BBR15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

Link copied
Case Copied 30 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BBR15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

[2017] FCA 1196

Appeal from: BBR15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCCA 209
File number: NSD 272 of 2017
Judge: RARES J
Date of judgment: 15 August 2017
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) Div 4 Pt 7, ss 5, 36, 91R, 499
Cases cited:

BBR15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCCA 209

Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex Parte Durairajasingham (2000) 168 ALR 407

SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 228 CLR 152

SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2016) 243 FCR 556

Date of hearing: 15 August 2017
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: No Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 58
Counsel for the Appellant: The Appellant appeared in person
Council for the First Respondent: Mr T Reilly
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a Submitting Notice

ORDERS

NSD 272 of 2017
BETWEEN:

BBR15

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

RARES J

DATE OF ORDER:

15 AUGUST 2017

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(REVISED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT)

RARES J:

  1. This is an appeal from the decision of the Federal Circuit Court refusing the appellant’s application for constitutional writ relief against the decision of the then Refugee Review Tribunal given on 18 May 2015 to affirm the Minister’s delegate’s decision not to grant the appellant a protection visa:  BBR15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCCA 209.

    Background

  2. The appellant was represented by a solicitor before her Honour, but has appeared for himself today before me.  He filed a detailed outline of submissions to which I will come.  The appellant is a Tamil citizen of Sri Lanka who arrived in Australia as an unauthorised maritime arrival in July 2012.

  3. In December 2012 he applied for a protection visa and was assisted by a solicitor migration agent throughout the process before the delegate and the Tribunal.

  4. In summary, he claimed that he, his wife, son and two daughters resided in the wife’s family home in a village in Trincomalee.  He claimed that other members of his family resided nearby, but that one of his brothers had been killed by the Sri Lankan army in 1990 while his family were moving to Jaffna as a result of being displaced from their home.  He claimed that he owned farming land in a village located in the vicinity of Trincomalee but that his wife’s family home was located next to a Sri Lankan army camp.  He said that until June 2005, that camp had been occupied by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read BBR15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2017] FCA 1196
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appellant, BBR15, sought to appeal a decision made by the delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, which refused him a protection visa. The appellant argued that he had a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of imputed political opinion and membership in a particular social group, as well as the fear of ill-treatment on his return as a failed asylum seeker. The delegate had questioned the appellant's claims and found inconsistencies and omissions in his account, but still accepted that he had a genuine subjective fear of Sri Lankan authorities. However, the delegate did not accept the appellant's claims that the army was searching for him or that they suspected him of being a supporter of the LTTE.

The legal issues that the court had to decide in this case were whether the delegate's decision to refuse the appellant a protection visa was based on an error of law and whether the appellant's claims were credible. The court had to consider whether the delegate had acted in a procedurally fair manner by giving the appellant a sufficient opportunity to give evidence or make submissions about any determinative issue in relation to the decision under review. The court also had to consider whether the delegate's findings were based on the evidence and whether they were reasonable.

The court found that the delegate's decision was not based on an error of law and that the appellant's claims were not credible. The court found that the Tribunal had given the appellant a sufficient opportunity to give evidence or make submissions about any determinative issue in relation to the decision under review. The court also found that the delegate's findings were based on the evidence and were reasonable. The court dismissed the appeal and ordered the appellant to pay the first respondent's costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

On that basis, the appellant claimed that he had a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of imputed political opinion as a perceived supporter of the LTTE, his membership of a particular social group, being Tamil males who resided in former LTTE-controlled areas, and, that he would be ill-treated on his return as a failed asylum seeker.The delegate’s decision On 31 July 2013, the delegate decided to refuse to grant the appellant a protection visa. The delegate questioned the appellant about his claims during their interview. She found that, despite some inconsistencies and omissions, his account had remained substantively consistent throughout the assessment process. She accepted that he had a genuine subjective fear of Sri Lankan authorities as a result of having lived in the east and north of the country throughout the civil war, and that he had been affected by traumatic events, including the killing of his brother by the army. Overall, the delegate found the appellant to be credible and she accepted a number of aspects of his account that I have described above, including that of the incident on 15 February 2012. However, the delegate did not accept that the army subsequently had searched for the appellant in connection with the 15 February 2012 incident, or for any other reason, prior to his departure for Australia. She did not find credible that the army would have been unable to locate him over a period of approximately four months, during which time he continued to reside in Trincomalee on his farm, located about 24 kilometres from his home village, and while he regularly visited his sister’s house, located about 16 kilometres from his village, and his wife and children in his home village. Given those visits to his sister and wife, the delegate did not accept his statement that he was in hiding on his farm during the four month period. She also found that at no time in the four months preceding his departure for Australia did the appellant experience any difficulties during the registration process at the army camp required when he was travelling between his village and the area near his farm, despite him travelling to visit his wife and children on a number of occasions. The lack of any action taken by the army during that period caused the delegate to find that the appellant’s claims that the army was searching for him were lacking in credibility. The delegate also accepted that the army had questioned the appellant’s wife in regard to his whereabouts twice before his departure for Australia, but she did not accept that that indicated that they were seeking to apprehend or seriously harm him. She also found that the questioning of Tamils in his village on the day celebrating the founder of the LTTE’s birthday was part of general questioning of the Tamil population in relation to that event, and not specific questioning with respect to the appellant. The delegate did not find the appellant’s asserted reasons for the army’s interest in him to be credible. In light of country information that there was general impunity enjoyed by Sri Lankan security forces in relation to human rights abuses, the delegate rejected his claim that, because he had fought with them in seeking to protect his wife in February 2012, the army wanted to harm him and to prevent him making an official complaint. The delegate did not accept that the army would be genuinely concerned about the appellant making a complaint to the police or other government body in connection with the incident involving his wife. She relied on country information to support that finding. She also did not accept that the army suspected the appellant of being a supporter of the LTTE. That was because it had not taken any action against him in the period between 2002, when he moved to his house, and his departure for Australia in June 2012. While she accepted that the appellant had been questioned by the army on a number of occasions, including in June 2005, she relied on country information that suggested that Tamil males, particularly in the north and east of the country, were frequently questioned by Sri Lankan authorities in connection with suspected involvement with the LTTE, both during the 26 year civil war and following the defeat of the LTTE in May 2009. The delegate did not accept that, given the lack of any ongoing interest by the Sri Lankan authorities beyond general questioning, the army suspected the appellant of being involved with the LTTE.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The appellant also sought to argue a new ground, namely that the Tribunal’s reasoning had been affected by a jurisdictional error of the kind raised in the appeal to the High Court from the decision of the Full Court of this Court in SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2016) 243 FCR 556. That appeal was heard on 5 April 2017 and the High Court reserved its judgment. The appellant argued that the Tribunal had accepted that, were he returned to Sri Lanka, overcrowding in prison would cause him pain or suffering and it should have been, but was not, satisfied that that would be intentionally inflicted so as to amount to significant harm. He argued that the Tribunal’s reasoning was analogous to the reasoning the subject of the appeal in SZTAL before the High Court, and that I should reserve my decision in his appeal until the High Court had given its decision.Consideration As to ground 1: The delegate accepted certain parts of the appellant’s account of the incident involving his wife. Nonetheless, she had, and expressed, concerns about his credibility in relation to the substance of his claims. During the course of the appellant giving his evidence to the Tribunal, it raised expressly with him its own concerns about inconsistencies between his oral evidence and his earlier claims concerning the alleged assault of his wife in February 2012. In SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 228 CLR 152 at 165-166 [44]-[48], Gleeson CJ, Kirby, Hayne, Callinan and Heydon JJ held that procedural fairness required an administrative decision maker, such as the Tribunal, to give a person, in the appellant’s position, a sufficient opportunity to give evidence or make submissions about what was, or turned out to be, any determinative issue in relation to the decision under review. They said that there may well be cases where either the delegate’s decision or the Tribunal’s statements or questions during a hearing sufficiently indicated to an applicant for review that everything he or she said in support of the application was in issue and that such an indication could be given in many ways. They noted that it was not necessary, and often would be inappropriate, for the Tribunal to put to an applicant for review, in so many words, that he or she was lying, or that he or she may not be accepted as a witness of truth, or that he or she may be thought to be embellishing the account given of certain events. They said that, because the proceedings before the Tribunal were not adversarial, it was not in, and should not adopt, the position of a contradictor. But, their Honours added, that where:there are specific aspects of an applicant’s account, that the Tribunal considers may be important to the decision and may be open to doubt, the Tribunal must at least ask the applicant to expand upon those aspects of the account and ask the applicant to explain why the account should be accepted. (emphasis in original)