IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Sydney No S352 of 2018
B e t w e e n -
BELL LAWYERS PTY LTD ABN 96114514724
Appellant
and
JANET PENTELOW
First Respondent
DISTRICT COURT OF NEW SOUTH WALES
Second Respondent
KIEFEL CJ
BELL J
GAGELER J
KEANE J
NETTLE J
GORDON J
EDELMAN J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT CANBERRA ON THURSDAY, 9 MAY 2019, AT 9.45 AM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
MR B.W. WALKER, SC: May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friend, MS M. CASTLE, for the appellant. (instructed by Bell Lawyers)
MR G.O’L. REYNOLDS, SC: If the Court pleases, I appear for the first respondent with my learned friend, MR D.P. HUME. (instructed by Castagnet Lawyers)
KIEFEL CJ: Yes, Mr Walker.
MR WALKER: Your Honours, the statute which is the ultimate source of power to make the order for costs in this case is to be found in the book of authorities, the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW), at tab 3. Could I take you immediately to section 98, pages 46 and 47 of the print that is reproduced where your Honours will see a collection of expressions familiar over the now more than a century of statutory costs provisions in this and like jurisdictions.
One sees that a costs order is the exhaustive means of obtaining costs, see section 98(2) and one sees in subsection (6) an expansion or clarification, as the case may be, of the notion of costs. In section 98 the expression “costs” is of course a pivotal expression and in section 98, for the purposes of cases such as the present, though not for the purposes of all the cases in section 98, the costs are costs in relation to proceedings. Thus one goes to section 3(1) of the Act, which is at page 10 of the print in the book, and one sees the expression “costs” used in relation to proceedings is there defined to mean:
costs payable in or in relation to the proceedings, and includes fees, disbursements, expenses and remuneration.
Your Honours appreciate that the way in which the case has been argued, and to a degree determined below, can now be characterised as involving a question with an enactment in those terms – particularly the meaning, such as it should be, to be given to the word “payable” and the definition of “costs” - is an enactment that precludes the application of the so‑called Chorley exception, extended, as we say it ought to be understood as having been so extended, by the Court of Appeal in this case.
EDELMAN J: Does the word “payable” appear in the legislation in other jurisdictions?
MR WALKER: It does in some of the legislation and, more to the point, some of the, I call it, delegated legislation court rules. It appears in a variety of different contexts. Your Honours will appreciate that some High Court Rules, at…
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- Case
- [2019] HCATrans 91
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the settlement agreement was void for illegality. Specifically, the court had to determine if the alleged breach of the *Legal Profession Uniform Law (NSW)*, relating to the provision of legal services and the charging of fees, rendered the entire settlement agreement unenforceable. This involved an examination of the principles of contractual illegality and the circumstances in which a contract may be deemed void due to contravention of statutory provisions.
The High Court held that the settlement agreement was not void for illegality. The Court reasoned that the alleged breaches of the *Legal Profession Uniform Law (NSW)*, even if proven, did not render the settlement agreement itself illegal or void. The Court distinguished between a contract that is illegal in its formation or performance and a contract that may be affected by subsequent events or breaches of statutory obligations. The principles applied focused on the intention of the legislature in enacting the relevant provisions and whether the consequence of illegality was intended to extend to the unenforceability of collateral agreements such as the settlement. The Court found that the statutory provisions were not intended to invalidate settlement agreements entered into by parties to resolve litigation, even if those agreements were influenced by prior conduct that might have contravened the law.
The High Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the orders of the lower courts that had declared the settlement agreement void. The matter was remitted to the Supreme Court of New South Wales for further proceedings consistent with the High Court's judgment.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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