SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
Bebendorf & Ors v Emmanuel College [2025] QSC 283
PARTIES:
BLAKE AUGUST BEBENDORF (by his litigation guardians, RODNEY CRAIG BEBENDORF and ELYSSA DIANNE BEBENDORF)
(first plaintiff)
AND
RODNEY CRAIG BEBENDORF
(second plaintiff)
AND
ELYSSA DIANNE BEBENDORF
(third plaintiff)v
EMMANUEL COLLEGEA.C.N 010 563 256
(Defendant)
FILE NO:
BS 16642/24
DIVISION:
Trial Division
PROCEEDING:
Originating Application
ORIGINATING COURT:
Supreme Court at Brisbane
DELIVERED ON:
31 October 2025
DELIVERED AT:
Brisbane
HEARING DATE:
6 June 2025
JUDGE:
Wilson J
ORDER:
1. Each party bear their own costs of the proceeding.
CATCHWORS:
PROCEDURE – CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS – COSTS – COSTS WHERE PROCEEDINGS DISCONTINUED – where the plaintiffs brought a claim against the defendant for various relief relating to the termination of the first plaintiff’s enrolment contract – where the plaintiffs discontinued the proceeding on the second day of hearing – where both parties seek costs – whether there be no order as to costs
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules1999 (Qld) rr 304(2), 307, 681, 685
Chapman v Luminis Pty Ltd [2003] FCAFC 162
Fairfield Services Pty Ltd (in liq) v Leggett (2020) 5 QR 50
ONE.TEL Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (2000) 101 FCR 548
Re Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of the Commonwealth of Australia; ex parte Lai Qin (1997) 186 CLR 622
COUNSEL:
D Savage KC and M Paterson for the plaintiffs
G Handran KC and R McDermott for the plaintiffsV Brennan for the defendant
SOLICITORS:
Hannams Solicitors Pty Ltd for the plaintiffs
Vocare Law for the defendant
Introduction
On 23 December 2024, the plaintiffs filed an originating application seeking interim and final relief against the defendant College. The first plaintiff was a former pupil of the College. The second and third plaintiffs are the first plaintiff’s parents. This proceeding arose following the termination of the first plaintiff’s enrolment at the College on 25 October 2024.
The plaintiffs originally sought relief in the following terms:
(a)an interim order restraining the defendant from taking any step or giving effect to the first plaintiff’s expulsion (Order 1);
(b)a declaration that the first plaintiff’s expulsion was “void and of no legal effect” (Order 3);
(c)an order that the first plaintiff’s expulsion “be set aside” (Order 4);
(d)a further declaration that the Enrolment Contract “remains in effect” (Order 5);
(e)specific performance of the Enrolment Contract (Order 5), which is repeated in Order 7; and
(f)a permanent injunction restraining the defendant from “taking any step pursuant or otherwise giving effect to the [first plaintiff’s] expulsion”.[1]
[1] The plaintiffs subsequently abandoned the relief at (a), (d), (e) and (f).
The originating application came on before me on the applications list on 20 January 2025, where I made various directions including that the plaintiff file a statement of claim.
The trial was set down to commence on 19 May 2025 and, as at that day, the only relief the plaintiff sought was:
(a)a declaration that the enrolment contract…
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- AGLC
- Bebendorf v Emmanuel College [2025] QSC 283
- Case
- [2025] QSC 283
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court were primarily centered around the general principles of costs in civil proceedings, particularly under rules 681, 685, and 307 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules. The court had to determine whether the circumstances warranted a departure from the general rule that costs follow the event. The court also needed to consider the impact of the mid-hearing discontinuance on the costs order. Furthermore, the court had to weigh the conduct of both parties, including the defendant's efforts to support the plaintiff's enrolment in an alternative school and its attempts to protect third-party identities.
The court found that the circumstances did not justify a departure from the general rule that costs follow the event. Both parties had conducted themselves reasonably, and there were no special or exceptional circumstances that warranted an order for one party to bear the costs of the other. The court noted that the defendant had defended the proceeding on the basis that it was entitled to expel the plaintiff and had made efforts to mitigate the impact of the situation. The court also considered the plaintiff's decision to discontinue the proceeding and seek alternative remedies, which complicated the costs issue. Given these factors, the court concluded that the most appropriate and just order was for each party to bear their own costs.
Each party bear their own costs of the proceeding.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Each party bear their own costs of the proceeding.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Accordingly, the defendant submits that they:(a)did not, and could not, know the true intent of the proceeding until it was disclosed in the plaintiffs’ two costs submissions; (b)defended the proceeding on the basis that they were entitled to expel the first plaintiffs; (c)by its Principal, had supported the first plaintiff’s enrolment in an alternative school and expressed its intention to continue that support (which is unchallenged on the evidence); (d)sought to protect the identity of, and the consequences of disclosure on, third parties at great expense to itself and in the face of staunch opposition; (e)made offers which were reasonable, in circumstances where the relief sought in the proceeding was ultimately abandoned for some other “remedy” about which the defendant was ignorant; and(f)made concessions in its affidavit material, by its counsel in court and in its documents which were appropriate and, on an objective view, consistent with the ultimate reason for the plaintiffs’ discontinuance. Consideration The general rule on costs is found in r 681(1) of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) (“UCPR”): “681 General rule about costs(1)Costs of a proceeding, including an application in a proceeding, are in the discretion of the court but follow the event, unless the court orders otherwise.” While the question of costs is ultimately in the court’s discretion, the general rule on costs should only be departed from in the event of special or exceptional circumstances. The question of costs in this case is more complex due to the mid-hearing discontinuance. Rule 685 of the UCPR states: “685 Costs if further proceedings become unnecessary (1) If, for any other reason, it becomes unnecessary to continue a proceeding other than for deciding who is to pay the costs of the proceeding, any party to the proceeding may apply to the court for an order for the costs. (2) The court may make the order the court considers just.” Rule 307 of the UCPR states: “307 Costs(1) A party who discontinues or withdraws is liable to pay -- (a)the costs of the party to whom the discontinuance or withdrawal relates up to the discontinuance or withdrawal; and (b)the costs of another party or parties caused by the discontinuance or withdrawal.(2)If a party discontinues or withdraws with the court’s leave, the court may make the order for costs it considers appropriate.” Regarding the question of costs for discontinued proceedings, McPherson JA considered the power under r 685 UCPR (formerly r 683) in Nolan v Warne [2001] QCA 537, stating: “[8] If for any reason it becomes unnecessary to continue a proceeding other than to decide who is to pay the costs, then by UCP Rule 683(1), any party may apply to the court for an order for the costs, and the court may make an order it considers just: r 683(2). Rule 683 is virtually a rescript of O 91, r 16 of the recently repealed Supreme Court Rules, which was considered in R v Gold Coast City Council, ex p Raysun Pty Ltd [1971] QWN 13. In awarding costs to the applicant in that case, Matthews J on behalf of the Full Court said that it was enough that the applicant had reasonable grounds for complaint in respect of the respondent Council and an arguable case to support the taking of proceedings up to the time when the Council acceded to the application.”