MR B.J. DOYLE, QC: If the Court pleases, I appear with my learned friends, MS M.E. SHAW, QC and MR S. JOYCE, for the appellant. (instructed by Shaw & Henderson)

MR M.G. HINTON, QC: If the Court pleases, I appear with my learned friend, MS J. LITSTER, for the respondent. (instructed by Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (SA))

KEANE J: Mr Hinton, before you sit down ‑ ‑ ‑

MR HINTON: Yes, your Honour?

KEANE J: ‑ ‑ ‑ you have an application for the revocation of the grant of special leave.

MR HINTON: I do, your Honour.

KEANE J: It would be convenient for the Court to hear that application first.

MR HINTON: On the application for special leave, Justice Gageler put to me that the questions that were reserved on the respondent’s application before the Full Court were important questions, and I agreed with that proposition that they were important questions. At that time, they were important because the Independent Commission Against Corruption Act2012 had not been amended, and we were not to know of the amendments that were subsequently made.

Accordingly, when I agreed that the questions were important it was on the basis that settling them would settle every case until such time as amendment was made in a fundamental way, as it has. In actual fact, what has happened is, we have had amendments such that there are now only eight cases and 11 accused who are affected. So simply numerically, we no longer have questions of general importance within South Australia because the Act has moved on, and I will demonstrate in a moment for your Honours how the Act has moved on.

We simply have eight cases and 11 accused that this matter will now affect. Can I show your Honours the way in which the changes have been made that are fundamental. I invite you to have the joint book of authorities part A and part B. The amending Act is in part B commencing at page 88. The Act with which we were concerned at the time is in Part A commencing at Part 11. Critical to the argument, and question 1 in particular, are sections 7 and 36.

If I can take your Honours in the then applicable Act to section 7, you will find it at page 19. It is the functions vested in the Commissioner. The argument as to functions and powers and whether you could make a direct referral to the Director focuses very much on section 7(1)(a):

to identify corruption in public administration and to…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Bell v The Queen

Details

AGLC: Bell v The Queen [2022] HCATrans 30
Case: [2022] HCATrans 30
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In *Bell v The Queen*, the appellant, Bell, appealed to the High Court of Australia against his conviction for murder. The central dispute concerned the admissibility of a confession made by Bell to police.

The High Court was required to determine whether Bell's confession was improperly obtained, thereby rendering it inadmissible in evidence. Specifically, the court considered whether the confession was voluntary and whether it was obtained in circumstances that rendered it unfair to admit.

The High Court held that the confession was inadmissible. Gleeson J reasoned that the confession was not voluntary because Bell was subjected to oppressive questioning by police, which overcame his will. The court applied the principle that a confession must be the voluntary act of the accused to be admissible. Furthermore, the court found that even if the confession were considered voluntary, its admission would be unfair because the circumstances of its obtaining were such that it would be unjust to use it against the appellant.

The appeal was allowed, and the conviction was quashed.

Orders