Berzin v Minister for Immigration

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BERZIN v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR [2020] FCCA 2152
Catchwords:
MIGRATION – Judicial review – whether applicant has standing application for summary dismissal – originating application dismissed.

Legislation:

Federal Circuit Court of Australia Act 1999 (Cth), s 17A

Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth), r 13.10(a)

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 476, 476(1) and 478(a)

Cases cited:

Singh v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCCA 1614

Spencer v Commonwealth of Australia (2010) 241 CLR 118

Applicant: MARINA XAVIER BATISTA BERZIN
First Respondent: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP, MIGRANT SERVICES & MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
Second Respondent: ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
File Number: ADG 479 of 2019
Judgment of: Judge Heffernan
Hearing date: 10 July 2020
Date of Last Submission: 10 July 2020
Delivered at: Adelaide
Delivered on: 10 July 2020

REPRESENTATION

The Applicant: In person
Counsel for the Respondents: Ms Ashby
Solicitors for the Respondents: Australian Government Solicitors

ORDERS

  1. The application filed on 27 November 2019 is dismissed.

  2. Any other extant orders are dismissed.

  3. The applicant do pay the first respondent’s costs fixed in the amount of THREE THOUSAND, SEVEN HUNDRED AND THIRTY SEVEN DOLLARS ($3,737).

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
AT ADELAIDE

ADG 479 of 2019

MARINA XAVIER BATISTA BERZIN

Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP, MIGRANT SERVICES & MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

(Settled from transcript)

  1. This is an application by the Minister for summary dismissal of an application that was filed in late November 2019.  That application sought an order that a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (‘the Tribunal’) be quashed, a writ of mandamus and an injunction against the Minister.

  2. There are 13 grounds of application which are expressed in terms of a series of particulars as follows:

    “1.I, Marina Xavier Batista Berzin started working at New Norcia Bakery from November 2015 until May 2018 as a Pastry Chef.

    2.At that time, I was studying Certificate III and IV at Patisserie, and the opportunity to work at New Norcia Bakery was very important to me, to learn and grown in my career as a Pastry Chef.

    3.As I was in a student visa, I worked 20 hours per week and my duties were the preparation and cooking of the dishes of the menu, prepare cakes and pastries, prepare fillings and toppings, decorate cakes, ensure all equipment were working properly and cleaned, check the quality of the products delivered, and so on.

    4.Rizza White and the owner Kirsti Knight, came to me to offer a Sponsorship job.

    5.I contacted an immigration agency to help us through the visa process, and we chose the company CCI - Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Western Australia Inc, with the immigration agent Jessica Williams.

    6.I had several meetings with the immigration agent of CCI to make sure everything was in order and to understand my rights and duties of the visa.

    7.The visa was lodged and then immigration agent told me…

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Details
Case
[2020] FCCA 2152
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the Federal Circuit Court of Australia, Judge Heffernan considered an application for judicial review brought by Ms Berzin against the Minister for Immigration. The Minister sought the summary dismissal of Ms Berzin's application.

The central legal issue before the Court was whether Ms Berzin had the legal standing to bring the application for judicial review, and consequently, whether the Court had the power to summarily dismiss the proceeding.

Judge Heffernan reasoned that his power to entertain judicial review was limited by section 478(a) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), which dictates who can make such an application. The Court found that standing is conferred upon the applicant for a visa and the Minister, not a nominated person such as Ms Berzin. The Court also had the power to deal summarily with applications under section 17A of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia Act 1999 (Cth) and rule 13.10(a) of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth). Applying the principles from *Spencer v Commonwealth of Australia* and other authorities, the Court determined that summary dismissal should be exercised cautiously, only where there is a high degree of certainty about the ultimate outcome.

Having considered the submissions and materials, the Court concluded that Ms Berzin did not have a reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting her application, and therefore, the originating application was dismissed.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

I have power to entertain judicial review pursuant to s 476 of the Act. As the Minister has correctly identified, that power is limited by virtue of s 478(a) of the Act which provides for who can make such an application. It is the Minister and the applicant for the visa, not the person who was nominated, which is the position of Ms Berzin, who have standing. The Federal Circuit Court of Australia Act 1999 (Cth) provides a power to me to deal summarily with applications and dismiss proceedings summarily where appropriate. That power is to be found in s 17A of the Federal Circuit Court Act:17A Summary judgment(1)The Federal Circuit Court of Australia may give judgment for one party against another in relation to the whole or any part of a proceeding if:(a)the first party is prosecuting the proceeding or that part of the proceeding; and(b)the Court is satisfied that the other party has no reasonable prospect of successfully defending the proceeding or that part of the proceeding.(2)The Federal Circuit Court of Australia may give judgment for one party against another in relation to the whole or any part of a proceeding if:(a)the first party is defending the proceeding or that part of the proceeding; and(b)the Court is satisfied that the other party has no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding or that part of the proceeding.(3)For the purposes of this section, a defence or a proceeding or part of a proceeding need not be:(a)hopeless; or(b)bound to fail;for it to have no reasonable prospect of success.(4)This section does not limit any powers that the Federal Circuit Court of Australia has apart from this section.” There is a rules-based power under the Federal Circuit Court Rules2001 (Cth) (‘the Rules’) to dispose of a matter by way of summary dismissal contained in r 13.10(a) of those Rules, and I can do so if I am satisfied that the party prosecuting the proceeding or claim for relief has no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting it. The Minister referred me to a number of authorities with respect to the exercise of power to summarily dismiss a matter, including a decision of Judge Mercuri in Singh v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection[1] which in its terms referred to the often-cited authority of Spencer v Commonwealth of Australia,[2] a decision of the High Court. It is to be accepted that the power to summarily dismiss proceedings should be exercised cautiously. And that is the case irrespective of whether the application for summary dismissal is an attack on the merits of the claim or whether it is an attack on the actual jurisdiction and standing to entertain the claim.[1] [2019] FCCA 1614.[2] (2010) 241 CLR 118. The High Court noted that whether it be expressed in terms of no reasonable prospect of conviction or some other formula, ultimately the discretion should only be exercised if the court has a high degree of certainty about the ultimate outcome of the proceeding if it were to be allowed to go to trial in the ordinary way. I have considered the submissions and all of the materials, and on the basis on which the originating Application has been filed, I do have a high degree of certainty about the ultimate outcome being unsuccessful, and to use the language of the Rules, I do not believe that the application has a reasonable prospect of being successfully prosecuted.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.