Bellaire Pty Ltd v Roselink Enterprises Pty Ltd as trustee for the Ice Nemesis Unit Trust [No 2]

Case

[2020] WASC 390

29 OCTOBER 2020


JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

IN CHAMBERS

CITATION:   BELLAIRE PTY LTD -v- ROSELINK ENTERPRISES PTY LTD as trustee for THE ICE NEMESIS UNIT TRUST [No 2] [2020] WASC 390

CORAM:   MASTER SANDERSON

HEARD:   31 AUGUST 2020

DELIVERED          :   29 OCTOBER 2020

PUBLISHED           :   29 OCTOBER 2020

FILE NO/S:   COR 166 of 2019

BETWEEN:   BELLAIRE PTY LTD

Plaintiff

AND

ROSELINK ENTERPRISES PTY LTD as trustee for THE ICE NEMESIS UNIT TRUST

Defendant


Catchwords:

Property law - Right to tenant's property on abandonment of lease by liquidator

Legislation:

Corporations Act 2001 (Cth)
Disposal of Uncollected Goods Act 1970 (WA)
Personal Property Securities Act 2009 (Cth)

Result:

Property passed to liquidator

Category:    A

Representation:

Counsel:

Plaintiff : No appearance
Defendant :

J E Scovell

Interested party : J M Healy

Solicitors:

Plaintiff : CX Law
Defendant :

Hall & Wilcox

Interested party : Kitto & Kitto

Case(s) referred to in decision(s):

Sandtara Pty Ltd v Abigroup Pty Ltd (1996) 42 NSWLR 491

MASTER SANDERSON:

  1. This dispute concerns the ownership of certain fittings and stock in trade which were left in leased premises in Mirrabooka at the time of termination of a lease between Slamdunk Holdings Pty Ltd, as landlord, (the 'interested party') and the defendant, as tenant.  There is no claim that any of the disputed items are to be considered tenant's fixtures.  The disputed items of equipment are listed in Annexure DRS8 to the affidavit of David Raymond Spencer sworn 26 June 2020.  It is the position of the interested party these assets are not assets of the defendant or the related trust and they therefore do not fall within the assets which the liquidator can have recourse to.

  2. Procedurally the matter arose in this way.  On 12 January 2020 the liquidator, by way of interlocutory process, sought the following order:

    1. Pursuant to s25(9) of the Supreme Court Act 1935, David Raymond Spencer c/- Business & Insolvency Solutions, Level 1/15 Adelaide St, Fremantle WA 6160, Western Australia (Liquidator) be appointed as receiver and manager without security of the property of the Ice Nemesis Unit Trust (Trust) for the purpose of preserving its property and if the Liquidator considers it to be advantageous to do so, selling or otherwise dealing with that property.

    2. The Receiver is granted:

    a. the powers to do all things, including the signing of any documents, necessary for the realisation and distribution of the property of the Trust; and

    b. the powers that might have been conferred on the Receiver under section 420 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) had the Trust been a corporation.

    3. The Receiver be allowed remuneration for time spent by him, his partners and his employees, as the Court may fix from time to time on application of the Receiver, in performance of the Receiver’s duties.  Unless the Court orders to the contrary, the remuneration is to be calculated as follows:

    Remuneration = (Time x Rates) + GST

    Where:

    'Time' means the time spent by the Receiver and any of the Receiver’s partners or employees (to be calculated in 6 minute units, and rounded up to the next 6 minute unit);

    'Rates' means the hourly rates as per Schedule B; and

    'GST' means the tax imposed by A New Tax System (Goods and Services) Tax Act 1999 (Cth).

    4. Pursuant to Schedule 2 s90-15 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) and s92(1) of the Trustees Act 1962 (WA), there be a direction and order or advice that, subject to the satisfaction of the Liquidator’s costs and remuneration, the Liquidator is justified in paying the balance of available Trust property in accordance with s 556 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) and proceeding as Liquidator to complete the external administration of and then deregister Roselink Enterprises Pty Ltd.

    5. Pursuant to Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA) O 51 r 5(1), the Receiver file accounts of receipts and payments verified by affidavit, as at each six month anniversary after the date of this order, within one month after each such date. These accounts, and the final accounts by the Receiver, may be filed be the Receiver electronically.

    6. The Receiver is not required to provide security under Order 51 rule 3 of the Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA).

    7. A direction that the Receiver will be acting properly and is justified in conducting the receivership on the basis that he is entitled to an indemnity secured by an equitable lien against the assets of the Trust for all costs and expenses, including remuneration (for time spent by the Receiver and his employees), reasonably incurred in caring for, preserving and realising the assets of the Trust.

    8. Upon disbursement of all funds comprising the Trust pursuant to these orders, these orders be discharged, and the Liquidator be discharged as receiver and manager of the Trust and released from all duties in relation to the Trust.

    9. Any interested parties and the Liquidator have liberty to apply on 3 business days’ notice.

    10. Any further order as the Court sees fit.

  3. On 29 June 2020, Slamdunk Holdings Pty Ltd filed an appearance.  They raised the matters which I have summarised earlier in these reasons.  The interested party accepted that if their claim failed, there would be no objection to making orders as proposed by the liquidator.

  4. The interested party makes two broad submissions. First, none of the terms and conditions of the lease created a 'security interest' within the meaning of s 12 of the Personal Property Securities Act 2009 (Cth) (PPSA). Consequently, the vesting provisions under s 267 of the PPSA have no application.[1] Second, by reason that the liquidator disclaimed the lease by notice dated 20 May 2020 the tenant's fittings and stock in trade remaining at the premises at that date become the property of the landlord in accordance with the terms of cl 7.3(a) of the lease.[2]

    [1] Interested party's submissions on security interest filed 12 August 2020 [5].

    [2] Interested party's submissions on security interest filed 12 August 2020 [6].

  5. The relevant facts, which are not in dispute, can be summarised in this way.  On 27 May 2010, the interested party and the defendant entered into a lease.[3]  The lease was due to expire on 24 May 2020.  On 21 April 2020 liquidators were appointed to the defendant.[4]  On 20 May 2020 the liquidators issued a notice of disclaimer of the lease.[5]  As at 20 May 2020 the liquidators had not removed any of the tenant's fixtures or stock in trade from the premises.[6]

    [3] Affidavit of Pier Benito Bertoncini sworn 20 July 2020 [4]; Annexure PB3.

    [4] Order of Master Sanderson made 21 April 2020.

    [5] Affidavit of Pier Benito Bertoncini sworn 20 July 2020 [8]; Annexure PB6.

    [6] Affidavit of Pier Benito Bertoncini sworn 20 July 2020 [14]; Annexure PB6.

  6. Crucial to the determination of this application is the proper interpretation of cl 7.3(a) of the lease. That clause reads as follows:

    7.3Abandoned Goods

    (a)Any Tenant's Fixtures, Tenant's fittings or stock in trade not removed by the Tenant as required by this clause shall be deemed abandoned by the Tenant and shall be or become the property of the Landlord.  The Landlord may invoice the Tenant, and the Tenant must pay, for the cost of removal of any Tenant's Fixtures, Tenant's fittings or stock which have been abandoned by the Tenant.[7]

    [7] Affidavit of Pier Benito Bertoncini sworn 20 July 2020; Annexure PB3, page 34.

  7. Although capitalised, there is no definition of 'Tenant's Fixtures' in the lease. 

  8. Section 12 of the PPSA is in the following terms:

    12Meaning of security interest

    (1)A security interest means an interest in personal property provided for by a transaction that, in substance, secures payment or performance of an obligation (without regard to the form of the transaction or the identity of the person who has title to the property).

    Note:  For the application of this Act to interests, see section 8.

    (2)For example, a security interest includes an interest in personal property provided by any of the following transactions, if the transaction, in substance, secures payment or performance of an obligation:

    (a)a fixed charge;

    (b)a floating charge;

    (c)a chattel mortgage;

    (d)a conditional sale agreement (including an agreement to sell subject to retention of title);

    (e)a hire purchase agreement;

    (f)a pledge;

    (g)a trust receipt;

    (h)a consignment (whether or not a commercial consignment);

    (i)a lease of goods (whether or not a PPS lease);

    (j)an assignment;

    (k)a transfer of title;

    (l)a flawed asset arrangement.

    (3)A security interest also includes the following interests, whether or not the transaction concerned, in substance, secures payment or performance of an obligation:

    (a)the interest of a transferee under a transfer of an account or chattel paper;

    (b)the interest of a consignor who delivers goods to a consignee under a commercial consignment;

    (c)the interest of a lessor or bailor of goods under a PPS lease.

    (3A)A person who owes payment or performance of an obligation to another person may take a security interest in the other person's right to require the payment or the performance of the obligation.

    (4)Without limiting subsection (3A):

    (a)an account debtor, in relation to an account or chattel paper, may take a security interest in the account or chattel paper; and

    (b)an ADI may take a security interest in an ADI account that is kept with the ADI.

    (5)A security interest does not include:

    (a)a licence; or

    (b)an interest of a kind prescribed by the regulations for the purposes of this section.

    (6)A security interest is not created only by an agreement or undertaking to do either of the following:

    (a)to postpone or subordinate a person's right to payment or performance of all or any part of a debtor's obligation to another person's right to payment or performance of all or any part of another of the debtor’s obligations;

    (b)to postpone or subordinate all or any part of a secured party's rights under a security agreement to all or any part of another secured party's rights under another security agreement with the same grantor.

  9. Section 267 of the PPSA provides that if a liquidator is appointed then any unperfected security interests vests in the company being wound up.[8] In order for a security interest to be created for the purposes of the PPSA, there is a three step process. First, there must be personal property. Second, there must be a transaction. Third, there is payment or performance of an obligation.[9]  Given that there is a written lease and the abandoned fittings in stock in trade can be considered property, the focus of the present consideration is on the third limb of the test.[10]

    [8] Interested party's submissions on security interest filed 12 August 2020 [17].

    [9] Interested party's submissions on security interest filed 12 August 2020 [19].

    [10] Interested party's submissions on security interest filed 12 August 2020 [20].

  10. The interested party approaches the matter in this way. It says the lease is in standard terms and creates a demise in the premises in favour of the tenant in exchange for the rental payments to the landlord. There are no provisions in the lease which create any security for the 'payment or performance of an obligation' and as such the PPSA has no application.[11] Further, it is submitted cl 7.3(a) of the lease does not in its terms create any 'security interest' for the purposes of the PPSA. This is because the clause is not securing 'payment or performance of an obligation'. Rather, cl 7.3(a) simply provides a contractual mechanism to ensure that on and from the time of 'expiration or sooner determination' of the lease the tenant's 'fittings or stock in trade not removed' become the property of the landlord. That provision enables the landlord to immediately take steps to re‑enter the premises and to make good and re‑lease the premises to a third party.[12] 

    [11] Interested party's submissions on security interest filed 12 August 2020 [21].

    [12] Interested party's submissions on security interest filed 12 August 2020 [22].

  11. The interested party points out there is no mechanism within cl 7 of the lease which seeks to offset any costs recovered from the sale of such 'fittings or stock in trade' against any outstanding rent or use the proceeds to reduce any other outstanding obligation. Rather, what cl 7.3(a) does is to enable the landlord to invoice the tenant for the cost of removal of any 'fittings or stock in trade' which were abandoned by the tenant in the premises.[13] This, it was submitted, creates no security interest for the purposes of the PPSA.[14]

    [13] Interested party's submissions on security interest filed 12 August 2020 [23].

    [14] Interested party's submissions on security interest filed 12 August 2020 [24].

  12. Counsel rationalised this unusual outcome in two ways. First, he submitted, cl 7.3(a) strikes a contractual bargain. It allows a tenant who retains full right, title and interest in the fittings or stock in trade to secure a loan or other financial accommodation from third parties. In other words, the commercial arrangement was such the landlord was not granted a 'security interest' over the fittings or stock in trade. Clause 7.3(a) was not attempting to secure such abandoned fittings or stock in trade to reduce any outstanding rent or other debt or obligation of the tenant under the lease. The clause would have equal operation in circumstances where the tenant had no outstanding rent, debts or other obligations at the date of expiration or sooner determination of the lease.[15] 

    [15] Interested party's submissions on security interest filed 12 August 2020 [25].

  13. Second, the bargain in cl 7.3(a) ensured the Disposal ofUncollected Goods Act 1970 (WA) had no application to the tenant's fittings or stock in trade which were abandoned at the expiration or sooner determination of the lease.[16] 

    [16] Interested party's submissions on security interest filed 12 August 2020 [26].

  14. The interested party had a further or alternative argument. It said even if the tenant's fittings or stock in trade created a security interest that vested in the tenant upon appointment of the liquidator, when the liquidator issued the notice of disclaimer, without first having removed such fittings or stock in trade, the items were deemed abandoned under cl 7.3(a) of the lease. From that point on, the landlord has no interest in such items.[17] 

    [17] Interested party's submissions on security interest filed 12 August 2020 [27].

  15. The liquidator approaches the matter in an entirely different way. Reference was made to div 7A of pt 5.6 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (the Act) which deals with what is commonly known as 'disclaimers' of onerous property. For present purposes the relevant sections are as follows:

    568Disclaimer by liquidator; application to Court by party to contract

    (1)Subject to this section, a liquidator of a company may at any time, on the company's behalf, by signed writing disclaim property of the company that consists of:

    (a)land burdened with onerous covenants; or

    (b)shares; or

    (c)property that is unsaleable or is not readily saleable; or

    (d)property that may give rise to a liability to pay money or some other onerous obligation; or

    (e)property where it is reasonable to expect that the costs, charges and expenses that would be incurred in realising the property would exceed the proceeds of realising the property; or

    (f)a contract;

    whether or not:

    (g)except in the case of a contract - the liquidator has tried to sell the property, has taken possession of it or exercised an act of ownership in relation to it; or

    (h)in the case of a contract - the company or the liquidator has tried to assign, or has exercised rights in relation to, the contract or any property to which it relates.

    568ALiquidator must give notice of disclaimer

    (1)As soon as practicable after disclaiming property, a liquidator must:

    (a)lodge a written notice of the disclaimer; and

    (b)give written notice of the disclaimer to each person who appears to the liquidator to have, or to claim to have, an interest in the property; and

    (c)if the liquidator has reason to suspect that some person or persons may have, or may claim to have, an interest or interests in the property, but either does not know who, or does not know where, the person is or the persons are - comply with subsection (2); and

    (d)if a law of the Commonwealth or of a State or Territory requires the transfer or transmission of the property to be registered - give written notice of the disclaimer to the registrar or other person who has the function under that law of registering the transfer or transmission of the property.

    Note:For electronic notification under paragraph (b), see section 600G.

    (2)If paragraph (1)(c) applies, the liquidator must cause a notice setting out the prescribed information about the disclaimer to be published in the prescribed manner.

    568CWhen disclaimer takes effect

    (1)A disclaimer takes effect if, and only if:

    (a)in a case where only one application under section 568B for an order setting aside the disclaimer, or each of 2 or more such applications, is made within the period that that section prescribes for making the application - the application, or each of the applications, is unsuccessful; or

    (b)no such application is so made.

    (2)For the purposes of subsection (1), an application under section 568B is successful if, and only if, the result of the application, and all appeals (if any) arising out of the application, being finally determined or otherwise disposed of is an order setting aside the disclaimer (whether or not further orders are also made).

    (3)A disclaimer that takes effect because of subsection (1) is taken to have taken effect on the day after:

    (a)if:

    (i)the liquidator gave to a person notice of the disclaimer because of paragraph 568A(1)(b); or

    (ii)notice of the disclaimer was published under subsection 568A(2);

    before the end of 14 days after the liquidator lodged notice of the disclaimer - the last day when the liquidator so gave such notice or such notice was so published; or

    (b)otherwise - the day when the liquidator lodged notice of the disclaimer.

    568DEffect of disclaimer

    (1)A disclaimer is taken to have terminated, as from the day on which it is taken because of subsection 568C(3) to take effect, the company's rights, interests, liabilities and property in or in respect of the disclaimer property, but does not affect any other person’s rights or liabilities except so far as necessary in order to release the company and its property from liability.

  16. The liquidator notes a disclaimer allows him to rid the insolvent company of burdensome financial obligations, which might otherwise continue to the detriment of those interested in the liquidation.  This power is given to a liquidator to advance the prompt, orderly and beneficial administration of the company's winding up.[18]  This statement of principle is uncontroversial.  Further, a disclaimer of the company's rights, interests, liabilities and property in or in respect of the disclaimed property is taken to have been terminated as from the day in which it is taken to have effect.  The disclaimer does not affect any other person's rights or liabilities except so far as necessary in order to release the company and its property from liability.  In effect, a disclaimer relieves the company in liquidation and its property from unprofitable contracts, but does not disturb the contractual relations affecting other persons.[19]

    [18] Defendant's outline of submissions in opposition to the interested party's submissions filed 19 August 2020 [13].

    [19] Defendant's outline of submissions in opposition to the interested party's submissions filed 19 August 2020 [14].

  1. Accrued obligations cannot be terminated.  A future obligation, such as to pay money or transfer property or provide goods and services, may be terminated.  In addition 'passive' obligations, in the sense of restrictions on the use or enjoyment of property, may also be terminated.[20]  Relying on the decision of the New South Wales Court of Appeal in Sandtara Pty Ltd v Abigroup Pty Ltd (1996) 42 NSWLR 491, counsel for the liquidator submitted that a disclaimer did not determine the covenants in the lease for all purposes. Rather, it determined the liability of the lessee company without affecting the contractual obligations of others because that was unnecessary to achieve the legislative object of relieving the lessee company from liability.[21]  Accordingly, a disclaimer by an original tenant destroys the lease and accelerates the landlord's reversion.

    [20] Defendant's outline of submissions in opposition to the interested party's submissions filed 19 August 2020 [15].

    [21] Defendant's outline of submissions in opposition to the interested party's submissions filed 19 August 2020 [16].

  2. The liquidator says, pursuant to s 568C(3), the disclaimer took effect from 21 May 2020, prior to the lease expiring.[22]  The interested party does not dispute that claim.  Therefore, according to the liquidator, the disclaimer took effect whilst the lease was operative and it had the affect of discharging the lessee's future obligations to make good the premises and collect its property under cl 7.1 and cl 7.2 of the lease.[23] As cl 7.1 and cl 7.2 did not come into effect, cl 7.3(a) never came into operation.[24]  The result is that the property remains the property of the company and any abandonment clause did not come to operate.[25]

    [22] Defendant's outline of submissions in opposition to the interested party's submissions filed 19 August 2020 [19].

    [23] Defendant's outline of submissions in opposition to the interested party's submissions filed 19 August 2020 [20].

    [24] Defendant's outline of submissions in opposition to the interested party's submissions filed 19 August 2020 [21].

    [25] Defendant's outline of submissions in opposition to the interested party's submissions filed 19 August 2020 [22].

  3. Clause 7.1 and cl 7.2 of the lease are in the following terms:

    7.Surrender, Making Good and Abandoned Goods

    7.1Surrender

    At the expiration or sooner determination of this Lease the Tenant shall:

    (a) surrender and deliver up possession of the Leased Premises to the Landlord clean and free from rubbish and in accordance with this clause 7 and the Tenant's Covenants;

    (b) surrender all keys for the Leased Premises to the Landlord at the place then fixed for the payment of rent and, shall inform the Landlord of all combinations on locks safes and vaults (if any) n the Leased Premises;

    (c) remove all partitions from the Leased Premises and make good any damage that maybe caused-by such removal;

    (d)remove all floor coverings and the floor cleaned of all dirt, chemicals, glue, grout or other substance and left sanded to a finish satisfactory to the Landlord;

    (e)patch and paint all walls and the ceiling with all light fittings removed; and

    (f) subject to clause 7,2(b), reinstate and make good all air‑-conditioning outlets, fire sprinklers (and any other items that were altered or moved dub to the Tenant's fit out of the Leased Premises) to the standard configuration that such Items were In prior to the Tenant's fit Out of the Leased Premises.

    7.2Making Good

    (a)Save to the extent otherwise set out in the Special Clauses or otherwise agreed in writing by the Landlord the Tenant must make good the Leased Premises to a similar standard and configuration as was supplied by the Landlord prior to the commencement of the Lease.

    (b)The Landlord may by notice in writing require the Tenant, as part of making good, to retain any air‑conditioning or fire sprinkler configuration to the configuration as is current at the time of expiry of the Lease,

    (c)Subject to clause 53 while making good the Tenant at its own cost shall:

    (i) remove all the Tenant's Fixtures and the Tenant's fittings and stock in trade before delivering up possession of the Leased Premises to the Landlord as provided In this clause 7;

    (ii)repair and make good any damage to the Leased Premises caused by such removal; and

    (iii)paint out or remove all signs and other advertising material to the satisfaction of the Landlord.

  4. Clause 7.1 of the lease, although headed 'Surrender' sets out the obligations of the tenant at the determination of the lease.  Clause 7.2 appears to mesh with and in part overlap cl 7.1.  Essentially both clauses are directing at ensuring the tenant delivers the premises back to the landlord in a fit and proper condition and in a condition very close to that they were in at the time of the demise.  No doubt counsel is correct to say the obligations in cl 7.1 and cl 7.2 did not arise because of the disclaimer of the lease.  But it is difficult to see how cl 7.3 is conditional upon cl 7.1 and cl 7.2 having some effect.  The key part of cl 7.3 is the reference to fittings or stock in trade 'not removed by the tenant as required by this clause' (my underlining).  The actual removal of the tenant's fittings and stock in trade is required by cl 7.2(c)(i).  As that clause has no effect consequent upon the disclaimer, it is difficult to see why the fixtures and fittings should not become the property of the landlord.

  5. If it were the case the fixtures and fittings remained the property of the tenant it is difficult to see how possession of these goods could be recovered by the liquidator.  The lease has been determined.  The liquidator has no more right than anyone else to enter onto the property and recover the fixtures.  There is nothing in the lease which provides for that right.  On the other hand, if the liquidator had taken possession of the fixtures and fittings and then disclaimed the lease, he would be entitled to those fixtures and fittings and would not be obliged to make good the premises under cl 7.1 or cl 7.2.  Accordingly, cl 7.3 operates in the way the interested party claims.

  6. It is further submitted on behalf of the liquidator that cl 7.3 gives rise to a security interest which ought to have been registered under the PPSA.[26]  It is said that cl 7.3 of the lease creates a security interest as it secured the performance of an obligation – that is, the obligation to make good the premises on termination of the lease.[27]  With respect, that is clearly not the case.  There is no obligation found in cl 7.3.  I accept the submissions of the interested party in this respect.  The way the clause is drafted specifically avoids the creation of a security interest.  The liquidator's argument on this issue should not be accepted.

    [26] Defendant's outline of submissions in opposition to the interested party's submissions filed 19 August 2020 [23].

    [27] Defendant's outline of submissions in opposition to the interested party's submissions filed 19 August 2020 [25].

  7. The liquidator further says that cl 7.3(a) constitutes a void disposition within the meaning of s 468(1) of the Act.[28]  Section 468(1) reads as follows:

    468Avoidance of dispositions of property, attachments etc.

    (1)Any disposition of property of the company, other than an exempt disposition, made after the commencement of the winding up by the Court is, unless the Court otherwise orders, void.

    [28] Defendant's outline of submissions in opposition to the interested party's submissions filed 19 August 2020 [27].

  8. It was submitted on behalf of the liquidator that if cl 7.3(a) operated as submitted by the interested party, then there was a disposition of the property as at the date of the disclaimer. In this sense 'deemed abandoned' is a disposition.[29] That argument is unanswerable. It matters not the lease was entered into long before the defendant went into liquidation. Clause 7 can only operate from the date of the notice. Therefore the disposition is void; put another way, cl 7.3(a) is of no force and effect.

    [29] Defendant's outline of submissions in opposition to the interested party's submissions filed 19 August 2020 [31].

  9. The final argument put by the liquidator related to s 474(1) of the Act.  That section reads as follows:

    474Custody and vesting of company's property

    (1)If a company is being wound up in insolvency or by the Court, or a provisional liquidator of a company has been appointed:

    (a)in a case in which a liquidator or provisional liquidator has been appointed - the liquidator or provisional liquidator must take into his or her custody, or under his or her control, all the property which is, or which appears to be, property of the company; or

    (b)in a case in which there is no liquidator - all the property of the company is to be in the custody of the Court.

    Note:Section 465 extends the meaning of the property of the company to include PPSA retention of title property, if the security interest in the property has vested in the company in certain situations.

  10. The defendant was wound up on 21 April 2020.  As at that date the company no longer had custody of its stock, fixtures and fittings.  Custody passed to the liquidator.[30]  It may be that title to the company property remained with the company.  But control of the company's property passed to the liquidator.  As a consequence, s 474 operates to make the abandonment of the goods ineffective as there were no goods controlled by the company which could have been abandoned.

    [30] Defendant's outline of submissions in opposition to the interested party's submissions filed 19 August 2020 [35] - [36].

  11. For these reasons I am satisfied the interested party's application fails.  Accordingly, there being no other objection to the making of the orders sought by the liquidator in his interlocutory process, I will propose such orders be made.  However, before doing so I will give the parties the opportunity to be heard as to the form of orders and as to costs.

I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia.

CB
Associate to Master Sanderson

29 OCTOBER 2020


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