Beesley v Australian Federal Police

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Beesley v Australian Federal Police
[2001] FCA 836

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION – access to documents – electronic information stored on a database – where joint right of access to database held by Commonwealth agency – whether this right of access amounted to “possession of information” – proper meaning of “possession” – whether physical possession necessary – application of concept of constructive possession.

Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth)
Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth)

Re Sullivan v Department of Industry, Science and Technology (1996) 23 AAR 59 distinguished
Information Commissioner for Western Australia v Ministry of Justice [2001] WASC 3 distinguished
Victorian Public Service Board v Wright (1986) 64 ALR 206 followed
Re Guide Dog Owners’ & Friends Association and Commissioner for Corporate Affairs (1988) 2 VAR 405 followed
Re Mildenhall and Department of Premier and Cabinet (No 2) (1995) 8 VAR 478 followed

TERENCE FRANCIS BEESLEY v AUSTRALIAN FEDERAL POLICE

N 1341 OF 2000

JUDGE:        BEAUMONT J
DATE:           15 JUNE 2001
PLACE:         SYDNEY


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N 1341 OF 2000

BETWEEN:

TERENCE FRANCIS BEESLEY
APPLICANT

AND:

AUSTRALIAN FEDERAL POLICE
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

BEAUMONT J

DATE OF ORDER:

15 JUNE 2001

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be allowed.

2.The Tribunal’s decision be set aside.

3.The mater be remitted to the Tribunal for reconsideration in accordance with these reasons.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N 1341 OF 2000

BETWEEN:

TERENCE FRANCIS BEESLEY
APPLICANT

AND:

AUSTRALIAN FEDERAL POLICE
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

BEAUMONT J

DATE:

15 JUNE 2001

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

BEAUMONT J:

INTRODUCTION

  1. This is an appeal from a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (“the Tribunal”), affirming a decision of the Australian Federal Police (“the AFP”), refusing access to files about the applicant.  The appeal raises important questions as to the meaning and operation of the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth) (“the FOI Act”).

  2. By letter to the Commissioner of the AFP, dated 30 July 1999, the applicant sought, pursuant to the FOI Act:

    “… access to my files and personal documents which includes but is not limited to: -

    Files relating to any dealings between your Department and any other Department or Authority – state, federal.  For example, NSW Police Department, Australian Taxation Office (Personnel Section), Australian Security Intelligence Organisation, state and/or Federal Public Service Boards;

    Files relating to any dealings between your Department and any private enterprise organisations such as Mayne Nickless Ltd - Cash Carrying and Security Services Division.”

  3. By letter to the applicant, dated 20 October 1999, the AFP stated:

    “I refer to your letter dated 19 September 1999 requesting an internal review pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act 1982, of the advice that there is no record of the name Terence Francis Beesley, born 29 April 1942. 

    The Commissioner of the Australian Federal…

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Details
Case
[2001] FCA 836
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Beesley v Australian Federal Police involved a dispute over access to documents under the Freedom of Information Act. The case was heard by the Federal Court of Australia. The primary issue was whether certain documents held by the Australian Federal Police (AFP) were subject to access under the Act. Specifically, the court had to determine whether the AFP had possession of the documents, as required by the Act, even though they were physically located with another agency, the Australian Crime Commission (ACC). The documents in question were part of a system known as LEAN, which was accessible by the AFP.

The court's reasoning focused on the interpretation of "possession" under the Act. The court found that the AFP's ability to access the documents through the LEAN system did not constitute possession. Instead, possession required a more physical or constructive holding of the documents. The court held that while the AFP could access the documents, they did not have the requisite control over them as they were physically held by the ACC. The court distinguished the present case from previous decisions that interpreted "possession" more broadly, finding that the specific context of this case required a narrower interpretation.

The court's decision was based on a detailed analysis of the relevant provisions of the Act and the specific circumstances of the case. The court concluded that the AFP did not have possession of the documents as required by the Act, and therefore, they were not subject to access under the legislation. The appeal was allowed, the Tribunal’s decision was set aside, and the matter was remitted for reconsideration.

ORDERS:
1. The appeal be allowed.
2. The Tribunal’s decision be set aside.
3. The matter be remitted to the Tribunal for reconsideration in accordance with these reasons.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be allowed.

2. The Tribunal’s decision be set aside.

3. The mater be remitted to the Tribunal for reconsideration in accordance with these reasons.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Her Honour then expressed her conclusion as follows:“22.In relation to the documents which are to be found in the blue file, it may be that the Parole Board retains ownership of them, and it is clearly the case that as between the Parole Board and the respondent the Parole Board is regarded by each of them as having the superior right of possession, or the ultimate right of control, of the blue file. However, the documents in the blue file are documents in the physical possession of the respondent, which certain of its officers are entitled to use, in accordance with directions given by it, for its purposes. I express no opinion on the question of whether those documents are not only in the possession of the respondent but are also to be regarded as under its control. However, the degree of control which is able to be exercised, together with the physical holding of the blue files by the respondent in the same place as certain of its records, is in my view sufficient to constitute the documents contained therein, ‘documents of’ the respondent for the purpose of cl 4(1) of the glossary in Schedule 2 to the Act.”CONCLUSIONS ON THE APPEAL It will be recalled that the essential steps taken in the reasoning of Allen SM here, were:·The force or effect of s 17 is that if information appears on a computer screen being material that can be downloaded then there is a duty to do so.·However, to be a “document” within the meaning of s 4(1) the article or material must be a “document of an agency” which is in turn defined as a document “in the possession” of an agency whether created in the agency or received by it.·The observations of Bayne SM in Sullivan as to the meaning of “possession” as “physical possession” (that is, an actual holding with or without ownership rights) should be adopted here.·The mere fact that the AFP can access the LEAN system does not mean that the AFP is in possession of a document; it is only if the information on the computer screen is reduced to printed form or transferred into the AFP’s database that the AFP can be said to be “in possession”. With respect, I have difficulty accepting the logic of this process of reasoning. Moreover, I cannot accept that either Sullivan or Information Commission of Western Australia bears directly upon the present case. Their context was far removed from this and those decisions could not be decisive of the present case. In any event, neither case stands for a narrow interpretation of the legislation. If anything, their approach is to the contrary. In truth the instant context is free from authority although several commentators have recognised aspects of the issues that now arise. For instance, in a paper, “FOI Access to Electronic Records”, submitted to the “Australian Archives ‘Playing For Keeps’ Conference” (1994), Madeleine Campbell, dealing with “Problems for Agencies”, specifically under a heading “Searching”, wrote:“Another issue that may arise is: whether an agency that ordinarily has computer access to databases held by other Commonwealth or State agencies, or private organisations, is required to search those databases. This situation may arise, for example, from information sharing arrangements. In most cases the FOI Act will not apply to such information, because its operation is limited to documents (including computer disks or tapes) in the possession of agencies subject to the FOI Act. For example, on-line access by a Commonwealth law enforcement agency to databases of State and Territory law enforcement agencies would not lead to a right of access under the Commonwealth FOI Act to those other databases. However, where an agency has provided another person or body with computerised data, for example under an ‘out‑sourcing’ agreement relating to certain tasks or functions of the agency, and has an immediate right of access to that data, whether by on-line access or by obtaining computer disks or tapes, then the data would be subject to FOI access on the basis of the agency's right to possession (or constructive possession). [Emphasis added]A further instance is where an agency shares its computer facilities with an outside person or agency not subject to the FOI Act, for example a consultant or a contracted service provider. If the information provided by that organisation is available to officers of the agency in the course of their duties, it would be subject to FOI access as being in the possession of the agency. The outcome in a particular case will depend on the form of any agreement with an outside organisation and the actual dealings between the agency and the organisation in relation to such matters.” (Emphasis added)

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established