Bennett v President, Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission

Link copied
Case Copied 80 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Bennett v President, Human Rights and Equal Opportunity
Commission [2003] FCA 1433

HUMAN RIGHTS – complaint to HREOC that employer had infringed freedom of expression and discriminated against public servant in workplace – HREOC decision to discontinue inquiry into complaints – decision based on public service regulation (Reg 7(13)) requiring Commonwealth public servants not to disclose information about public business or anything of which he or she has official knowledge

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW – validity of Regulation 7(13) under Public Service Act 1922 (Cth) – regulation infringes implied freedom of political communication – not appropriate or adapted to serving a purpose that does not unreasonably impair the freedom

EMPLOYMENT LAW – Public Service – duty of loyalty and fidelity – secrecy obligation – permissible public comment and disclosure of official information

HUMAN RIGHTS – right to freedom of expression under ICCPR – whether restriction necessary for protection of public order – restriction founded on Regulation 7(13) not necessary for protection of public order – open to HREOC to consider if necessary for protection of public order if restriction based on Commonwealth employee’s implied contractual duty to serve with good faith and fidelity

HUMAN RIGHTS – discrimination – inherent requirements of the job – public servant’s duty of loyalty and fidelity – conflict between employee’s dual role as public servant and as trade union official

Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act1977 (Cth)
Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), s 70
Commonwealth Public Service Act 1902 (Cth)
Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Act 1986 (Cth), ss 3(1), 11(1)(f), 20(2)(a), 31(b), 32(3)(a)
Public Service Act 1922 (Cth), ss 25(2), 56, 62, 97(1)(k)
Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth)
Public Sector Management Act 1995 (SA)
Public Service Regulations 1913 (Cth), Reg 41
Public Service Regulations 1998 (Cth), Reg 7(13)
Civil Service Regulations 1867 (Vic), Regs 20, 21
Public Service Regulations 1884 (Vic), Regs 33, 34, 36
Public Service Regulations 1896 (NSW), Reg 74
Public Sector Management Regulations 1995 (SA)

Official Secrets Act 1889 (UK), s 2(1)
Official Secrets Act 1911 (UK)
Official Secrets Act 1989 (UK)
Public Service Employment Act (Canada) RSC 1970, c P-32
Civil Service Management Code 1993 (UK)

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Art 19
Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention 1958

Anderson v Sullivan (1997) 78 FCR 380 cited
Boulting v Association of Cinematograph Television and Allied Technologies [1963] 2 QB 606 cited
Clark Boyce v Mouat [1994] 1 AC 428 cited
Commonwealth v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd (1980) 147 CLR 39 considered
Connick v Myers 461 US 138 (1983) considered
de Freitas v Permanent Secretary of Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, Lands and Housing [1999] 1 AC 69 considered
Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Plowman (1995) 183 CLR 10 cited
Finance Sector Union of Australia v Australian & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (2002) 120 FCR 107 applied
Haydon v Canada [2001] 2 FC 27 considered
Hivac Ltd v Park Royal Scientific Instruments Ltd [1946] Ch 169 applied
John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd v Attorney-General (NSW)

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Bennett v President, Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Comm... and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2003] FCA 1433
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Bennett v President, Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, the applicant, Mr Bennett, challenged the decision of the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (HREOC) to decline to continue its inquiry into his complaint. Mr Bennett, who was the President of the Customs Officers' Association (COA), was disciplined by Customs for making public statements about drug importation during the Olympic Games. He alleged that this disciplinary action was discriminatory and in breach of his human rights. The legal issues before the court included whether the direction given by Customs was beyond its power and whether the actions taken by Customs constituted discrimination under the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Act 1986 (Cth).

The court found that the Delegate's decision to decline to continue the inquiry was flawed. The Delegate, Ms Clifford, concluded that Mr Bennett's actions did not constitute discrimination because they were based on the inherent requirements of his position as a public servant. Specifically, the Delegate held that it was an inherent requirement for Mr Bennett to not impede the effective operations of Customs and to comply with the legislation governing employment in the Australian Public Service, which included a prohibition on making public comments on matters of which he had knowledge through his work. The court disagreed, stating that while there are legitimate reasons to regulate the disclosure of certain information, the broad scope of Regulation 7(13) unreasonably compromised the implied freedom of political communication by effectively allowing censorship. The court held that the decision of HREOC to decline to continue the inquiry was unlawful and ordered that the matter be referred back to HREOC for further consideration.

The court's final orders included allowing the application, setting aside the decision of HREOC of 27 July 2001, and referring the matter back to HREOC for further consideration. This decision underscores the importance of balancing the need for public servants to adhere to certain limitations with the protection of freedom of political communication.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application be allowed.

2. The decision of the first respondent of 27 July 2001 declining to continue to inquire into the applicant’s complaints be set aside.

3. The matter be referred to the first respondent for further consideration.

Background

Background to the litigation

Mr Bennett, the President of the Customs Officers Association, filed a complaint with the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (HREOC) regarding the actions taken against him by the Australian Customs Service. The complaint stemmed from Mr Bennett's media interviews discussing drug importation ahead of the Sydney Olympics, which Customs considered to be in breach of his employment terms. Customs issued directions to Mr Bennett, which he failed to comply with, resulting in formal charges being laid against him under the Public Service Act 1922. Mr Bennett's complaint to HREOC included the assertion that the direction given to him by Customs on 21 September was unlawful as it was beyond power, and all subsequent actions taken by Customs were not lawful. On 27 July 2001, the Delegate, Ms Clifford, decided not to continue the inquiry into Mr Bennett's complaint, finding that the actions taken by Customs did not constitute discrimination and were based on the inherent requirements of Mr Bennett's job as a public servant.

The case before the court was an appeal against the decision made by the Delegate of HREOC on 27 July 2001, which declined to continue the inquiry into Mr Bennett's complaint. The matter originated from Mr Bennett's complaint to HREOC regarding actions taken by Customs, which he considered to be discriminatory and in breach of his human rights. The Delegate assessed the complaint and concluded that the actions of Customs did not constitute discrimination and were justified by the inherent requirements of Mr Bennett's position as a public servant. Mr Bennett sought judicial review of the Delegate's decision, leading to the current appeal before the court.

Decision

Reasons for decision

FINN J
On 8 March 2001 Mr Bennett wrote to HREOC. The principal purpose of this letter was the “Clarification of the unlawfulness of the direction and the charges”. The clarification provided is calculated to confuse. Nonetheless, the burden of it would seem to be the contention that the direction given on 21 September was unlawful because it was beyond power, apparently for reasons relating to limitations on the scope of Reg 7(13). In consequence, “all directions and authorisations, which flowed from the original direction, were not lawful”.HREOC’S DECISION The Delegate, Ms Clifford, provided HREOC’s decision to Mr Bennett on 27 July 2001. As I earlier indicated the decision was that she declined to continue her inquiry into his complaint as she was not satisfied that the acts complained of were inconsistent with or contrary to Mr Bennett’s human rights or constituted discrimination. The Delegate’s reasons for decision characterised Mr Bennett’s complaint as being, in substance, the first two of the three complaints in the original complaint form. I emphasise in passing that, insofar as the third of those complaints related to the implied “constitutional freedom”, Ms Clifford had already indicated that HREOC lacked jurisdiction to entertain that complaint. The reasons noted (inter alia) that:“Customs states that the disciplinary proceedings that were taken against you were done so because of its understanding at the time of the scope and operation of Public Service Regulation 7(13). Customs states that during the Federal Court proceedings against you it became aware that its interpretation of Regulation 7(13) was too broad, which is why it commenced settlement negotiations and agreed to pay your costs.” In making her own assessment of the complaints the Delegate dealt first with the discrimination complaint. She took the view that (i) as Mr Bennett was representing the view of the COA as its President in the radio interviews, that constituted trade union activity for the purposes of the HREOC Act; and (ii) the concerns he expressed constituted “political opinion” under the Act. In each case though the “critical issue” was whether the way he was treated by Customs constituted discrimination on the basis of his trade union activity or political opinion. Ms Clifford noted that a distinction, exclusion or preference would not constitute discrimination under the Act if, in respect of a particular job, it was “based on the inherent requirements of the job”. She then characterised those requirements in his case as follows: “I am satisfied that it is an inherent requirement any public service position that a person not impede the effective operations of the agency for which he or she works. It is also an inherent requirement that an employee comply with the legislation that governs employment in the Australian Public Service. Public Service Regulation 7 states in part that you must obey all reasonable directions given to you by a person who has the authority to do so, and also that you are not permitted to make public comment on matters of which you have knowledge through your work. Emphasis added.I have also examined findings of the ILO in relation to ILO111 and its discussions of the need for public servants to have certain limitations in relation to their actions and public comments. The ILO has accepted that there are limitations for public servants in relation to the expression of political opinions where a certain obligation of neutrality and loyalty can be required. …I am also satisfied that it is an inherent requirement of being a public servant that a person not criticise his or her employer in the media in a way that would damage the reputation or operational capacity of the agency. I am satisfied that this inherent requirement would include that a person employed by Customs should constrain their public comments so as to not create an apprehension of loss of confidence by the public in the services provided by Customs or undermine the core function of the agency in relation to protecting Australia’s borders.I note that you were not prevented by Customs from making any comments, public or private, in the course of your role as President of the COA, just from making media comments. You have provided information to the Commission that demonstrates that you wrote to the Minister and the Prime Minister as well as the Leader of the Opposition and the Australian Olympic Committee expressing concerns about the importation of drugs prior to the Olympics. You were not sanctioned for such letters and comments. It was comments in the media that caused Customs’ concern and led to your being warned and then charged. While I understand that you were mostly speaking of these things as President of the COA, you were at the same time an employee of the Australian Public Service and so were bound to follow a reasonable order not to speak to the media about things that you have official knowledge.” Emphasis added.The Delegate then concluded (in the following paragraph):“As this is the case, I am satisfied that the actions of Customs in relation to your being charged under the Public Service Act 1922 were based on the inherent requirements of your position and so did not constitute discrimination. This also means that any subsequent acts of Customs, such as your transfer, did not constitute discrimination.” Emphasis added.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: FINN J

There are, unquestionably, species of official information the disclosure of which the State, properly, might wish to regulate or prohibit for reasons of public interest relating, variously, to the nature of the information, the circumstances of its generation or acquisition or the timing or possible consequences of its disclosure. So, for example, the present Civil Service Management Code in the UK provides (4.1 Annex A, para 10):“Civil servants should not without authority disclose official information which has been communicated in confidence within the Administration, or received in confidence from others. Nothing in the Code should be taken as overriding existing statutory or common law obligations to keep confidential, or to disclose, certain information. They should not seek to frustrate or influence the policies, decisions or actions of Ministers, Assembly Secretaries or the National Assembly as a body by the unauthorised, improper or premature disclosure outside the Administration of any information to which they have had access as civil servants:” emphasis added.I should add, given my earlier reference to the Official Secrets Act 1911 (UK), that that Act was repealed in 1989 and its successor, the Official Secrets Act 1989 (UK), abandoned the “catch-all” approach in favour (as stated in its preamble) of “protecting more limited classes of official information”. It is one thing to regulate the disclosure of particular information for legitimate reasons relating to that information and/or to the effects of its disclosure. It is another to adopt the catch-all approach of Reg 7(13) which does not purport either to differentiate between species of information or the consequences of disclosure. It is noteworthy in this that the very breadth of Reg 7(13) has been relied upon by the Commonwealth in association with the penal sanction of s 70 of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) as a deterrence to public whistleblowing: see eg Public Service Commission, Guidelines on Official Conduct of Commonwealth Public Servants, 95 (1995). The Commonwealth in its submissions has suggested that the authorisation exception in Reg 7(13) in effect provides for this differentiation to be made and in somewhat the same way as authorised officers make determinations under Freedom of Information legislation. Further, it is said, the discretion given the agency head would not offend the implied freedom as it must be read down so as to conform with that freedom. There is a number of responses that can be made to this, the most blunt being that placing “an unbridled discretion” in the hands of an Agency Head may, or may appear to, “result in censorship”: cf Wolf v City of Aberdeen 758 F Supp 551 (1991) at 555. Distinctly, when this authorisation mechanism is considered as part of the balancing process required by the second Lange test, it unreasonably compromises the freedom by transforming the freedom into a dispensation. It is not an appropriate filtering device to protect the efficient workings of government in a way that is compatible with the freedom. The suggested “reading down” proposed by the Commonwealth merely highlights that inappropriateness.