HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Mason A.C.J., Murphy, Wilson, Deane and Dawson JJ.
LESLIE BELTON v. GENERAL MOTORS-HOLDEN'S LIMITED
24 August 1984
Constitutional Law (Cth)
Constitutional Law (Cth)—Inconsistency between Commonwealth and State laws—State statute providing for relief for employees whose dismissal harsh or unreasonable—Commonwealth award providing for retrenchment payments—Termination of employment provision of award expressed to be subject to State statute—Whether award provision applies to termination by retrenchment—The Constitution (63 &64 Vict. c. 12), s. 109—Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1972 (S.A.), s. 15(1)(e).
Decision
MASON A.C.J., MURPHY, WILSON, DEANE and DAWSON JJ. This appeal, which is brought from a decision of the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia, raises the question whether s.15(1)(e) of the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1972 (S.A.), as amended ("the State Act"), is by virtue of the General Motors-Holden's Limited (Part 1) General Award 1982 ("the 1982 Award") made in accordance with the provisions of the Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904 (Cth) ("the Commonwealth Act") inconsistent with that Act and rendered invalid to the extent of the inconsistency by s.109 of the Constitution.
2. The appellant was one of sixty-four employees retrenched by the respondent from its plants at Elizabeth and Woodville in South Australia as a result of a decision made in March 1983 to rationalize its production of motor vehicles in the light of declining market trends. In carrying out the retrenchments, the respondent relied on the provisions of cl.6(b) of the 1982 Award. The appellant thereupon commenced proceedings in the Industrial Court of South Australia under s.15(1)(e) of the State Act for a determination that his dismissal was harsh, unjust or unreasonable and for an order directing the respondent to re-employ him in his former position on terms not less favourable than if he had not been dismissed from his employment and for payment of wages lost.
3. The respondent then sought in the Supreme Court of South Australia relief by way of prohibition directed to the Industrial Court. By majority (Wells and Bollen JJ., Zelling J. dissenting), the Full Court held that the Industrial Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the appellant's application on the ground that s.15(1)(e) of the State Act was inconsistent with the Commonwealth Act to the extent that it sought to operate in respect of the retrenchment of an employee in accordance with cl.6(b) of the 1982 Award. The Court made absolute an order nisi prohibiting the Industrial Court from proceeding with the appellant's application other than for the purpose of determining whether the appellant was retrenched in accordance with the provisions of cl.6(b) of the 1982 Award. The order of the Court was expressed to be subject to the proviso that if the appellant was not retrenched in accordance with cl.6(b) the order should be of no effect.
4. Section 15(1)(e) of the State Act confers jurisdiction on the Industrial Court:
"to hear and determine any question as to whether the dismissal from his employment of an employee,…
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- Case
- [1984] HCA 54
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the respondent had breached its duty of care to the appellant by manufacturing and selling a motor vehicle with a design defect that rendered it unreasonably dangerous. This involved determining the standard of care owed by a manufacturer to a consumer in relation to the design of its products, and whether the design of the seat belt anchorages in the subject vehicle fell below that standard, thereby causing or contributing to the appellant's injuries.
The High Court, in a majority decision, found that the respondent had breached its duty of care. The Court applied the principles established in *Donoghue v Stevenson* and subsequent authorities, holding that a manufacturer owes a duty to take reasonable care to avoid foreseeable harm to persons who are likely to use their product. The Court concluded that the design of the seat belt anchorages was defective and that this defect created an unreasonable risk of injury to occupants in the event of a collision. The evidence demonstrated that the anchorages were not of sufficient strength to withstand the forces typically encountered in a moderate collision, leading to the failure of the seat belt and the exacerbation of the appellant's injuries. The Court emphasised that the duty of care extended to the design of the product, not just its manufacture.
The High Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the order of the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia and remitting the matter to that Court for determination of the quantum of damages.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi