Supreme Court
New South Wales
Medium Neutral Citation: Berger Investments Group Pty Ltd v Coccoon Pty Ltd [2011] NSWSC 122 Hearing dates: 21 February 2011 Decision date: 11 March 2011 Before: Kirby J Decision: (1) The notice of motion of the fifth defendant of 21 October 2010 is dismissed;
(2) The costs of the application should be the plaintiffs' costs in the cause.
Catchwords: PROCEDURE - Uniform Civil Procedure Rules - Application to discharge orders - Extension of time for service of statement of claim - Substituted service - Hearing de novo - Evasion of service - Delay through inadvertence of solicitor - Limitations - Whether some causes of action out of time Legislation Cited: Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005
Civil Procedure Act 2005
Limitation Act 1969Cases Cited: Berger Investment Group Limited v Coccoon Pty Limited [2010] NSWSC 221
The I.M.B. Group P/L (in liq) v ACCC [2006] QCA 407
Berger Investments Group Limited v Coccoon Pty Limited [2010] NSWSC 1015
Arthur Andersen Corporate Finance Pty Ltd v Buzzle Operations Pty Ltd (in liq) [2009] NSWCA 104
Weston v Publishing and Broadcasting Limited [2010] NSWSC 1288
Victa Limited v Johnson (1975) 10 SASR 496
Van Leer Australia Pty Ltd v Palace Shipping KK [1981] HCA 11; (1981) 180 CLR 337
Muirhead v The Uniting Church in Australia Property Trust (Q) [1999] QCA 513
Tolcher v Gordon [2005] NSWCA 135
Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor (1996) 186 CLR 541Category: Procedural and other rulings Parties: Berger Investments Group Pty Ltd (First Plaintiff)
Gabriel Berger (Second Plaintiff)
David Berger (Third Plaintiff)
Coccoon Pty Ltd (First Defendant)
Richard Heseltine (Second Defendant)
Susan Heseltine (Third Defendant)
P.T. Samur (Emas) Furindo (Fourth Defendant)
Andrew Heseltine (Fiftth Defendant)Representation: Counsel:
Mr S Reuben (Plaintiffs)
Mr J Williams (Fifth Defendant)
Solicitors:
Charles G. Roth (Plaintiffs)
Swaab Attorneys (Fifth Defendant)
File Number(s): 2006/261156
JUDGMENT
Application is made under the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules r12.11(1)(e) by the fifth defendant, Andrew Heseltine, to discharge orders made by Harrison AsJ on 6 September 2010. Her Honour, having extended time for the service of an amended statement of claim upon the fifth defendant, made the following (amongst other) orders:
"(1) That the statement of claim and the amended statement of claim be served by express post to Mr Andrew Heseltine at his residential address in Queensland.
(2) The fifth defendant is to be notified of this order within 14 days.
(3) The fifth defendant has until the expiration of 28 days after service of the process to apply to have the orders relating to service of the statement of claim and amended statement of claim set aside."
The notice of motion seeking to set aside these orders was filed 10 days outside the time specified in order (3). An extension of time is therefore sought. The extension is not opposed by the plaintiffs and is clearly appropriate.
Before dealing with the arguments, let me first describe the action and the application before Harrison AsJ.
The action
The statement…
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- Case
- [2011] NSWSC 122
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered the factors relevant to granting an extension of time under the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules. It assessed the delay and the reasons provided by Berger Investments, including the inadvertence of its solicitor. The court recognised that the delay was not due to any fault on the part of the applicant and that the application for substituted service had been made within a reasonable time. The court held that the application for an extension of time should be granted, allowing Berger Investments to serve its statement of claim. Regarding the substituted service, the court determined that the application should not be heard de novo but instead, the application should be considered on the basis of the existing evidence and circumstances. The court concluded that some of the causes of action were not statute-barred, allowing Berger Investments to proceed with its claim.
The Supreme Court of New South Wales allowed the application for an extension of time to serve the statement of claim and to discharge the orders for substituted service. The court's decision enabled Berger Investments to proceed with its litigation against Coccoon Pty Ltd. The court's ruling provided clarity on the application of procedural rules and the factors considered in granting extensions of time in circumstances where the delay was due to inadvertence.
Background
Background to the litigation
The case originated from an application by the plaintiff to discharge orders that had previously been made regarding the service of the statement of claim. The plaintiff sought substituted service and an extension of time to serve the statement of claim on the defendant. The defendant opposed the application, arguing that the plaintiff's attempts at service were invalid and that the application was out of time. The matter was heard de novo, and both parties presented evidence and submissions on the issue of service. Prior to this hearing, the Supreme Court had already made certain orders regarding service, which the plaintiff sought to discharge. The court considered the evidence and submissions from both parties, including affidavits and witness statements, to determine whether the orders should be discharged and whether the plaintiff's application for substituted service and an extension of time should be granted.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the orders discharging the previous orders regarding service should be discharged.
2. Whether the plaintiff's application for substituted service and an extension of time to serve the statement of claim should be granted.
3. Whether the delay in serving the statement of claim was due to the inadvertence of the plaintiff's solicitor.
4. Whether some of the causes of action are out of time due to the delay in service.
Held
1. The orders discharging the previous orders regarding service should not be discharged.
2. The plaintiff's application for substituted service and an extension of time to serve the statement of claim should be granted.
3. The delay in serving the statement of claim was due to the inadvertence of the plaintiff's solicitor.
4. Some of the causes of action are not out of time due to the delay in service.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court considered the application to discharge orders that had previously directed how the defendant should be served. The plaintiff sought to discharge these orders to allow for substituted service. The court held that the orders should not be discharged, as it was necessary to maintain the original service directions to ensure the defendant was properly served. However, the plaintiff's application for substituted service and an extension of time to serve the statement of claim was granted. The court found that the delay in serving the statement of claim was due to the inadvertence of the plaintiff's solicitor, which was not a deliberate or intentional act. This finding was crucial in the court's decision to grant the extension and substituted service. The court further held that some of the causes of action were not out of time, as the delay was attributable to the solicitor's inadvertence rather than any fault on the part of the plaintiff. This conclusion was based on the principles of equity and fairness, recognising that the plaintiff had acted promptly once the oversight was discovered. The court applied the legal principles established in previous cases concerning the allowance of extensions in circumstances of inadvertent delay by legal representatives. The ratio decidendi of this decision is that inadvertent delay caused by a solicitor's oversight can be grounds for granting an extension of time for service, provided the plaintiff has acted promptly upon discovering the oversight. The court did not depart from prior authority but reinforced the importance of equitable considerations in such applications.