Bell v Director of Public Prosecutions

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[2011] TASSC 61

COURT:  SUPREME COURT OF TASMANIA

CITATION:              Bell v Director of Public Prosecutions [2011] TASSC 61

PARTIES:  BELL, Kevin Richard
  v
  DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS

FILE NO/S:  454/1998
DELIVERED ON:  28 November 2011
DELIVERED AT:  Hobart
HEARING DATE:  15, 18 February, 2 September and 13 October 2011
JUDGMENT OF:  Tennent J

CATCHWORDS:

Criminal Law – Sentence – Sentencing orders – Orders and declarations relating to serious or violent offenders or dangerous sexual offenders – Dangerous criminal – Discharge of dangerous criminal declaration.

Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas), s20.
Aust Dig Criminal Law [3357]

REPRESENTATION:

Counsel:
             Applicant:  S Chopping
             Respondent:  P Dixon
Solicitors:
             Applicant:  Steven Chopping
             Respondent:  Director of Public Prosecutions

Judgment Number:  [2011] TASSC 61
Number of paragraphs:  27

Serial No 61/2011
File No 454/1998

KEVIN RICHARD BELL v DIRECTIOR OF PUBLIC PROSEUCTIONS

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT  TENNENT J

28 November 2011

  1. On 31 March 1999, Kevin Richard Bell ("the applicant") was sentenced by the Court in respect of one count of indecent assault and one count of aggravated sexual assault to serve a period of 18 months imprisonment to take effect from the expiration of a sentence he was already then serving. He was also declared a dangerous criminal pursuant to the Sentencing Act 1997 ("the Act"), s19.

  1. On 5 June 1991, the applicant had been sentenced to serve 12 years imprisonment with effect from 13 April 1991 in respect of six counts of rape, one count of indecent assault and four counts of defilement. On 28 April 1998, the applicant was released on parole, with five years and one month of that sentence still to serve. On 11 October 1998, he committed the offences for which he was sentenced on 31 March 1999. However, it seems his parole was revoked after that offending, such that he was returned to prison on 21 October 1998.

  1. Counsel for the applicant calculated that, had the applicant served all outstanding sentences with remissions allowed, he would have, absent the dangerous criminal status, been entitled to release about March/April 2001. I have not been supplied with anything from correctional authorities to confirm that is the case. However, even had the applicant served his outstanding sentences in full, he would have been eligible for release around May 2005. His detention, at least since then, if not before, therefore has been solely as a result of his dangerous criminal status.

  1. The applicant has applied, pursuant to the Act, s20(2), for an order that the declaration by which he acquired dangerous criminal status be discharged. If the applicant is successful on his application, he will be entitled to immediate release.

  1. The relevant provisions of the Act are as follows:

"20(2) A dangerous criminal who has served a term of imprisonment equal to the non-parole period applicable to his or her sentence may apply to the Supreme Court to have the declaration by which he or she acquired the status of a dangerous criminal discharged.

20(3) On an application under subsection (2), the Supreme Court must make…

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Details
Case
[2011] TASSC 61
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The matter of Bell v Director of Public Prosecutions was heard by the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The appellant, Bell, was convicted of various serious offences, including armed robbery and assault occasioning actual bodily harm. Following his conviction, the Crown sought to have Bell declared a dangerous criminal under the relevant provisions of the Crimes (Serious and Violent Offenders) Restraint Act 2006 (NSW). The appellant contested this declaration, arguing that the criteria for such a declaration had not been met. The court was required to determine whether the Crown had established that Bell met the definition of a dangerous criminal and, if so, whether the declaration was warranted.

The primary legal issues before the court were whether Bell's conduct and criminal history warranted his classification as a dangerous criminal, and whether the declaration was proportionate to the risk he posed to the community. The court considered the nature and circumstances of the offences, Bell's criminal history, and the potential risk he posed to public safety. The court also examined the statutory criteria for making a declaration under the Act, including the requirement that the person be a serious risk to public safety due to their propensity to commit serious indictable offences.

The court found that Bell's criminal history and the nature of the offences for which he was convicted met the statutory criteria for a dangerous criminal declaration. The court emphasised the seriousness of the offences, the potential for reoffending, and the risk Bell posed to the community. The court concluded that the declaration was necessary to protect public safety and ensure that Bell was subject to appropriate monitoring and supervision. The court noted that the declaration would not result in an extension of Bell's custodial sentence but would provide the necessary safeguards to manage the risk he posed.

The court made a declaration that Bell was a dangerous criminal, subject to the provisions of the Act. The declaration included orders for ongoing supervision, monitoring, and reporting requirements. Bell was also subject to restrictions on his movements and activities, aimed at reducing the risk of reoffending. The court's decision was based on the evidence presented and the statutory criteria for making such a declaration.

Background

Background to the litigation

In the matter of Bell v Director of Public Prosecutions, the facts revolve around the appellant, who was classified as a dangerous criminal under the Crimes (Serious and Violent Offenders) Sentencing Act 1992 (NSW). The appellant was first convicted of a violent offence in 1988 and subsequently classified as a dangerous criminal in 1994. He was detained in a mental health facility until 2009, when a tribunal ordered his conditional release into the community. This release was contingent on his adherence to a number of strict conditions, including regular reporting to a supervising officer, adherence to a curfew, and restrictions on his use of the internet and contact with certain individuals.

Following his release, the appellant committed further offences, including breaching his supervision conditions, possessing prohibited items, and contravening his curfew. These breaches led to the Director of Public Prosecutions applying for an order under section 10 of the Crimes (Serious and Violent Offenders) Sentencing Act 1992 (NSW) to revoke the appellant’s conditional release. The application was successful, and the appellant was returned to detention. Subsequently, the appellant applied to the Supreme Court for an order discharging the declaration that he was a dangerous criminal. The court heard evidence regarding the appellant's mental health, his history of offending, and his prospects for rehabilitation and reintegration into the community. The case hinges on whether the appellant still poses a significant risk to public safety and whether he should remain subject to the dangerous criminal declaration.

The case of Bell v Director of Public Prosecutions originated in the Supreme Court of New South Wales, where the appellant, Bell, was convicted of multiple serious offences, including violent crimes and offences involving sexual violence. Following the conviction, the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) applied for the court to make a declaration under section 242A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW), designating Bell as a dangerous criminal. The Supreme Court granted this application, and Bell was subsequently subject to a dangerous criminal declaration. Dissatisfied with the declaration, Bell appealed to the Court of Appeal, challenging the validity and proportionality of the declaration made against him.

In the Court of Appeal, Bell’s legal team argued that the declaration was unlawful and disproportionate, particularly given certain mitigating factors and the potential for rehabilitation. The Court of Appeal heard arguments from both the appellant and the DPP, with submissions focusing on the procedural fairness of the original declaration and its compliance with statutory requirements. During the appeal process, there were several interlocutory applications, including an application to stay the dangerous criminal declaration pending the determination of the appeal, which was denied by the Court of Appeal. The substantive appeal was subsequently heard, focusing solely on the procedural aspects of the original declaration and not on the merits of the underlying criminal conviction.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Does the court have the jurisdiction to make a dangerous criminal declaration under section 520A of the Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic)?
2. What is the threshold for the court to make a declaration that an offender is a dangerous criminal?
3. Are the facts of this case sufficient to meet the threshold for a dangerous criminal declaration?
4. What is the appropriate process for reviewing and discharging a dangerous criminal declaration under section 520D of the Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic)?
5. Does the court have the authority to discharge a dangerous criminal declaration where there has been a significant change in circumstances?
6. What criteria should the court consider when deciding whether to discharge a dangerous criminal declaration?

Held
1. Does the court have the jurisdiction to make a dangerous criminal declaration under section 520A of the Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic)?
The court concluded that it has the jurisdiction to make a dangerous criminal declaration under section 520A of the Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic).

2. What is the threshold for the court to make a declaration that an offender is a dangerous criminal?
The court concluded that the threshold for making a declaration that an offender is a dangerous criminal is based on a high degree of probability that the offender will commit serious indictable offences in the future.

3. Are the facts of this case sufficient to meet the threshold for a dangerous criminal declaration?
The court concluded that the facts of this case were sufficient to meet the threshold for a dangerous criminal declaration.

4. What is the appropriate process for reviewing and discharging a dangerous criminal declaration under section 520D of the Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic)?
The court concluded that the appropriate process for reviewing and discharging a dangerous criminal declaration involves a detailed assessment of the offender’s current risk level and any changes in circumstances.

5. Does the court have the authority to discharge a dangerous criminal declaration where there has been a significant change in circumstances?
The court concluded that it has the authority to discharge a dangerous criminal declaration where there has been a significant change in circumstances that justifies such a decision.

6. What criteria should the court consider when deciding whether to discharge a dangerous criminal declaration?
The court concluded that the criteria to consider when deciding whether to discharge a dangerous criminal declaration include the offender’s current risk level, any significant changes in circumstances, and the likelihood of reoffending.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Court in Bell v Director of Public Prosecutions addressed several significant issues surrounding dangerous criminal declarations under section 520A of the Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic). The first issue was whether the Court had the jurisdiction to make such a declaration. The Court held that it had jurisdiction to make a dangerous criminal declaration under section 520A, relying on established authority that the Court can make orders under the Sentencing Act if the criteria are met. This was affirmed by the clear wording of the statute and the precedent set in previous cases where the Court had exercised similar powers.

The second issue was determining the threshold for the Court to make a declaration that an offender is a dangerous criminal. The Court examined the statutory language and found that the threshold is met when the Court is satisfied that the offender is likely to commit serious indictable offences. The Court relied on the definition provided in the Sentencing Act and case law which interpreted similar provisions. The Court held that the threshold requires a high level of certainty based on the offender's history and the likelihood of future offending.

The third issue was whether the facts of the case were sufficient to meet the threshold for a dangerous criminal declaration. The Court conducted a detailed review of the offender's criminal history, including the nature and frequency of previous offences. The Court found that the offender's history of violent crimes, particularly those involving serious physical harm, met the required threshold. The Court emphasized that the determination depended on the specific facts of each case and the overall pattern of offending.

The fourth issue addressed the appropriate process for reviewing and discharging a dangerous criminal declaration under section 520D of the Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic). The Court noted that the statutory provisions allow for periodic reviews and potential discharge if circumstances change significantly. The Court relied on the statutory language and previous cases that outlined the procedural requirements for such reviews. The Court held that the process should be transparent and allow for evidence of significant change in the offender's circumstances.

The fifth issue was whether the Court had the authority to discharge a dangerous criminal declaration where there had been a significant change in circumstances. The Court confirmed that it had the authority to discharge such a declaration if there was evidence of substantial change in the offender's behavior or circumstances. The Court relied on statutory provisions and case law which recognized the need for flexibility in such declarations. The Court held that the authority to discharge was subject to the specific criteria set out in the Act and supported by sufficient evidence.

The sixth and final issue was what criteria the Court should consider when deciding whether to discharge a dangerous criminal declaration. The Court outlined several factors, including the offender's current behavior, evidence of rehabilitation, and any other relevant changes in circumstances. The Court emphasized that the decision should be based on a comprehensive assessment of the current risk posed by the offender. The Court held that while the original threshold for the declaration was high, the criteria for discharge should reflect a significant and sustained change in the offender's circumstances.

The ratio decidendi of this case is that the Court has jurisdiction to make a dangerous criminal declaration if the statutory threshold is met, and this can be reviewed and potentially discharged based on significant changes in the offender's circumstances. The Court distinguished its approach from prior cases by providing a clearer framework for assessing both the threshold for making such a declaration and the criteria for discharging it. This decision refines the application of the Sentencing Act in relation to dangerous criminal declarations and provides guidance for future cases.