Supreme Court
New South Wales
Medium Neutral Citation: Becker v Gurr [2018] NSWSC 1717 Hearing dates: On the papers Date of orders: 12 November 2018 Decision date: 12 November 2018 Jurisdiction: Equity Before: Darke J Decision: Order that the defendants pay the plaintiff’s costs of the proceedings on the ordinary basis.
Catchwords: COSTS – proceedings resolved without a determination on the merits – proceedings commenced following service of lapsing notice in relation to a caveat – defendants effectively capitulate in the face of plaintiff’s claim – appropriate that defendants pay plaintiff’s costs, but not on an indemnity basis. Legislation Cited: Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW), s 98(1)
Real Property Act 1900 (NSW), s 74KCases Cited: Re the Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs; Ex parte Lai Qin (1997) 186 CLR 622 Category: Costs Parties: Sheree Becker (Plaintiff)
William James Gurr (First Defendant)
Kerrie Alice Gurr (Second Defendant)Representation: Counsel:
Solicitors:
Mr H W Somerville (Plaintiff)
Mr J A Trebeck (Defendants)
Safe Harbour Lawyers (Plaintiff)
MRM Thompson Norrie Lawyers (Defendants)
File Number(s): 2018/290055 Publication restriction: None
Judgment
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These proceedings were commenced by Summons filed on 21 September 2018. The proceedings arise out of a terms contract for the sale of a property in East Branxton, entered into between the plaintiff as purchaser and the defendants as vendor in February 2014, and a Deed of Mutual Rescission of Contract dated 30 June 2018. The Deed, which appears to have been made on about 4 July 2018, provided in cl 2 for the terms contract to be rescinded and treated as void ab initio as at 30 June 2018. Clause 3 of the Deed provided:
(a) The vendors shall repay to the purchasers the sum of $23,000 from the monies received from the purchasers in respect of the property.
(b) The vendors grant to the purchaser caveatable interest on the property to secure the payment referred to in subparagraph (a) above.
(c) The payment in subparagraph (a) above will be effected upon sale of the property or within three (3) months of the date of this deed (whichever is earlier).
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As envisaged by cl 3 of the Deed, on about 4 July 2018 the plaintiff lodged a caveat against the title to the East Branxton property. The interest claimed in the caveat was an estate in fee simple, by virtue of an agreement dated 30 June 2018 between the plaintiff and the defendants. It was further stated in the caveat that the interest was “an equitable interest as the purchaser under a Deed of Rescission of contract for refund of deposit of $23,000”. A lapsing notice in respect of the caveat was served on 4 September 2018.
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By her Summons the plaintiff sought interlocutory relief, including an order under s 74K of the Real Property Act 1900 (NSW) extending the operation of the caveat, and final relief including declarations that the terms contract had been terminated by the Deed, and that the defendants were obliged under the Deed to pay $23,000 to…
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- Case
- [2018] NSWSC 1717
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered the circumstances under which the proceedings were resolved. The defendants effectively capitulated in the face of the plaintiff's claim, leading to the resolution without a determination on the merits. The court held that it was appropriate for the defendants to pay the plaintiff's costs. However, it was determined that the costs should not be awarded on an indemnity basis. Instead, the court found that the costs should be assessed on a standard basis, reflecting the nature of the proceedings and the resolution achieved.
The court's decision was grounded in the principle that while it was appropriate for the defendants to contribute to the plaintiff's costs, the circumstances did not warrant an indemnity award. The resolution of the proceedings without a determination on the merits, coupled with the defendants' capitulation, justified an award of costs but not to the extent of an indemnity basis. This approach balanced the need to recognise the plaintiff's successful enforcement of their rights while also considering the procedural context in which the resolution occurred.
The final orders of the court included a direction that the defendants pay the plaintiff's costs of the proceedings on a standard basis, reflecting the court's reasoning and determination. The defendants were required to cover the costs incurred by the plaintiff in the proceedings, ensuring that the resolution of the matter was financially accounted for in a manner that was fair and proportionate to the circumstances.
Background
Background to the litigation
The matter came before the court after the defendants failed to respond to the lapsing notice served by the plaintiff. The plaintiff subsequently applied for an order for costs. This application was made in the context of proceedings that had been resolved without a determination on the merits, as the defendants had not contested the plaintiff's claim. The court considered the appropriate basis for awarding costs in such circumstances. This case did not involve a first-instance hearing but rather an application for costs following the resolution of the proceedings.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. What is the appropriate basis for awarding costs in proceedings that have been resolved without a determination on the merits?
2. Should the defendants be ordered to pay the plaintiff's costs on an indemnity basis given their failure to contest the proceedings?
Held
1. The court concluded that the appropriate basis for awarding costs in proceedings resolved without a determination on the merits is not on an indemnity basis.
2. The court held that the defendants should not be ordered to pay the plaintiff's costs on an indemnity basis despite their failure to contest the proceedings.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court began by noting that the proceedings were resolved without a determination on the merits, as the defendants effectively capitulated in the face of the plaintiff's claim following the service of a lapsing notice in relation to a caveat. The court acknowledged that it is appropriate for the defendants to pay the plaintiff's costs given the circumstances, but found that it was not appropriate to order the defendants to pay the plaintiff's costs on an indemnity basis.
The court examined the principles governing the awarding of costs in proceedings that have been resolved without a determination on the merits. It noted that such proceedings are typically resolved by consent or discontinuance, and that the general rule is that the unsuccessful party pays the successful party's costs on the standard basis. However, the court also recognised that in some cases, an indemnity costs order may be appropriate, particularly where there has been an abuse of process or a vexatious claim.
In this case, the court found that the defendants' failure to contest the proceedings did not amount to an abuse of process or a vexatious claim. Rather, it was a situation where the defendants effectively capitulated in the face of the plaintiff's claim, and the court found it appropriate that they pay the plaintiff's costs. However, the court did not consider it appropriate to order the defendants to pay the plaintiff's costs on an indemnity basis, as this would be a disproportionate punishment given the circumstances.
The ratio decidendi of this decision is that in proceedings resolved without a determination on the merits, the court may order the unsuccessful party to pay the successful party's costs on the standard basis, but an indemnity costs order is not appropriate unless there has been an abuse of process or a vexatious claim. The court distinguished this case from previous authority where indemnity costs orders were made, finding that the circumstances of this case did not warrant such a disproportionate punishment.