IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Hobart No H4 of 2019
B e t w e e n -
CHAUNCEY AARON BELL
Applicant
and
STATE OF TASMANIA
Respondent
Application for special leave to appeal
BELL J
GAGELER J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
FROM SYDNEY BY VIDEO LINK TO HOBART
ON FRIDAY, 5 JUNE 2020, AT 1.30 PM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
MS K.L. BAUMELER: If it pleases, your Honours, I appear on behalf of the applicant with my friend, MS P.J. WILLSHIRE. (instructed by Philippa Willshire, Barrister & Solicitor)
MR D.G. COATES, SC: If it please, your Honours, I appear on behalf of the respondent with MS Y. PRENC. (instructed by Director of Public Prosecutions (Tas))
BELL J: Yes, Ms Baumeler.
MS BAUMELER: Yes, thank you, your Honours. In relation to the matter, the special leave point we submit is specific but that the broader ramifications of the answer to the question goes to the very heart of the criminal justice system and, in our submission, it is a fundamental issue that needs to be addressed. I guess there are two specific areas that we would say there are issues that there needs to be clarity to.
The first is in relation to innocence and the scope of innocence and what does innocence actually mean, and the second is especially in a co‑jurisdiction as Tasmania as to what outside the enactment and the discussions in the authorities as to what an enactment actually covers and whether it is the whole of the legislation, the portion of the legislation or not.
BELL J: Yes.
MS BAUMELER: So, they are broadly the two areas that we would argue are relevant in terms of High Court authority needing to clarify those issues.
BELL J: Can I take up with you, Ms Baumeler, just perhaps a more fundamental issue raised by some of the submissions that you advance in support of the application. Am I right in understanding this jury was directed in relation to the offence under the Misuse of Drugs Act that the offence would be complete upon proof of the intentional supply of the drug, and then the element of the offence, namely, that it was supply of a prohibited drug to a child was, in essence, an element of absolute liability in the sense that regardless of - no mental element at all was required. That was the way the jury were instructed?
MS BAUMELER: That is correct, your Honour, yes.
BELL J: In terms of fundamental notions of criminal responsibility, at common law, in the way those principles were explained in He Kaw Teh, absent statutory indication to the contrary, a criminal liability does not attach if the prosecution fails to establish that the accused person had knowledge of all the facts and circumstances that make his or her act criminal in the sense of expose him or her to liability for the offence charged.…
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- Case
- [2020] HCATrans 77
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the Full Court, and subsequently on appeal, was whether the State of Tasmania's actions, including the creation of marine reserves and the grant of leases and licences, constituted an extinguishment of native title under section 10(1)(b) of the Act. This provision states that native title is extinguished if a lease or licence was granted in relation to the land or waters, and the grant was of a kind that is inconsistent with the continued existence of native title rights and interests. The court was required to determine the scope and nature of the native title rights asserted and to assess whether the State's actions were indeed inconsistent with those rights.
The Full Court had found that the State's actions had extinguished native title. However, on appeal, Bell and Gageler JJ analysed the nature of the native title rights claimed, which included rights to hunt, fish, gather, and use the resources of the sea country. Their Honours then examined the legislative and executive acts of the State, including the establishment of marine protected areas and the granting of various licences for commercial activities. The Court applied the principles established in cases such as *Mabo v Queensland (No 2)* and *Western Australia v Ward*, focusing on the test of inconsistency. They concluded that the State's actions, while regulating the use of the sea country, did not necessarily extinguish all native title rights and interests, particularly those that could co-exist with the State's regulatory regime. The Court found that the extinguishment provisions should be interpreted narrowly and that the State's actions were not so fundamentally inconsistent with the asserted native title rights as to warrant their complete extinguishment.
The appeal was allowed, and the matter was remitted to the Federal Court for further consideration of the extent to which native title had been extinguished.
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