FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BBR15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection
[2017] FCA 1196
Appeal from: BBR15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCCA 209 File number: NSD 272 of 2017 Judge: RARES J Date of judgment: 15 August 2017 Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) Div 4 Pt 7, ss 5, 36, 91R, 499 Cases cited: BBR15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCCA 209
Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex Parte Durairajasingham (2000) 168 ALR 407
SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 228 CLR 152
SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2016) 243 FCR 556
Date of hearing: 15 August 2017 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: No Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 58 Counsel for the Appellant: The Appellant appeared in person Council for the First Respondent: Mr T Reilly Solicitor for the First Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a Submitting Notice ORDERS
NSD 272 of 2017 BETWEEN: BBR15
Appellant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
RARES J
DATE OF ORDER:
15 AUGUST 2017
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be dismissed.
2.The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(REVISED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT)RARES J:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Federal Circuit Court refusing the appellant’s application for constitutional writ relief against the decision of the then Refugee Review Tribunal given on 18 May 2015 to affirm the Minister’s delegate’s decision not to grant the appellant a protection visa: BBR15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCCA 209.
Background
The appellant was represented by a solicitor before her Honour, but has appeared for himself today before me. He filed a detailed outline of submissions to which I will come. The appellant is a Tamil citizen of Sri Lanka who arrived in Australia as an unauthorised maritime arrival in July 2012.
In December 2012 he applied for a protection visa and was assisted by a solicitor migration agent throughout the process before the delegate and the Tribunal.
In summary, he claimed that he, his wife, son and two daughters resided in the wife’s family home in a village in Trincomalee. He claimed that other members of his family resided nearby, but that one of his brothers had been killed by the Sri Lankan army in 1990 while his family were moving to Jaffna as a result of being displaced from their home. He claimed that he owned farming land in a village located in the vicinity of Trincomalee but that his wife’s family home was located next to a Sri Lankan army camp. He said that until June 2005, that camp had been occupied by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read BBR15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2017] FCA 1196
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues that the court had to decide in this case were whether the delegate's decision to refuse the appellant a protection visa was based on an error of law and whether the appellant's claims were credible. The court had to consider whether the delegate had acted in a procedurally fair manner by giving the appellant a sufficient opportunity to give evidence or make submissions about any determinative issue in relation to the decision under review. The court also had to consider whether the delegate's findings were based on the evidence and whether they were reasonable.
The court found that the delegate's decision was not based on an error of law and that the appellant's claims were not credible. The court found that the Tribunal had given the appellant a sufficient opportunity to give evidence or make submissions about any determinative issue in relation to the decision under review. The court also found that the delegate's findings were based on the evidence and were reasonable. The court dismissed the appeal and ordered the appellant to pay the first respondent's costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The appellant also sought to argue a new ground, namely that the Tribunal’s reasoning had been affected by a jurisdictional error of the kind raised in the appeal to the High Court from the decision of the Full Court of this Court in SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2016) 243 FCR 556. That appeal was heard on 5 April 2017 and the High Court reserved its judgment. The appellant argued that the Tribunal had accepted that, were he returned to Sri Lanka, overcrowding in prison would cause him pain or suffering and it should have been, but was not, satisfied that that would be intentionally inflicted so as to amount to significant harm. He argued that the Tribunal’s reasoning was analogous to the reasoning the subject of the appeal in SZTAL before the High Court, and that I should reserve my decision in his appeal until the High Court had given its decision.Consideration As to ground 1: The delegate accepted certain parts of the appellant’s account of the incident involving his wife. Nonetheless, she had, and expressed, concerns about his credibility in relation to the substance of his claims. During the course of the appellant giving his evidence to the Tribunal, it raised expressly with him its own concerns about inconsistencies between his oral evidence and his earlier claims concerning the alleged assault of his wife in February 2012. In SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 228 CLR 152 at 165-166 [44]-[48], Gleeson CJ, Kirby, Hayne, Callinan and Heydon JJ held that procedural fairness required an administrative decision maker, such as the Tribunal, to give a person, in the appellant’s position, a sufficient opportunity to give evidence or make submissions about what was, or turned out to be, any determinative issue in relation to the decision under review. They said that there may well be cases where either the delegate’s decision or the Tribunal’s statements or questions during a hearing sufficiently indicated to an applicant for review that everything he or she said in support of the application was in issue and that such an indication could be given in many ways. They noted that it was not necessary, and often would be inappropriate, for the Tribunal to put to an applicant for review, in so many words, that he or she was lying, or that he or she may not be accepted as a witness of truth, or that he or she may be thought to be embellishing the account given of certain events. They said that, because the proceedings before the Tribunal were not adversarial, it was not in, and should not adopt, the position of a contradictor. But, their Honours added, that where:there are specific aspects of an applicant’s account, that the Tribunal considers may be important to the decision and may be open to doubt, the Tribunal must at least ask the applicant to expand upon those aspects of the account and ask the applicant to explain why the account should be accepted. (emphasis in original)