Bergin and Fordham

[2018] FCCA 1011

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BERGIN & FORDHAM [2018] FCCA 1011

Catchwords:
FAMILY LAW – Parenting – six year old child – sustained parental hostility – impossibility of cooperation – equal shared parental responsibility on all matters except schooling – sole parental responsibility in favour of mother on matters of schooling.

Legislation:

Family Law Act 1958, s.60CC

Applicant: MR BERGIN

Respondent: MS FORDHAM

File Number: MLC 10684 of 2013

Judgment of: His Honour Judge Wilson

Hearing date: 26 February 2018

Date of Last Submission: 26 February 2018

Delivered at: Melbourne

Delivered on: 4 May 2018

REPRESENTATION

Counsel for the Applicant: Mr. J. C. Stanley

Solicitors for the Applicant: None

Counsel for the Respondent: Mr P. M. O’Shannessy

Solicitors for the Respondent: Accessible Family Law

ORDERS

1. All previous parenting orders in respect of [X] born (omitted) 2012 (“[X]”) are discharged.

2. The parents have equal shared parental responsibility for [X] save as to schooling.

3. The mother has sole parental responsibility in respect of [X]’s schooling.

4. The mother is authorised to do all such acts and things, and sign all necessary documents, as may be required to ensure [X] is enrolled at (omitted) Primary School in (omitted) including for any extracurricular activities.

5. The mother do all such acts and things, and sign all necessary documents, as may be required to authorise the father (at the father’s expense) to –

   (a)obtain from [X]’s school copies of school newsletters, school reports, school photograph order forms and any other communications usually provided to parents; and

   (b)be at liberty to attend upon and participate in school activities to which parents are usually invited to attend.

6. The mother forthwith provides [X]’s school with a copy of these orders and ensures all authorisations referred to herein remain current.

7. Commencing on 4 May 2018, with the mother, [X] reside with each parent on a week-about basis from the conclusion of school or 5pm on Friday until the conclusion of school or 5pm on the following Friday, or as otherwise agreed between the parents in writing.

8. [X]’s time with the parent with whom he is living pursuant to these orders is suspended so that [X] may spend time the parent with whom he is not living –

   (a)at Christmas –

   (i)in 2018 and each alternate year thereafter from 2pm on Christmas Day until 2pm on Boxing Day; and

   (ii)in 2019 and each alternate year thereafter from 2pm on Christmas Eve until 2pm on Christmas Day;

   (b)at Easter –

   (i)in 2019 and each alternate year thereafter from 2pm on Easter Sunday until 2pm on Easter Monday; and

   (ii)in 2020 and each alternate year thereafter from 2pm on Easter Saturday until 2pm on Easter Sunday;

   (c)on [X]’s birthday from 3pm or the conclusion of school until 7pm; and

   (d)on that parent’s birthday from 3pm or the conclusion of school until 7pm.

9. If [X] is otherwise in the care of his father on the Mother’s Day weekend, [X]’s time with his father is suspended from 9am on Mother’s Day until the commencement of school or 9am on the Monday following Mother’s Day.

10. If [X] is otherwise in the care of his mother on the Father’s Day weekend, [X]’s time with his mother is suspended from 9am on Father’s Day until the commencement of school or 9am on the Monday following Father’s Day.

11. All changeovers that coincide with the commencement or conclusion of school occur at [X]’s school and otherwise changeover is to be effected by the parent with whom [X] is residing delivering [X] to his other parent.

12. [X] communicate with the parent with whom he is not residing by telephone, Skype or other media (as agreed between the parents in writing) at times agreed between the parents in writing or in default of agreement in writing –

    (a)by telephone between 6:30pm and 7pm on Sundays during school term; and

    (b)by telephone between 6:30pm and 7pm on Sundays and Wednesdays during school term breaks and the long summer vacation.

13. Neither parent make arrangements for [X] to participate in any extracurricular activity which would occur during the other parent’s time with [X] without the express written consent of the other parent.

14. If [X] is engaging in an extracurricular activity as agreed in writing between the parents, the parent with whom [X] is residing during the time of that activity facilitate [X]’s participation in that activity.

15. [X] attend upon a single treating general practitioner as agreed between the parents in writing or, in default of agreement, the mother nominate two general practitioners (from alternate medical practices) and the father choose one.

16. Each parent is authorised to obtain (at that parent’s expense) information about [X] from [X]’s treating general practitioner.

17. If [X] suffers an illness or injury requiring his admission to hospital, the parent with whom [X] is residing at that time pursuant to these orders immediately inform the other parent and provide to the other parent the details of the hospital where [X] has been admitted, including a telephone number for the medical team treating [X].

18. Each parent and their servants and agents are hereby restrained from –

    (a)verbally or in writing abusing, harassing, belittling or denigrating the other parent or that parent’s family in the presence or hearing of [X];

    (b)discussing this proceeding within the presence or hearing of [X]; and

    (c)allowing [X] to access copies of documents filed with the court in respect of this proceeding.

19. The father is restrained from describing [X] as (religion omitted) or expressly or impliedly indicating that [X] is (religion omitted).

20. The mother is restrained from referring to [X] in any formal capacity other than by [X]’s full name, being [X].

21. Subject to order 24 herein, [X] is permitted to travel outside of the Commonwealth of Australia pursuant to s.11(1)(b) of the Australian Passports Act 2005.

22. The parents jointly do all such acts and things, and sign all necessary documents, as may be required to apply for the issue of an Australian passport for [X] or, in default of which, the mother is at liberty to apply for the issue of an Australian passport for [X] without further obtaining the consent of [X]’s father.

23. The mother has custody of [X]’s passport.

24. Each parent is at liberty to take [X] outside of the Commonwealth of Australia in accordance with s.65Y(2)(b) of the Family Law Act 1975 PROVIDED that the parent intending to travel outside of Australia with [X] provides to the other parent, not less than four weeks’ prior, written notice of the intended travel outside of Australia, specifying the –

    (a)dates and times of their departure and return;

    (b)intended destination(s);

    (c)means of transport and all details of the airline (including flight numbers and times for proposed air travel) or shipping company with which that parent and [X] will be travelling; and

    (d)contact telephone number and residential address for [X] at each destination for the duration of the travel outside of Australia.

25. The mother provide [X]’s passport to the father not less than 48 hours prior to any intended travel by the father with [X] outside of Australia.

26. The father return [X]’s passport to the mother within 48 hours of the father returning with [X] to Australia.

27. At the conclusion of any overseas travel pursuant to these orders, [X] resume living with each parent on a week-about basis pursuant to order 7 hereof as if that overseas travel had not occurred.

28. All extant applications are otherwise dismissed.

29. There is no order as to costs.

30. Pursuant to s.62B and s.65DA(2) of the Family Law Act 1975, the particulars of the obligations these orders create and the particulars of the consequences that may follow if a person contravenes these orders and details of who can assist parties adjust to and comply with an order are set out in Attachment A and these particulars are included in these orders.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment under the pseudonym Bergin & Fordham is approved pursuant to s.121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
AT MELBOURNE

MLC 10684 of 2013

MR BERGIN

Applicant

And

MS FORDHAM

Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Introduction

1. This litigation concerned [X] born (omitted) 2012.  His parents, the applicant and respondent in this proceeding, commenced a relationship in (omitted) 2010 and began living together in (omitted) of the same year.  They did not marry.  Their relationship came to an end in February 2013.

2. For almost the entirety of the life of their son, the applicant and the respondent have been at war over various aspects of their son’s parenting.  On 2 June 2014 orders (euphemistically described as “final orders”) were made in this court.  Having regard to the subsequent skirmishing, those orders were very far from “final orders”.

3. The father subsequently applied for orders altering the regime ordered on 2 June 2014.  The mother filed a cross-application pursuant to which she sought orders that she have sole parental responsibility of her son, limited to decision-making in respect of his education.  The father sought orders that [X] lives with the mother and father on a week about basis from the conclusion of school each Friday, that [X] spends half of each school holiday period with each parent and that [X] be enrolled in (omitted) Primary School.  The mother sought different orders in respect of the living arrangements for [X].

4. A high degree of antagonism punctuated the relationship between the mother and father even during the trial of this proceeding.  Each was educated at tertiary level and each appeared to have received the benefit of a privileged background.  However, each was ferociously bitter towards the other such that their ability to cooperate in order to undertake the tasks customarily associated with parenting a child had long since evaporated.  The reason for their hostility towards one another was unimportant in the scheme of things.  More important was their ability (or lack thereof) in the future to perform the tasks that parents must perform when raising a child to adulthood.  Having watched and listened to each parent while each gave evidence in the witness box, I was able to form certain impressions about each.  Those impressions have provided the basis for certain views I have reached in this case.  However, in a case where the lines of demarcation are so trenchantly drawn as was the situation in this case, the search for objectivity in a true assessment of the best interests of the child assumed a high degree of importance in this case.

5. That objectivity was provided in large measure by the evidence of Dr J. She provided two reports in this litigation, the first dated 7 April 2014 and the second dated 6 December 2016. She was subjected to searching questioning from both counsel in this case. Her answers to various propositions require close examination. I have relied upon her evidence for the purposes of forming conclusions about the best interests of [X] as s 60CC(3) of the Family Law Act commands me to do.

Synopsis

1. For the reasons that follow, in my view the mother should have sole parental responsibility in relation to the education of [X].  Each parent should have equal shared parental responsibility and the living arrangements should be on a week about basis.  The other more complicated finer details have been set out in the orders recorded above.

A short factual narration

1. The father was born in the (country omitted) and was 41 years of age at the trial of this proceeding.  He described his occupation as a (occupation omitted) with an organisation known as “(employer omitted)”.

2. The mother was born in suburban Victoria in 1976 and was 41 years of age at the trial of this proceeding. She has qualifications in (omitted).

3. The mother and father attended the same school although their relationship commenced quite some time thereafter.

4. In (omitted) 2010 the parties commenced cohabitation and in (omitted) 2011 lived at (omitted).

5. [X] was born in (omitted) 2012.

6. The applicant and the respondent separated in February 2013 when [X] was about eight months of age.  [X] has lived with his mother ever since and has seen his father on a regular basis.  The father’s work took him to regional Victoria whereas the mother has lived in the (omitted) suburbs of Melbourne.  The geographical distance between the mother and the father has historically presented obstacles.

7. Within 12 months of their separation the parties were fighting in court in December 2013 in litigation commenced by the father against the mother for parenting and property orders.

8. In June 2014 so-called “final orders” were made by consent that addressed aspects of property, orders for equal shared parental responsibility and an age-based regime for the father’s time with [X], to be reviewed when [X] was four years of age.

9. In October 2014, no more than four months after the commencement of the first proceeding, the father issued a second proceeding in this court to restrain the mother from relocating to (omitted).  In April 2015 orders were made by consent pursuant to which the mother was restrained from changing residence to (omitted) without the express written consent of the applicant or court order.

10. This proceeding was issued in June 2016.

11. Self-evidently, the parties are no strangers to litigation.  They seem very quick to engage the litigation option.  Naturally, in the family law jurisdiction where emotional frailties dominate perspective, this court should be willing to accommodate reasonable approaches being made to it by parties who are genuinely unable to resolve their disputes, particularly where the best interests of one or more children of their relationship is involved.  But this court should not be used in some game of barter between implacable and intractable parents who jettison reasonable conduct, forestall negotiations, completely excise sensibility and wish instead to consume valuable court time by engaging in wasteful and draining episodes in court.

12. The background to the mother’s and father’s meeting, then the formation of their relationship and subsequent very short life together was documented in a tolerably objective manner by Dr J in her 7 April 2014 report.  A large volume of that report may be condensed into the simple proposition that the attitude of the mother and the father towards one another while initially happy in their rapidly evolving relationship, soured very shortly after they commenced living together and they began to experience conflict.  The detail of their squabbling is unimportant.  However, Dr J made a collection of behavioural observations and she undertook psychometric testing.  Her 7 April 2014 report was commendably comprehensive in her customary way.  Importantly, Dr J addressed issues relevant to [X].

13. Dr J expressed the opinion in her report dated 7 April 2014 that the prognosis for [X] was bleak, mainly on account of the conflict between his parents.  She recommended that any measures capable of reducing [X]’s exposure to conflict at changeovers was to be introduced immediately.  She did not recommend equal shared time as the parental relationship was too difficult and the potential too great for [X]’s care to be disrupted by reason of his parents’ inability to communicate or cooperate.

14. In her report dated 2 December 2016, Dr J stated that neither parent was particularly motivated to avoid conflict.  She recommended the making of very clearly defined orders allowing for [X] to live in a parallel parenting arrangement. She recommended [X] be moved to spending alternate weekends with his father on Thursday through to Monday morning if possible and practical and leaving the alternate Wednesday overnight in place with changeover taking place from kindergarten, child care or school. In various places during her viva voce evidence she said that each parent made almost exactly the same allegations against the other.  Dr J said that each parent regarded him or herself as blameless with the other being entirely responsible for the conflict.

15. Pausing at that point in the narrative, Dr J’s evidence on that issue told me that both parents demonstrated a very considerable absence of insight into their respective strengths and weaknesses and commensurate character strengths and flaws insofar as those issues bore upon their capacity to properly perform the role of parent in respect of their son.  It concerned me whether they will ever assume the degree of intellectual and emotional maturity that is required to properly parent a child having the vulnerability and emotional fragility of their son.

16. Be that as it may, in the family law jurisdiction, judges must do the best they can to make orders that best meet the circumstances of the case, recognising that in certain cases (of which this is one) the material with which to work is limited.

17. Dr J said in as many words that she did not perceive that either parent had very much in the way of insight.  She spoke of the allocation of power between the parents and that each would abuse and exploit that conflict.  She was pessimistic about the way forward, preferring a solution on the basis that “very clear orders that cover a very long time” are required setting out “exactly what is to happen”.  She highlighted the seemingly insurmountable obstacle of a decision about schooling for [X]. She said that a change of school would not be good for [X]. She said that at its core, the major issue in this case related to the formulation of orders that went to ameliorating the conflict between the parents in their constant and relentless warring.  Sadly, but poignantly, Dr J put the position thus –

    “These parents report a most incompatible relationship when they were together, where they had very different goals and philosophies, and found that neither could compromise. Further, although they each blame the other parent, [X] has clearly been exposed to considerable open conflict between his parents at changeovers. I reiterate my advice from the previous assessment that any parenting arrangement which prevents his parents meeting and saves this child from exposure to that type of experience can only improve his quality of life.”[1]

    [1] Family report of Dr J dated 6 December 2016, p 13. 

18. Aside from the parents, Dr J described [X] as a “very vulnerable boy”.  She said he loved his mother and his father and wants to spend time with both.

19. So far as the time to be spent by [X] with each of his parents was concerned, Dr J said that on balance the best interests of [X] were served in protecting him from the conflict between his parents by [X] having a block of time with both parents.  Dr J’s agreement with the proposition put by counsel for the father was reluctantly reached, underscoring (it seemed to me) the desperate nature of the circumstances that had been reached in respect of the parenting of [X].

20. Each parent was cross-examined at length and with vigour about aspects of the affidavits to which each parent swore, as well as other aspects of each parent’s personality insofar as it addressed his or her capacity to adequately parent [X]. Both counsel obtained significant admissions from the parties on those issues.  Not all admissions were purposive for the determination of the issues in this case.  Naturally, some were.  To those I now turn.

21. The first related to schooling. In essence, the father was opposed at a philosophical level to the concept of private schooling.  Even when pressed that the mother would assume the financial obligation to meet private school fees for [X], the father did not budge in his philosophical opposition to [X] attending a private school.  Various explanations were offered for that philosophical objection.  None seemed to me to be particularly cogent.  The father left me with an indelible impression that he was rebelling against his privileged upbringing, he having made a spiritual or religious conversion during adulthood to (religion omitted), and that concepts of exclusivity and privilege associated with private schooling were antithetical to his philosophy and were anathema to his way of living.

1. Naturally, the father is entitled to hold those spiritual and religious views.  However, they ignored the practical reality that the mother was proposing to meet the expenses associated with the private schooling of [X] and she indicated a financial capacity to do so, none of which was seriously challenged by the father. In addition, to my mind it is beyond argument that the empiric evidence on point conclusively demonstrates that children with malleable minds and willing dispositions benefit from a private school education over children with lesser fortunes who undertake schooling through the state system.  That is not to say that the state system does not produce a perfectly satisfactory form of primary and secondary level education.  However, the benefits of a private school education incalculably eclipse those when measured against their state school education counterparts.

2. The father was not being asked to contribute in any shape or form towards the education of [X].  He appeared to me to adopt a bloody minded attitude of resistance, dare I say abject refusal, towards the concept of private school education.  That was baseless, irrational and unsupportable.  To the extent that it might stand in the way of [X] obtaining the best that life can offer, I will not permit the father to do so.

3. In those circumstances, I have made orders conferring upon the mother sole parental responsibility in respect of educational matters for [X].

4. So far as time to be spent between [X] and each of his parents is concerned, there is a good deal of merit in the recommendation urged by the father in the week about regime.  Self-evidently, it is less disruptive than is the regime suggested by the mother.  As [X] matures with the progression of his education, greater demands will be exhibited by his need to study longer.  He will be engaged in sporting activities and he is likely to undertake after-school activities.  The less time he spends being driven between alternate households, the better. Now that the father has relocated, at least in the short term to suburban Melbourne, the prospects of time being wasted in transit between residences is reduced. To my mind, the proposal that was once under discussion of the father maintaining a residence in regional Victoria and [X] being required to commute between his mother’s residence and that of his father in the (omitted) area was utterly unworkable.

5. To the extent that, it is necessary for me to make observations about aspects of the parents especially in respect of the discrete considerations of matters relevant to s 60CC(3) of the Family Law Act, I have done so in the passages below.

6. In the absence of evidence about [X] being exposed to physical or psychological harm, s 60CC(2)(a) of the Family Law Act provides that one of the two primary considerations relevant to my considerations relates to the benefit [X] will enjoy in having a meaningful relationship with both of his parents.  The orders for equal shared parental responsibility, limited by the exception that I have ordered in respect of sole parental responsibility being conferred in relation to education, achieve the result that [X] has a meaningful relationship with both of his parents.

7. Section 60CC(3) of the Family Law Act requires me to separately consider an array of discrete subsections, the resolution of which assist in the determination of the best interests of the child [X].

8. Let me begin with subsection (a).  It requires consideration of any views expressed by the child and any factors that the court thinks are relevant to the weight that should be given to the child’s views. As Dr J reported, [X] has expressed a desire to be involved with both parents.  She recorded his love for his mother and his father in equal measure. He expressed the view that the more time he spends with each, the better. As it happened, that coincided with my interpretation of the information he gave to Dr J.

9. Subsection (b) called for an examination of the nature of the relationship [X] has with each of his parents and with any other person including grandparents or other relatives.  The evidence reveals that each parent has an excellent relationship with [X].  During the trial a little time was devoted to an issue that seemed to me to tell more of parental conflict than it did of the usurpation of any particular parental role in the life of [X].  Here, I refer to the evidence of the way [X]’s name appeared on certain personal items that were used by [X] such as items of clothing and luncheon items.  The father complained that the mother deliberately omitted the father’s name among the four names [X] bears. The father complained that the mother’s omission of the father’s name on items of personal property belonging to [X] indicated that the mother was deliberately endeavouring to excise the father, albeit subtly, from the life of [X] by deleting reference to the father’s name thereby relegating the father to a position of irrelevance. I do not agree. But even if there were merit in the point, orders could easily be made in requiring the mother to include all four names whenever referring to [X] in any formal capacity.

10. I expect the parties to behave in such a manner that there is to be no relegation of the other in the importance of each, even in the subtle way of including or omitting either parent’s name from the full names of [X].

11. Subsection (c) called for an examination of the extent to which each of the child’s parents has taken or failed to take the opportunity to participate in decisions about long-term issues in relation to [X], to spend time with [X] and communicate with [X].  No particular point can be highlighted as between each parent. It seemed to me that each spent as much time as possible with [X] and endeavoured to communicate with him to the extent possible. In respect of long term major issues concerning [X], it may be said that the father’s one-time strategy for living in (omitted) or his opposition to [X] attending a private school might adversely impact on considerations relevant to this subsection.  However, on balance it did not appear to me to go much further than the expression of the father’s ideological opposition to private schools.  For reasons canvassed above, I have ruled against the father on the point by making orders for sole parental responsibility in favour of the mother on the issue of schooling.

12. Under subsection (c)(a), it became relevant to consider the extent to which each of the child’s parents has fulfilled or failed to fulfil the parent’s obligations to maintain the child.  Among the material filed in this case was documentation that revealed a challenge launched by the father in relation to the payment of child maintenance.  The point was not explored in much detail.  However, the amount involved was ridiculously small.  That indicated to me a particular approach adopted by the father towards his obligations to maintain [X].  That approach did not impress me and it told of a niggardly attitude towards paying for discretionary items in favour of [X].  No comparable evidence existed in respect of the mother’s attitude towards [X].  Subject to a person’s personal budget, raising children can in some circumstances be a costly exercise.  Conversely, most parents who lovingly perform their roles as parents think nothing of spending their discretionary income on issues that benefit their children.

13. Subsection (d) required me to examine the likely effect of any change in [X]’s circumstances including the likely effect on him of any separation from either of his parents or any other child with whom he has been living.  There was no evidence either way on this point, it seemed to me.

14. Subsection (e) called for an investigation into the practical difficulty and expense of [X] spending time with and communicating with a parent.  There was no particular evidence on this issue that was the subject of highlight from either counsel.

15. Next, it became relevant to consider the capacity of each of the child’s parents and any other person to provide for the needs of [X], including his emotional and intellectual needs, as required by subsection (f).  The evidence, particularly from Dr J, revealed that both parents appeared to provide satisfactorily in respect of [X]’s emotional and intellectual needs.

16. Under subsection (g), maturity, sex, lifestyle and background of [X] and of each of his parents were relevant.  Both parents came from a broadly similar background in terms of cultural heritage and their stations in life. I detected nothing that warranted any particular attention in the manner contemplated by this subsection.

17. [X] is not of aboriginal heritage nor is he of Torres Strait Islander heritage and therefore subsection (h) was irrelevant.

18. Each parent’s attitude to [X] and to their responsibilities of parenthood as demonstrated by each of them was relevant for the purposes of subsection (i).  This point engaged the mainstay of debate in this case. There was no doubt that each parent believed, in a heartfelt way, that he and she had and was behaving in an appropriate matter when raising [X], even by engaging in the appalling fighting undertaken in the presence of [X].  They each said they took their responsibilities of parenthood seriously.  However, it seemed to me they were borderline clueless in raising a young child while concurrently exposing him to horrendous episodes of bickering, brawling and inappropriate conduct.  It must not be forgotten, each parent is in his and her forties.  These are not teenagers with a child.  These are educated adults who have come from a background not enjoyed by very many Australians. They should exhibit a much higher standard of behaviour than the levels of which they have stooped. They should demonstrate a sophisticated understanding of their responsibilities of parenthood, including the need to not expose their young son to the psychological damage occasioned when parents show no control and no restraint when fighting in front of their child. The effect on a child of that behaviour is well documented and need not be repeated here. Dr J alluded to some of it in her evidence.  I accept that unreservedly.

19. The time has come for the parents to grow up. They must stop preferring their selfish personal interests in this case.  Instead they must promote the best interests of their child, relegating to second if not last place their divisive personal attitudes and heightened enmity towards each other.

20. Sadly, my consideration of the issues in subsection (i) did not speak at all well of either parent.  By their unrestrained destructive behaviour towards each other, they exhibited a poor attitude towards their child and their abandonment of their responsibilities as parents.

21. Neither party suggested that physical family violence was involved in this case.  

22. Last, I am required to consider whether it would be preferable to make an order that would be least likely to lead to the institution of further litigation in relation to [X].  Several times previously, one or more judges of this court have agitated their minds over that consideration.  Despite that consideration, after so-called “final” orders were made in this case, later litigation followed, and quickly.  That does not speak at all well for the parties.  It seemed that to the parties had no idea what “final orders” mean.  They seemed to go to court in the recognition that whatever may be the outcome, it is temporary only and that they can persuade a judge to indulge their grievances yet again, giving them time in court and causing yet more federally funded resources to be exhausted on a consideration of their implacably obdurate nature and intransigence.

23. That must end.

24. In this proceeding I have pronounced orders. Ever hopefully, they are expressed as final orders.  I entertain no doubt whatsoever that long before [X] is 18 years of age the parties will be back in this court arguing over the unworkability of the orders that I have pronounced, levelling more personal insults against one another, directing more slings and arrows to the fact that their parenting can never be cooperative and that their poisonous relationship must wreak its deleterious effect upon [X].  That much seems to be an inalienable truth in this case.

25. It need not be.  The parties can choose to cooperate.  They can choose to show some maturity.  They can demonstrate that their selfish attitudes have been directed away from themselves with their endless pugilism.  They can step up by behaving as normal, responsible, caring adults by cooperatively parenting [X] so that his life – not theirs – is thereby enhanced.

26. I am willing to make final orders in this case notwithstanding my scepticism that those orders will endure.

27. For all those reasons I have made the orders recorded earlier in these reasons.

I certify that the preceding fifty-four (54) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of his Honour Judge Wilson

Date: 4 May 2018