hear the Complaint was the Magistrates Court of South Australia.
This ground of appeal must fail.
The device used to measure Mr Best’s speed did not meet the National Measurement Act 1960 (Cth) and the certificates of accuracy were invalid
Mr Best submitted that the radar device used to detect his speed did not conform with the National Measurement Act 1960 (Cth). The device used to detect Mr Best’s speed was a Kustom Mobile Radar traffic Speed Analyser.
Section 53A of the RTA provides that:
The Governor may, by regulation, approve apparatus of a specified kind as traffic speed analysers.
Pursuant to reg 27 of the Road Traffic (Miscellaneous) Regulations 2014 (SA) the device in question was an approved apparatus:
27—Apparatus approved as traffic speed analysers (section 53A of Act)
Pursuant to section 53A of the Act, the following are approved as traffic speed analysers:
…
(c) a Kustom mobile radar traffic speed analyser;
…
The evidentiary presumptions prescribed by s 175(3)(ba) and s 175(3)(b) of the RTA meant Mr Best carried the onus of proving on the balance of probabilities that the evidence contained in the certificates of accuracy tendered to the Magistrates Court was not accurate .
Section 175(3)(ba) of the RTA provides:
(3) In proceedings for an offence against this Act—
…
(ba) a document produced by the prosecution and purporting to be signed by the Commissioner of Police, or by any other police officer of or above the rank of inspector, and purporting to certify that a specified traffic speed analyser had been tested on a specified day and was shown by the test to be accurate to the extent indicated in the document constitutes, in the absence of proof to the contrary, proof of the facts certified and that the traffic speed analyser was accurate to that extent on the day on which it was so tested and, for the purpose of measuring the speed of any motor vehicle—
(i)in the case of a traffic speed analyser that was, at the time of measurement, mounted in a fixed housing—during the period of 27 days immediately following that day; or
(ii)in any other case—on the day following that day,
whether or not the speed measured differed from the speed in relation to which the analyser was tested or the circumstances of the measurement differed in any other respect from the circumstances of the test;
…
Section 175(3)(b) provides a presumption in similar terms pertaining to proof of accuracy of speedometers.
The certificates are therefore admissible if they satisfy the criteria prescribed by s 175(3)(ba) of the RTA as regards Certificate of Accuracy of Traffic Speed Analyser and s 175(3)(b) as regards Certificate of Accuracy of Speedometer. There is no requirement that the certificates must satisfy the criteria required by the National Measurement Act.
This Court has on many occasions considered and rejected very similar if not identical arguments to that contended by Mr Best regarding alleged non-compliance with the National Measurement Act.[6] I agree with the reasons of Peek J in Police v Young in deciding that the National Measurement Act does not exclude the operation of the State law and does not govern the operation of speed cameras in this State.[7]
[6] See Moran v Police [2010] SASC 269; Anastasiou v Police [2013] SASC 112; Kuipers-Lloyd v Police [2013] SASC 137 and Millington v Police [2015] SASC 52.
[7] (2012) 114 SASR 567.
Mr Best failed to put forward on appeal any evidence to prove that the certificates were inaccurate, invalid or that the device used to detect his speed was inaccurate or not an approved apparatus.
There is no merit to Mr Best’s argument regarding the application of the National Measurement Act.
This ground must be rejected.
Under common law he has not hurt anybody or caused any loss or injury
Mr Best stated that he does not consent to “the enactments” and that he is representing himself under common law. He submitted that it is impossible to be 100 per cent compliant with the road rules 100 per cent of the time. He said his job is to avoid accidents and not to be constantly watching the speedometer. He said that he appreciates the laws but he cannot confirm what speed he was travelling at the time.
Mr Best is clearly under an obligation to comply with the RTA and therefore this argument has no merit.
That he was entitled to a trial by jury
Mr Best argued that s 80 and s 109 of the Australian Constitution (the Constitution) gave him a right to trial by jury. Section 80 reads:
The trial on indictment of any offence against any law of the Commonwealth shall be by jury, and every such trial shall be held in the State where the offence was committed, and if the offence was not committed within any State the trial shall be held at such place or places as the Parliament prescribes.
Section 5 of the Summary Procedure Act 1921 (SA) clearly stipulates that this offence is a summary offence against a South Australian law. As s 80 of the Constitution only applies to a trial on indictment of any offence against any law of the Commonwealth there is no requirement that Mr Best’s trial be heard by a jury.
This ground must also be rejected.
Nothing Mr Best submitted on this appeal caused me to doubt the correctness of the Magistrate’s decision. Mr Best was given ample opportunity to arrange his affairs so that he or a solicitor could attend the Clare Magistrates Court. He was warned that if he did not attend the Court may proceed to hear and determine the matter in his absence. He was informed the matter could not be transferred to another Court because it was contested. The Court heard the matter in his absence on 6 July 2015 and convicted him. Despite this he did not attend the rehearing on 8 September 2015. There was no merit to any of Mr Best’s purported defences. Mr Best, on appeal, did not produce any evidence to rebut any of the evidentiary presumptions. Accordingly the Magistrate was not in error in finding that the prosecution case was overwhelming and that the charge was proved beyond reasonable doubt.
As no error of fact or law was demonstrated I dismissed the appeal.
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