Bensen and Secretary, Department of Social Services (Social services second review)

Bensen and Secretary, Department of Social Services (Social services second review) [2018] AATA 1076 (27 April 2018)
Division:GENERAL DIVISION
File Number: 2017/0449
Re:David Bensen
APPLICANT

AndSecretary, Department of Social Services
RESPONDENT

DECISION
Tribunal:Deputy President J Sosso
Date:27 April 2018
Place:Brisbane

The Tribunal affirms the decision under review.
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Deputy President J Sosso
CATCHWORDS
SOCIAL SECURITY – newstart allowance – sickness allowance – austudy payment – overpayments – payments under income protection insurance policies - whether debts against the Commonwealth are owed – Whether income insurance payments are ‘ordinary income’ – whether income insurance payments are ‘compensation’ - debt write off – whether sole administrative error - special circumstances – matters of relevance in determining special circumstances
LEGISLATION
Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975
A New Tax System (Family Assistance) Act 1999
Social Security Act 1991
CASES
Angelakos v Secretary, Department of Employment and Workplace Relations [2007] FCA 25
Groth v Secretary, Department of Social Security (1995) 40 ALD 541
Patterson and Secretary, Department of Social Services [2017] AATA 1566
Read v Commonwealth [1988] HCA 26; 167 CLR 57
Segran and Secretary, Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations [2008] AATA 799
Secretary, Department of Employment and Workplace Relations v Richards [2008] FCA 97
Secretary, Department of Social Security v Hales (1998) 82 FCR 154
Secretary, Department of Social Security and Winters [1997] AATA 594
Sekhon v Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services (2003) 132 FCR 126

REASONS FOR DECISION
Deputy President J Sosso
27 April 2018
INTRODUCTION

Mr David Bensen (the Applicant) applied to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal on 28 January 2017 for a review of a decision of the Social Services and Support Division of this Tribunal (AAT1) which decided that the Applicant was overpaid newstart allowance, sickness allowance and austudy payments. The debts arose during two time periods: 15 September 2011 to 28 February 2014 (the first debt period) and 8 June 2015 to 25 March 2016 (the second debt period). The amount of the claimed debt for the first debt period was recalculated during the course of previous proceedings, and amounted to $37,685.31 when the matter was heard by AAT1 – T19 pp. 742 – 743,
The Applicant received the following payments during the stated periods – T13 p. 142:
(a)sickness allowance – 15.09.2011 – 07.11.2011;
(b)newstart allowance – 08.11.2011 – 31.07.2012;
(c)austudy payments – 01.08.2012 – 28.02.2014; and
(d)newstart allowance - 08.06.2015 – 25.03.2016.
The Applicant, was, however, receiving insurance payments from 1 July 2011 to 30 June 2014.
In the period 1 July 2011 until 20 June 2012 the Applicant was paid $30,240 (gross) from MLC Limited under an income protection insurance policy – T19 p. 537.
During the period 1 July 2012 until 30 June 2013 the Applicant received $45,000 (gross) from The Universal Super Scheme pursuant to an income protection insurance policy – T19 p. 535.
In the following financial year (2013 – 2014) the Applicant was paid a further $45,660 (gross) from The Universal Super Scheme pursuant to his income protection insurance policy – T19 p. 536.
The Applicant is a lawyer by profession (T13 p. 175) but due to a “major depressive disorder” has not worked, or received income from any employment, since July 2011 – T5 p. 55, T 12 p. 103. He worked for two major Queensland based law firms in the 2009 – 2011 period as a solicitor – T5 p. 56. His employment in the first law firm was between July 2009 and January 2010. He commenced working for the second law firm in February 2010 and remained technically employed until 8 November 2011. The Applicant claims that he performed no gainful tasks for that firm from approximately 27 July 2011 until he was formally terminated on or about 8 November 2011 – T8 p. 91, T12 p. 103, T12 p. 107.
The Applicant had a partner, but this relationship ended on 16 October 2011 (T5 p. 46) and he ceased living in the family home - T 5 p. 57, T6 p. 72. When the Applicant completed a Centrelink “Separation Details” form in October 2011, he was living in accommodation where he was paying no rent, and stated: “not paying rent or board yet as I have no money but will be and will advise Centrelink then” – T6 p. 72. The Applicant also stated – T6 p. 73:
“I expect to receive something from the sale of our house, but I have no idea yet as we have not discussed this or gone to court.”
In an “Income and Assets” Centrelink form, also completed in October 2011, the Applicant listed two bank accounts which contained less than $200 – T7 p. 79 and a motor vehicle which was in his name which he estimated had a market value of $9000 – T7 p. 78.
Question 45 of the form sought information about compensation, insurance and/or damages, including personal accident and sickness insurance or income replacement insurance. The question posed was: “Have you (or your partner) ever CLAIMED or are your (or your partner) ABLE TO CLAIM compensation, insurance and/or damages.” The Applicant ticked the “Yes” box and wrote: “I have previously provided this information” – T7 p. 89.
A person responding in the affirmative to Question 45 is required to complete and attach a “Compensation and damages form” – “Mod C”. There is no record of the Applicant having completed this form.
In response to the Question 46, which was whether the Applicant or his partner was receiving or had ever been paid compensation, insurance and/or damages, The Applicant ticked the “No” box – T7 p. 89.
The treatment the Applicant received for his depressive disorder included drugs which resulted in him feeling “mentally cloudy, disoriented in the morning” T5 p. 55.
At some time after October 2011 the Applicant moved from Brisbane to Sydney and enrolled full-time in a Diploma of Screen and Media at the Sydney Film School. The Diploma was a 46 week course, but he was granted an extension in December 2013 until 15 February 2014 to complete and hand in his outstanding assignments – T10 p. 98. The Applicant notified Centrelink of this in a Statement dated 16 December 2013 – T11 p. 99:
“I am still studying my course, Diploma in Screen and Media. The school I attend has given those students who have not completed all assessment, until 15^th February 2014 to hand in all assessment to graduate by 15^th February 2014.
I have been clinically diagnosed with major depressive disorder for the past 2 years. I see a psychiatrist every month for treatment. This depressive disorder has been the reason I have not been able to complete my course within the usual time frame of 46 weeks. I am not able to work because of this medical condition. Can you please restore and back pay my Austudy payments”.
There is no dispute about the amount of income protection insurance payments that were credited to the Applicant or the quantum of the debts, at least as determined by AAT1 – T2 p. 8.
Fundamentally, there are two issues before the Tribunal:
(a)were the income protection insurance payments received by the Applicant properly to be taken into account as “ordinary income” under the relevant income tests prescribed by the Social Security Act 1991 (the Act); and
(b)whether all or any of the debts should be waived or written off.
This matter was dealt with “on the papers” pursuant to s 34J of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975.
CONSIDERATION
Preliminary issue
The Respondent, in the Secretary’s Statement of Issues, Facts and Contentions (SSIFC), raises as a preliminary issue (at paras 17 – 18) that the cancellation the Applicant’s newstart allowance was the correct and preferable decision.
The Tribunal’s attention was drawn to s 608(1) of the Act which provides that a newstart allowance is not payable if the person’s newstart allowance rate would be nil.
It is not contested, having regard to the quantum of income protection insurance payments received by the Applicant, that his newstart allowance rate was nil both at the date of its cancellation, and for some period prior to that. Consequently, the cancellation was in accordance with the Act.
Are the overpayments debts due to the Commonwealth?
Subsection 1223(1) of the Act provides that if a social security payment is made and a person “obtains the benefit of the payment” and was not entitled to “obtain that benefit” the amount of the payment is a debt due to the Commonwealth.
There is no issue in this matter that the Applicant received the social security payments and obtained the benefit of them. This is, therefore, not a matter where the question of obtaining benefit arises as was the case in, for example, Segran and Secretary, Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations [2008] AATA 799 and Patterson and Secretary, Department of Social Services [2017] AATA 1566.
Whether the monies received are debts properly owed to the Commonwealth can only be answered by resolving the key characterisation issue, namely whether the income protection insurance payments fall within the definition of “ordinary income”.
Were the income insurance payments “ordinary income”?
Sickness and newstart allowances as well as austudy payments are calculated based on rate calculators set out in the Act – ss 1067L and 1068. Both of the rate calculators require that a person’s “ordinary income” be assessed in making the calculations. Accordingly, “ordinary income” is ascertained by applying the formulae contained in the relevant modules – e.g. s 1068 – G. A precursor to applying the formulae, however, is to ascertain what comprises “ordinary income”.
Section 1072 provides that a reference in the Act to a person’s ordinary income for a period is a reference to the person’s gross or ordinary income from all sources for the period calculated without any reductions, other than a reduction under Division 1A.
Subsection 8(1), in turn, defines “ordinary income” as income that is not maintenance income or an exempt lump sum.
Maintenance income is defined by s 10 to have the same meaning as in the A New Tax System (Family Assistance) Act 1999, and, as such, relates to child and partner maintenance payments. Accordingly, the payments under consideration in this matter are unrelated to the concept of maintenance income.
An “exempt lump sum” is defined by s 8(11). The definition comprises four paragraphs, but the key paragraph is (d) which provides:
“the amount, is an amount, or class of amounts, determined by the Secretary to be an exempt lump sum.”
It is not contested that the Secretary has not determined that income protection insurance payments are exempt lump sums.
Consequently, the first, and fundamental, step in the process of ascertaining what comprises “ordinary income” is to consider how the Act defines “income” - see Secretary Department of Employment and Workplace Relations v Richards [2008] FCA 97.
The term “income” is defined by s 8(1) to mean:
“income, in relation to a person means:
(a) an income amount earned, derived or received by the person for the person’s own use or benefit; or
(b) a periodical payment by way of gift or allowance; or
(c) a periodical benefit by way of gift or allowance;
but does not include an amount that is excluded under subsection (4), (5) or (8).”
It will be noted that in paragraph (a) of the definition, the term “income amount” is used. The concept of “income amount” is also defined in s 8(1) as follows:
“income amount means:
(a) valuable consideration; or
(b) personal earnings; or
(c) moneys; or
(d) profits;
(whether or a capital sum or not).”
The Respondent contends (SSIFC para 24), and the Tribunal agrees, that the definition of “income” in the Act has a wider ambit than the ordinary meaning of that word. It is also the case that the definition is exhaustive and not inclusive. Brennan J in Read v Commonwealth (1988) 167 CLR 57 made the following observations (at 69):
“The definition is exhaustive: the term ‘income’ means what it is defined to mean; it does not mean what ‘income’ would be understood to mean if the definition were not in the Act. The definition is couched in the widest terms, presumably to ensure that public expenditure is directed to those who stand in actual need of periodic support which income-related pensions provide.”
Accordingly, proceeding from first principles, in order for a sum of money (used in its broadest sense) to be characterised as income for the purposes of the Act, it must fall within paragraphs (a) to (c) of the definition of “income” unless it is specifically excluded by the operation of s 8(4),(5) or (8). The key concept in paragraph (a) is the term “income amount” which is also specifically defined by s 8(1). That definition, in turn, casts its net widely to include a wide array of monetary concepts, which, by their very nature, overlap.
Further, paragraph (a) of the definition of “income” is drafted so that the reason underlying its receipt is rendered basically irrelevant. If a person earns, derives or receives an income amount, then that person is caught by the definition of “income”.
The Respondent contends (SSIFC para 25) that the moneys paid to the Applicant under his income protection insurance policies are “income” as defined. It is submitted that they are an “income amount” received for the Applicant’s own use or benefit and are not excluded by any of the provisions set out in s 8(4), (5), or (8).
The Respondent specifically draws the Tribunal’s attention (SSIFC para 26) to the exclusion from the definition of income in s 8(8)(k) namely:
“insurance or compensation payments made by reason of the loss of, or damage to, buildings, plant or personal effects.”
The definition of “income” is broad and exhaustive. The statutory scheme is based on approaching the concept of income by giving it the broadest possible meaning, and then dealing with the injustices, inconsistencies and overlaps by means of specific statutory exclusions. The fact that one of the many statutory exclusions concerns insurance payments made by reason of loss of, or damage to, buildings, plant or personal effects, indicates that insurance payments, of whatever kind, are caught by the definition of “income”. It follows as a matter of clear statutory interpretation, that income protection insurance payments are income for the purposes of the Act. Even the nomenclature of the type of insurance involved, leads to that conclusion.
The Applicant, however, raises two issues which he submits warrant a different finding.
The Applicant draws the Tribunal’s attention (Outline of Applicant’s Arguments (OAA) paras 4 – 13) to the definition of “compensation” in s 17(2) which includes a payment under a scheme of insurance or compensation, whether as a lump sum or periodic payments, “that is made wholly or partly in respect of lost earnings or last capacity to earn resulting from personal injury.”
The Applicant then draws the Tribunal’s attention to the definition of “employment income” in s 8(1A) which specifically excludes (at (d)) payments of compensation or payments under an insurance scheme, in relation to the person’s inability to earn, derive or receive income from remunerative work.
The Applicant’s submissions are misconceived. The sole focus of the Tribunal’s inquiry is determining the Applicant’s ordinary income. Whether or not his insurance payments fall within the concept of compensation is s 17 is not germane to the question to be determined.
Central to this matter is whether the Applicant’s insurance payments fall within the definition of “income” and are not otherwise excluded by the Act. AAT1 was at great pains to explain that the income test that stipulates the method of calculating the maximum payment rate of social security benefits is calculated by reference to ordinary income and not employment income T2 p.9 para 10.
The second issue, though not pressed in the Applicant’s written submission, was raised previously, and, in fairness, should be dealt with.
The Applicant submitted at AAT1 that the insurance payments should not be regarded as “ordinary income” as the circumstances surrounding the receipt of such payments was “extraordinary”. This was said to be so because the Applicant was suffering from a major depressive illness that prevented him from working, precluded him from practising in the law and required him to train for another field of endeavour – T2 p. 10 para 12.
Leaving aside the question whether in fact the Applicant’s circumstances could be characterised as “extraordinary”, the scheme of the Act does not allow the Tribunal to engage in such an exercise. The sole task required of a decision-maker is to assess the quantum of the Applicant’s “ordinary income”. Questions of fairness or uniqueness lie outside the purview of a decision-maker. Whether the Applicant’s circumstances were extraordinary or not is irrelevant to working out the quantum of his income. That exercise is grounded on applying the statutory provisions to the evidence presented. Subjective considerations may be relevant when considering the provisions relating to debt waiver or write off.
CONCLUSION
The Tribunal finds that the first and second debts are debts owed by the Applicant to the Commonwealth.
Are the debts to be recovered?
Debt write-off
The Respondent is empowered, pursuant to s 1236 of the Act, to write off a debt for a stated period or otherwise if:
(a)the debt is irrecoverable at law;
(b)the debtor has no capacity to repay the debt;
(c)the debtor’s whereabouts are unknown; or
(d)it Is not cost-effective for the Commonwealth to take action to recover the debt..
In this matter the Applicant’s whereabouts are known, the debts are recoverable at law and it is cost-effective for the Commonwealth to take action to recover the debts.
As the matter was dealt with on the papers, the Tribunal did not have the benefit of receiving oral testimony from the Applicant. However, in order to find that a debtor has no capacity to repay the debts owed, there usually has to be evidence of severe financial hardship. There is no evidence of this degree of hardship. On the contrary, AAT1 found – T2 p. 10 para 16:
“Mr Bensen’s financial position today, having regard to his continuing income protection payments, means that he is significantly better off than a person who is entirely dependent on income support.”
The Tribunal has not been presented with any evidence of a material change in the Applicant’s financial circumstances since the AAT1 heard from the Applicant on 27 October 2016.
In these circumstances, there is no scope for the writing off the debts for a stated period pursuant to s 1236.
Sole administrative error
Section 1237A requires the Respondent to waive the right to recover the proportion of a debt that is attributable solely to an administrative error made by the Commonwealth. Waiver, however, is dependent on the debtor receiving the payments in good faith and suffering severe financial hardship if the debt is not waived.
In Sekhon v Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services (2003) 132 FCR 126 Heerey J, on behalf of the Full Federal Court, said ([35]/135):
“The ordinary or usual interpretation of the phrase ‘attributable solely to’ is that it refers to the single or sole cause of the relevant act or event. The word ‘attributable’ means ‘capable of being attributed’. It involves an objective assessment of causation. The words ‘a debt attributable solely to an administrative error’ can be paraphrased as meaning that the only cause that objectively can be ascribed to the relevant debt is an administrative error.”
The evidence presented does not lead to the conclusion that the debts arose solely because of administrative error by the Commonwealth, or, indeed, any administrative error.

During the period 2 November 2011 to 20 January 2016 the Department of Human Services (the Department) sent numerous letters and statements to the Applicant advising him of the income and other details being used to calculate his various social security payments. The letters and statements also informed the Applicant of his requirement to advise, within 14 days, of any changes in his circumstances which included any increases in income – T18 pp. 190 – 450.
Despite receiving this information, the Applicant failed to inform the Department of his insurance payments and accordingly was paid social security on an incorrect premise. The failure to inform the Department is all the more serious because of the Applicant’s legal training and obvious intelligence. Despite his psychiatric condition, a reading of the T documents suggests that the Applicant is a very competent individual who can analyse issues, write cogently and argue persuasively – e.g. T12 pp 100 - 102, 103 – 105, 106 – 109 and, in particular, 114 - 118. In short, if there was any social security recipient who should have been put on notice of their responsibilities to inform the Department of any possible issues, it would have been the Applicant.
Consequently, there is no basis for waiving the debts on the basis of sole administrative error by the Commonwealth.
Special circumstances
Section 1237AAD of the Act provides that the Respondent may waive the right to recover all or part of a debt if the Respondent is satisfied that:
“(a) the debt did not result wholly or partly from the debtor or another person knowingly:
(i) making a false statement or false representation; or
(ii) failing or omitting to comply with a provision of this Act, the Administration Act or the 1947 Act; and
(b) there are special circumstances (other than financial hardship alone) that make it desirable to waive; and
(c) it is more appropriate to waive than to write off the debt or part of the debt.”
There is a considerable body of jurisprudence on what constitutes “special circumstances”, however for present purposes reference can be made to the following observation of Kiefel J (as she then was) in Groth v Secretary, Department of Social Security (1995) 40 ALD 541 at 545:
“The phrase ‘special circumstances’, it has been said, although imprecise is sufficiently understood not to require judicial gloss: Beadle’s case (at ALR 229; ALD 674), and for present purposes it is sufficient to observe that it would require something to distinguish Mr Groth’s case from others, to take it out of the usual or ordinary case. That was, I consider, the only enquiry to be undertaken in this case. It would of course follow that if one were to conclude that something unfair, unintended or unjust had occurred that there must be some feature out of the ordinary.”
As French J (as he then was) observed in Secretary, Department of Social Security v Hales (1998) 82 FCR 154 at 162 (Hales), the concept of special circumstances is broad and a constellation of factors may fall within it. The ability to waive a social security debt on the basis of special circumstances is a feature of various Commonwealth statutes. The Act is but one of these. Nonetheless, each of these provisions is alike in providing, as French J observed (at 162):
“a flexible response to the wide range of situations which could give rise to hardship or unfairness in the event of a rigid application of a requirement for recovery of debt.”
It will be noted that both Kiefel J and French J avert to concepts of unfairness, unjustness, hardship and unintended consequences. Although each of the many Federal Court decisions have in common an emphasis on not limiting the operation of special circumstances by the enunciation of rigid formulae, all are linked by a focus on whether the particular circumstances of each case disclose that the rigid application of the debt recovery provisions of the relevant statute would produce a result which an ordinary citizen would say is unfair, harsh or inappropriate.
Certainly, in the normal course, where there has been an overpayment of social security benefits the expectation of the Australian community would be that any excess payment is repaid. However, a rigid application of this principle in all cases would be productive of harsh and unintended results that would be unacceptable to most citizens. It is for this reason that there is the ability to waive or write-off debts. The tension in balancing the overarching policy of preventing unjust enrichment with the need to ensure fairness and equity in particular situations was helpfully explained by French J in Hales as follows (155):
“From time to time in the administration of social security benefits overpayments occur. Sometimes these are the result of innocent non-compliance with the requirements of the law which can be affected by the stress associated with the circumstances that led to the receipt of the benefits in the first place. The taxpayer is entitled to expect that in the ordinary course money paid to people which they are not entitled to receive will be recovered, albeit in a way appropriate to the circumstances which led to the overpayment and the circumstances of the persons concerned. However, the confining of a recovery regime by rigid rules, particularly in this area of the law, is likely to be productive of unfair or harsh outcomes in some of the great variety of fact situations that can arise. There are provisions in the Act which recognise that reality. They relate to the writing off and waiver of debts… where special circumstances are found to exist. There is a tension in the construction of such provisions between the needs for certainty of application and flexibility of response to the situations that may arise from time to time.”
It is important to note at the outset, and as the Respondent accepts (SSIFC para 53), there is no evidence which would support a finding that the Applicant made a knowingly false statement or knowingly failed to comply with the Act.
The Applicant draws to the Tribunal’s attention his claimed extreme financial hardship – OAS paras 14 – 20;
“14. Where a person registers and becomes homeless because they cannot afford rental bonds and rent, they can be said to under extreme financial hardship. The Applicant registered homeless twice and had nowhere to live while the Applicant was previously living and studying in Sydney.
15. The Applicant says that the purpose of social security payments and the purpose of the Act is to provide a person with the ability to afford the basic necessities of living which includes rental in the city where the person lives.
16. The poverty threshold, poverty limit or poverty line is the minimum level of income deemed adequate in a particular country, it is the estimated minimum level of income needed to secure the necessities of life.
17. In October 2016, ACOSS released a report ‘Poverty in Australia Report 2016’ that shows 36.1% of people receiving social security payments were living below the poverty line, including 55% of those receiving Newstart Allowance, 51.5% receiving Parenting Payment.
18. The Report measures poverty as the number of people living below the poverty line of 50% median household income.
19. Average Australian earnings were A$82.804 per annum in November 2016 according to the Australian Bureau of Statistics ( The Applicant, based on these definitions of poverty and median household income, lives below the poverty limit for which the intention and purpose of enacting the Social Security Act was to relieve.”
In Hales French J also made the following observations (162):
“The concept of special circumstances is broad. A constellation of factors, including financial circumstances, may fall within it. The express exclusion of financial hardship alone as a special circumstance is an indicator that it would otherwise be included. This gives some measure of the range of circumstances which will qualify as special. But as a matter of grammar and ordinary logic, the exclusion of financial hardship alone as a special circumstance does not mandate its inclusion in the range of matters constituting such circumstances for the purpose of enlivening the Secretary’s discretion…
It may well be that there are few cases in which having found special circumstances to exist, the Secretary would exercise the discretion to waive in the absence of financial hardship”.
As French J explains, financial hardship is usually the foundation stone on which a special circumstances case is built. Absent financial hardship, an applicant would have difficulties in founding a persuasive case for establishing special circumstances.
The Tribunal has, on a number of occasions, exercised the discretion where there is evidence that an applicant’s psychiatric condition has materially impacted on either their failure to notify the Department or in some other way negatively impacted their capacity to live - e.g Secretary, Department of Social Security and Winters [1997] AATA 594.
In this case, there is no evidence that the Applicant is experiencing “extreme” financial hardship. Certainly, the Tribunal was presented with no evidence that he is currently homeless, destitute, impecunious, living on the streets or otherwise “in extremis”. If there was such evidence, then, of course, there may be grounds for exercising the discretion.
The Applicant has presented the Tribunal with a case based on arguments about how the social security safety net should operate. It may well be, as ACOSS submitted, that a very large proportion of social security recipients are living below the poverty line. If that be the case, then it highlights that when administering the social security system, great care must be taken to ensure that finite public revenue is directed to those most in need. The revenue stream used to support those in need is not infinite and a great many taxpayers also fall below the poverty line.
So the starting point in considering the exercise of the discretion in s 127AAD is that an applicant is in financial hardship, as with most social security recipients, but there is something that distinguishes his or her predicament from the ordinary or usual case – Angelakos v Secretary, Department of Employment and Workplace Relations [2007] FCA 25.
There is nothing on the evidence which distinguishes the Applicant’s position from most social security recipients, except perhaps that he has had the very great advantage of receiving income insurance payments over an extended period of time. In this respect the Applicant has been in a financially superior position to most social security recipients. Further, despite his mental health problems, he has still enrolled in tertiary studies, and as the T documents highlight, has an excellent grasp of the English language and is able to write and present an argument founded on a difficult area of the law in a persuasive manner.
In short, there are no apparent special circumstances that would support a favourable exercise of the discretion in s 1237AAD.
DECISION
The Tribunal affirms the decisions under review, noting that the first debt amount has been recalculated from 5 July 2016.

I certify that the preceding 74 (seventy-four) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of Deputy President J Sosso

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Associate
Dated: 27 April 2018

Date of hearing:

Date Decision Reserved:

Applicant:

Respondent’s Representative:

Hearing on the Papers

19 February 2018

David Bensen

Jasmine Forsyth
Department of Human Services

[2018] AATA 1076

27 April 2018

Key Legal Topics

Areas of Law

Administrative Law

Statutory Interpretation

Legal Concepts

Judicial Review

Statutory Construction

Jurisdiction

Appeal

Natural Justice

Procedural Fairness