FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Bennett v President, Human Rights and Equal Opportunity
Commission [2003] FCA 1433HUMAN RIGHTS – complaint to HREOC that employer had infringed freedom of expression and discriminated against public servant in workplace – HREOC decision to discontinue inquiry into complaints – decision based on public service regulation (Reg 7(13)) requiring Commonwealth public servants not to disclose information about public business or anything of which he or she has official knowledge
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW – validity of Regulation 7(13) under Public Service Act 1922 (Cth) – regulation infringes implied freedom of political communication – not appropriate or adapted to serving a purpose that does not unreasonably impair the freedom
EMPLOYMENT LAW – Public Service – duty of loyalty and fidelity – secrecy obligation – permissible public comment and disclosure of official information
HUMAN RIGHTS – right to freedom of expression under ICCPR – whether restriction necessary for protection of public order – restriction founded on Regulation 7(13) not necessary for protection of public order – open to HREOC to consider if necessary for protection of public order if restriction based on Commonwealth employee’s implied contractual duty to serve with good faith and fidelity
HUMAN RIGHTS – discrimination – inherent requirements of the job – public servant’s duty of loyalty and fidelity – conflict between employee’s dual role as public servant and as trade union official
Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act1977 (Cth)
Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), s 70
Commonwealth Public Service Act 1902 (Cth)
Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Act 1986 (Cth), ss 3(1), 11(1)(f), 20(2)(a), 31(b), 32(3)(a)
Public Service Act 1922 (Cth), ss 25(2), 56, 62, 97(1)(k)
Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth)
Public Sector Management Act 1995 (SA)
Public Service Regulations 1913 (Cth), Reg 41
Public Service Regulations 1998 (Cth), Reg 7(13)
Civil Service Regulations 1867 (Vic), Regs 20, 21
Public Service Regulations 1884 (Vic), Regs 33, 34, 36
Public Service Regulations 1896 (NSW), Reg 74
Public Sector Management Regulations 1995 (SA)Official Secrets Act 1889 (UK), s 2(1)
Official Secrets Act 1911 (UK)
Official Secrets Act 1989 (UK)
Public Service Employment Act (Canada) RSC 1970, c P-32
Civil Service Management Code 1993 (UK)International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Art 19
Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention 1958Anderson v Sullivan (1997) 78 FCR 380 cited
Boulting v Association of Cinematograph Television and Allied Technologies [1963] 2 QB 606 cited
Clark Boyce v Mouat [1994] 1 AC 428 cited
Commonwealth v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd (1980) 147 CLR 39 considered
Connick v Myers 461 US 138 (1983) considered
de Freitas v Permanent Secretary of Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, Lands and Housing [1999] 1 AC 69 considered
Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Plowman (1995) 183 CLR 10 cited
Finance Sector Union of Australia v Australian & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (2002) 120 FCR 107 applied
Haydon v Canada [2001] 2 FC 27 considered
Hivac Ltd v Park Royal Scientific Instruments Ltd [1946] Ch 169 applied
John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd v Attorney-General (NSW)
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- Case
- [2003] FCA 1433
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that the Delegate's decision to decline to continue the inquiry was flawed. The Delegate, Ms Clifford, concluded that Mr Bennett's actions did not constitute discrimination because they were based on the inherent requirements of his position as a public servant. Specifically, the Delegate held that it was an inherent requirement for Mr Bennett to not impede the effective operations of Customs and to comply with the legislation governing employment in the Australian Public Service, which included a prohibition on making public comments on matters of which he had knowledge through his work. The court disagreed, stating that while there are legitimate reasons to regulate the disclosure of certain information, the broad scope of Regulation 7(13) unreasonably compromised the implied freedom of political communication by effectively allowing censorship. The court held that the decision of HREOC to decline to continue the inquiry was unlawful and ordered that the matter be referred back to HREOC for further consideration.
The court's final orders included allowing the application, setting aside the decision of HREOC of 27 July 2001, and referring the matter back to HREOC for further consideration. This decision underscores the importance of balancing the need for public servants to adhere to certain limitations with the protection of freedom of political communication.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application be allowed.
2. The decision of the first respondent of 27 July 2001 declining to continue to inquire into the applicant’s complaints be set aside.
3. The matter be referred to the first respondent for further consideration.
Background
Background to the litigation
The case before the court was an appeal against the decision made by the Delegate of HREOC on 27 July 2001, which declined to continue the inquiry into Mr Bennett's complaint. The matter originated from Mr Bennett's complaint to HREOC regarding actions taken by Customs, which he considered to be discriminatory and in breach of his human rights. The Delegate assessed the complaint and concluded that the actions of Customs did not constitute discrimination and were justified by the inherent requirements of Mr Bennett's position as a public servant. Mr Bennett sought judicial review of the Delegate's decision, leading to the current appeal before the court.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: FINN J
There are, unquestionably, species of official information the disclosure of which the State, properly, might wish to regulate or prohibit for reasons of public interest relating, variously, to the nature of the information, the circumstances of its generation or acquisition or the timing or possible consequences of its disclosure. So, for example, the present Civil Service Management Code in the UK provides (4.1 Annex A, para 10):“Civil servants should not without authority disclose official information which has been communicated in confidence within the Administration, or received in confidence from others. Nothing in the Code should be taken as overriding existing statutory or common law obligations to keep confidential, or to disclose, certain information. They should not seek to frustrate or influence the policies, decisions or actions of Ministers, Assembly Secretaries or the National Assembly as a body by the unauthorised, improper or premature disclosure outside the Administration of any information to which they have had access as civil servants:” emphasis added.I should add, given my earlier reference to the Official Secrets Act 1911 (UK), that that Act was repealed in 1989 and its successor, the Official Secrets Act 1989 (UK), abandoned the “catch-all” approach in favour (as stated in its preamble) of “protecting more limited classes of official information”. It is one thing to regulate the disclosure of particular information for legitimate reasons relating to that information and/or to the effects of its disclosure. It is another to adopt the catch-all approach of Reg 7(13) which does not purport either to differentiate between species of information or the consequences of disclosure. It is noteworthy in this that the very breadth of Reg 7(13) has been relied upon by the Commonwealth in association with the penal sanction of s 70 of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) as a deterrence to public whistleblowing: see eg Public Service Commission, Guidelines on Official Conduct of Commonwealth Public Servants, 95 (1995). The Commonwealth in its submissions has suggested that the authorisation exception in Reg 7(13) in effect provides for this differentiation to be made and in somewhat the same way as authorised officers make determinations under Freedom of Information legislation. Further, it is said, the discretion given the agency head would not offend the implied freedom as it must be read down so as to conform with that freedom. There is a number of responses that can be made to this, the most blunt being that placing “an unbridled discretion” in the hands of an Agency Head may, or may appear to, “result in censorship”: cf Wolf v City of Aberdeen 758 F Supp 551 (1991) at 555. Distinctly, when this authorisation mechanism is considered as part of the balancing process required by the second Lange test, it unreasonably compromises the freedom by transforming the freedom into a dispensation. It is not an appropriate filtering device to protect the efficient workings of government in a way that is compatible with the freedom. The suggested “reading down” proposed by the Commonwealth merely highlights that inappropriateness.