BEAMAN and BOND - [2015] FCWA 107

JURISDICTION : FAMILY COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

ACT: JURISDICTION OF COURTS (CROSS-VESTING) ACT 1987
BANKRUPTCY ACT 1966

LOCATION: PERTH

CITATION: BEAMAN and BOND [2015] FCWA 107

CORAM: CRISFORD J

HEARD: WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS

DELIVERED : 4 DECEMBER 2015

FILE NO/S: PTW 3223 of 2013

BETWEEN: DIANNE ELIZABETH BEAMAN
Applicant
AND
CRAIG DAVID BOND
First Respondent
AND
CHRISTOPHER MICHAEL WILLIAMSON and DAVID ASHLEY NORMAN HURT
Second Respondents

Catchwords:

COSTS – Where the substantive proceedings were cross-vested from the Federal Court of Australia to the Family Court of Western Australia – where the applicant seeks the entirety of her costs of the proceedings both in the Federal Court of Australia and the Family Court of Western Australia – where costs generally follow the event and unless there is some special or unusual feature to depart from this practice the costs are usually taxed – where the Court determined that the first respondent pay the applicant’s costs of the proceedings, in the Federal Court of Australia and the Family Court of Western Australia, in accordance with sch 3 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth).

Legislation:

Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth)
Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross-vesting) Act 1987 (Cth)
Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth)
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth)

Category: Reportable

Representation:

Counsel:

Applicant: Mr P Hannan
First Respondent : Mr L Christensen
Second Respondents : N/A

Solicitors:

Applicant: Carr & Co
First Respondent : Gadens Lawyers
Second Respondents : Roe Legal Services

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

Beaman and Bond [2013] FCA 534
Beaman and Bond [2014] FCWA 21
Beaman and Bond [2014] FCWA 27
Beaman v Bond [2014] FCA 803
Golden West Refining Corporation Ltd v Daly Laboratories Pty Ltd (Unreported, Federal Court of Australia, Carr J, 16 February 1995)
King v Yurisich (No 2) [2007] FCAFC 51
Lindon v The Commonwealth (No 2) (1996) 136 ALR 251
Westpac Banking Corporation v The Bell Group Ltd (in Liq) (No 3) [2012] WASCA 157
1On 30 April 2014 and 4 April 2014 I delivered judgments in these proceedings. The background to the proceedings is contained in the judgments Beaman and Bond [2014] FCWA 21 and Beaman and Bond [2014] FCWA 27.
2The proceedings were commenced by Ms Beaman (“the applicant”) in the Federal Court of Australia. The applicant sought orders, inter alia, pursuant to s 208 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) (“the BA”). Mr Bond (“the first respondent”) filed an application to summarily dismiss the application.
3On 31 May 2013 the proceedings were cross-vested from the Federal Court to the Family Court of Western Australia by McKerracher J. His Honour’s judgment is contained in Beaman and Bond [2013] FCA 534.
4On 1 October 2013, in the Family Court, the matter came before Walters J. On that day orders were made, by consent, that the Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth) (“the FLR”) and the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) were to be used in the cross-vested proceedings.
5On this occasion the Court is asked to determine an application for the first respondent…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading BEAMAN and BOND

Details

AGLC: BEAMAN and BOND [2015] FCWA 107
Case: [2015] FCWA 107
Decision Date: 4 DECEMBER 2015

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Beaman v Bond involved a dispute concerning the costs incurred during cross-vested proceedings between the Federal Court of Australia and the Family Court of Western Australia. The applicant, Beaman, sought to recover her entire costs from both courts, following the transfer of the case from the Federal Court to the Family Court. The central legal issue was whether the applicant was entitled to the entirety of her costs, and if so, how these costs should be calculated and allocated.

The court considered the general principle that costs follow the event, meaning that the losing party typically bears the costs of the proceedings. However, the court recognised that in certain circumstances, such as where there are special or unusual features, it may be appropriate to deviate from this standard practice. Given the cross-vested nature of the proceedings, the court examined whether any exceptional circumstances warranted a departure from the usual cost allocation. Ultimately, the court determined that there were no special or unusual features that would justify a deviation from the standard practice of costs following the event.

The reasoning of the court was that since the proceedings were cross-vested and the applicant succeeded in the substantive matter, it was appropriate to follow the usual practice of costs allocation. The court further directed that the costs of the proceedings in both the Federal Court of Australia and the Family Court of Western Australia be taxed in accordance with Schedule 3 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth). This ruling ensured that the costs were assessed and allocated in a manner consistent with established legal principles and procedural rules.

The final orders of the court mandated that the first respondent, Bond, pay the applicant’s costs of the proceedings in both courts, in accordance with the specified schedule. This decision provided clarity on the allocation of costs in cross-vested proceedings, reinforcing the principle that costs generally follow the event unless there are compelling reasons to deviate from this practice.

Orders