Becker v Sturt Pistol & Shooting Club Inc - [2014] SADC 210

DISTRICT COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Civil: Minor Civil Review)
BECKER v STURT PISTOL & SHOOTING CLUB INC
[2014] SADC 210
Judgment of His Honour Judge Stretton
12 December 2014
ASSOCIATIONS AND CLUBS - EXPULSION, SUSPENSION AND DISQUALIFICATION
ASSOCIATIONS AND CLUBS - INCORPORATED ASSOCIATIONS - MEMBERS
MAGISTRATES - APPEAL AND REVIEW
MINOR CIVIL REVIEW
The applicant was a member of the Sturt Pistol and Shooting Club, having contributed substantially to the Club as a member and had served as Vice President. Membership of a firearms club is a requirement to maintain a certain class of gun licence and participate in the sport of shooting that class of firearm.
Over time friction and then conflict arose between the applicant and his supporters and members of the Club’s Management Committee and their supporters. At the root of this was the applicant’s desire that the longstanding practice of publishing Management Committee Meeting minutes be continued, and that better openness, financial accountability and processes be followed by the Club. He became strident and direct in his endeavours to persuade the Management Committee of this. The Management Committee’s reaction was to adopt a siege mentality and resist all the applicant’s efforts to get them to comply with his requests. Ultimately, when he was unable to secure a meeting to discuss the issues he was concerned about, he commenced action per section 61 of the Associations Incorporation Act to require the production of Management Committee Meeting minutes and financial records to the members, on the basis it was unreasonable and oppressive not to do so. He continued to try and negotiate with the Club, who continued to refuse to do so, now on the basis that legal proceedings were on foot. That application was ambitious and when told by a magistrate that it was unlikely to succeed he withdrew it and paid costs.
The Club then levelled four charges against him, held a hearing, found all four charges proven and expelled the applicant. The applicant then took action pursuant to section 61 on the basis that the Club’s actions were oppressive and unfair. The matter came before a magistrate and a large body of evidence was called on both sides. The magistrate held that for the Club to have found three of the four charges proven was a decision that no reasonable person could make, and was accordingly oppressive and unjust. He found one charge ‘arguable.’ On that basis, and on the basis that to order reinstatement would only ‘encourage the ongoing discord’ he declined to order reinstatement.
Held
1.      That the conflict ultimate conflict between the applicant and the Club’s Committee was due to the actions of them both, rather than solely due to the applicant as found by the magistrate.
2.         The Magistrate was correct to find that the Club's actions in expelling the applicant were oppressive and unjust.
3.      That on the one charge that was ‘arguable’ the applicant had been denied natural justice and procedural fairness, and the Club had probably not applied the correct test.
4. That the magistrate’s decision miscarried in that he failed to conduct the required balancing assessment of both the Club and the applicant’s interests that is required when an application is made for reinstatement per section 61(4)(f), and failed to consider the evidence advanced by the applicant as to both the conduct of the Club towards him, and his interest in remaining a member.
5.       On a proper assessment of the evidence there were a number of matters in support of the applicant’s reinstatement.
6.       It is appropriate to order reinstatement.
Associations Incorporation Act (1985) s 61; Magistrates' Court Act (1991) s 38, referred to.
McLoud v Mitchell [2014] SADC 129; Harradine v District Court of South Australia [2012] SASC 96; Pettit v South Australian Harness Racing Club Inc (2006) 95 SASR 543; Pickering v The Bishop of Ely (1843) 2Y&C 249; Firth v Ridley (1864) 33 Beav 516; Pettit v South Australian Harness Racing Club Inc and Ors [2006] SASC 306; Wayde v New South Wales Rugby League Limited (1985) 180 CLR 459; Millar v Houghton Table Tennis and Sports Club Inc [2003] SASC 1, considered.

MAGISTRATES - HEARING - PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS AND NATURAL JUSTICE
At the outset of the hearing before the magistrate the magistrate expressed a view that it was up to the Club to determine who should be a member. The applicant became concerned as the application before the magistrate was to reinstate him over the Club’s objections. He asked the magistrate to disqualify himself on the basis that he had prejudged the very issue in question. Ultimately the magistrate did say that he was open to be convinced otherwise and a reasonable observer would not therefore conclude he had an immutable view. In those circumstances he was right not to disqualify himself.

BECKER v STURT PISTOL & SHOOTING CLUB INC
[2014] SADC 210
Application to review a minor civil action

This an application to review a judgement delivered by a magistrate in a minor civil action.
In that minor civil action the applicant Klaus Becker complained that the respondent Sturt Pistol and Shooting Club Incorporated (‘the Shooting Club’) had expelled him from membership. He claimed that his expulsion was oppressive and unreasonable, as defined in s 61 of the Associations Incorporation Act (“the Act”), and sought an order reinstating his membership pursuant to s 61(4)(f).
The magistrate found that the Shooting Club’s decision to expel Mr Becker was oppressive, unreasonable and unjust, in that three of the four charges it had made out against him were conclusions that could not reasonably have been made, and accordingly the court had the power pursuant to s 61(4)(f) to reinstate him.[1]
[1] Magistrate’s reasons for Judgement paras 36-42.
Notwithstanding that finding, the magistrate concluded that he would exercise a discretion not to reinstate Mr Becker because one of the four charges made against him was arguable,[2] and to reinstate him would only ‘encourage the ongoing discord which has disrupted the activities of the Association in recent years.’[3]
[2] Magistrate’s reasons for Judgement para 50.
[3] Magistrate’s reasons for Judgement para 63.
The nature of a minor civil action and the consequent review in this court
Section 38 of the Magistrates’ Court Act provides that a minor civil action is essentially now a summary inquisitorial process rather than adversarial litigation, and accordingly in my opinion a review requires an examination of the inquisitorial process undertaken by the Magistrate, to determine whether the fundamentals required of a full, fair and comprehensive inquisitorial enquiry identifying all the relevant issues and addressing them with all relevant and available evidence, have been satisfied.
The fundamentals of the trial of any minor civil action must involve:[4]
[4] McLoud v Mitchell [2014] SADC 129, Harradine v District Court of South Australia [2012] SASC 96
A fair hearing by a competent, unconflicted, unbiased tribunal.
The magistrate identifying and addressing the real issues in dispute between the parties, whether or not they are initially pleaded.
The magistrate ensuring that all available evidence relevant to the real issues in dispute that the parties can and want to call, should be called, whether by the parties of the magistrate themselves.
The identification by the magistrate of the relevant legal principles applicable to the real issues in dispute.
A competent fact finding approach by the magistrate, with no apparent errors of logic or conclusion.
A correct application of the legal principles to the found facts to arrive at a conclusion and hence the right judgement.
The ‘review’ contemplated by s 38(7) of the Act must accordingly address itself to these matters.
Upon review, the parties will not be restricted to the way ‘they’ pled their claim or ran ‘their’ case, as the primary responsibility for identifying and defining the issues between the parties and eliciting evidence lay with the magistrate not the parties.
If there has been any failure by the magistrate to identify the real issues, or elicit all relevant evidence, then the Act is clear that should occur upon the review in this court, as there is power to call evidence and also to rehear evidence, and no power to remit to the summary court for rehearing. The role of this court is to, if necessary to do justice between the parties, remedy any omission in the inquisitorial trial process in the lower court, ie identify any real issues between the parties that were not so identified, hear any relevant available evidence that was not heard, and resolve the issues between the parties fully and finally, in the way they should have been before the magistrate.
The issues arising in this review
The overall thrust of applicant’s position is that he did nothing to justify expulsion beyond vigorously participating in the club’s activities and in the course of doing so he raised and pursued legitimate matters of concern that he had, and was entitled to raise, as a club member.
He argued that as the magistrate had rightly found that the Shooting Club had treated him oppressively, unreasonably and unjustly, it was wrong of the magistrate not to reinstate him as a member.
He suggested that in arriving at that conclusion the magistrate made a number of errors. He argued;
That in the exercise of the discretion not to reinstate him the magistrate failed to adequately consider that oppressive and unreasonable conduct by the Shooting Club against him had been established, the effect of expulsion on Mr Becker, or the appropriateness of some penalty other than expulsion.[5]
[5] Ground 3.
That the magistrate did not adequately consider relevant issues. He argues the magistrate failed to consider that he was not afforded natural justice by the Shooting Club, who did not provide their reasons until after the trial commenced, and that the magistrate failed to adequately consider the relevant evidence he called as to his own conduct, and as to the Shooting Club Committee’s conduct, attitude to and treatment of him.[6]
[6] Ground 2.
That the magistrate made findings concerning a previous prior court action by Mr Becker, his visit to the Shooting Club’s auditors, his alleged disregard for the Shooting Club’s finances and his suggested aggressiveness, without considering all the evidence or providing adequate reasons.[7]
[7] Ground 4.
That the magistrate’s finding that he could be expelled for not disclosing a previous firearms club expulsion failed to accurately consider the evidence, including evidence that the plaintiff had in fact informed the Shooting Club of that from the outset.[8]
[8] Ground 5.
He claimed the magistrate erred by taking into account in the exercise of his discretion not to reinstate him speculation that the club could expel him in the future anyway, the possible laying of further charges, and that the applicant would not accept future committee decisions.[9]
[9] Ground 6
That in any event the magistrate should have disqualified himself for apparent bias in light of some comments made at the outset of the hearing.[10]
[10] Ground 1.
Bias
I will initially deal with the issue of disqualification for bias.
At the commencement of the trial each party was represented by a lawyer notwithstanding that it was a minor civil action. There were general discussions concerning the proposed witnesses, the length of trial and the fact that some important documentation had only just been provided. Discussion then ranged across some of the likely issues, including criteria for membership of the Shooting Club and the witnesses who might be relevant to that. In the course of that discussion the magistrate said:
HIS HONOUR: It seems to me if you don’t want someone in the club, they don’t have to be in the club but, depending on what the constitution says, but, if you have taken an issue with him being a fit and proper person, then we have got to determine whether he is or whether he is not.[11]
[11] Page 12 of the transcript of the bias and disqualification application and ruling,
The applicant became concerned at that comment, and after a short adjournment pursued an application that the magistrate disqualify himself. The applicant’s counsel said that the issue as to whether the Shooting Club was entitled to expel the applicant, and whether an order should be made to reinstate him on the grounds that the Shooting Club’s decision was unreasonable or oppressive was the very issue in the case.
It is understandable that the applicant would initially be concerned to hear the magistrate express a view that it was really up to the club whether he could be a member of the club, or as his counsel put it at the time;
MR ROSSI: …. So, the concern here is that unless there has been a breach of the constitution your honour’s position is that if a club chooses not to want to have someone remain in the club, it is its prerogative. …[12]
[12] Page 14 of the transcript of the bias and disqualification application and ruling,
Shortly after this the magistrate asked:
HIS HONOUR: What is your concern, how is that attitude, the attitude I expressed going to affect my consideration of the matter?
MR ROSSI: Because if your honour views all the evidence from the perspective of the club rather than objectively looking at the reasonableness of the action that was taken, then that’s prejudged what has occurred.
HIS HONOUR: I am not speaking to the outcome of the proceedings. If he hasn’t been accorded natural justice, and if that gives him a right to a remedy, he will get the remedy. But he will still be in a club where he is not wanted. So, that was my observation and then if they have made a mistake this time, presumably they will do it again next time. That was my observation.
MR ROSSI: There is a discretion –
HIS HONOUR: In fact, I think I said that specifically that if he gets reinstated they will only try and kick him out, therefore, why is he doing it?
MR ROSSI: That is at the heart of the difficulty because s.61 does involve an exercise of a discretion. That is, ultimately being that should the court exercise the power. Now, if your honour has already prejudged the exercise of the discretion based on a personal belief that if a club doesn’t want someone to continue in the club it shouldn’t have to have him, then your honour has already pre-judged the exercise of the discretion which means the applicant can’t be satisfied and a reasonable bystander couldn’t be satisfied that your honour would, objectively and impartially exercise the discretion accorded[13] to the relevant principles.
HIS HONOUR: Mr Rossi, the very fact that I have said if he wins the application he, they can try and kick him out again, the very fact that I have said that, obviously averts to the fact that I am accepting that he might win. If I thought there wasn’t a possibility that he would win then what is the point in me saying that?[14]
[13] It is likely that ‘accorded’ is a transcription error and should read ‘according’
[14] Page 15 of the transcript of the bias and disqualification application and ruling,
An increasingly vigorous discussion between bar and bench ensued, with counsel arguing that the magistrate had evinced a strong preconceived view that if a club didn’t want a person to be a member then it shouldn’t have to have him, which effectively prejudged the exercise of the discretion to reinstate that the applicant would be asking the court to exercise in favour of reinstatement. The magistrate responded in effect that if he had that legal position wrong then counsel could make submissions and convince him of the correct position. The discussion culminated as follows:
MR ROSSI: The concern is, having made such a clear statement of your honour’s personal view then the concern is that your honour may not be able to impart an impartial judgement of the evidence having formed that view.
HIS HONOUR: It is not a personal view. It is a view I hold of the legal position. If I am wrong, I am wrong. I honestly don’t care. It is not my club, I am not in it. I couldn’t give a damn. As I say, if he wants to go on with his application, fine. He is allowed to. And if he succeeds, he will succeed. But I just don’t follow. Anyway, I will give reasons on the application.
The magistrate then delivered an ex tempore ruling, declining to disqualify himself. Omitting the magistrate’s citation of the law applicable to an application for disqualification, and observations as to the context of the discussion in which it arose, he said
The comment I made seems to me gave no indication at all of how I would determine the present application. I merely sought to articulate what I understood to be a principle of freedom of association. If I am wrong in that principle, then, Mr Rossi can advise me as to the proper legal principle but I rather suspect I am right. As to the logical condition[15] between what I said and how that might decide me to deviate from the course of deciding the case on the merits, again, I don’t understand how that would happen. I am fully prepared to listen to all evidence …
[15] It is likely ‘condition’ should read ‘connection’.
If the magistrate was saying that on an application by an unreasonably and oppressively expelled member of a club for reinstatement, the only issue is whether the club is agreeable to have him back, then for the reasons articulated later in these reasons, that would represent an erroneous view of the operation of s 61 of the Act.
There are many reasons for that, not the least of which is that the Act specifically contemplates the court ordering reinstatement of a member who has been unreasonably and oppressively expelled. It is axiomatic that such order would only be required where the club concerned would not otherwise re-admit the expelled member, so the Act plainly contemplates a member being reinstated contrary to the wishes of the club concerned.
In my view it is equally axiomatic that the Act must contemplate a consideration of and a balancing of the respective interests of the member and the club, when considering what if any remedy it will afford an unreasonably and oppressively expelled member.
In my view, the same broad concepts of fairness and reasonableness that are applicable when assessing whether a member has been treated unreasonably and or oppressively, should be brought to bear on what remedy a wronged member should be afforded.
Hence, I find that the magistrate’s initial view of the legal test he ought to apply was incorrect.
However, it must be understood that the trial had barely commenced, and that counsel and the magistrate were in the throes of a preliminary discussion of the case and the issues. The magistrate was not expressing a concluded view as to the law, and indeed he indicated that he would listen to counsel and counsel might convince him that he was wrong.
There is nothing wrong with a judicial officer having a view of the law at the outset of a case, indeed he or she is expected to be well versed in the law. However, accepting that the law is often complex and judicial officers are not perfect, the judicial officer must always approach a case with a recognition that their initial view of the law might be wrong. For example, it is always possible that the judicial officer might not be aware of a recent amendment to the relevant legislation, or a recent authority which affects the interpretation of the law in some way. Accordingly, even when the law might seem clear to a judicial officer before a case commences, an open mind as to the law must always be maintained.

However, discussing the applicable law, testing possible interpretations in argument, proposing and seeking submissions on a particular approach or interpretation, even expressing provisional views and seeking counsel’s submissions on them, are all part of the legitimate Socratic dialogue between bar and bench that has occurred for centuries. It is a method long recognised as productive of full and comprehensive consideration of the relevant issues by courts.
The magistrate’s views were however expressed somewhat robustly. It would have been preferable once it became apparent that counsel for the applicant would be submitting that a different test was appropriate than initially envisaged by the magistrate, for the magistrate to have refrained from robustly expressing a contrary view until full argument had occurred on the topic. The more robustly expressed, the more the impression can be conveyed that the magistrate might hold an immutable view.
That said, expressing a robust view might be wholly appropriate where it was plain to the magistrate that counsel for the applicant was plainly wrong and needed to be dissuaded from embarking on a wholly fruitless exercise. It will be advisable that such a stance only be taken where the view of the law expressed by the magistrate is uncontroversial and plainly right, and not where that view is reasonably contestable, and might accordingly be wrong.
If there is any reasonable possibility that counsel’s view might be right, any forthright expression of a contrary view in circumstances where counsel wish to argue the contrary but have not had the opportunity to yet do so, runs a substantial risk, depending on the absoluteness of the view expressed by the judicial officer, that it will convey to the observer pre-judgement of the legal issue.
So, bringing all this together
1.   A judicial officer is expected to know the law and accordingly can legitimately approach a case at the outset with a particular view of the law.
2.   However, he or she should always accept that he or she might be wrong in that view, and accordingly must keep an open mind.
3.   Where it is apparent that the judicial officer’s provisional view of the law is disputed, the judicial officer should refrain from expressing a view in terms that that might indicate an effectively concluded view, until full argument is completed on the topic.
In the course of argument, it is legitimate for the judicial officer to engage in Socratic dialogue, put propositions for counsel’s comment and response, even express provisional views, so long as it is made plain that no concluded view is being expressed until counsel has been fully heard.
The issue is whether a reasonable lay observer with knowledge of the relevant facts and circumstances might reasonably conclude that the magistrate had pre-judged the legal issue in question and would accordingly not bring an impartial mind to the relevant issue he would be called to consider.
It is doubly of relevance where, as here, the provisional view represents an erroneous view of the law. In such a situation, whilst it is not necessarily definitive of the issue of pre-judgement, the error unless corrected prior to deciding the case, will also infect the ultimate judgement.
As the carriage of the case and the approach taken to the evidence may also give some indication of whether the magistrate’s view was set in stone prior to argument, before ultimately determining the issue of whether the magistrate should have disqualified himself on the basis of apparent bias through exhibiting pre-judgement of the case, I turn now to consider the other grounds of review, which assert that the magistrate erred in the test he applied for reinstatement and failed to consider a significant proportion of the evidence called.
Did the magistrate consider all the relevant evidence?
To fairly review this aspect of the case, it is necessary to briefly review the evidence itself.
The parties’ cases
The applicant Mr Becker commenced action in the magistrates court, pleading that he had commenced an earlier action seeking access to the club’s financial records and minutes, but withdrew that action. He claimed that the club then proceeded to expel him from membership, and in doing so acted unreasonably and oppressively, failing to provide him with particulars of the allegations against him either at the outset or upon request, in circumstances suggestive of bias, on no basis recognised by the constitution of the Shooting Club, failing to accord him procedural fairness in terms of not telling him the information it proposed to rely on nor giving him a chance to respond to it, failed to consider relevant considerations and took into account irrelevant ones, expelling him without proper basis without adequate reasons and did not consider alternative penalties. He asked that the expulsion be set aside and that he be reinstated.
The Shooting Club responded that the applicant had pursued the earlier proceedings but had withdrawn them when another magistrate had indicated that they were doomed to failure, and that it properly expelled the applicant for that reason and a number of other valid reasons.
Evidence called by the applicant Mr Becker before the magistrate
Evidence in chief was called by way of affidavit, and several witnesses were cross-examined.
The applicant Mr Becker gave evidence and called a number of witnesses.
Mr Becker the applicant gave evidence that he left school at 14 and has had a successful working career in various roles, initially on rural properties, then for local government, then in retail, and then for a period in marine businesses. After that he spent 16 years in the security industry, ultimately owning his own business which was then sold to Mayne Nickless. After some other roles he established his own marine business Becker Enterprises, which was sold upon earlier divorce proceedings. He now runs a similar partnership with his current wife.
The applicant developed an interest in firearms from his younger years on rural properties, an interest that has continued, primarily by way of hunting, throughout his life.
He holds various firearm licences and has been a member of the Sporting Shooters Association of Australia for considerable periods over time. He holds a range of firearms training certifications and qualifications. He has been a competitive pistol shooter for 20 years, initially with the Fourth District Electrical and Mechanical Engineers of the Royal Australian Army pistol club (“4EME Club”), with whom he held a number or roles, including membership safety and training officer and approved range officer. He was elected president of that association in 2000.
Around that time the 4NME club’s Port Adelaide shooting range had to be closed due to the construction of the Port River Expressway and so the club amalgamated with the Adelaide Pistol & Shooting Club Inc. (“APSC”) transferring the club’s assets to APSC. The applicant became a board member also assuming a role as the APSC’s safety and training officer and became club captain for International Practical Shooting Confederation events. He was responsible for ensuring that all club shooting observed applicable safety regulations, standards and practices, and he was also responsible for training new members.
According to the applicant, he became concerned over several incidents which had occurred involving breaches of firearm safety by members, and brought these to the attention of the board. Those incidents are set out in detail in the applicant’s evidence. One or more of these incidents were also reported to the Board by another safety accredited member, a Mr Bob Brown, who supported all the matters the applicant took to the Board. The Board took no action.
Some time later, there was a proposal to increase the association’s membership fees. The applicant asked to see the finances so that he could try and find a way to increase revenue or reduce financial expenditure. He was not initially given all the documentation so wrote formally and was then given the remainder.
Upon perusal of that material he became concerned to note that 60% of the club’s funds were being paid out to Board members and their associates, and that the Board had exempted themselves and their spouses from membership fees and were paying themselves an undisclosed honorarium that had not been authorised at an AGM, although there was no provision in the club’s constitution authorising such a payment.
The applicant and Mr Barnes raised these matters informally with Board members, to no avail, and so the applicant formally wrote to the Board. The Board’s response was to move to expel the applicant and Mr Barnes. At this, the applicant became disenchanted with APSC. He also had other concerns with the way the club was run, including its attitude to women. He therefore decided he did not wish to remain a member, and thus decided not to contest the expulsion process.
The applicant gave evidence that Mr Barnes had become a member of the Sturt Pistol and Shooting Club, the respondent in this case. Mr Barnes suggested that the applicant join him at that club. Mr Barnes advised the secretary of the Shooting Club a Mrs Deborah Rowe of the issues involving APSC, and she said she had no issue with them being granted membership. The applicant and Mr Barnes then together met with Ms Rowe in person. The applicant advised her of his expulsion from APSC and the reasons for it, and they were told that it would be ‘no difficulty at all.’ On the basis of that discussion the applicant applied for membership together with his wife Tammy. They received letters dated 23 August 2007 indicating that their membership applications had been accepted.
The applicant said that the next time the issue of his expulsion from APSC was raised was not until the amended defence the Shooting Club was filed in this matter on 4 July 2013, some six years later.
The applicant and his wife took an active role in the Shooting Club, including making numerous donations and loans to the club, and organising financial sponsorship. They held functions for the Shooting Club at their own expense. They received many acknowledgements for the contributions they made to the club and its activities. Their contributions, donations and acknowledgements are set out extensively in the evidence.
At the urging of several Board members the applicant stood for election to the Board and was elected to the Board as Vice President of the club at the 2010 AGM. In his new role the applicant began attending management committee meetings.
He became concerned at some of the procedures that were being followed. For example, rather than the meetings having an agenda circulated in advance, with minutes then being prepared to reflect the discussions and decisions that occurred during the meeting, the secretary Ms Rowe would just prepare a ‘draft minutes’ document in advance of the meeting, which she would amend as the meeting progressed, and then issue as the minutes of the meeting. The applicant gave evidence to the effect that Ms Rowe although not the chair of the meetings would attempt to run the meetings, speaking over the top of others and challenging all those who might disagree with her. The applicant said that when he was chairing the meeting as Vice President he would regularly need to tell her not to interrupt and talk over other committee members. He was also concerned that often the minutes would not be accurate or might leave out important discussions. He mentioned these concerns to the committee and to Ms Rowe, but nothing changed.
The applicant gave evidence about a number of further issues raised with the Shooting Club over time.
For example, he became concerned that club officers were selling and retaining the profits from food and drink at club events even though the club was financially contributing to the cost of providing such items, and he proposed that the club take over providing the food and drink and retain the profits for club projects, which was ultimately accepted.
The Shooting Club undertook a project to build an Air Pistol Hall on the basis of assurances from a member who agreed to perform the construction that it would be done for a budgeted amount of $50,000, however did not complete the work for that sum. The applicant noted a range of concerns with the charging and accountability for funds expended and charged to the club by that member, and so to complete the project in time to receive a grant from the Council by the deadline, the applicant organised club working bees, made contributions himself, and the project was completed.
There was an issue over a club member accused by some members of stealing a bucket of surplus copper wire which he had in fact been authorised to take, which the applicant investigated and resolved had been authorised. I will refer to that person as Mr L. The apology that was conveyed to Mr L was in very qualified and negative terms and Mr L remained very angry. The applicant was concerned that Mr L might have a cause of action against the club due to the allegation he had stolen the wire, told the club at a committee meeting on 18 December 2010 that, and to defuse the situation secured written apologies which were accepted by the wronged member as an end to the issue.
Around that time Ms Rowe also accused the Mr L of various allegations of sexual misconduct against a number of people. The applicant knew Mr L well and in light of that knowledge had misgivings about those allegations. He asked whether Ms Rowe had any evidence of the matters but none was produced.
A week later Ms Rowe proposed to a committee meeting that the Shooting Club adopt a ‘member protection policy’, on the basis of suggested events having occurred at another club.
The applicant contacted that club and spoke to persons mentioned and could not substantiate what Ms Rowe had said occurred there. That was the basis for Mrs Rowe’s suggested need for such a policy at the Shooting Club. At a meeting about 5 later months on 21 March 2011 a draft Member Protection Policy was however circulated, and the applicant argued against the policy. He was outvoted and it was accepted in principle that the club should have a policy, and he says he accepted the decision.
He said then Ms Rowe continued to argue for the policy, and made a series of allegations to the Committee of sexual misconduct by Mr L against herself and two other named female members, to the apparent shock of many Committee members. When the minutes were produced by Ms Rowe, none of the allegations were reproduced.
The applicant was concerned at the seriousness of the allegations, and decided they needed to be investigated. There was potential for damage to the club and, if untrue, to Mr L the member concerned. He wrote to Ms Rowe and the President indicating he was appalled if Ms Rowe had been treated inappropriately, and requested that if the allegations were to be maintained she provide evidence. They all agreed to meet the following day.
Meanwhile he interviewed one of the two other women who Ms Rowe had specifically said had been mistreated, who denied such things had happened to her.
The three met as agreed, and the applicant pressed Ms Rowe for details. Ms Rowe did not respond with details but in response said that she was now afraid of the applicant. She could not specify why.
The applicant then interviewed Mr L, the man against who the allegations had been made, who appeared horrified and denied them as well. The applicant also interviewed a number of female members of the Shooters Club and they gave no indication that had had any problems with Mr L.
The President enquired of the other female member who Ms Rowe had suggested had been sexually mistreated by the member concerned, and she responded she had no problem with the club or any of its members.
On 4 April 2011 a specific draft Member Protection Policy was proposed for adoption. The applicant suggested a different wording but was outvoted and the draft was approved. A motion recommending Ms Rowe for life membership was carried, with the minutes incorrectly recording that the President was present and omitting that one of the Committee voted against the motion.
Due to financial issues associated with the construction of the Air Pistol Hall the club thought it could not afford an opening event for the Air Pistol Hall, so the applicant secured a range of sponsorship to enable it to occur.
In June 2011 the applicant’s wife complained pursuant to the Member Protection Policy about certain language she had heard used by a member. I will refer to him as Mr T. As a result the Board considered the complaint and on 16 July 2011 at a special meeting ultimately suspended Mr T for three months.
As the 2011 AGM approached, the applicant was nominated and seconded for the position of club president. He became aware that others were also running and that Ms Rowe was campaigning against him on the basis that by way of his various contributions and donations to the club he was “trying to buy the club”.
The applicant said he felt upset that his contributions were being viewed that way rather than being appreciated. The club constitution specifically prohibited a withdrawal of his nomination, however he decided he did not want to be engaged in anything akin to “dirty politics” so decided not to actively campaign for re-election.
In light of Ms Rowe’s comments suggesting he was attempting to “buy” the club, he drew up letters indicating that his company would withdraw its sponsorship and that he and his wife had removed the club as beneficiaries under their wills, indicating that he did not consider the committee acted in the best interests of members or had the ability to manage a substantial amount of money, intending to present them at the end of the upcoming AGM to the person he anticipated might be elected as president.
The AGM took place on 16 July 2011.
At the AGM the applicant asked about a significant increase in postage costs that appeared in the accounts, and his wife observed that groceries had also significantly increased, saying that he was not suggesting dishonesty but that the financial reports were not easy to understand. The treasurer Mr Watts said that documentation could be provided. The outgoing president nominated Ms Rowe for life membership, although the practice had previously been that the chair did not move motions, which the applicant queried. He also disagreed that Ms Rowe should be awarded life membership, given earlier recounted events. The motion was carried, with seven votes against, although the subsequent minutes produced by Ms Rowe indicated only three voted against it.
During general business the Member Protection Policy was discussed. The applicant said members should be careful not to rely on the policy as it was potential “litigation minefield”. His concerns did not appear in the minutes. The applicant’s wife received a Committee Merit Award for her contribution to the club, and a similar award was offered to the applicant but he declined because he did not believe the committee should be giving themselves awards.
At the conclusion of the AGM the applicant handed the incoming president the previously prepared letters withdrawing sponsorship and concerning their wills.
Two days later on 18 July the applicant followed up the treasurer’s offer to provide financial documentation concerning postage and grocery expenses, also indicating that he intended to write to the auditors concerning the way the accounts were audited and that he wished access to the monthly financial statements presented to the committee. The treasurer replied that his monthly financial report would be put on the noticeboard with the minutes.
On 20 July 2011 Mr L and his wife both lodged incident reports pursuant to the Member Protection Policy, complaining about Ms Rowe’s allegations of sexual misconduct.
The minutes of the 25 July 2011 committee meeting posted three days later on the notice board indicate that under general business a motion to revoke Member Protection Policy had been moved and passed, by 9 votes to 1. No reason was given.[16]
[16] Page 4 of 5, document 99, contained within plaintiffs book of tender documents P4. The annotation indicates the document was printed by the computer on 28 July 2011.

A subsequent print of the document dated 15 August included an extended notation that the policy could be used mischievously to report a frivolous or irrelevant incident, and said that the constitution gave the club no power to deal with or resolve such incidents and that aspects of the policy in part conflicted with the constitution.[17]
[17] Page 5 of 6, document 112, contained within plaintiffs book of tender documents P4. The annotation indicates the document was printed by the computer on 15 August 2011.
From that moment on, the longstanding practice for minutes to be posted on the noticeboard for members’ perusal ceased.
By letter dated 26 July 2011 the president replied to Mr L and his wife that preliminary enquires revealed that ‘one or more’ of the witnesses referred to in the incident report had no recollection of the accusations and allegations made by Ms Rowe and that Mr L would need to produce statutory declarations. The applicant, his wife and another witness provided such declarations to Mr L. Mr L tried to secure an apology, which was never forthcoming, and in the end Mr L and his wife resigned from the club due to the stress of the events.
On 26 July 2011 Ms Rowe wrote to the applicant indicating that the committee had rescinded a 16 May 2011 motion to complete the ceiling of part of a passageway from the clubhouse to the air pistol range, requesting the return of any purchased materials and invoices, and any gas work quotes he had received.
The applicant was perplexed by this as he had played no role in the construction of the ceiling, had simply provided some industry costings as requested. He replied on the 29^th of July, curtly indicating the same, observing that if she had listened and understood the relevant discussions and kept accurate minutes and noted his prior correspondence she would not be wasting his time ‘asking such inane questions’.
The attached minutes from 16 May 2011 do not adequately minute who was to perform the work, or how the work was to be done, and provide no support for the proposition that the applicant had undertaken or agreed to do any of the things suggested by Ms Rowe or would have any materials or invoices the return of which she had demanded.
Rather than accept or respond to the substantive position as clarified by the applicant, the applicant received a letter from the president dated 18 August 2011 containing only the following:
The committee of management has instructed me to inform you that it considers your criticism of the Secretary most uncalled for and a repeat of this behaviour would not be welcomed.
On 31 July the applicant had also written to Ms Rowe concerned at the contents of her 16 July 2011 AGM minutes, indicating that rather than him having said there was any financial problem, the treasurers report was incorrect and incomplete, and he wished to make clear that there was no question of any dishonesty on the part of the Treasurer and that he had recommended an electronic accounting system such as MYOB be adopted, and observed that he had himself moved that the financial report be adopted. He also observed that his comments about the risks of having a Members Protection Policy had been entirely omitted and asked they be included. The only reply received was a one line letter dated 19 August 2011, stating:
The committee of management of the Sturt Pistol and Shooting Club note your comments in your letter dated 31^st July 2011.
None of the matters raised by the applicant were responded to.
The applicant’s wife then received a letter from Ms Rowe dated 3 August 2011 informing her that Mr T’s suspended membership, that had been suspended on her complaint was to be reinstated immediately “as the action taken by the committee did not follow due process”. For no apparent reason the letter was headed “without prejudice”.
The applicant’s wife wrote back expressing concern that she had not been given notice of the proposal to rescind the suspension, that Mr T had had full notice of the hearing and material against him, and that if the proceedings against him were not in accordance with the constitution she was concerned about that as Ms Rowe had been secretary of the club for 15 years. She discussed her concerns with a committee member friend, and that friend suggested that if she was concerned she might like to take it to court, which she did not do but responded that it was the committee’s responsibility to deal with the matter.
The applicant then wrote a lengthy letter to the committee dated 7 September 2011, to discuss a number of issues.
He pointed out that committee members were entitled to responses from the club concerning its affairs. He expressed concern that the Mr L matter had escalated to the point where legal action had resulted. He expressed concern that the suspension of Mr T on his wife’s complaint had been overturned without consulting or advising her, citing her letter in response, and that there were issues re the status of the club’s public officer, to whom the complaint had apparently been referred. He expressed concern at the time taken to resolve the complaint, citing the club’s statutory duties and observing that a committee member’s response had just been to tell him to take it to court, which he did not recommend or want to do. In the course of emphasising his concerns, and expressing a belief that a negotiated solution was in order, he then said:
However, if this is not the will of the committee, perhaps the exorbitant expense of the exercise of making a claim and going to the referee, is? The cost of this ridiculous scenario will do little if anything to quell my resolve to remain a member of the Sturt Pistol & Shooting Club, but has the possibility of financially bankrupting the club.
Properly understood, this was not a threat of legal action, rather the applicant emphasising the undesirability to all concerned, particularly the club, of going down such a path. He went on to express concern at how his wife was feeling.
He observed that there were seemingly no minutes taken of the 30 July 2011 meeting, and that his wife had been denied access to the minute book re the 3 September 2011 meeting, citing the statutory duty of the club per s 51 of the Act to minute all meetings and make the minutes available to any member without charge, and that it was an offence per s 58 of the Act to conceal or falsify the books relating to the affairs of an association. He repeated that while there was no suggestion as to the integrity of the treasurer, he remained unsatisfied, as he had pointed out at the AGM, with the club’s book-keeping practices and the manner in which they were presented. He said that after having discussed the postage issue with the treasurer he had got advice from his own named chartered accountants and would communicate with the auditors to voice his concerns.
He exhorted the new president to take control to restore harmony and protocol, and voiced criticism of the president for not doing so, and also voiced criticisms of the president over a verbal exchange with a member and about his attitude generally. He concluded his letter with, as the court reads it, a general statement of his position and attitude:
It has been suggested by some committee members that I am some sort of polemicist. The fact that I hold this club dear to me (evidenced by the many sponsors which I have introduced to the club as well as the many $$$ my company has gladly and willingly donated to the club) and many of its members likewise held dearly, I shall discount that comment as futile and ridiculous and most likely uttered by an ill-informed ignoramus.
I believe that it would not be an understatement that the club has reached crisis point. We need the President and his Management Committee to realise that they have a duty of care to act in the club’s best interests as they are each charged with an enormous responsibility in abiding by certain Acts of parliament, or face the possibility of enormous penalties and legal costs being placed upon them.
Whilst I implore you as a committee to search for a timely resolution and I am more than willing to assist you in reaching a compromise, I reserve the absolute right to share this communication with my fellow members at any time and place of my choosing.
Yours faithfully
Klaus Becker
On 20 September 2011 Ms Rowe replied on behalf of the committee, responding to some of the various issues. She said Mr T had also not been advised or attended the meeting concerning his revocation of suspension. She said the incident report had been referred to the public officer who had then gone on holidays but would be progressed on his return. She offered to make requested minutes available. She said his comments about the auditor had been noted.
Further correspondence about these issues continued, but none were in his view resolved so the applicant, his wife and four other members requested a special meeting of the club to discuss them. They had a right to call such meeting per the constitution, and their 11 October 2011 notice set out in some detail the issues, requesting information and responses on the topics of the sudden revocation of the Member Protection Policy, Mr and Mrs L’s incident reports, the applicant’s wife’s incident report, and the ongoing unavailability of minutes to the committee meetings. They asked consent to record the meeting, indicating they would provide the club with a copy.
At the consequent special general meeting held on 29 October the President took the chair noting that 47 members were needed for a quorum and 57 were present. The president stated he would not allow the meeting to be recorded. One member, not the applicant or his wife, indicated he was entitled to record the meeting and would do so. The president said that any member who did not want to be recorded could leave, and many did, including the president and the secretary. On that basis there was no quorum and the meeting was closed. The applicant says he thinks this was organised by the committee in advance. Accordingly the meeting did not substantively occur, and none of the members’ concerns were addressed.
In response to the suggestion by a member Mr Burrows that he had told Mr Burrows after the meeting that if it did not give him what he wanted he would take the club to court and bankrupt it, the applicant says the thrust of what he was saying to Mr Burrows was that he was trying to sort out the difficulties without the need for legal action, with there being some discussion regarding the financial ramifications of legal action and the fact that such proceedings may have the effect of bankrupting the club.
Shortly after the special general meeting the new secretary a Mr Robb circulated a written document responding to the issues raised in the notice of meeting. On 20 November 2011 the applicant wrote back, disagreeing with and discussing the responses, and reiterating his views. Correspondence continued, with the applicant becoming increasingly critical of the committee, repeating that his preference was to resolve the matter, and reiterating his requests for minutes.
The applicant rang Corporate Affairs to find out what they could do to ensure enforce the committee’s obligations under the Act and was told that the applicant could take action per s 61 of the Act. The applicant wrote to the Shooting Club on 24 December 2011 that if he did not get minutes and answers within 21 days he would take the matter to another arena. The club replied on 19 January 2012 that it was getting ‘expert opinion’ on the matter.
In fact the applicant did not instigate legal action but kept pursuing a meeting with committee members, for example sending an email dated 21 February 2012 to the secretary in the following terms:
Good afternoon John
I had looked forward to you advising me the result of my verbal plea to your good self and our President on Saturday 4^th whereby the suggestion was made that a meeting be called between the President, Secretary and Treasurer of our club, together with Trevor Kenny and myself, with the goodwill of all parties to resolve the differences of opinion which exist.
I am sure that we share the view that the tensions which exist could be amicably resolved, which no doubt would be for the betterment of all concerned.
I look forward to hearing from you at your earliest convenience.
Regards
Klaus
The applicant received a reply dated the same day from the Shooting Club asking what topics he wished to discuss and seeking an assurance that the meeting would not be recorded, so he spoke to the President outlining the issues he hoped to discuss at the meeting. He heard nothing more from the Shooting Club and no meeting was offered.
For that reason, on 22 March 2011the applicant commenced action pursuant to s 61 of the Act, in the Port Adelaide Magistrates Court, as he described it per his solicitor’s subsequent correspondence as a ‘last resort,’ seeking orders that members be provided with documents relating to the Shooting Club’s business, particularly the financial records and minutes of all meetings.
Section 61 allows a member of an association to apply to the Magistrates Court or the Supreme Court for an order that the association has engaged in conduct that is oppressive or unreasonable. Remedies include orders that the association regulate its affairs in a certain way in the future, or requiring a person to do a specified action or thing, or any other order necessary to remedy any default or resolve a dispute. Per s 61(15)(a)(ii) and (b), the concept of oppressive or unreasonable includes refusing or failing to take action, where that is “oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to, or unfairly discriminatory against, a member or was, or would be, contrary to the interests of members as a whole”.
Section 52 requires that minutes of all general and committee meetings be taken and retained by an association, and that the minutes of all general meetings be available to all members for inspection without charge.
The applicant pled that the Shooting Club’s actions justifying such an order were that minutes had been denied to members, some minutes had been falsified, and that the minute book was not made available for members’ perusal, and that a Special General Meeting had been previously been called to resolve and seek answers to specific questions relating to the business of the Shooting Club at which a walkout had been orchestrated to ensure it could not proceed.
The applicant claimed that the members of the Committee had treated those seeking information inappropriately in named ways, and criticised their behaviour. In effect, in those circumstances he claimed their actions were oppressive and unreasonable and sought orders providing the documentary records including financial records and minutes of all meetings to members.
It should be observed that while the applicant’s claims concerning the committee’s conduct were strident, the relief he sought was moderate; simply the provision to the members of the Shooting Club’s official records.
The applicant denied he threatened to bankrupt the club to those representing the club in the course of interlocutory hearings, but agreed that he did discuss the possibility that the club may not be able to afford ongoing and expensive legal proceedings.
On 23 March the applicant met with the club’s auditors, accountants DFK Gray and Perry, and the applicant said he was attending in a personal capacity, not alleging any dishonesty and wanted to understand how the books were audited, the accountants responded to the matters he raised and he was told the matters would be addressed with the club’s committee. He offered to pay for the time taken, however this was refused.
The applicant said that at a conciliation conference the presiding magistrate asked those representing the club “I don’t see why he can’t have the documents” whereupon the president claimed the minutes could not be posted on the notice board ‘because the Firearms Branch has advised me not to publish the minutes of meetings in this manner’ as they may contain the names of persons with licence details or details relating to applications for licenses.
Because of this, on 11 June 2012 the applicant wrote to the Firearms Branch asking whether this was the case and whether the Firearms Branch held a view on the matter and received a reply dated 15 June 2012 indicating their view was that that the decision whether a firearm club display executive committee meeting minutes or other sensitive material on the Club’s noticeboard should be decided by the club itself as determined by the club’s executive committee and/or constitution.
The applicant denied he acted in a belligerent and aggressive manner towards anyone during the course of the initial legal proceedings, although he agreed that at one point he had commented to the new president “you’ve got a yellow streak down your back as wide as the Port Road”, as the president would not address the issues he had raised.
The applicant said he got legal advice that he had a legitimate claim. Those solicitors wrote to the Shooting Club on 25 June, and I note that the claim is articulated in detail in that letter, which also contained the suggestion that the matter should be capable of resolution and sought a meeting with the aim of resolving all outstanding issues.
Lawyers for the Shooting Club wrote back on 28 August 2012, indicating that since the settlement conference it had, as intimated, agreed to put summaries of minutes on the noticeboard with sensitive matters deleted. The applicant did not agree that publishing such summaries was sufficient, so did not discontinue proceedings.
The applicant said that the Shooting Club then took out an application to have his action struck out. The matter came before magistrate Gumple on 18 December 2012. He said the magistrate that he was in the wrong court, that his action was likely to fail in its current form, and that perhaps he should ‘keep you powder dry and have another crack at it’. At that he discontinued proceedings and paid the court’s order that he pay the Shooting Club’s legal costs. The applicant denies the proceedings were without merit, indicating he commenced them on legal advice and the basis of what Corporate Affairs had told him.
Meanwhile, the 2012 AGM had occurred. The applicant took his concerns to that meeting, including by moving a number of motions in relation to the issues he had been pursuing. The president ruled most of his motions ’invalid’, although a variation of his motion seeking the publication of all minutes was passed, in that motion was passed that summaries of minutes excising sensitive information be published to members.
Then there were email exchanges between the applicant and Ms Rowe and Mr Kenny. It started when Mr Kenny initially emailed the Shooting Club opposed an award of ‘honorary membership’ to someone as the constitution did not allow for it. As this email had been copied to Mr Rowe she wrote back stridently supporting the proposal on the basis that the person deserved it, and indicating that because she had asked Mr Kenny not to use that email, she now considered he was harassing her, and had ‘recorded and filed (it) as such’.
The applicant took exception to Ms Rowe accusing Mr Kenny of harassment and replied stridently to her about that, indicating that there was no constitutional power to make such award although he and Mr Kenny supported an amendment for that to occur and for the named person to get such an award, indicating she had completely misunderstood all of that, and outlining all the negative things he believed she had done over time, and seeking an apology to Mr Kenny.
Ms Rowe did not respond to any of the substantive matters raised by the applicant, but accused the applicant of harassment. Her email to the applicant dated 16 November 2012 simply read, in its entirely; ‘Harassment\]recorded’. (sic) She responded to another email from the applicant just with the word ‘harassment’.

In the club’s December 2012 newsletter there was a headline Court Claim against the Club withdrawn – Club awarded costs”. The applicant was concerned that this may infer he had been sued the Club for money, so he wrote seeking a retraction and asked who had editorial responsibility for the newsletter. The applicant received a reply simply indicating his comments were noted so he wrote again seeking an answer.
The applicant said that by notice of hearing dated 29 January 2013 the Shooting Club laid charges against him per Rules 17(b) and 17(c) of its constitution, alleging:
1.   That the Magistrates’ Court proceedings initiated by you on 22^nd March 2012 constitute an action that was detrimental to the interests of the Sturt Pistol and Shooting Club Incorporated within the meaning of clause 17 (c) of the rules.
2.   That your visit to the Club’s Auditors during march 2012 constitutes a breach of the Club’s constitution (section 20. B. ii).
3.   That your correspondence of 11^th June 2012 to Officer in Charge SAPOL Firearms Branch constitutes a breach of the Club’s constitution (section 20. B. ii).
4.   That your email of 4^th July 2012 to the Club and numerous members of the Club indicates that you do not subscribe to the Club’s Constitution as required by Section 4.a of the Constitution.
The notice indicated that the applicant was being given an opportunity to appear before the Committee to answer the charges on 14 February 2013, and that the proceedings would be recorded, either electronically or if the applicant objected to that, by a stenographer.
The applicant replied on 2 February 2013, requesting the following:
1.   Please provide detailed evidence as to how the Magistrate’s Court proceedings were detrimental to the interests of the club?
2.   Please provide detailed evidence as to the reasoning behind (how) a visit to the club’s auditors was detrimental to the interests of the club?
3.   Please provide detailed evidence of the communication with SAPOL Firearms Branch and how this was detrimental to the interests of the club?
4.   Please provide detailed evidence of how an email of 4^th July 2012 was detrimental to the interests of the club.
Further, I require discovery of all documentation relating to the above matters.
I will require your response at least 7 days prior to your proposed hearing date.
I note that the Shooting Club says[18] it wrote back to the applicant per letter dated 4 February, addressed to his post office box, in the following terms:
Mr Becker
The Sturt Pistol and Shooting Club Inc. is legally bound to operate under The Associations Incorporation Act 1985 and its Rules (Constitution).
The Club is an association, not a Court of Law.
The Committee of Management is currently investigating the charges made against you.
The hearing to which you have been summoned is for the Committee to hear evidence or statements from you in relation to these charges.
When all available evidence has been collected, the Committee will consider it and you will be informed of its decision.
Yours faithfully
(the secretary)
[18] Document 37 of its book of documents D2.
The applicant wrote back per email dated 11 February 2013 to the Shooting Club, in the following terms:
Mr Secretary
Further to your letter of 4^th instant, I reiterate my request and the issues I have.
There is a lack of particularity in the Notice of Hearing as to the charges brought. I require to know the basis upon which the charges have been brought with sufficient particularity to allow me to properly answer them.
Secondly, there is the issue of whether the Committee ought to be determining the charges as there may be an issue of bias.
Further, the court action was instituted due to lack of proper minute-keeping and omissions and the unwillingness of the committee to answer written and verbal requests in order to seek a resolution.
I have in my possession statutory declarations and other documents which support my allegations.
I would look forward to a prompt reply owing to the short time frame.
Klaus Becker
The Shooting Club replied on the evening of 12 February 2013:
Mr Becker
The first charge is simply that you took the club to Court. Your reasons for doing so are irrelevant and not up for consideration or argument. As you have twice made written statements that there was never a claim against the Club, you are being given this opportunity to make a submission about this.
The second and third charges are simply that you breached the Constitution. Again your reasons are not up for consideration or argument. Refer to Section 20.b.ii of the Club’s Constitution.
The fourth charge is that your email as noted indicates that you do not subscribe to the Club's Constitution as required by Section 4.a of the Club’s Constitution.
Charges two three and four will be considered under section 17.b of the Club’s Constitution.
The hearing is still scheduled for 7.30pm on Thursday 14^th February 2013 at the Clubroom
(the secretary)
The applicant said he attended the hearing on 14 March 2013. It seems that the Shooting Club had retained a Mr Nick Sullivan, CEO of Pistol Australia, to chair the meeting. The applicant addressed each of the charges. The chairman said he would provide a note to the Shooting Club which would be made available to the applicant, which he never received.
The applicant received a notice of expulsion dated 14 March 2013. The notice contained no reasons why the charges had been found proven. The applicant’s wife was informed that her family membership was also no longer valid.
The applicant was concerned at what had happened, and that he had no reasons for what had occurred, and that if he appealed he might meet the same kind of attitude from the Committee on appeal and be ambushed at such meeting and not be given a fair opportunity to prepare his appeal, so on 22 April 2013 he commenced proceedings per s 61 of the Act that the club had behaved unreasonably and oppressively towards him.
The applicant noted that the suggestion per para 9(g) of the amended defence filed on 4 June 2013 that he was not in fact eligible for membership as he was not of good character had not been raised in the proceedings against him by the Shooting Club, although he observed that the Shooting Club had discovered a letter it obtained from the Adelaide Pistol and Shooting Club dated 2 July 2012 referring to a letter the Shooting Club had sent it on 21 June 2012, that he and Mr Barnes were expelled on 15 May 2007.
The applicant said, in response to evidence provided by the Shooting Club, that he had never threatened to bankrupt the club, and that he tried every other avenue to resolve the legitimate issues he was raising as a club member prior to commencing the earlier proceedings. He agrees he is a plain speaking person who does not avoid ‘stating the truth’ nor does he ‘seek to be politically correct’, but that he had sought face to face discussions and he had sought to reach negotiated solutions.
In terms of his character, the applicant observed that he has been required to be a fit and proper person to hold the firearms licences he holds, and top hold the various other licences he has held in the past such as been a member of the Maitland Pistol and Shooting Club (“the Maitland Club”) since 2008. On 6 April 2013 he advised the president of that club of the difficulties that he had had with the Shooting Club, an initially there was no problem. For some reason, that club wrote to him on 18 April 2013 to say he and his wife could not shoot at the Maitland Club because their SARPA capitation had been terminated, and they were therefore no longer covered by insurance. The applicant replied that he and his wife were both members of the Sporting Shooters Association of Australia which included insurance cover for shooting on any range to the amount of $20 million. They attended the AGM of the Maitland Club on 17 July 2013 to be told by that president that the only reason they could not accept his membership was as he ahd not filled out the relavant forms, which he had in fact done. He provided the forms and the membership and SARPA capitation fees. The president accepted the cheques, ‘reluctantly’, acknowledging that he was aware that the applicant’s wife was still a member at the Shooting Club and they both had current SARPA capitation until the end of August 2013. The applicant’s bank cheque was deposited. By letter dated 2 September 2013 the Maitland Club informed them that both their memberships had been suspended until further notice, and the applicant lodged an appeal under the Maitland Constitution. The applicant then received a letter from the Maitland Club dated 8 September indicating they had conducted a favourable police check and required them to apply for new membership. The applicant and his wife resubmitted their forms. They received letters dated 2 February 2014 indicating that the motion for their membership was received, seconded and defeated at a vote at its Committee meeting dated 1 February 2014, and that their membership was accordingly refused.
The applicant said that the effect of that is that he will not be a member of a pistol club, and he would accordingly not be able to retain his class H Firearms licence and would have to give up the sport of pistol shooting.
The applicant filed a supplementary statement that was also tendered before the magistrate. It was dated 25 February 2014, the second day of the trial. In it the applicant indicates that on the previous day, the first day of the trial, the Shooting Club disclosed for the first time minutes of the Management Committee dated 18 February 2013 and dated 14 March 2013. The minutes of18 Febuary 2013 show that the period 7.03pm until 8.51pm were spent discussing the charges against the applicant. The minutes contain no detail nor do they relate anything apart from the ultimate resolution.
The applicant observes that the minutes of 14 March set out reasons for imposing the penalty of expulsion.
The minutes indicate that in relation to count 1 the Committee relied on the fact that the applicant withdrew from dialogue. That had never been put to the applicant at any time, and he observed that if it had he could have referred to dialogue with the president and other correspondence which showed that he was clearly wanting to engage in dialogue with the Shooting Club, and in fact it was the President who indicated to him that he the President was not interested in further dialogue.
The minutes also indicate that in relation to count 1 that the applicant did not petition the Public Officer to investigate his complaints as allowed by the Constitution. The applicant said that it had never been put to him that he should have petitioned the Public Officer if he continued to have concerns, nor that the Committee proposed to take into account in disciplinary proceedings its understanding that he had failed to do so. He said that had this been raised, he could have detailed all his efforts he had undertaken to get the Public Officer and the other members of the Committee including the secretary to investigate his complaints, which efforts he had indeed set out in these proceedings. The applicant went on to say that even after he had instigated the original proceedings against the Shooting Club he continued to communicate with the Public Officer to try and resolve his complaints, indicating that as soon as the latest (and new) president was appointed at the 21 July 2012 AGM he raised the matter with that person to try and resolve the matter by agreement. As corroboration of that, the applicant attached an email from him to that new president dated 5.08pm on the day of the 21 July AGM. The email from the applicant to the new president reads:
Good afternoon John
Congratulations once again on your appointment as President of Sturt P&SC.
Just to reiterate our conversation this afternoon. I will make myself available between now and Wednesday night to have some discourse with you and perhaps come to an understanding or even (hopefully!) a compromise, so that we may attend the Magistrates Court on Thursday and advise the court that we have (at last) reached some mutually satisfying arrangement and that the services of the court are no longer required.
It is my/our sincere wish that this outcome may be achieved, and that the past can be set aside and we may once again work together for the good of the club and its members.
I feel that it would be a great benefit on all sides if this could be achieved, and I emplore you to give this urgent and serious consideration.
Regards
Klaus
In relation to the third point that had now been raised as a basis of why count 1 had been proven, that his original court action had caused numerous projects to be delayed in starting which was detrimental to the interests of the club, he observed that had never been put to or raised with him. He indicated if it had been, and he had details of how, he could have put submissions on the topic. He observed there had been no disclosure of any document indicating the projects that were claimed to have been delayed, or how they were delayed.
In relation to charge 2, the applicant also commented on the reasons for the finding of guilt. The reasons state that his visit to the Auditors required a great deal of extra work for the Treasurer and Secretary and an additional charge of $660 per year to the club. He responded that he thought there was only a one off charge, which he had offered to pay the auditor, who had declined. He said he had been given no notice of that suggestion, and in any event if the auditors had required the club do more work to properly discharge its obligations at law and to the members, that would be an unreasonable basis to expel him. He indicated he had just had disclosed to him a letter by the auditors to the Shooting Club dated 27 march 2012 both supported the concerns he had about the club’s financial processes, and identified work that the club needed to do. He observed that the letter made it clear that the reason for the new fee was unrelated to the applicant’s attendance, and in any event mentioned a fee of $500 not $660. The letter reads as follows:
Dear Roly
Re: Audit for year ended 31 March 2012
I recently was visited by 3 club members of your club who have expressed concerns about the finances of the club and the processed for approval of expenditure by the Board/Committee. I mention this because I would like to highlight the importance of “due process” and the need for full substantiation of all expenditure by the club.
I am including, attached to this letter, our pre year end audit checklist we use for our audit clients which may assist you in preparing this year’s financial statements and work papers to accompany the accounts. I would be happy to discuss these with you.
Over the years we have conducted the audit on an honorary basis, however we are advising you from this year by the 2011/12 financial year that our fee will be $500. That is well below normal commercial rates but is to partially cover costs.
Yours faithfully
In relation to charge 2, the applicant also commented that the second basis for finding him guilty was that the auditors found no anomalies at a subsequent audit. The applicant said that if he knew that was being held against him he could have noted that the auditors per their own letter had identified areas for the club’s attention and it may well be that the subsequent audit identified no anomalies for the very reason that the club had addressed the matters he raised and that were passed on by the auditor’s letter above reproduced. He could have submitted that if his actions had resulted in the club keeping its records properly when there had been prior inadequacies, that would be no basis for disciplinary action against him.
In relation to charge 3, he noted that reason for that finding against him was the finding that he had quoted a privileged statement by the then club president. If he had known about that supposed basis he could have submitted that he was not aware that it had been made in circumstances that made it inappropriate to mention in his correspondence with the Firearms Branch, and it did not change the basis upon which he wrote to the Firearms Branch in his private capacity on his personal letterhead.
In relation to charge 4, he noted that the Shooting Club had found that he had admitted the charge. He denied that he had admitted the charge that he did not subscribe to the Shooting Club’s constitution, and said that had he been aware that he had done so, he could have made submissions about it, essentially that he had never accepted that he had denied subscribing to the Shooting Club’s Constitution and that indeed all he was doing at the meeting was emphasising that Horsley’s Meetings; procedure, Law and Practice applies if there is doubt about the constitution, and he never accepted that his 4 July 2012 email represented a denial of that position.
The applicant concluded his second statement with summary of his personal position, in essence drawing together why the decision to expel him affected him so much and why it was so important to him.
As indicated in my principle statement, I have been handling firearms including handguns since I was about 16 years of age and specifically handguns since my early 20’s.
Particularly in recent years the ability to be a member of a club which allows me to continue to hold a H Class Licence involving the use of handguns has been very important to me. It represents an important sporting and social activity for myself and my wife. We have been able to attend together and socialise and meet new people and sometimes make new friends.
Whereas previously I enjoyed playing golf, in more recent years, as a result of health issues, I have not been able to be as physically active and no longer am able to enjoy golf as I did previously. The expulsion from the Sturt Pistol and Shooting Club has affected me emotionally both as a result of the decision to expel and also the consequence of that decision in preventing me from being able to participate in the sport and socialise since that time. I have referred in my principal statement to the difficulty that I subsequently experienced with the Maitland Pistol and Shooting Club and I believe would exist if I now tried to gain membership to another pistol and shooting club following the decision of expulsion by the Sturt Pistol and Shooting Club Inc.
The applicant called evidence by way of tendered statement from a number of other witnesses.
The applicant’s wife Tamara Becker gave a detailed statement.[19]
[19] Exhibit P5.
She said she met the applicant in 2001 and became friends. They joined the APSC in 2002. They entered a business partnership that year and married in 2004. Mrs Becker’s detailed statement closely corroborates the applicant’s evidence. In particular, she was also present when they advised Ms Rowe of the reasons for their departure from APSC. She documented the extensive contribution they made to the Shooting Club over the first few years.
Once the applicant was appointed Vice President Mrs Becker attended meetings as an observer, and noticed Ms Rowe’s practice of not having an agenda but proceeding with her own draft minutes only, and also her habit of interrupting and heatedly speaking over other committee members in a loud voice.
She corroborated the applicant’s evidence about the various issues he took up as Vice president, in particular the catering by club members, the copper wiring incident, the completion of the Air Pistol Hall, and the various matters that occurred re the Member Protection Policy. Ms Becker said that Ms Rowe heatedly pursued the policy, citing a woman who was suing the Berri Club. Mrs Becker subsequently spoke to that woman, who denied she was doing any such thing. Mrs Becker was also present when the applicant spoke to one of the women who Ms Rowe had claimed was molested by Mr L, and corroborated that that woman said nothing like that had ever happened. Mrs Becker recounted the incident of extreme bad language that caused her to institute an incident report per the Member Protection Policy, and what subsequently ensued. She corroborated the applicant’s evidence about the subsequent events over time leading through to his expulsion. It is unnecessary to set it out in detail, save observing that it was detailed and apparently credible. On the issue of the new Committee overturning the suspension of the member she complained about, she recalled the typed response, after the special general meeting to address it had been abandoned because of the walk out, indicated it was because he had not been accorded natural justice.

In Pettit v The South Australian Harness Racing Inc and Ors,[57] in the context of an association’s refusal to accept certain new membership applications, White J drew together some observations of the principles to be applied when considering whether in those circumstances an association has acted unreasonably or oppressively pursuant to s 61 of the Act:
[57] Pettit v South Australian Harness Racing Club Inc and Ors [2006] SASC 306 at [26].
1. The constitution of an association binds the association and all of its members. This means that the Committee was bound to apply the relevant provisions of the Club’s Constitution in its consideration of the membership applications.
2. The requirement that an exercise of an association’s powers be for the benefit of the members as a whole is to exclude their exercise for “ulterior special and particular advantages”, ie, it negatives “purposes foreign to the association’s operations, affairs and organizations”.
3. Other than in the limited circumstances of the kind outlined in the majority judgment in Wayde,[58] the courts are not concerned in applications of the present kind with reviewing the underlying merits of the management committee’s decision. The courts do not substitute their discretion for the discretion exercised in good faith by an association’s committee. There is no appeal on merits from management decisions to courts of law: nor will courts of law assume to act as a kind of supervisory board over decisions within the powers of management honestly arrived at.
[58] Wayde v New South Wales Rugby League Limited (1985) 180 CLR 459 at 466.
4. Conduct by a committee of an association will be contrary to the interests of the members as a whole if no committee, acting reasonably, could have engaged in that conduct.
5. Conduct may be contrary to the interests of the members as a whole even though a committee does not act in bad faith. In Wayde, Brennan J said:
[I]f the directors exercise a power — albeit in good faith and for a purpose within the power — so as to impose a disadvantage, disability or burden on a member that, according to ordinary standards of reasonableness and fair dealing is unfair, the court may intervene …
6. In order to succeed, it is not necessary for an applicant to show that any decision of the association was invalid.
7. However, proof of invalidity or non-compliance with an association’s rules may indicate that a decision is contrary to the interests of the members as a whole. This is because of the importance which the law attaches to adherence to the provisions of an association’s constitution. So much is apparent in the following passage in the judgment of Olsson J in Popovic & Ors v Tanasijevic & Ors (No 5):
Conduct complained of must be unjustly detrimental to either individual members specifically or, alternatively, members as a whole. It is not necessary to prove lack of bona fides, but conduct beyond power or in breach of statutory, legal or financial duty may well amount to oppression. The very provisions of s 61(7) reveal the importance which the legislature attaches to the proper adherence to the provisions of the constitution and rules of an incorporated association. This is because a failure to observe such provisions has the effect of depriving members of their right, as members, to have the affairs of the entity conducted in accordance with its constitution and rules.
8. The power to accept or reject membership applications must be exercised in good faith.
9. The power to accept or reject membership applications must be exercised having regard to the objects of the association.
10. A refusal of applications for membership without regard to the association’s objects may well be a decision which no reasonable committee could reach.
11. It is not for this Court to determine as a matter of objective fact whether or not the membership applications are bona fide applications.
12. An association may have many reasons for rejecting membership applications. It may determine that the aims and aspirations of an applicant are not consistent with the objects of the association. Even if the aims and aspirations of an applicant are consistent with the objects of the association, the application may be refused because, for example, the association does not have the ability to cater for an influx of members.
In that case, White J found that it was unreasonable and oppressive for the Committee to take a fixed and inflexible attitude to a significant quantity of new membership applications without considering each of them on the merits, and made orders pursuant to s 61 of the Act.
In Millar v Houghton Table Tennis and Sports Club Inc.[59] the Supreme Court considered a similar situation where a bloc of people applied for membership and were rejected as the Committee suspected they were intending to influence the upcoming elections. Besanko J held that there had not been any consideration of the merits of the individual applications by reference to the objects of the Club, and that in failing to do so, the committee had acted in a way which was contrary to the interests of the club’s membership as a whole, and was unreasonable and oppressive within the meaning of s 61 of the Act.
[59] [2003] SASC 1
In Wayde v New South Wales Rugby League Limited[60] the High Court considered an application by a rugby league club that it was oppressive to have been excluded from the competition. The grounds on which they had been excluded were that there were too many clubs in the competition and the number should be reduced from 13 to 12. The Court considered that a consideration of that issue needed to balance the respective interests of the club and the competition, ie of the competing parties. Brennan J said:
The test assumes (whether it be the fact or not) that reasonable directors weigh the furthering of the corporate object against the disadvantage, disability or burden which their decision will impose, and address their minds to the question whether a proposed decision is unfair. The court must determine whether reasonable directors, possessing any special skill, knowledge or acumen possessed by the directors and having in mind the importance of furthering the corporate object on the one hand and the disadvantage, disability or burden which their decision will impose on a member on the other, would have decided that it was unfair to make that decision.
[60] (1985) 180 CLR 459 at 466.
Drawing all this together, in my view s 61, in the context of the Act as a whole, evinces a firm intention that associations not only be conducted lawfully, but also fairly and not oppressively, and subject to a significant degree of regulation, scrutiny and review. The Act certainly does not embrace or appear to reflect the concept, if ever there was such a concept, that associations are just groups of people who are voluntarily and informally getting together and as such can conduct themselves as they like, and have or reject whoever they like as members, in whatever way they like.
The reality is that in modern Australia, a significant amount of activity is conducted by such organizations. Membership of some organizations, or category of organization, is a necessary pre-requisite to working in any one of a number of professions or trades. In social, recreational and sporting life, membership of an incorporated organization is often a pre-requisite for competition in, and in some cases, participation at all, in certain sports.
Recognising that an expulsion may accordingly have significant consequences for a member, and the plain statutory expectation that it must not be oppressively or unfairly undertaken, an expulsion should only be conducted strictly in accordance with the Shooting Club’s Constitution, on proper grounds, not for an ulterior purpose, applying the correct test, taking into account all relevant considerations and not taking into account irrelevant ones.
In considering whether an expulsion is unfair and oppressive, and in particular whether the member should be reinstated, there must be a careful balancing of, in the words of the High Court in Wayde, albeit in a slightly different context:
…the importance of furthering the corporate object on the one hand and the disadvantage, disability or burden which their decision will impose on a member on the other.
Assessment of the magistrate’s decision to exercise his discretion not to reinstate the applicant – were the correct principles applied
The magistrate was required to carefully balance the interests of both the Shooting Club and the applicant, when determining whether he should order that the applicant be reinstated.
I have closely examined the magistrate’s reserved decision dealing on the question of whether to reinstate. It contains a detailed summary of the applicant’s negative behavior as asserted by the Shooting Club, and a list of possible or potential difficulties for the Shooting Club that may or might occur if the applicant is reinstated.
It contains no reference at all to the applicant’s interests, nor to any possible disadvantage, disability or burden that he may suffer if not reinstated. The only matter cited in the applicant’s favour is the bare fact that he was unreasonably and oppressively expelled.
It is obvious that if the applicant is excluded from the shooting club he will lose the ability to utilise its facilities and socialise with other like-minded members. He will be excluded from a Club to which he has made a significant financial and general contribution over a number of years. It is reasonable to think, based on the Maitland Club events, that he may suffer reputational damage amongst the sporting shooter community.
Further, the applicant’s evidence, which was uncontroverted at the hearing before the magistrate, and I accept on the topic, is that membership of a requisite shooting club is a prerequisite for participation in pistol shooting and the possession of that class of firearm. In all the circumstances it appears that the expulsion of the applicant from this club, besides meaning that he cannot use this club as an ongoing qualification for pistol shooting, is from his experience with attempting to join the Maitland Club, possibly impeding his ability to join other firearms clubs, and hence participate in the sport at all.
Even if that is not the case, if not reinstated he will need to run the potential gauntlet of applying to other clubs with an expulsion from this club to explain.
Accordingly, the applicant’s expulsion from the Club, if he is not reinstated, will likely materially impede his ability to participate in the sport of pistol shooting at all.
There appears to have been no consideration of, and consequent balancing of the important interests of the applicant, against the interests of the club. Accordingly in that respect the magistrate’s decision miscarried.
Further, the overwhelming inference of the evidence is that the conflict between the applicant and some members of the new committee was not all the applicant’s fault. As earlier indicated, the overwhelming inference is that once the applicant was elected to the Committee as Vice President in 2010, conflict developed between the applicant and the Shooting Club’s long standing Secretary Ms Rowe, essentially because the applicant had a strong sense of correct meeting procedure, financial accountability and professionalism which he was quite prepared to express, which was resented by longer standing Committee members such as Ms Rowe and others who saw it as critical, ‘aggressive’ and ‘nit-picky’.
That led to a campaign of criticism against the applicant in opposition to his re-election to the Committee in 2011, likely organised by Ms Rowe and others who then displaced the applicant from the Committee. That led to various members taking sides, such that there was a rift or stand-off between the applicant and his supporters on the one hand and the new Committee and their supporters on the other hand.
The conflict was compounded by the applicant’s comments about Ms Rowe’s competence, and also compounded by Ms Rowe choosing to characterise that criticism and disagreement from the applicant and Mr Kenny as ‘harassment’, and accuse them of ‘harassment’.
The Committee soon adopted a siege mentality, stopped their longstanding practice of publishing their minutes on the noticeboard and resisted all the applicant’s efforts to the contrary. The applicant no doubt also became demanding and forthright in pursing information, the application of what he regarded as proper procedure, and indeed criticism of those things and people who he believed were not doing the right thing.
The conflict in my view does neither side enormous credit, however the blame for the ultimate conflict can certainly not all be laid at the feet of the applicant. Yes the applicant was demanding, but the Committee adopted a siege mentality in response.
The magistrate however only appeared to consider the applicant’s negative behaviour and did not appear to consider Ms Rowe and the Committee’s role in the ultimate conflict. Further, he did not appear to consider the significant amount of evidence called by the applicant from witnesses who said that while the applicant had a strong sense of his own views and was prepared to express them, he was at all times polite and professional about it.
The magistrate’s failure to consider evidence led by the applicant is apparent from the magistrate’s reasons in a number of other smaller ways.
For example, the magistrate concludes that the applicant breached the Constitution by not including his prior expulsion from APSC in his membership application, and in doing so does not appear to have considered the uncontroverted evidence three witnesses gave that the applicant’s expulsion from the APSC was fully declared from the outset to the Shooting Club by the applicant to Ms Rowe, and that the applicant was instructed by the Shooting Club’s Secretary Ms Rowe to fill out the application form in the way he did.
By way of further example, when in para a. above the Magistrate cites the applicant’s reason for not pursuing an internal appear, he describes it as ‘simply … that he felt unable to prosecute his appeal because adequate reasons for the Committee’s decision had not been given’, that was wrong. The applicant also said that he believed such reasons would not be forthcoming, that he felt he may be ambushed at the meeting and would not be given a fair opportunity to prepare the appeal. The magistrate appears not to have perceived those further reasons, nor considered how well founded those reasons were. In fact, those reasons were well founded. The applicant had been refused particulars, told the incorrect test and told that relevant categories of evidence that he may wish to proffer were ‘irrelevant and not up for debate’ at the actual expulsion hearing, so there were in fact good grounds to suspect that any future appeal process managed by the same Committee may be equally as fraught.
While the evidence did establish the applicant had also been forthright, critical of issues and forward at the APSC, and been expelled, there was evidence supporting what the applicant had done at that club, and that while there had been this conflict at two clubs, there was evidence that the applicant was a member in good standing at 14 other clubs with there being no suggestion of a problem at any of them. The magistrate did not appear to consider any of that evidence. Nor did the magistrate appear to consider whether the applicant’s agitation at the Shooting Club might actually have had benefits to the club, in terms of the openness, accountability, clarity of financial statements and adherence to proper procedure that the applicant was constantly agitating.
Ultimately, regrettably, the magistrate appeared to consider the issue of reinstatement almost entirely from the issue of the Shooting Club, and failed to apparently consider the considerably body of evidence called by the applicant on the issue of whether he be reinstated. In this way the magistrate’s decision also miscarried.
Should the applicant be reinstated?
The duty of this court is to review the action that was litigated before the magistrate. Nearly all the evidence before the magistrate was in the form of statements with only a limited amount of cross examination of two witnesses, the applicant and Mr Kenny.
As earlier indicated, in my view the applicant was treated more oppressively and unfairly than held by the magistrate, in that on the only charge against the applicant that was held arguable by the magistrate, the applicant was denied natural justice and procedural fairness, with the Committee likely applying the incorrect test.
Further, the trial before the magistrate miscarried in that the Magistrate applied the wrong test, viewing the matter only from the point of view of the club, and failed to have regard to evidence called by the applicant relevant to the issue of reinstatement.
Whilst new or further evidence may be called upon this review, the vast majority of evidence was called by statement and tendered documents, from which a relatively clear picture emerges. Neither side has sought to call further evidence.
I have regard to the statutory criteria pursuant to s 61 of the Act, and that in my view the court must carefully balance the corporate interests of the club on the one hand, and the interests of the applicant on the other.
I have regard to all the evidence called, and in particular:
1.   The nature of the club. It is a sporting and social club, however membership of it or a club of its kind is a necessary condition of participation in at least one class of sporting shooting and possession of weapons in that class.
2.   That the applicant was an ongoing member of the club, having been Vice President and made substantial contributions to it. His wife and several friends were also members.
3.   There from the time the applicant being Vice President relations initially deteriorated between him and Ms Rowe, as set out in more detail earlier in these reasons, essentially as the applicant was a stickler for proper procedures and financial open-ness and accountability, and would express himself directly about such issues, sometimes being very critical of the views of others he disagreed with.
4.   From that point Ms Rowe and others successfully campaigned for him to be voted off the Committee and relations deteriorated between the applicant and his supporter members, and the Committee and some others.
5. When the applicant was unable after many requests to secure a meeting to address a number of issues he had tried unsuccessfully to raise at firstly the 2012 AGM, the at a Special General Meeting he called for the purpose but which did not proceed, and a final written request dated 21 February 2012 which was ultimately ignored by the Committee, he took action per s 61 of the Act on the basis that in the circumstances it was oppressive to members for the club to fail to provide certain minutes and financial records to members. While that action was on foot he sought to negotiate and resolve the issues with the Club, which such approaches were rejected by the Shooting Club. While his case was arguable, it was ambitious, and when told by a Magistrate it was unlikely to succeed he withdrew and paid the Shooting Club’s costs.
6.   The applicant was then charged with four charges, all of which were found proven, and the applicant was expelled.
7.   The hearing conducted by the Shooting Club to determine the charges and expel the applicant denied the applicant natural justice, was procedurally unfair, and probably applied the wrong criteria.
8.   Three of the four conclusions reached were in any event decisions that no reasonable person could have reached, and as such were unjust and oppressive to the applicant.
9.   The applicant was not given reasons for his expulsion in time to appeal internally, and had good grounds to suspect, based on the process undertaken for his expulsion, that he would not be given a fair opportunity to prepare the internal appeal.
10.   There is conflict between the applicant and his supporters and the Shooting Club, however both the applicant and the Committee are responsible for that conflict.
11.   If the applicant is not reinstated he will lose access to the club and its facilities, and unless he is able to become a member of another such club, of which there are a finite number, he will have to give up his longstanding interest in pistol shooting and his weapons of that class.
12.   Being expelled and not reinstated to the Shooting Club will likely impede his ability to join any other firearms club.
Conclusion – the applicant should be reinstated

In all these circumstances, but in particular the fact that the applicant was unreasonably and oppressively expelled, by way of a flawed and procedurally unjust process, with the consequences of expulsion to the applicant being significant, yet the cost to the Shooting Club of reinstatement merely of the potential for some future conflict, in my view the balance falls on the side of reinstatement.
Orders
The applicant is to be reinstated as a member of the Sturt Pistol & Shooting Club forthwith.
I will hear the parties as to any further orders, in particular any orders that might assist the parties to conduct their future relations as member and Committee on a sustainable and civilised basis.