Bazzi and Secretary, Department of Social Services (Social services second review)

[2019] AATA 5395

Bazzi and Secretary, Department of Social Services (Social services second review) [2019] AATA 5395 (10 December 2019)

Division:GENERAL DIVISION

File Number(s):      2019/1775 & 2019/1904

Re:Fatmy Bazzi

APPLICANT

AndSecretary, Department of Social Services

RESPONDENT

DECISION

Tribunal:Emeritus Professor P A Fairall, Senior Member

Date:10 December 2019

Place:Sydney

The Tribunal decides that:

1.From 15 May 2007 until 30 June 2009 the applicant was an Australian resident for Family Tax Benefit purposes; and that between 1 July 2009 and 15 May 2010 (the second debt period) the applicant was not an Australian resident for Family Tax Benefit purposes.

2.The Tribunal sets aside the decisions under review and remits the matter to the Respondent for reconciliation by reference to the aforementioned date.

...................................[sgd]..................................

Emeritus Professor P A Fairall, Senior Member

CATCHWORDS

SOCIAL SECUIRTY – Family Tax Benefit debt owed to the Commonwealth – whether applicant was an Australian resident and eligible to receive the benefit in circumstances where applicant was residing in Lebanon – whether debts amounting to $12,472.34 were correctly calculated – whether all or part of total debt should be written off or waived – decision under review set aside and remitted

LEGISLATION

A New Tax System (Family Assistance) Act 1999 (Cth)

A New Tax System (Family Assistance) (Administration) Act 1999 (Cth)

Social Security Act 1991 (Cth)

CASES

Hafza v Director-General of Social Security [1985] FCA 164
Wybrow v Secretary Department of Social Security [1992] AATA 315

REASONS FOR DECISION

Emeritus Professor P A Fairall, Senior Member

10 December 2019

1. On 1 April 2019, the applicant applied to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the Tribunal) for review of a decision of the Social Services and Child Support Division (AAT1) made on 12 March 2019.

2. AAT1 considered two decisions of an Authorised Review Officer (ARO) of the Department of Social Services (Centrelink):

   (a)The first decision, made on 31 May 2018, was that the applicant had a recoverable Family Tax Benefit (FTB) debt of $8,322.00 for the period 1 July 2008 to 30 June 2009 (the first debt period); and $7,547.54 for the period 1 July 2009 to 15 May 2010 (the second debt period);[1]

   [1] Letter dated 31 May 2018: T8, p.39.

   (b)The second decision, made on 4 January 2019, affirming the original decision made on 17 May 2010 to cancel the applicant’s FTB on the ground that she was not residentially qualified to receive FTB.[2]

   [2] Letter dated 4 January: T10, p.44.

3. AAT1 varied the first ARO decision by substituting 27 November 2008 for 1 July 2008 as the commencement date for the first debt period. That is because AAT1 found that from 27 November 2008 the applicant ceased to be an Australian resident.

4. With this small modification, both decisions were affirmed, AAT1 concluding that FTB paid in respect of the period after the applicant ceased to be an Australian resident was a debt due to the Commonwealth under s 71(1) of the Family Assistance Administration Act.

5. Centrelink therefore recalculated the amounts owing as $4,924.80 for the revised first debt period and $7,547.54 for the second debt period, making a total of $12,472.34 owing.

6. In response to the standard question as to why she thought the decision is wrong, she responded: I’m being made to pay back something they said I was entitled to. For a certain date which is in writing. And later was told it is now debt.

   The hearing

7. The matter was heard by the Tribunal on 8 October 2019.

8. The applicant was unrepresented.  She gave evidence to the following effect. She was born in Colombia in 1979. Her father is Lebanese-Australian, her mother Colombian. Her father brought her to Australia as a five year old in 1984 when he separated from her mother.

9. On 1 January 1994, her father took her to Lebanon (this was her second trip there), and she was married (to a relative of her father)[3] at the age of 14 years and 8 months old.[4]

   [3] Transcript, 8 October 2019, p.40.

   [4] Ibid p.11.

10. In July 2006 war broke out between Hezbollah and Israel. The applicant, an Australian citizen, was then 5 months pregnant with her fourth child. She and her children were evacuated from Lebanon by ship as part of an operation to evacuate foreign nationals.[5]  She was regarded as high-risk because she had a complicated pregnancy. She returned to Australia with her children, where she gave birth to a fourth son in November 2006.[6]

    [5] Ibid p.13.

    [6] T-documents, T13, p.62 (He was two on 02/11/2008).

11. In May 2007, she informed Centrelink of her intention to go back to Lebanon for a short visit. She planned to leave, with her four children, on 15 May 2007, and to return on 14 August 2007.[7] She asked for information about the portability of her social security payments. She was given information about the portability of various benefits, including Family Tax Benefit (FTB), the subject of these proceedings. She was told that FTB had a portability limit of three years.

    [7] Ibid T13, p.56.

12. At the hearing, she tendered a letter from Centrelink dated 11 May 2007, which read in part as follows: 

    Thank you for telling us about your plans to travel outside Australia from 15 May 2007.

    The information you provided shows that you can receive FTB until 15 May 2010.

    If you are outside Australia on 15 May 2010, your Family tax benefit will stop.

    Your payment will continue to be affected by any changes that would normally impact on it. For example, if your income or assets change, your rate of payment may be reduced…Your payments will stop if we cannot get in touch with you.

13. The applicant left with her children as planned on 15 May 2007 but did not return until 2017, some ten years later. She gave evidence that despite wanting to return to Australia as she had planned to do in 2007, she was prevented from doing so by her husband and his parents.

14. She says that her father, acting on her behalf, informed Centrelink in 2007 of her situation and change of plans.

15. She received FTB until 15 May 2010, that is, for the maximum period of portability applicable at the time.

16. When she left Australia on 15 May 2007 she says that she believed, on the basis of the letter of 11 May, that she was entitled to be paid FTB for 3 full years from the date of her departure. She says that she was aware of her reporting obligations.

17. When her mother-in-law died on 8 December 2016, her husband agreed that she could return to Australia with the children, which she did on 24 September 2017. Her husband remained in Lebanon, awaiting a visa to enable him to join her in Australia.

18. Counsel for the Respondent conceded that the letter of 11 May 2007 was misleading, insofar as it may have conveyed the impression that the applicant was entitled to FTB until August 2010, provided that she informed Centrelink about her overseas contact details. He accepted that there was evidence to support a finding that the applicant did inform Centrelink about her living arrangements in Lebanon. He also accepted that she was unable for family reasons to return on 14 August 2007, as originally planned. For these reasons, he offered to reduce the debt by 50% and to withdraw the matter from the Tribunal on that basis. The applicant, having considered the matter during a short adjournment, rejected the offer and said she did not believe she should pay anything.  She said:

    No I still believe that I shouldn’t be made to pay it because I left the country with the knowledge that I was still going to get paid until 2010.  So, I am still where I am. Nothing changes.  I told them everything, I told them where I am, and my reason for not coming back, I was not able to come back.  I don’t have the prerogative to come back, but I informed them.[8]

    [8] Transcript, 8 October 2019, p. 48.

    Portability entitlements in 2007

19. Under the legislation as it stood in May 2007, the maximum FTB portability period while an eligible recipient was overseas was three years. This was progressively shortened and presently stands at six weeks, subject to extension in certain cases. This state of affairs was not fully appreciated at the hearing, and may have contributed to the belief, apparently shared by both parties, that the letter contained incorrect information about the maximum portability period for FTB. 

20. In 2007, s 24(4) of the relevant legislation[9]  provided:

    [9] See A New Tax System (Family Assistance) Act 1999 (Cth), (as in force from 6 December 2006; superseded on 28 June 2007), s 24(4).

    Maximum period of eligibility for family tax benefit while individual overseas

    (4)  If an individual leaves Australia, the maximum period for which the individual can be eligible for family tax benefit during that absence from Australia is the period of 3 years beginning on the first day of that absence.

21. It is apparent that the letter of 11 May 2007 did not contain incorrect information about the maximum portability period for FTB.

22. Moreover, s 24(4) does not redefine the eligibility requirements. It merely specifies a maximum period of overseas absence for those otherwise eligible. In order to be eligible to receive FTB a person must be an Australian resident.[10] 

    [10] A New Tax System (Family Assistance) Act 1999 (Cth), s 21(1)(b)(i).

    Did the applicant cease to be an Australian resident after she left on 15 May 2007 and if so, when?

23. A critical question is whether, for FTB purposes, the applicant ceased to be an Australian resident prior to 15 May 2010; and if so, the date on which her residency came to an end.

24. The original decision by Centrelink was that, for FTB purposes, the applicant ceased to be an Australian resident on 30 June 2008. It is not clear why this particular date was selected by Centrelink. In any event, AAT1 amended the date to 27 November 2008, based on the applicant’s evidence to AAT1 that her intention to return to Australia changed in November 2018.[11]  The question is whether there is any reason to depart from this finding of AAT1.

    [11] AAT1 decision: T2, p.10.

25. Section 7(2) of the Social Security Act 1991 (Cth) (‘The SSA’) states that an Australian resident is a person who resides in Australia, and 7(3) provides:  

    (3)  In deciding for the purposes of this Act whether or not a person is residing in Australia, regard must be had to:

    (a)  the nature of the accommodation used by the person in Australia; and

    (b)  the nature and extent of the family relationships the person has in Australia; and

    (c)  the nature and extent of the person’s employment, business or financial ties with Australia; and

    (d)  the nature and extent of the person’s assets located in Australia; and

    (e)  the frequency and duration of the person’s travel outside Australia; and

    (f)  any other matter relevant to determining whether the person intends to remain permanently in Australia.

26. It is noticeable that each of the six factors referred to in s 7(3) above relate to the person’s relationship to Australia. The applicant acknowledged that, excluding the time since her return in September 2017, she had lived in Australia for only ten months in the previous 23 years. It is however accepted that the applicant was an Australian resident when she approached Centrelink in May 2007 to clarify her entitlements given her plans to travel to Lebanon.

27. As noted by the AAT1, a key authority in relation to the residence requirements in s 7(2)(a) is Hafza v Director-General of Social Security [1985] FCA 164 (Hafza) where Wilcox J said (emphasis added):

    [13] There is a plethora of decisions, arising in various contexts but predominantly matrimonial causes and revenue cases, relating to the legal concept of residence. As a general concept residence includes two elements: physical presence in a particular place and the intention to treat that place as home; at least for the time being, not necessarily forever. The concept was explained in a taxation case, Koitaki Para Rubber Estates Ltd v FCT (1941) 64 CLR 241 at 240, by Williams J:

    “The place of residence of an individual is determined, not by the situation of some business or property which he is carrying on or owns, but by reference to where he eats and sleeps and has his settled or usual abode. If he maintains a home or homes he resides in the locality or localities where it or they are situate, but he may also reside where he habitually lives even if this is in hotels or on a yacht or some other abode.

    [14] Physical presence and intention will coincide for most of the time. But few people are always at home. Once a person has established a home in a particular place -- even involuntarily : see Commissioners of Inland Revenue v. Lysaght (1928) AC 234 a p 248 and Keil v Keil (1947) VR 383 -- a person does not necessarily cease to be resident there because he or she is physically absent. The test is whether the person has retained a continuity of association with the place -- Levene v. Inland Revenue Commissioners [1928] UKHL 1; (1928) AC 217 at p 225 and Judd v. Judd (1957) 75 WN (N.S.W.) 147 at p 149 -- together with an intention to return to that place and an attitude that that place remains "home" -- see Norman v Norman (1969) 16 F.L.R. 231 at p.236 It is important to observe firstly, that a person may simultaneously be a resident in more than one place -- see the facts of Lysaght and the reference by Williams J. to "a home or homes" -- and, secondly, that the application of the general concept of residence to any particular case must depend upon the wording, and underlying purposes, of the particular statute in relation to which the question arises. But, where the general concept is applicable, it is obvious that, as residence of a place in which a person is not physically present depends upon an intention to return and to continue to treat that place as "home", a change of intention may be decisive of the question whether residence in a particular place has been maintained.

28. In Wybrow v Secretary, Department of Social Security [1992] AATA 315, the Tribunal relied on Hafza and commented:

    [22] It is true that s 7(3) of the Act now requires certain factors to be taken into account in deciding whether, for the purposes of the Act, a person is residing in Australia. They are, and do not detract from the general observations which His Honour made in relation to the ordinary concept of residence. The definition however, compels a decision maker to pay some regard to the enumerated factors.

29. At the hearing, the applicant gave evidence that during the ten months she lived in Australia in 2006-7 she lived with her father and her children attended the local school. Her father acted as an intermediary between the applicant and Centrelink and was very aware of the applicant’s situation in Lebanon.

30. The applicant did not provide evidence of any other family or other significant relationships in Australia, or evidence of employment, business or financial ties during the relevant period, or of financial assets in Australia.

31. The applicant stated that when she left Australia with her four children in May 2007 she intended to return to Australia and regarded it as her home.

32. The decision to take her children to Lebanon in 2007, even for a short trip, was a bold one. With hindsight, one might well question the wisdom of her decision to return to Lebanon at this time. She says she wanted to show the newborn to the family and of course, to the father. It must have been a hard decision, for Lebanon was a difficult place to live in the aftermath of the 2006 war. She had been evacuated barely ten months before. It also appears that her husband was often out of the country and she would be living with his family. The decision points to a degree of comfort in the bosom of her husband’s family, upon whom she was dependant to a considerable degree. Her decision to return to Lebanon in May 2007 is understandable, given the circumstances of her departure and the fact that she had recently given birth and no doubt wanted to be reunited with her husband. It is, however, also consistent with the view that she then regarded Lebanon, not Australia, as her home. She denies this. She says she had a continuity of association with Australia and an ongoing intention to call Sydney home.[12]  She says that the only reason she was unable to act on this intention was the opposition of her husband and his parents. There is no reason to doubt that this, if true, would have been an insurmountable obstacle. It is almost certain that she would have been unable to return without the permission of her husband. Moreover, she says that she lacked the financial means to return to Australia. At the hearing the applicant was reluctant to discuss family matters in any detail and was not pressed to do so.[13] 

    [12] See Norman v Norman (1969) 16 F.L.R. 231 at p. 236, referred to above at para [27].

    [13] Transcript, 8 October 2019, pp. 40 and 46.

33. In essence, the applicant claims that she was prevented from returning to Australia due to factors beyond her control. In relation to a person so disempowered, it might well be argued that such factors are relevant to determining whether the person intends to remain permanently in Australia. However, there is little by way of corroboration to support the claim that she was unable to return because of her stated reasons. There is nothing before the Tribunal to suggest, for example, that she asked her father for assistance to come home, or sought assistance from Australian consular officials, or did anything else about getting back to Australia. She appears resigned to her fate, or as she put it, to have lacked sovereignty over her life.

34. It is very difficult to discern whether or when she might have changed her mind about living permanently in Australia. Unfortunately, Centrelink file notes during the portability period cast little or no light on the topic. The Centrelink record does not contain any notation prior to 2011 bearing specifically upon her intentions.[14]  

    [14] See Centrelink notes 24 November 2011, T13, p.67: 6 December 2011, T13, p.70.

    ·     20 August 2007 … General enquiry for parenting Payment Single. Appears cus has been granted pps/s24. Cus is in Iraq with ptr currently as he is rebuilding their home which was damaged by the current war.[15]

    [15] T-documents, T13, p. 57.

    ·     Nominee contacted … on 20 AUG 2007 regarding update to for FTB … cust in pps/s.24.[16]

    [16] Ibid T13, p. 58.

    ·     Customer contacted … on 9 November 2007 regarding general enquiry for FTB. Cus nominee attended CSC today – requesting information on FTB pmt for grandchildren. Advd cus of FTB portability rules, on checking if all children coded as being o/s. Only one of the children coded. Have coded all children as o/2 from 15/5/07.[17]

    [17] Ibid T13, p. 59.

    ·     Customer contacted … 18 November 2008 enquiry re Maternity Immunisation Allowance … Updated portability details for … recorded as being overseas.[18]

    [18] Ibid T13, p. 61.

    ·     20 November 2008 Enquiry re FTB focusing on immunisation.[19]

    [19] Ibid T13, p. 62.

35. The documentary evidence before the Tribunal does not support any particular finding based upon her subjective intent with regard to returning to Australia.

36. The AAT1 found that by 27 November 2008 the applicant was resigned to living in Lebanon for the time being (T2, p.9) on the basis of a communication that day with Centrelink. AAT1 stated:

    The tribunal noted that Mrs Bazzi contacted Centrelink on 7, 18, 20 and 27 November 2008. Although none of the documented file notes of those contacts contain information about Ms Bazzi’s intention, the tribunal accepted that from 27 November 2008 (the latest date of her contact with Centrelink in 2008), Mrs Bazzi’s intention to return to Australia changes and she was resigned to living in Lebanon “for the time being”.

37. The fact that she was prevented from returning does not mean that her intention to remain in Australia automatically changed. Had she been kidnapped upon her return to Lebanon, or injured by an exploding bomb so as to be rendered unconscious for the rest of the portability period, there would be no reason to infer that an intention to return to Australia was no longer present. The difficulty in applying such logic to this case is that there is so little material upon which to base a decision as to her true intentions during the relevant period.

1. The AAT1 selected 27 November 2008 as the date she ceased to be an Australian resident. This was based on some communications with Centrelink. Those communications do not relate specifically to her state of mind and do not obviously suggest that at that time she no longer regarded herself as an Australian resident. Moreover, and with respect to AAT1, it is not clear that there is equivalence between (1) having an intention not to return, and (2) accepting that one is not likely to return in the foreseeable future. The former implies the latter, although the latter does not imply the former.

2. There is no obvious candidate for the date which marks a change of intention on her part. In that context, the objective fact is that she left in 2007 and did not return until 2017. Since getting married in 1994 she spent only ten months in Australia in the following 23 years. It is hard to see that under such circumstances she was an Australian resident throughout the three year portability period, especially since soon after going back to Lebanon she realised that she could not return to Australia.

3. The factors outlined in s 7(3) of the SSA must inform the Tribunal’s decision. Based on all the available material, I think that by 1 July 2009 the applicant had resolved to remain in Lebanon.  At that point just over two years had passed. There was no return in sight. By then her intention to live permanently in Australia, if still dimly lit, must have been overshadowed by the practical realities of her situation. One might safely say that she no longer intended to live permanently in Australia and could no longer, in all gravity, call it “home”.

4. The date I have selected coincides with the beginning of the second debt period. It differs slightly from that selected by AAT1, but does represent I think a reasonable and fair assessment based on the available evidence.

5. As previously noted, one of the eligibility requirements for FBT, overarching the portability rules, is that the FTB holder is an Australian resident. I accept that from 30 June 2009 her status changed and that from 1 July 2009 she ceased to be an Australian resident for FTB purposes. FTB is not payable to non-residents.  This change of status was a change that affected her eligibility for FTB.

6. The letter of 11 May 2007, upon which the applicant based her claim to full three years of portability, expressly stated:

   Your payment will continue to be affected by any changes that would normally impact on it. For example, if your income or assets change, your rate of payment may be reduced…Your payments will stop if we cannot get in touch with you.

7. Section 71(1) of the Family Assistance Act provides that if an amount has been paid to a person by way of FTB in respect of a period and the person was not entitled to the assistance in respect of that period the amount so paid is a debt to the Commonwealth by the person. Section 71(2) provides for recovery of any overpaid amount.  The adjusted debt amount is recoverable unless there are provisions of the Act under which the debt may be extinguished or varied.

   Is the debt recoverable or should it be waived in whole or part?

8. I turn to whether the debt arising from a change of residency status on 30 June 2009 should be waived.

   Write off

9. The Family Assistance Administration Act contains provisions that allow for non-recovery of debts in prescribed circumstances.

10. Section 95 of the Family Assistance Administration Act relevantly provides:

    95       Secretary may write off debt

    (1) The Secretary may, on behalf of the Commonwealth, decide to write off a debt for a stated period or otherwise, but only if subsection (2) … applies.

    Secretary may write off debt if debt irrecoverable or debt will not be repaid etc.

    (2) The Secretary may decide to write off a debt under subsection (1) if:

    (a) the debt is irrecoverable at law; or

    (b) the debtor has no capacity to repay the debt; or

    (c) the debtor's whereabouts are unknown after all reasonable efforts have been made to locate the debtor; or

    (d) it is not cost effective for the Commonwealth to take action to recover the debt.

11. If a debt is written off, the debt will not be recovered at the point in time when it is written off, but the debt still exists and may be recovered later.

12. There is no evidence before the Tribunal that the applicant’s debts are irrecoverable at law or that she has no capacity to repay the debt given that her whereabouts are known and she lives in secure rental accommodation.

    Waiver for sole administrative error

13. Section 97 of the Family Assistance Administration Act relevantly provides that an FTB debt may be waived if the debt is solely attributable to an administrative error by the Commonwealth; provided the debtor received the payments in good faith and the person would experience severe financial hardship if it were not waived.

14. The information provided in the 15 May 2007 letter was accurate, and the decision to continue paying FTB throughout the period was contingent upon there being no relevant change of circumstances. It was the duty of the applicant to inform Centrelink of any relevant changes impacting upon her eligibility.

15. According to Centrelink records, the applicant did not inform Centrelink until 24 November 2011 that she had no plans to return to Australia. This was well after the expiration of the three year portability period, for all of which she received FTB. It does not appear that there was any attempt during the relevant three year period to address her change of residential status. To say this is not to criticise the applicant, for she almost certainly did not appreciate the various factors that inform a decision regarding residential status.

16. There is no evidence before the Tribunal of any administrative error on the part of the Commonwealth.

17. Moreover, an element of s 97 is a finding that the applicant would suffer financial hardship if the debt were not waived. The applicant did not seek to persuade the Tribunal that she would suffer extreme financial hardship were she to repay the outstanding debt. Indeed, at the time of the decision, a significant portion of the debt had been repaid by debt recovery from her entitlements. She has the moral if not financial support of her father who appears to take a keen interest in her financial affairs. Her three oldest sons are either working or fully engaged in studies. The applicant lives with her four children in rental accommodation. Her older sons might reasonably be expected to insulate her from the extremes of financial deprivation. And she has a husband who is waiting for immigration clearance so that he can join her in Australia. There is insufficient material before the Tribunal to satisfy a claim of severe financial hardship.

    Special circumstances

18. Section 101 of the Family Assistance Administration Act provides a broad discretion to waive or write off the debt or part of the debt in special circumstances. Section 101(b) directs the decision-maker to consider special circumstances (other than financial hardship alone) that make it desirable to waive, and that it is more appropriate to waive than to write off the debt or part of the debt.

19. There are troubling aspects of this case: the age of the applicant when she married, the circumstances of her extraction from Lebanon, on a ship in the face of a war, and the duress she suffered upon her return to Lebanon in May 2007. There is also the salient fact that she has spent so little time in Australia as an adult. However, in my opinion these matters do not amount to special circumstances presently operating so as to justify writing off part or all of the debt.

20. The applicant has a sense of injustice that a debt has accrued under these circumstances.  She feels that she was entitled to the FTB for three years and did not appreciate the importance of continuing at all points to satisfy the eligibility requirements for FTB. It may be that her status changed by reason of circumstances that she did not fully control, the implications of which she may not have fully understood. This does not however, create a special circumstance such as to allow waiver or debt write-off.

    Conclusion

21. I find that from 15 May 2007 until 30 June 2009 the applicant was an Australian resident for FTB purposes; and that between 1 July 2009 and 15 May 2010 (the second debt period) the applicant was not an Australian resident for FTB purposes.

22. The Tribunal sets aside the decisions under review and remits the matter to the Secretary for reconciliation by reference to the aforementioned date.

I certify that the preceding 59 (fifty-nine) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of Emeritus Professor P A Fairall

................................[sgd]..............................

Associate

Dated: 10 December 2019

Date of hearing:	8 October 2019
Date final submissions received:	8 October 2019
Applicant:	In person
Solicitors for the Respondent:	Dr S Thompson, Department of Human Services

Appendix – Extracts of Relevant Centrelink File Notes

1.    20 August 2007 … general enquiry for parenting Payment Single. Appears cus has been granted pps/s24. Cus is in Iraq with ptr currently as he is rebuilding their home which was damaged by the current war (T13, p.57).

2.    Nominee contacted … on 20 AUG 2007 regarding update for FTB … cust in pps/s24 (T13, p.58).

3.    9 November 2007: general enquiry regarding FTB. Cus nominee attended CSC today – requesting information on FTB pmt for grandchildren. Advd cus of FTB portability rules, on checking if all children coded as being o/s. Only one of the children coded. Have coded all children as o/2 from 15/5/07 (T13, p.59).  

4.    18 November 2008: Enquiry re maternity Immunisation Allowance…Update portability details for … recorded as being overseas (T13, p.61).

5.    20 November 2008: Enquiry re FTB focussing on immunisation (T13, p.62).

6.    24 November 2011: Enquiry for FTB … since cus departure to Lebanon in 2007 cus has resided with her husband’s parents and she has been supported financially by them and her husband, who has been working in other countries and returning to Lebanon. Cus stated that her children have been enrolled in school since dep from Au and she has no plans to return to Australia… (T13, p.67).

7.    25 November 2011: Father attended Centrelink office (T13, p.68).

8.    25 November 2011: Payment of FTB $2,488.20 (T13, p.69).

9.    6 December 2011: Cus now states that she only lived with her husband’s parents for 1 year after leaving Australia but that she still considered herself to be single and did not receive any financial assistance from her husband for her children … Cus states that her intention is not to reside in Lebanon permanently and that she plans to return to Australia at the end of 2011 (T13, p.70).

10.  7 December 2011: Although cus has advised that she does not intend to live o/seas perm she has not returned to AUS for over 4 years and when she has prev returned was in AUS for less than 12 months (T13, p.71).